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ERRATA.

Page 378, after eighteenth line from bottom, add
and earth," as we know them are a function of our own organ-
Page 413, seventh line from bottom, for "McDonald" read "MacDonald."

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INTERNATIONAL

JOURNAL OF ETHICS.

OCTOBER, 1899.

THE RELATION OF ETHICS TO SOCIOLOGY.*

In selecting the subject of my lecture this evening I was influenced by the title of the body to whose invitation I responded,—the London School of Ethics and Social Philosophy. For I take this title to imply that the studies of the school are not concerned only with ethics in the narrow sense:—*i.e.*, with the inquiry into the principles and method of determining what is right and wrong in human action, the content of the moral law, and the proper object of rational choice and avoidance. This is, indeed, a vast, comprehensive, and difficult subject, even if we pursue it, so far as possible, as a separate and independent inquiry; still, I take it to be the aim of your school not to confine the work of your students to the theory of what ought to be, of the ideal relations of human beings living in society; but rather to combine with this the scientific study of the actual relations of men regarded as members of societies, as they have been, are, and will be. For it is only by a combination of the two studies, that we can hope to attain that wider view which belongs to philosophy as distinguished from science; from which we endeavor to contemplate the whole of human thought—whether concerned with ideals or empirical facts—as one harmonious sys-

* A paper read before the London School of Ethics and Social Philosophy.

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tem. It is as a contribution to social philosophy thus understood that I offer the observations that follow on the relation of ethics to sociology.

But at the outset I find myself in some perplexity. In order to examine closely the relation between the two studies, we ought to be able to bring the general character and outline of each in turn clearly before our minds. Now, I may assume that my audience can do this in the case of ethics;—or, at least, as the range of the subject is somewhat vaguely and variously conceived—the brief description that I just now gave will suffice to indicate to you the body of systematic thought that I have in my mind when I use the term. But it is not so clear that I can assume this with regard to sociology; since, though the educated world has heard of sociology for about three-quarters of a century, it can hardly be said, in England at least, to have yet attained the rank of an established science,—at any rate, if academic recognition can be taken as a criterion of the establishment of a science. There is, so far as I know, no chair of sociology in any English university; it is not formally included in any academic curriculum; there is no elementary manual of English manufacture by which a student may learn to pass an examination in sociology with the least possible trouble. It is otherwise in the United States, where sociology has already got both professorial chairs and hand-books. Perhaps in intellectual as well as industrial matters the Anglo-Saxons across the Atlantic are more apt than we are to seize and effectively apply new ideas. Still, the leading English philosophers of the latter half of the century, J. S. Mill and Herbert Spencer, have both devoted an important part of their energies to the exposition of the subject,—which, indeed, occupies three out of the ten volumes of Spencer's great system of synthetic philosophy. And, largely under their influence, in spite of the cold shade of official neglect in which it still lingers, the ideas of sociology have more and more tended to penetrate and pervade current ethical discussion. Take, as an instance of this, the following statement made some years ago by a writer of repute:

"A man's first and last duty is to see and do those things

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which the social organism of which he is a member calls upon him to do."

"The social organism" is essentially a sociological conception; and if we admit this statement in its full breadth, we implicitly admit the claim—which the young science has in fact been making since its birth from the brain of Auguste Comte—to dominate the older subject of ethics and even to reduce it to a department of itself.

This claim I propose to examine in the present lecture; but, for the reasons I have just indicated, it seems best that before proceeding to examine it I should briefly sketch the aims and method of sociology as presented by the leading writers whom I have named.

Sociology, as conceived by Comte and Spencer, may be briefly described as an attempt to make the study of human history scientific by applying to it conceptions derived from biology, with such modifications as their new application requires. We have, however, for this purpose to include, along with history in the ordinary sense, a large part of what is commonly known as anthropology,—that is, the comparative study of the contemporary social conditions, and recent social changes so far as ascertainable, of those parts of the human race that have not arrived at a sufficiently advanced stage of civilization to have a history in the ordinary sense.

To begin, we may definitely conceive the objects which sociology studies as a number of groups of human beings, which at the outset I shall consider to be each an independent political or governed society, though this view must be taken subject to important modifications later on. Each such society may be to a great extent properly regarded—and I shall begin by regarding it—as having an organic life of its own, distinct from the lives of the individuals composing it. It is in this view that I call it an "organism," meaning by the term first that such a group is not a mere aggregate of individuals, but an aggregate of which the members have definite relations that, though themselves subject to change, remain comparatively constant while the individuals change; and that these relations bind the individuals together into mutually

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dependent parts of a larger whole, performing mutually dependent functions. The society has thus a structure which so far resembles the structure of a living animal that its existence depends on its structure; it cannot cease to function and retain its structure, as a machine can. I further mean to imply that such a society goes through processes of growth and change which are at any rate largely caused—as the changes of a plant or animal—by interaction with its environment, physical and social; and especially changes by which it adapts or adjusts itself to its environment,—*i.e.*, tends to preserve itself amid changes in environing conditions even, if need be, by the occasional sacrifice of the lives of individual members. With this definite meaning, finding in such societies these characteristics, we may agree to call them organisms in spite of their unlikeness in other important respects to the organisms which biology studies.

Then, following Spencer and combining the results of history and archæology with the study of less advanced societies now existing, somewhat as the biologist combines the results of geology with those of zoölogy and botany, we may note how the prevalent type of social organism, like the prevalent types of animals or plants, tends, as evolution goes on, to grow in mass both by multiplication of units within each group and by union of groups. We may note further how along with increase of mass goes development of social structure, by which the differentiation of its mutually dependent parts becomes continually more complex; until from the simplicity of a little tribe of hunters, with hardly any division of functions except what is connected with sex, we arrive ultimately at the complexity of a modern industrial society, with its vast diversity of occupations.

Spencer proceeds to draw an instructive parallel between the sociological and the biological differentiation of organs. He bids us observe in each case

(1) A "sustaining system," alimentary in the animal and industrial in the society,

(2) A "distributing system," carrying about nutriment in the animal and commodities in the society, and

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(3) A "regulating and expending system." By this last notion he represents analogy between the apparatus of nerves and muscles in an animal which carries on conflict with other animals and the governments and armies of political society; taking the governmental system as ultimately developed to correspond to the brain and nervous centres, the supreme deliberative assembly being analogous to the cerebrum.

So much for the resemblances between the social organism and the animal or plant. As we should expect, they belong primarily to the physical life of human societies; but when we turn to note the differences, we shall be led gradually to contemplate their intellectual life.

We may begin by observing that a political society has not, like an animal, a normal period of life and a normal series of vital changes from infancy to senility and death. Indeed, the political societies historically known to us do not ordinarily die unless they are assailed and structurally destroyed by other societies; and when death, in a certain sense, thus befalls any such society, it does not entail the death of the human beings composing it. Some of them, no doubt, perish in the collision, but the bulk of them are absorbed alive by the conquering society. Even in peace an important mingling of units from different societies goes on, as is most conspicuously illustrated at the present time by the comparatively new societies formed in America. They are largely made neither by "multiplication of units" nor by "union of groups," but by composition of units from a number of groups.

But it is still more important to observe that the social organism to which an individual is found to belong, through the social relations binding him to other men, becomes very different in its range as we pass from one set of relations to another. There is nothing corresponding to this in the case of an animal. Each animal has its own sustaining system, its own distributing system, and its own regulating and expending system, quite unconnected with the corresponding systems of other animals. The alimentary organs of one animal do not provide, nor its blood-vessels convey, nutriment to the

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organs of other societies, nor does its brain co-operate in directing their movements, except indirectly by producing external movements of its own organs. The case is quite otherwise with the organic life of societies. The channels of communication by which commodities are carried run, as we know, not only within states, but across states, almost ignoring their boundaries; and the same is true of the process of differentiation which localizes particular branches of industry in situations specially favorable to it, and thus tends to bind the inhabitants of the districts in question into one economic whole. We all know that England forms part of an economic system extending far beyond the limits of the British empire.

But again a very similar set of cross-divisions, lines of separations that cut across the boundaries of states, is found in what we cannot but regard as an important part of the regulative apparatus of social organisms: I mean the ecclesiastical systems. We all know how throughout the civilized world members from the same states are divided from another, and members of different states are united by communities formed for the purpose of religious instruction and worship. No fact is more striking in the history of regulating social agencies than the manner in which religions claiming to be world religions—Buddhism, Christianity, Mohammedanism—have arisen and spread and overleaped all the lines of separation of political societies; binding their converts through the most powerful ties of common beliefs and common worship into organisms quite different from states, though they come to have an elaborately differentiated quasi-political organization. Now, in studying these ecclesiastical organisms from the outside, we might of course dwell on the social differences and relations between priests or monks and laymen, and the organization of ecclesiastical government. But it would be a very shallow insight that did not penetrate further and recognize as the most essential social relation which binds human beings together on this side of their life community of thought and sentiment; a common stock of ideas and convictions about the universe, its ground and end, and human destiny. Hence, when the sociologist studies these ecclesias-

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tical bodies, it is to the laws of change and growth of this intellectual and emotional context, this common body of ideas and sentiments, that his deepest attention should be directed.

And this is true also of the political regulation of social man. Mr. Spencer, as we saw, compares the brain of an animal with the supreme deliberative assembly of a nation. But surely the political brain of England is not limited to the six hundred and seventy respectable gentlemen who chiefly make our laws: it is to be found wherever political thought is going on which will take effect in determining the action of the English government. And if so, the history of political ideas shows that no modern nation has a brain strictly and entirely its own. If we insist on keeping the analogy, we have for the main movements of political thought to trace the operation and development of at least a West-European brain; whose range of influence in modern times has not only extended to European colonies in other parts of the globe, but has even included a people so alien in its origin and previous history as the Japanese.

And, finally, what I have said of religious and political ideas is equally true of moral ideas and sentiments. Indeed, throughout the history of European civilization morality has had an intimate connection both with religion and with polity. Still, the study of the development of morality and its conditions and laws of growth and change may be pursued, no less than the study of religious or political thought, as a partially independent branch of sociological inquiry; and when we so pursue it we soon find that the aggregate of human beings bound together spiritually by sharing a common moral life is not to be identified with any one of the political societies which we began by regarding as social organisms. And the same may be said in modern times of the possession of a common body of scientific knowledge; indeed, science is less modified by national differences than morality; and European science has united the educated portion of the Japanese people more completely with our educated world than European political ideas. Thus, in contemplating the

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continual enlargement of these spiritual bonds of social union we are irresistibly led—as the founder of sociology, Comte, was led—to an ideal future when the whole population of the globe will form, from an intellectual point of view, a single social organism. There is a striking passage, remarkable in a writer who claims to expound a purely positive method, in which Comte tells us that Sociology, reading the future into the past, "represents the whole human race, past, present, and future, as constituting a vast and eternal social unit, where different organs, individual and national, concur in their various modes and degrees in the evolution of humanity."

To sum up, as we pass from one aspect to another of the many-sided social life of man, we are led gradually from the conception of an indefinite number of social organisms, subject, like plants or animals, to the struggle for existence as a main factor in their development,—a conception which physical analogies and the contemplation of the earlier stages of human history combine to press on us,—to the idea of a single social organism, which a study of later civilized history, especially in its spiritual aspect, renders no less inevitable.

I turn now to examine the relation of sociology to ethics, and especially the claim of the latter study to absorb the former and reduce it to a subordinate department of itself. I may perhaps say that I come to the examination of this claim in an impartial spirit. Speaking as a professor of ethics, I do not consider myself as holding a brief for the independence of my subject. It is for the true good of any department of knowledge or inquiry to understand as thoroughly as may be its relation to other sciences and studies, to see clearly what elements of its reasonings it has to take from them, and what in its turn it may claim to give to them; and the value of this insight becomes greater in proportion as the steady growth of human knowledge, the steady extension of the range of human inquiry, brings with it a continually more urgent need for a clear and rational division of intellectual labor. If, therefore, the relation of ethics to sociology is truly one of subordination, it is important that students of ethics should fully recognize this truth and render due obedience to the superior authority.

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Of course, in order that this authority, however ideally unquestionable, should be actually unquestioned, sociology must have become an established science, and be not merely struggling towards this position. And if I were speaking as an advocate of the claims of ethics to actual independence, I should have much to say on this topic. I should take the simple criteria of the real establishment of a science laid down by Auguste Comte, which we may briefly characterize as a Consensus of experts, Continuity and Prevision, and try the claims of sociology by the standards of its own founder. I should give you in Comte's own words his negative application of the test of continuity: "When we find that recent works, instead of being the result and development of what has gone before, have a character as personal as that of their authors and bring the most fundamental ideas into question," —then, says Comte, we may be sure we are not dealing with any doctrine deserving the name of positive science. And my brief would be stuffed with quotations from very recent treatises on sociology, whose authors—to quote a well-known epigram,—show themselves most emphatically "conscious of one another's shortcomings."

But this advocate's work is not now my affair. I wish to assume for the purposes of my present discussion that the struggle of sociology to become an established science, a struggle carried on now for three-quarters of a century, has been crowned with the success which I hope will ultimately crown it. I will assume that it has attained as much consensus as to principles, method, and conclusions, and as much continuity of development as the physical sciences dealing with organic life, and as much power of prevision as Comte hoped for it;—for he was not sanguine enough to suppose that sociology could ever predict with the exactness and minuteness of astronomy, and foretell the stages of a political revolution as astronomy foretells the stages of a solar eclipse.

Let us suppose this consummation attained and consider how far this scientific prevision of social effects will so far determine ethical reasonings as to reduce ethics to a subordinate department of sociology.

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I think it must be admitted that this effect will be produced to a considerable extent, upon any view of ethics except the ultra-intuitional, in respect of the deduction of particular rules of morality from fundamental principles. For all schools, except that which takes the immediate judgments of conscience as infallible guides in all questions of conduct, admit that the application of moral principles to practice must be largely governed by foresight of consequences, and must therefore admit that rules of social behavior will properly be determined in detail by the scientific prevision of social consequences so far as such prevision is available. We may compare, as a parallel case, the relation of the moral duty or virtue of temperance to human physiology, including pathology; the ethical maxim that the bodily appetites ought to be strictly obedient to the regulation of reason must receive its practical application from a forecast of consequences; and this, with the development of physiological knowledge, must change from a merely empirical to a more or less scientific forecast. We commonly recognize that the diet scientifically known to be promotive of health and efficiency is the truly temperate diet; and the most ascetic moralist has to admit that self-denial, no less than self-indulgence, must be limited and guided by medical prevision. Similarly we must admit that our social affections and sentiments will have to yield to the control and obey the guidance of sociological prevision when sociology has become a really established science.

Indeed, some effect of this kind has already been produced on current ethical notions and habits by the branch of sociology which has been separated from the general science of society, and received a development in advance of the rest under the name of political economy. For instance, under the influence of the economic forecast—deductively and inductively established—of the bad consequences of indiscriminate almsgiving, the old and eminent virtue of charity, in its narrower signification, has materially changed its practical content for the modern educated man, while retaining its principle and motive unchanged. Its application to conduct has become more complex and exacting; it is recognized as demanding thought

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and care, besides the mere altruistic preference of the satisfaction of others' desires to the satisfaction of our own, and as imposing restraints on sympathetic impulses as well as on self-regarding ones.

A similar effect of economic forecast on ethical conceptions and accompanying sentiments is traceable in the case of justice; but with the difference that in this case we have marked ethical divergences resulting from divergences in the economic or sociological prevision of consequences. Suppose we take the principle that desert ought to be requited as expressing the abstract essence of distributive justice. Its practical application cannot but be different, on the one hand, for the individualist who holds that any important relaxation in the competitive struggle for existence must result in the arrest and decline of human improvement, through the equalizing of the prospects of survival of the unfit along with the fit; and, on the other hand, for the socialist who forecasts a more rapid and effective improvement under the stimulus of altruistic affection, sympathy, and public spirit, when these nobler impulses are no longer starved and depressed by the egoistic habits and sentiments that necessarily result from the present competitive struggle. The former will tend to interpret the requital of desert to mean securing to each man the precise social value of his services; the latter will tend to interpret it to mean securing him what he requires for the most efficient performance of his social function.

Of course, as sociological prevision extends in range and increases in exactness, we must suppose fundamental divergences of this kind to diminish and a more decisive effect to be produced.

I have said enough to show the import of my admission as a representative of ethics that if we suppose sociology as an established science, we must suppose its forecast of social consequences to exercise a fundamentally important effect on the practical application of general ethical principles or maxims, and the deduction of subordinate rules of conduct from these.

I now turn to the more important and more disputable ele-

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ment of the claim of sociology to absorb and subordinate ethics,—*i.e.*, the claim not merely to modify the practical application of ethical principles, but to determine these very principles themselves.

Here, first, I quite admit that the connection of sociology, supposing it an established science, with the subject-matter of ethics must necessarily be so intimate and so comprehensive, that its claim to dominate and subordinate ethics is natural and almost inevitable; and we cannot be surprised that it should appear irresistible to students of sociology who have never made a systematic attempt to purge their moral notions of the confusions of popular thought. For, as we have seen, sociology undoubtedly comprehends in its subject-matter the study of morality as a social fact, and this study must include morality as a whole, the principles accepted in any age and country, no less than the accepted and current application of the principles to particular concrete problems of conduct. It is a part of the business of sociology—at least as important, from a purely sociological point of view, as any other part—to ascertain first the facts, and then, as far as possible, the laws of the development of moral opinions and sentiments, as one element in the development of human society as a whole; to show how it has influenced and been influenced by other elements in the whole social evolution; to trace it back, if possible, to its origin; and—always supposing sociology to have arrived at the stage of scientific prediction—to foretell its future conditions.

It is natural to infer that a sociology supposed able to accomplish all this—and I am willing, for the sake of argument, to make the supposition—would reduce ethics to a subordinate department of itself. I do not, however, think that this inference is logically sound. Indeed, I think that in most cases it arises from a confusion of thought that a little reflection ought to dispel.

To show this, let us suppose ethics and sociology as independent and established systems of thought, and then try to imagine a conflict between them, a conflict such as sometimes takes place between established sciences,—*e.g.*, there was one

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some time ago between physicists and geologists as to the time of duration of the earth.

We shall find that we cannot really suppose such a conflict possible. No ethical proposition can possibly contradict a sociological proposition, since they cannot relate to the same subject-matter,—that is, so long as ethics is understood in the limited sense that I have defined and so long as sociology keeps strictly within the bounds of its domain as a positive science. Sociology thus conceived is strictly incapable of answering any ethical question, and ethics thus understood is strictly incapable of answering any sociological question,—for ethics is only concerned with what ought to be, and sociology, even when it deals with ethical judgments, is only concerned with what is, has been, and will be judged, and not at all with the question whether it is, has been, or will be truly judged. So far as any sociologist expresses any opinion on the latter point, he assumes a knowledge which the method of his science, regarded as a study of empirical fact, is quite incompetent to supply.

I do not think that this is likely to be disputed, so far as sociology is concerned with the mere ascertainment of particular facts, past and present; but it may be disputed in respect of the general truths which sociology as a science must be supposed to have established. And I admit that if we examine this dispute with care we shall find, not indeed a possible conflict between ethics and sociology, but a possible coincidence so close as, if actually accepted, to justify the view that sociology is destined to absorb ethics.

But here again I must point out that the dispute sometimes arises from mere confusion of thought. It is rightly seen that the aim of sociology is not merely to ascertain, but to explain, the variations and changes in social morality, and that this explanation must lie in reducing to general laws the diversity of moral opinions prevalent in different ages and countries; and it is vaguely thought that these general laws, at any rate when brought to a sufficiently high degree of generality, must coincide—if they do not clash—with ethical principles. But not only is there no *primâ facie* reason

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why they should coincide, but *primâ facie* every reason why they should not. For the sociological laws must explain and be manifested in the erroneous moral judgments that have been prevalent in human society no less than in true moral judgments; they must explain the prevalent opinion of certain groups of primitive men that successful thieving is honorable and virtuous, or that the revenge of a blood-relation is the holiest duty that man can perform, no less than in the opposite moral opinions now prevalent in Europe.

There is, however, a subtler form of the same view which cannot be so decisively put on one side. It may be urged that the subject-matter of sociology, no less than the subject-matter of animal or vegetable biology, is a kind of organic life; and that as the varied structures and functions of animal or vegetable organisms can only be understood if we regard them as adapted or adjusted to the preservation either of the individual organism or its type, so sociology requires the same conception of adaptation to the end of social preservation in its explanation of social facts. Accordingly, morality, prevalent moral opinions and sentiments, being an important complex of relations among the members of a society, must be brought under the same general conception; so that the most comprehensive and fundamental sociological law, explaining the development of morality, will consist in just this statement of Preservation of the Social Organism as the end to which morality is normally and broadly a means,—though in any particular society at any particular time details of positive morality may not be perfectly adapted to this end. If this is so, it may be said the moralist must adopt this sociological end as his ultimate ethical end, since otherwise he would be setting up an ideal opposed to the irresistible drift of the whole process of life in the world, which would be obviously futile.*

* Some writers would substitute "welfare" or "health" for "preservation" in this reasoning. But unless "welfare" or "health" is interpreted to mean merely preservation in a condition favorable to future preservation, in which case simple preservation is still the ultimate end, the terms seem to me to introduce an ethical conception which cannot be arrived at by any strictly sociological method.

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Now, supposing a *consensus* of sociologists to declare that the preservation of the social organism is the one all-comprehensive end, by continual adjustment to which the actual evolution of morality may be simply and completely explained; and supposing a *consensus* of moralists to accept this sociological end as the ultimate good to the attainment of which all human action should be directed, then, I admit, it would be broadly true to say that ethics was absorbed by sociology. For on these hypotheses there would, firstly, be a complete coincidence between the sociological and the ethical end; and, secondly, as I have already explained, the working out of the rules conducive to the end must, so far as social morality is concerned, consist in an application of sociological knowledge. Ethics would not, indeed, even so, be exactly a branch of the science, but it would be an art based on the science and having as its fundamental principle the highest generalization of the science, modified so as to take on an ethical import.

It would still, I think, be *formally* important to insist that this fusion of studies can only be rationally effected by the judgment that identifies the sociological and the ethical ends; and that is not one to which the moralist can be cogently driven by any sociological arguments. For the argument that if he declines to accept it he places himself in opposition to the process of nature is only forcible if we introduce a theological significance into our notion of nature, attributing to it design and authority; and this introduction of theology carries the sociologist beyond the limits of his special science. But, though it would be formally important to insist on this, the fusion would still be complete on the two hypotheses, sociological and ethical, above stated.

But neither of these hypotheses can be accepted as more than partially true.

Take the ethical question first,—can we regard the *mere preservation* of the life of a human being, or of any number of human beings combined in a society, as an ultimate and paramount end and standard of right action, apart from any consideration of the quality of the life preserved? I appeal confidently on this point—it is the only appeal possible—to the

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deliberate judgment of thoughtful persons, when the question is clearly set before it. Doubtless a fundamentally important part of the function of morality consists in maintaining habits and sentiments preservative of individual and social life; but this is because, as Aristotle said, in order to live well we must live. It does not follow that life is simply the ultimate end; since if all life were as little desirable as some portions of it have been in the experience of most of us we should judge anything tending to its preservation as unmitigatedly bad. It is not life simply, but good or desirable life, that is the ethical end; and though—as all students of your school will know—there is still much controversy as to the precise content of the notion "good" in this application, it is a controversy which ethics has got to work through, and in settling which it cannot derive any material aid from sociology.

But, again, the sociological hypothesis seems to me equally unacceptable when put forward as a complete explanation of the facts to which it relates.

The view that morality has been developed under the influence of the struggle for existence among social organisms as a part of the complex adaptation of such organisms to the conditions of their struggling existence is, I think, a probable conjecture as regards the earlier stages of its development in prehistoric times. It is reasonable to suppose that the observance of duties to fellow-tribesmen within a primitive tribe tended to the survival of the tribe in the struggle for tribal existence, by increasing the internal coherence of the tribe and the effective co-operation of its members. But it is not reasonable to accept this as the main explanation of the evolution of morality even in primitive ages, because it is certainly not a cause that has had any great effect on the important changes in moral beliefs that have taken place in historic times. Take one of the greatest of such changes, that resulting in the conversion of the Greco-Roman civilized world to Christianity. Not only would it be obviously absurd to attribute this change to the struggle for existence among civilized societies; there is not even any adequate evidence that it had a preservative effect on the

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political society in which the conversion took place. I should conjecture that before Constantine its operation was the other way, considering the passive alienation of primitive Christians from the secular society in which they lived, over which they believed a swift and sudden destruction to be impending. And, though this split between religion and the state was healed by Constantine, it is difficult, even after this, to see any tendency in Christianity to preserve the Roman empire, or even arrest its decline and fall. The Christian empire seems simply to continue the process tending towards surrender to the barbarians outside.

In short, the sociological hypothesis that I am now considering—so far as it is offered as a complete explanation of moral evolution—seems to me due to the one-sidedness of view which I before noted as a source of sociological error: the concentration of attention on the physical side of social life and its primitive conditions, unduly ignoring its spiritual side and the later stages of its development. And this is true, not of morality only, but of the development of knowledge, of art,—indeed of all the chief elements of that ideal good which we most deeply value in what we call the progress of civilization. We cannot say of the most signal contributions to this progress that they are always decisively preservative of the particular nation of which they are made; if we are to view them as adjustments of means to a social end, it can be no lesser or more limited end than the welfare of humanity at large.

I now turn to consider an objection that may be taken against the whole line of thought that I have adopted. I may be asked, "Why insist on this artificial separation between the subjects of ethics and sociology? Why not allow the development of both to be influenced by the natural play of thought between the two? Why attempt the impossible task of keeping different portions of our thought on human relations in separate water-tight compartments?"

To objections of this kind my answer is,—First, that I fully recognize the propriety of the demand that our ethical and our sociological thought should be brought into clear and

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consistent relations: indeed, I regard the harmonizing of different sciences and studies as the special task of philosophy. I think, however, that the impulse to put together different lines of thought requires methodical restraint, because one of the most fruitful sources of error in philosophy has been overhasty synthesis and combination without sufficient previous analysis of the elements combined. But, secondly, in order to avoid this error, I by no means wish to prevent altogether mutual influence, interpenetration of ideas, between the two studies I am now considering. I only urge that it should be carefully watched and criticised, in order that it may not be the source of confusion, which is especially dangerous in the condition of controversy and conflict of opinion on fundamental points from which neither sociology nor ethics has as yet successfully emerged. To illustrate this, let me consider first the current influence on ethics of sociological conceptions. I will take the fundamental conception of the social organism.

Although as a utilitarian I cannot regard mere preservation of the social organism as the ultimate end and supreme standard of right action, I recognize the value of the conception in making our general view of duty, whether framed on utilitarian or any other principles, fuller and truer. In any case it is important for an individual that he should not conceive himself merely as a member of an aggregate, capable of benefiting or injuring by his actions other individuals as such, but also as a member of a body formed of individual human beings bound into a whole by complex mutual relations; a whole of which the parts, whether individuals or groups, have functions diverse and mutually dependent. Adopting this conception, he will, whatever view he takes of the ultimate ethical end, judge actions largely by their effect in promoting or impeding the coherent and harmonious co-operation of different organs of society, and in strengthening or weakening habits and sentiments that tend to the efficient performance of social functions.

All this is highly important. But some writers seem drawn by the interest of the novel conception to regard it as supply-

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ing a complete determinant of duty. That is, it seems to be supposed that adequate guidance to particular duties is given in all cases by the facts of social relations. "A man," it is said, "finds himself as a member of a society in certain relations to other human beings. He is son, brother, husband and father, neighbor, citizen. These relations are all facts, and his duties lie in fulfilling the claims that are essential parts of these relations." Now, no doubt the claims or conscious expectations connected with these relations, and the common recognition of these claims by other members of the society than those primarily concerned are important social facts. But it can hardly be maintained that it is an absolute duty to fulfil all such expectations, as they are to a certain extent vague, varying, liable to conflict with each other, sometimes unreasonable, sometimes sanctioned by custom but by custom "more honored in the breach than in the observance." In short, so far as these claims are actual facts they are not indisputably valid and do not form a harmonious system, and the study of them as facts does not give a criterion of their validity and a means of eliminating conflict. In considering which of the demands made on us by our fellow-men have to be satisfied and which repudiated, and, when two conflicts, which is to be postponed, we require a system of principles of right conduct which the study of social facts as such cannot alone give, but which it is the business of ethics to give.

On the other hand, just as this wide and quasi-architectonic use of sociological conception in ethics leads to a mistaken attempt to get the ideal out of the actual, so the converse influence of ethics on sociology leads to equally mistaken attempts to get the ideal into the actual,—*i.e.*, to predict a future state of society in harmony with ethical ideas without any adequate support in scientific induction from the known facts of past social evolution.

In criticising this "evolutionary optimism," as we may call it, I ought to explain that I am not opposing optimism as a philosophical doctrine. I am not myself an optimist; but I have a great respect for the belief that, in spite of appearances to the contrary, the world now in process of evolution, is ulti-

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mately destined to reveal itself as perfectly free from evil and the best possible world. What I would urge is that, in the present state of our knowledge, this belief should be kept as a theological doctrine, or, if you like, a philosophical postulate, and that it should not be allowed to mix itself with the process of scientific inference to the future from the past.

The sociologist who brings his optimism into his sociological reasonings must, I think, find the tendency almost irresistible to give a one-sided prominence to those facts in the past history of society which make for a favorable view of its future progress and to ignore those facts which make for the opposite conclusion. It is only in this way that I can account for Mr. Spencer's belief, regarded by him as a strictly scientific inference from a survey of historical facts, that the evolution of human society will ultimately bring about a condition of social relations in which the voluntary actions of normal human beings will produce "pleasure unalloyed by pain anywhere." And, similarly, I think that his hypothetical conclusion that "there needs but a continuance of absolute peace externally and a vigorous insistance on non-aggression internally to insure the moulding of men into a form naturally characterized by all the virtues" has not really been reached by a strictly sociological method; but that the sociological reasoning which has led him to it has been influenced and modified throughout by an individualistic ideal formed prior to systematic sociological study.

I seem to find this confusing effect of "evolutionary optimism" in an even more extreme though vaguer form in a good deal of popular discourse about progress. The believer in a good time coming often seems inclined to believe that what is coming is good because it is coming, no less than that what is good is coming because it is good. Now, granting the latter proposition to be well founded, it does not in any way imply the former; granting that man is destined to unalloyed bliss, still his road to this bright goal may be in parts very devious and distressful; and some of the most distressful turns that would otherwise be found in it may be avoidable evils, but only avoidable by vigorous resistance to present

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tendencies of change. This seems obvious enough: but it is an obvious truth which is liable to be missed because the opposite error is not explicitly propounded, but lurks in a vague acquiescence in the drift of events.

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AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AS A RELIGION.

THE nations of the ancient world—Egyptians, Babylonians, Greeks, Romans—drew no line of demarcation between religious and political life, between Church and State. In all of them, the gods were members of the State, and the service due to them was a State function. They could form no conception of a State without gods and worship; and no one could be a member of the State without worshipping its gods. A man going beyond the limits of a god's territory could not worship him. David could not worship Yahweh, when driven out from his "inheritance" (1 Sam. xxvi. 19). Individuals who sought to disown the gods of their nation were often punished with death. This was the case with Socrates in Athens, and with many Jews and Christians under the Roman empire.

Two things resulted from this, one good and one evil: (1) there was in the lives of the ancient peoples a unity, a wholeness, to which modern life is a stranger; (2) there was absent from their lives the universalism, the cosmopolitanism, with which ours are familiar. The exclusiveness of nationalism forbade universality of religion. It was only through the separation of the two that religion could become universal. As far as the Western world is concerned, this separation first took place among the Jews, and through the agency of their prophets. It is in Amos, the earliest of the writing prophets, that we first find the conception of a universal god, not exclusively bound up with a single people, but extending his care to all peoples and to all the earth. However much Israel might claim to be, in a special sense, the chosen son of

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that god, this conception necessarily broke the bond between nationalism and religion. While the former remained partial, the latter became universal. In the struggle between the universal religion of the prophets and the partial nationalism of the Hebrew people, the latter succumbed, and the former rose on its ruins. The Jews, after the captivity, formed a Church, whose very nature it is to be universal, and not a nation. For long ages, indeed, they failed to realize this, and did their best to be an exclusive nation, and it was only in Christianity, with its epochal "Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and unto God the things that are God's," that religion at last became universal, separating itself from the State, and standing, as something higher and more commanding, over against it. It then connected itself with certain universal tendencies that had been growing up among the Greeks and Romans, and, in great measure, disowned the State altogether. The State, at best, was allowed the control of things temporal, while the Church claimed for herself all authority in things eternal. This arrangement might have been almost unobjectionable, if the temporal had been regarded as an essential and legitimate phase of the eternal; but, for reasons of an historic, we might almost say, accidental, sort, the eternal was set over against the temporal, as something alien to it, and the latter regarded as a fallen and evil condition. The life of the world was a life of sin, and the function of the Church, of religion, was to redeem man from that world. In the fourth century of our era, a bold attempt was made to combine the universal Roman State with the universal or catholic Christian religion, and, at the first glance, we might imagine this eminently feasible. Why should not Christianity bear the same relation to the Roman State that the religion of Zeus and Athena had borne to the Athenian republic? That was what the men of the time asked themselves; and they answered, There is no reason. But there was the very best of reasons. The attempt had come too late. The Christianity of the fourth century was utterly unfitted to enter into any such relation, and just for the reason already mentioned. As a supernatural system, aiming to train men for a super-

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natural life, and despising the natural life of States, it harbored in its bosom a secret hostility to all that these represented. If it combined with the empire, it was with the hope of ultimately mastering and suppressing it, and advancing its own claim to govern the world by denying it. While in the eastern half of the Roman empire it failed in this, and became mainly a corroding and demoralizing influence, in the western half it virtually succeeded, and turned the pagan naturalism of old Rome into a mystic supernaturalism. The city that had tried to conquer the world for an orderly earthly life now tried to conquer it for a superhuman life in the heavens. The natural, indeed, could not be suppressed; but it was discredited and neglected in favor of the supernatural. Religion, instead of being that side of human life which connected it with higher powers, and so completed it, became a means for rising above human life altogether.

This is the view of religion that pervaded the entire Middle Age, and that is most generally accepted even in our own time. According to it, this life is a mere probation, in which we bear a cross, in order that we may wear a crown in a world to come. Here the toil, yonder the reward. Here virtue, yonder bliss. Virtue, goodness, are not their own reward, but merely a means to something more desirable. And the virtues that contribute most to the desired end are not the civic and social ones, temperance, fortitude, wisdom, and justice, but faith, hope, love, and the performance of ritual observances. Indeed, and especially under Protestantism, faith came to be regarded as the one redeeming virtue. "By faith ye shall be saved." Civic life is common and profane; only churchly life is elevated and sacred.

Obviously enough, this is a very unhappy outcome, dividing human life against itself, and discrediting the more immediate portion of it. And yet it was perhaps necessary. If human life, as a civic and religious whole, could not be elevated into universality, it was surely well that, at least, one side of it, the religious, should be so elevated, with the possibility of drawing the other after it. Catholic Christianity had, and has, this great merit: it aims at universality, and opens up universal

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vistas. Its great demerit was, and is, its failure to rehabilitate civic life. It either drew a sharp distinction between Church and State, or else strove to overbear the latter altogether. It utterly failed to restore in universal form that complete and harmonious unity of civic and religious life which had existed, in partial form, in the ancient States. And the reason of this was that it drew a sharp and harsh line of distinction between human or temporal life, on the one hand, and divine or eternal life, on the other, bringing them together only through a miracle. God, uncreated and eternal, is altogether different from man, created and temporal, and the two are united only by the miracle of the Incarnation. Man is not essentially divine. He has none of the divine attributes,—self-existence, eternity, freedom. Human life, with its social relations, is not divine life, but rather something that has to disappear before divine life. In a word, social life, with its domestic, social, economic, political, scientific, and philosophical interests, is not religious, and the man who perfectly performs his part in that life may be an altogether irreligious man, unless he holds certain supernatural beliefs, and takes part in church services.

So long as the Church was stronger than the State, she was able, in large measure, to subordinate, or even to suppress, all that the latter stood for; but, in these later centuries, the condition of things has been reversed, and now the State is asserting herself against the Church, saying to her, You wished to stand apart from me, and apart you shall stand. Especially is this true of our nation, which, as a nation, ignores the Church, and even goes so far as to forbid her to teach her doctrines in the public schools. The public schools of the United States are, on the whole, civic, not religious, institutions. We are very apt to rejoice at this condition of things, and to regard ourselves as superior to other nations, in having completely separated Church and State; but, though this may be admitted, it is surely not the highest condition of things. Anything that divides up human life, and bases one part of it upon one set of principles and another upon another, cannot but be hurtful. Indeed, the result is that our

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civic life has ceased to be religious, and our religious life lacks content. There is not much human life in our pulpits, and not much religion in our legislatures. Our religion is not patriotic, our patriotism not religious.

The simple fact is: there is an utter incompatibility between the principles of our religion and those of our State, and it is this, and this alone, that justifies us in separating Church and State, and extruding religion from our public schools. There could be no reason for dealing so unhandsomely with a religion based upon the same principles as the State, and reinforcing them. In a word, while religion derives all authority from God, our State derives all authority from man. The one is based upon supernatural revelation, the other upon natural reason. Between these two things there is no compromise possible. We are vainly trying to serve two masters, and failing in the attempt. This becomes most painfully manifest when we try to find a rational basis for ethics to teach in our schools. We cannot have recourse to supernaturalism, and we can find nothing available in a reason which relegates all questions regarding man's spiritual nature and his destiny to supernaturalism for solution. Thus we are forced into a position of being compelled to teach children to be good, without being able to tell them what good is, and why they should be good. We can, at best, show them why they should be prudent.

In this condition of things there arises a very grave question, Can this division between the two sides of our life continue indefinitely, or must we try, in some way, to reconcile them? That the division cannot continue is, I think, obvious; it is leaving us without a rational ground for ethics, a rational hope for the highest aspirations of humanity. We must, therefore, try to bring the two sides of our life into harmony.

Now this can be done in either of two ways. We may either seek to adapt our State and social life to supernatural religion, as the New England Puritans did, and as the Roman Catholics and all persons who desire to see God acknowledged in our Constitution, would wish to do; and then we should have to abandon our present position, and look to God as the

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source of all authority, as the Middle Age did; or we may abandon the supernatural altogether, and discover a religion in the principles upon which our civic life rests; and then our nation will itself become a religious institution, and our civic life a religious life. I think there is no possibility of our ever adopting the former alternative. There remains, therefore, only the latter. We must find a religion in our civic principles and aims. The only question that remains is, whether it is possible to do so. Do these principles lend themselves to a religious interpretation? I think they do; but, before this can be made clear, we must fully understand what is meant by "religion." This we must now attempt.

How many definitions of religion have been given, and how hard it is to find one that covers all the facts, is well known. Those who insist upon considering a god necessary to religion are forced to deny that name to Buddhism, Jainism, and to all the many forms of fetichism and animism. The only definition that seems to me to cover the whole ground is this: Religion is a belief or theory of man's relation to his environment or to the universe, with action based on that belief or theory. Of course, if the universe is regarded as a mere phenomenon or creation of God, or an instrument in the hands of gods, then, of course, but only then, religion will include God or gods. If this definition be accepted, we have now to ask: Do the fundamental principles of our nation imply a theory of the universe and man's relation to it, a theory fitted to furnish sanctions for a course of moral action?

In order the better to bring out these principles, it will be useful to contrast them with the principles of the old religion with which they are incompatible. According to that religion there is an omnipotent God, who created all things and all spirits, and of whom, therefore, they are mere phenomena, dependent entirely upon his good pleasure. Under such circumstances, man can have no independence, no existence of his own. He cannot be the ultimate source of anything, good or evil. He has no moral life, for that is possible only for a being who is the primal cause of his own actions. His existence, of whatever sort it may be, is a mere act of

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divine favor, we might even say, of divine caprice. If God chooses to give him a happy phenomenality, well and good; if not, no complaint can be raised against him. He may do what he will with his own, or, rather, with himself, for a creation out of nothing contains nothing but himself. Job, amid unspeakable tortures, demands justice of God, based upon a well-grounded conviction of his own righteousness; but, on recognizing God's nature and his own, he is fain to say, "I had heard of thee with the hearing of the ear; but now mine eye seeth thee: therefore I retract and repent in dust and ashes." He retracts all claim to justice, as he ought, being what he is. This is the attitude of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, equally. In such a system there can be no question where the source of all authority lies. It lies with the source of all action, in God. He is all in all. Man, being a mere phenomenon, whose reality is God, can find peace only in a recognition of this, in a laying aside of the delusion that he is anything in himself, and losing himself in his source. As a modern poet has put it, Life is

> "The dream of a drop that hath withdrawn it
> From the primal fount, as itself were something."

It is true that only the profound thinkers have recognized this to be the meaning of the old religion,—the Origens, St. Bernards, St. Bonaventuras, and the like; and it is also true that only a few logical minds, like Augustine, Calvin, and Jonathan Edwards, have seen that it involved fatalism, complete absence of free-will.

It is upon this view of man's nature and relations that all the governments, as well as all the religions, of the Old World are founded, and, though some of them are departing from it, they have to belie their first principles in so doing. In contradistinction to all these, our government is founded upon the principle that the source of all authority lies in man himself; that he is an original source of action, responsible for his own deeds. The question is, Can any religion be based on this principle?

The framers of our Constitution "builded better than they

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knew." They laid the only possible foundation for a free government, and yet they did not fully realize all that was implied in their work. Indeed, few people realize it even now,—realize that these men were sweeping away the very foundation of old religions and governments, and substituting for it another; that they were removing the groundwork of tyranny and laying the groundwork of freedom and ethical life. But so it was. Assume that men are the source of authority. It follows at once that they must be free; for that which is unfree, that which is compelled by necessity, cannot be the source of anything. The source will lie in that which exercises the compulsion. That which is necessitated from within, if such a thought be thinkable, may be the source of power, but not of authority. I may be carried out to sea by a flood, but I do not therefore acknowledge any authority on the part of the flood. On the contrary, I may refuse to obey the dictates of an enlightened conscience, but I cannot well dispute its authority. That which has authority, then, is free. But that which is free must have its being in itself; must be eternal and indestructible. It cannot be created, for that which is created has its being in, and derives its nature from, that which creates it. If we are created by God, then, as Paul says, "in him we live, and move, and are" (Acts xvii. 28); in the last resort, He is "all in all" (1 Cor. xv. 28). We are nothing but mere phenomena. But if we, as free beings, must necessarily be uncreated and eternal, every one of us, to what sort of world does this introduce us? Obviously to a world composed of a multitude of beings existing in and through themselves, beings whom no one can destroy or really harm. We are eternal and self-existent, or we are not free at all. This is an utterly different world from that which underlies the old religions and states. Can there be religion in such a world? If religion consists in the worship of a creating God by his creatures, then, of course, no. But this is not necessarily the definition of religion, as we have seen. Religion is any belief or theory of man's relation to his environment, or to the universe, the largest possible environment, with action based on such belief or theory. If the

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world consists of a multitude of spiritual beings related to each other through mutual activity, and finding their well-being in such activity,—and we have seen that only on this supposition is there any moral world at all,—then the question of questions is, How shall this activity be regulated so as to produce the greatest amount of well-being, the last word being taken in its literal meaning? And the answer will express the religion of the future. It will be, in the deepest sense, the religion of democracy, as over against the old religion of monarchy.

The ideal of our American democracy is an association of essentially equal beings endeavoring, through each other, to attain the greatest amount of being, that is of knowledge, of affection and of will, with whatever is included, as condition or result, in these. This is, in the best sense, well-being. Now, if this ideal has any justification, it must be because it represents the order of the world and its aim. The world must be fundamentally a democracy, and its end must be an association such as has been described. But this is just the world which we have found to be alone moral. American democracy, therefore, gives the true basis for morality, which is, after all, the chief element of every worthy religion.

Here we must introduce another idea, to which the modern world has given prominence, viz., that of evolution. Just as the old monarchic idea of the world is correlated with a doctrine of creation, so the modern democratic idea is correlated with a doctrine of evolution. According to the former, the Primal One created the atoms, or individuals, of which the world is composed, and superintends their growth; according to the latter, the Primal Many are uncreated and unfold through union with each other. In both ideas the One and the Many are involved.

The doctrine of evolution, though now accepted by almost every educated man and woman, labors, thus far, under certain disadvantages, not very different from those attaching to the other doctrine. (1) It does not tell us what it is that evolves, nor why it evolves,—evolution is accepted, like creation, as a brute fact. (2) It does not enable us to pass from the inani-

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mate to the animate. (3) It does not bridge over the gulf between the natural and the ethical. (4) It does not show us any satisfactory goal for evolution.

One of the most popular evolutionists (Drummond) says, "No living thinker has yet found it possible to account for evolution. Mr. Herbert Spencer's famous definition of evolution as 'a change from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite coherent heterogeneity through continuous differentiations and integrations' is simply a summary of results, and throws no light on ultimate causes." Another (Weismann) tells us that "behind the co-operating forces of nature, which aim at a purpose, we must admit a cause . . . inconceivable in its nature, of which we can only say with certainty that it must be theological,"—a statement which at once lands us in miraculism and agnosticism. I need not occupy time by quoting admissions of the other three defects. They are readily to be found. Suffice it to say that evolution, thus far, is a mere "summary of results," not an explanation of anything. It has neither beginning nor end. The truth is, as the quotation from Weismann shows, it is tacked on to some sort of agnosticism or old-fashioned theology.

Now, it seems to me that, given the view of the world which I have shown to underlie our democracy, it is possible to remedy all these defects, fill all these gaps, and make of evolution a completely satisfactory theory of the world and of life. Instead of saying, as has been said heretofore, that the world starts with an inscrutable God, inscrutable atoms, or an inscrutable ether, not one of which can identify itself with our intelligence, and so be known, our theory says that the world consists of a multitude of sentient individuals or atoms, whose unity is their sentience, and that these are essentially related to each other through desire. Sentience and desire are two aspects of the same fundamental fact. There is no desire without sentience, and no sentience without desire. Given a multitude of such individuals, the world can be fully explained, and faith and agnosticism rendered unnecessary.

It will be perhaps said, But your fundamental sentiences

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are as purely an assumption as the old gods, atoms, etc. I reply, No, and that for four reasons: (1) Because, in saying that sentience is fundamental, I am only saying that what the world is now, it always has been. The world, as I know it, and I can speak of no other, is merely a total of feelings arranged, grouped, and classified. (2) Because it is impossible to conceive any prime mover other than desire. (3) Because there is no desire but for that which is, in some degree, felt. (4) Because, inasmuch as feeling is the only thing that completely penetrates itself, it is the only world principle that can save us from agnosticism. Will, which some would substitute for it, is entirely ineffective. These seem sufficient reasons for assuming that the world is at bottom a democracy of feelings or, more strictly, of desiderant feelings. Atoms themselves, matter itself, in so far as we could know them, would have to be groups of feelings. Feeling is more primitive than matter, which, as far as we know it, is composed of feelings. We now arrive at this conclusion: The only possible completely intelligible and moral world is a world composed of essentially distinct feelings or sentiences (we must not say "sentient beings," because the being must be essentially permeable by feeling), interrelated through action and passion, two forms of feeling, and yet fundamentally impenetrable to each other. And, indeed, this is the world that we really find ourselves in, or in ourselves. I can feel your action, and you can feel mine; but my feeling, or the feeling which I am, is utterly opaque to you, and the feeling which you are to me. I can learn that you have a toothache, and even understand it, if I have had one as a modification of my own feeling; but I can never feel the toothache which you feel. As sentient and desiring subjects we are absolutely impenetrable to each other, and, in so far, we are hypotheses to each other. That is the price we pay for being realities, eternal realities, if you will. If you could feel my feelings, we should be merged into one, and both cease to be individuals. This does not lead to agnosticism, as might seem at first sight. There is nothing in you that I may not know, if you choose to be communicative; but your feelings I can never feel. So far, happily, we must

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be eternally agnostics. That is the price of our being anything at all.

In a world, then, such as we have attempted to describe, what does evolution mean? It means the persistent desire of all sentient individuals to find satisfaction by acting upon, and being acted upon by, other individuals. It is this action and reaction that produces the world, which, as we have seen, is entirely made up of such sensible actions and reactions. Beings are more highly evolved in proportion as they are related to other beings, or in proportion as they have larger worlds. My world is the sum of the beings to whom I am related by feeling and desire, or, to name the more developed forms of these, by knowledge, love, and will. The oyster and the microbe are less developed than we are, because they have narrower relations and a smaller world. And we may even go below the microbe. The so-called inanimate world is what it is, because the sentient individuals who compose it have but the most beggarly and unchanging relations to each other. They seem to have but one fixed feeling, so that they do but one thing. This is the reason why physicists can treat the laws of nature as unchangeable, why exact physical science is possible. In proportion as beings develop and have larger worlds, the less possible is a predictive science of them. We can foretell the phases of the moon, but not those of nations or of men.

It is possible, then, to explain the whole course of evolution as the result of the interaction of innumerable sentient individuals, each endeavoring to find satisfaction, or, which is the same thing, to enlarge its world, by entering into more extensive and profound relations with other individuals, and then transmitting its results to its posterity. It is in this way that the atoms or molecules of matter are formed, and that they combine and cohere into bodies or material masses. It is in this way, as desires grew more varied and less stable, that living protoplasm, which, as Huxley says, lives only by dying, is formed, and from it, by the same process, are evolved all the forms of life. The world is essentially individual and essentially social. The ultimate elements are essen-

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tially individual, their evolution, their progress towards well-being, is entirely due to social interaction, and is greater as that deepens and widens. If it is objected that of the passage from the inanimate and inorganic to the animate and organic, science, thus far, teaches us nothing, one may reply with Huxley: "If it were given me to look beyond the abyss of geologically recorded time to the still more remote period when the earth was passing through physical and chemical conditions which it can no more see again than a man can recall his infancy, I should expect to be a witness of the evolution of living protoplasm from not living matter." Or again, "With organic chemistry, molecular physics, and physiology yet in their infancy, and every day making prodigious strides, I think it would be the height of presumption for any man to say that the conditions under which matter assumes the properties we call 'vital' may not some day be artificially brought together." Indeed, this expectation is raised to a certainty when we realize that all matter is essentially feeling, and nothing but feeling, however inert and unconscious certain portions of it may seem. "*Vivre, c'est sentir,*" says Cabanis. *Être, c'est sentir,* I should say, for the reason that it is utterly impossible to conceive being as anything else. That which is not feeling is to us nothing, and must forever be nothing. One thing is certain: that which is not, in its nature, feeling can never be roused into feeling; for only that which feels can be roused at all.

I repeat, then, the world view that underlies our democracy and justifies it is this: The world is composed of, and created by, an innumerable multitude of sentient individuals, eagerly tending to, or desiring, satisfaction, which they can find only through each other. In the process of this insatiable desire, they unite their activities to form, first, brute matter so-called, then protoplasm, then all the forms of plant life, then all the forms of animal life, culminating, so far as we know, in man. Mere immediate feeling at the same time passes into conscious feeling, and consciousness is, on the whole, memory. To become conscious of any feeling, I must refer it to groups of remembered feelings. That is, the very meaning of conscious-

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ness, which seems to be an attribute of animal, as distinguished from vegetable, life. Consciousness, finally, passes over into self-consciousness, or awareness that all feelings are modifications of one fundamental feeling, now called an *Ego* or *I*. The Ego, having thus come to recognize itself, begins to take itself into its own hands, so to speak, and to classify its feelings. appending to them tickets or symbols, usually of a vocal sort. Thus language arises, and, with it, the possibility of a boundless career. Language, we are wont to say, expresses thought; but the categories of thought are merely so many distinctions between groups of feelings. Apart from these they are nothing; with these, everything; for, as we have seen, the world is merely groups of feelings distinguished,—my world, groups of my feelings, or modifications of the fundamental feeling or sensibility which I am. I need not add that my body, that medium of activity and sensibility, is, in the last analysis, only a group of my feelings. I cannot imagine a more foolish inversion of fact than to say that thought and feeling are functions of matter, since matter itself is nothing but thought and feeling, or feeling differentiated by thought.

With the rise of self-consciousness, or, let us say at once, of human beings, two new phenomena arise,—religion and ethics. The former is man's attempt to deal with the subhuman world so as to draw the greatest satisfaction from it; the latter his attempt to deal with the human world for the same purpose. They, of course, merge with each other, for the reason that the agencies in the subhuman world are, at first, naturally conceived under human form. The earliest religion is pure superstition, which only slowly yields to natural science. As we all know, it has not yet entirely yielded, and the fault lies largely with natural science, which has not yet clearly seen its own implications. But all natural science grows out of superstition, astronomy out of astrology, chemistry out of alchemy, and so on. It is important to notice that religion was originally non-ethical and ethics non-religious. How they gradually approached, we shall see.

In their endeavor to find satisfaction through each other, through mutual help and association, men formed societies,

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and ethical life began. Ethics is altogether a social affair. It is simply the principle of evolution, as social, become conscious of itself. Having advanced by instinct till they could advance no farther, men became self-conscious, and entered into ethical relations, adopting rules and regulations, which all virtually agreed to follow for the general good. Self-consciousness and ethical freedom appear at the point where man's world becomes so complicated as to demand a choice on the basis of past experience. The rules and regulations are enforced partly by use and wont, and partly by religious sanctions, that is, fear of the powers of nature, regarded as human in character. In this way religion came to be mixed up with ethics, and, in proportion as it did so, the service of the powers or gods became ethical, and men were regarded as standing in direct relation to them. There is hardly any greater event in human history than the passage from natural to ethical religion. It is especially marked in the case of the Hebrews. The old Hebrew religion was purely natural. Yahweh was a storm-god, just as the other gods, borrowed from the Canaanites, were gods of fertility. Such gods were, of course, worshipped with sacrifices and rejoicings, about which there is nothing ethical. It was the prophets who banished the fertility-gods, with their obscene rites, and raised the cruel Yahweh to the position of an ethical god, who desired mercy and not sacrifice. Then religion and ethics were united, the latter deriving its strongest sanctions from the former. Men were called upon to be moral, because moral life was pleasing to God, and called down his blessing.

The Hebrews themselves, indeed, while a nation, never succeeded in rising permanently above natural religion, with its sacrificial system: that was left for Christianity, which is, *par excellence*, an ethical religion, based on religious sanctions. Along with it go later Judaism and Islam. All these, though practically abandoning the sacrificial system, still consider a special ritual due to God,—this ritual being the humanized remnant of the old nature-sacrifice. In none of them are the demands of God satisfied by ethical life alone. Indeed, such life is frequently contemned in comparison with ritual and

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faith. Cardinal Newman, in one of his sermons, and Henry Drummond, in his "Natural Law in the Spiritual World," make a great deal of this distinction, denying salvation to mere virtue.*

It is very obvious, nowadays, that ethics based upon a religion of this sort is not, strictly speaking, ethics at all, but mere prudence, which is virtuous only because it expects a reward other than virtue itself.

To put this matter briefly: Man, on reaching self-consciousness, sought to relate himself favorably to his fellow-men and to the sub-human world, gradually finding his sanctions for his behavior to the former in fear of the agencies controling the latter. Though these agencies came, more and more, to be endowed with human virtues, they never altogether lost their natural character, or ceased to inspire fear and hope, so that virtue based on these sanctions never really rose to the dignity of free virtue. At last the natural agencies, having been found to make a single manifold world, were united into one, and Monotheism was the result,—One God, Father Almighty, Maker of Heaven and Earth. So much, however, was he still a nature-god, that he had to be supplemented by a Son to redeem man from natural into ethical life, and a Holy Spirit to keep him ethical. At the same time, the breach between religion and ethics was never entirely healed. They continued to be represented by different institutions,—the former by the Church, the latter by the State; and though the Church tried to absorb the State, it never succeeded in so doing. Its terrors and its tyrannies proved in vain. The State at last asserted its independence, and the Church was made a matter of individual choice. This meant that free inquiry and choice should take

* "Ei non peccaro; e s'elli hanno mercedi
Non basta, perchè non ebber battesmo
Ch'è parte della fede che tu credi:
E se furon dinanzi al Cristianesmo,
Non adorâr debitamente Dio,
E di questi cotai son io medesmo.
Per tai difette, e non per altro rio,
Semo perduti."

DANTE, Hell, IV., 34 *sqq.*

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the place of supernatural fear and authority. The result of this free inquiry was science, an inquiry into the true nature and origin of the world and of man. This science, though it has made rapid strides in the last three hundred years, is only just beginning. Nevertheless, we can see that every step it takes is a step away from the theology that underlies the old religion. Whoever wishes to see the proofs of this may read Professor White's "History of the Warfare of Science with Theology."

And now the old supernatural, monarchic religion has passed away, or is rapidly passing away, along with the institutions founded upon it, and is giving place to a religion of democracy, which finds its highest expression, so far, in this great republic, which, in its Constitution, acknowledges no God, but finds the source of all authority in man.

It is, no doubt, at first, a little startling to think of our government, our national ideal, as a religion: we are so accustomed to think of religion as something quite distinct from the profane State. But this is mere prejudice, born of traditional notions. A religion is that which places us in such harmony with our environment that we attain the highest possible development or satisfaction,—development in knowledge, love, and will. But surely no institution was ever better calculated for this than our republic. Does it not make possible, as never before, the highest manhood? Does it not leave us free to grow to our full height? Does it not furnish us with opportunities for enlightenment and education, such as no other religion ever offered? Does it not secure us life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness? Does it not promote free inquiry into the meaning of life, and encourage the greatest individual initiative? Does it not encourage the growth of the social spirit, and of the consciousness that we are, so to speak, members one of another? Does it not promote the deepest and most extensive humanity? Compare our treatment of Cuba with that of Armenia by the nations of Europe! Can any religion do more than this? Has any religion ever done so much? It is interesting to observe that the nations of Europe are slowly coming to the conviction that our education is the

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only one that really makes men. You will no doubt recall the recent book of M. Demolins on the Superiority of the Anglo-Saxons.

But, under the influence of old notions regarding the nature of religion, some will perhaps say that our American ideal lacks two of the essentials of religion: it supplies no god, and promises no immortality. The answer is, that the old external god, an autocratic spirit among spirits, being incompatible with freedom and ethical life, finds no justification for continued existence as a factor in thought, and must be replaced by the perpetual divinity of every one of us. God is not a being reflecting barbaric splendor from a cloudy throne, to awe a race of helpless, cringing sycophants, but the sense of right and the strength of will enthroned in every human soul. *Ἦθος ἀνθρώπῳ δαίμων*, said Herakleitos long ago. Our American ideal, in truth, gives us the only God about whom there can be no doubt, the God whom each one of us knows as the deepest impulse in his own soul. And as to immortality, the religion of Americanism is the only one that makes it a certainty. In the old religion, it was a hope, a matter of faith. It was held that God, by a pure act of grace, would accord an eternal life of weal for a small number, and of woe for a large one, of phenomenal beings, who had no claim to justice or pity. That was surely a poor outlook,—immortality not certain; and, if a fact, probably an eternity of misery. If the principles upon which American liberty rests are genuine, then immortality is the most certain thing in the world,—immortality for every living thing. If man is the source of authority, he is a moral being, and if he is a moral being, he is free. But a free being is necessarily self-subsistent; for that which is not self-subsistent is subject to that which gives it subsistence. Thus, according to the principles of Americanism, man is free and immortal in his own right. No external power can annihilate or damn him. Life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are his, for the acquiring, forever.

I think, then, we may conclude, not only that Americanism is a religion, but that it is the noblest of all religions, that which best insures the realization of the highest manhood and woman-

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hood, and points them to the highest goal,—a goal which it is their task throughout eternity to approach without reaching. It is a religion, too, that unifies our present life with eternal life, and identifies our civil with our religious life. It is a religion that can be taught to every human being, and that, when taught, will make all men brothers. It can be made the principle of ethical life in all its phases,—domestic, social, and political. Religion need no longer be banished from our public schools, as a mere matter of individual opinion, when it is really the mainspring of social life. In teaching children to lead the life of true Americans, we shall be leading them in the paths of eternal life.

We have still to inquire, What are the ideas and duties attaching to such a religion as we have tried to present? In speaking of the ideals, we need not stop to compare them with those of the old religion,—a lazy, useless heaven for a few, a restless and devouring hell for the many. The ideal of the future religion is perfectly simple. It is a social order of conscious beings working with all their might for universal growth in knowledge, love, and will-power,—beings who find their bliss in each other's society. Heaven is the ever-growing unfolding of spirits through such pure and high intimacy. As to the duties of the religion of the future, they are very different from those of the religion of the past. The latter consisted chiefly in holding certain beliefs, taking part in certain ceremonies or observances, and saving one's own soul. If these things were done, the world might be left to the devil, who, indeed, was supposed to fall heir to the larger share of it. The duties of the religion to come will be summed up in a single precept: Do all that you can to raise yourself and every other human being to the greatest possible height of insight, of kindly, intelligent sympathy, and of helpfulness. Or, to put it negatively, Do your best to put an end to ignorance, prejudice, hatred, exclusiveness, weakness, selfishness. That, indeed, is the whole duty of man. Jesus, borrowing two old Hebrew commandments, made it consist in loving God with all one's powers, and one's neighbor as oneself. The second commandment was often forgotten in the

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vain attempt to obey the first, and, even though it had been obeyed, it was defective so long as love was not defined. We can to-day drop the first of these commands and define the second. Love must mean, not a mere feeling of attachment and desire of possession, but a desire and a determination to elevate its objects to the highest worth. Such objects will, of themselves, be lovable. In the old religion a great deal was said about self-sacrifice, until at last it came to be regarded as the chief virtue, which looked for a large reward in the life to come. "He that giveth to the poor lendeth to the Lord," a good speculation, no doubt. In the future relation there will be no such thing. When it is felt and seen that the good of others is inseparably bound up with our own, that altruism is the most intelligent egoism, then we shall recognize that what we do for another we do for ourselves, and, further, that what we do for ourselves we do for all mankind. I cannot possibly become wiser, or more loving, or more energetically helpful, without being to that extent a blessing to my kind.

And now for a closing remark. If our nature ever become conscious of what is involved in its first principles, and make them the basis of a religion, two great changes will come over us. (1) The present unbrothering, supernatural, world-despising religion of the churches will disappear, and the great edifices and uncounted wealth, which it now uses to misdirect men's highest interests, will be used to elevate men to a higher sense of their duties in the present life, as that in which alone we at present have any duties. (2) The energies which are now wasted in the pursuit of worthless ends, pleasure, place, flattery, or of mere means to ends, wealth, possessions, display, etc., will be directed towards the only end that is really worthy, and an end in itself,—to the elevation of mankind in the three attributes of spirit. The abandonment of a false and enslaving religion, and the direction of all our energies to the realization of a new one, reared on the foundation of our national life,—these are the chief tasks of a century that is soon to open before us. Neither of them will be easy. Old superstitions die hard, and unreal ends that satisfy low and immediate appetites have a strong hold on the ordinary

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human being; but they must in the long run give way before the growth of intelligence and good-will. Then the cruel distinction that has so long been drawn between civic and religious life, between the service of man and the service of God, will be blotted out, and it will be recognized that a noble civic life, which seeks the good of all, is the most religious of all lives.

THOMAS DAVIDSON.

NEW YORK.

THE MORAL ASPECT OF CONSUMPTION.

THE new stress laid upon consumption is one of the most significant changes in the treatment of economics in recent years. Long ago, indeed, Mr. Ruskin, himself taking up the older tradition, had declared that the study of *spending* was the most important branch of Political Economy;* and as early as 1854 Le Play had published his great work, "Les Ouvriers Européens," in which "the workmen's way of life and the budget of expenses" received at least as much attention as "the workmen's means of living and the budget of receipts." But both Mr. Ruskin and Le Play spoke to unbelieving generations; and by an irony of fate it was not the Ethical or Historical School of economists who were to bring consumption to its high place of honor, but the Austrian School, who arose as opponents of the German "Historicals," as masters in analytic reasoning, as defenders of the hypothetical, as advocates of "natural value," and as restorers of an amended "economic man." For the whole question of value was reopened; and as this centre-piece of economics was made to depend not upon cost but upon utility, it followed that the using of things rather than the making of them became the matter of prime importance. So Mr. Keynes tells us that a true theory of consumption is the keystone of political economy;† and economists are beginning to see, as Mr. Hobson bears witness, "that the prosperity of a country

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*"Crown of Wild Olive," p. 77.

†"Scope and Method of Political Economy," p. 107.

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can be enhanced as much by educating the consumer as by improving the arts of the producer." *

It is not my business in this article to criticise the Austrian School and their brilliant following and its varieties in America, but much rather to thank them for the good service they have done in preparing the way for the complete ethical treatment of economics. For "the education of the consumer" has been one of the chief tasks of the moralists for several thousand years, as we may learn by looking at the Book of Proverbs, or St. Paul's Epistles, or the "Parson's Tale" in Chaucer; or by listening to any mission sermon in London or New York.

But on no account let us compromise the ethical character of economics by any exaggeration; or forget that, because the moral aspect of consumption is our aim, there is also the technical aspect, not to be ignored, and indeed a needful preliminary to higher studies, somewhat as the Greek grammar and dictionary are preliminary to Homer and Æschylus. Thus, in Mr. Hobson's delightful volume, to which I have already referred, it seems confusing to say with Mr. Ruskin:

"THERE IS NO WEALTH BUT LIFE. Life including all its powers of love, of joy, and of admiration." †

For beans and bacon seem in this way to get mixed up with parental love; and although in many a humble household the former may be the visible expression of the latter, and not forthcoming without it, still it would seem clearer to keep apart these two economic categories; nor again to say that it makes a marvellous difference in the true value—of beans and bacon—what kind of persons will get them,‡ for example, the idle apprentice of Hogarth's illustrations, or the industrious. Such a dissolving of the material into the immaterial is wholly unnecessary to the ethical treatment of economics, and may lead us to curious results. So Herr Böhm Bawerk has pointed out how, according to Roscher's terminology, an

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* "John Ruskin, Social Reformer," p. 96.
† Ibid., p. 78.
‡ Ibid., p. 97.

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idle young debauchee would be a zealous producer of the personal goods of ease and satiety.*

In the reaction, therefore, against materialistic and unethical economics let there be no loss of lucidity or balance of mind, no forgetfulness that technical and moral are not the same, or that there is a difference between consumption as the subject of rules of art and consumption as the subject of ethical judgments.

It is, perhaps, still necessary to explain, though it has often been done before, that an art is (objectively) a body of rules or (subjectively) the knowledge of them, enabling us to reach some particular end, as building towns or bombarding them, rearing pheasants or cooking them, apart from any question of moral right or wrong. Hence it is premature or irrelevant, while we are considering the range of projectiles, to discuss the lawfulness of war; or, while we are dealing with the proper protection of pheasants' eggs, to urge the total impropriety of preserving game. Similarly in all the other arts—an almost innumerable multitude—the "best" is what suits best the particular end; and the "right way" or "wrong way" of making shoes or verses implies no moral approval or reprobation: the skilful cobbler may be a wife-beater, the great poet may be of lax morals; and again (no small mercy in these days):

"On peut être honnête homme, et faire mal des vers."

No doubt there is a certain analogy between particular aims and the general aim of life, between managing one's cattle and managing one's passions; and there can be manuals written how to learn virtue as well as how to learn book-keeping or Russian; and in fact the terms of art are often applied metaphorically to morals. But at least for those who hold that oat-cake and honesty are incommensurable, that vice in a horse and vice in a man differ in kind, and that the moral sphere transcends the material, there is a fundamental difference between art with its adjective technical, and morality with its adjective ethical.

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* "Positive Theory of Capital," p. 44.

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Now, starting with the mere art of consumption, and aiming at a mere satisfaction of wants, without any regard to their character, we find it by no means a simple matter to make the proper choice regarding food and drink, dwellings and furniture, fuel and light, clothing and washing, not to speak of amusement. Every household, high or low, is confronted with a series of technical problems: how, in each department of expense, to choose the quality and quantity of goods that will give the maximum result, and how to distribute expenditure among the departments so as to avoid in any either plethora or atrophy. And, in fact, the mistakes made are innumerable,—wasteful or unhealthy systems of diet, the wrong choice in dress, houses unsuitable in size or construction, superfluous or deficient furniture, costly recreations showing a balance rather of pain and exhaustion than of pleasure and refreshment. And the skill in the art of consumption is so various that, while some people always get "good value" for their money, others spend twice as much with only half the result.

These are indeed truisms; and it has been observed before and after Shakespeare:

> "Foolery, foolery doth walk about the orb."

But we may profess assent to truisms without any real acceptance of their consequences; and, in fact, in England we endured for a century a political economy in flat contradiction to the truisms just repeated; nor till recently, except in books little read, has any stress been laid on the portentous phenomenon of *misdirected consumption*, namely, that, as a result of our competitive industrial system, it has become the interest of many producers and sellers to supply inferior goods, apparently cheap, but in reality, when duly weighed in the balance of cost and utility, incredibly dear. Hence the immense waste indicated by such phrases as jerry-built houses, scamped furniture, slop clothing; hence the displacement of English wheat in bread-making by the drier foreign wheat, and of English produce by imported bacon, cheese, and tinned provisions; not because the new goods were better for health

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or nourishment,—they were worse,—but because more profit was got by intermediaries from their sale.*

Mr. David Syme, though few listened to him in 1876, pointed out these truths, and cited Mr. Robert Dale Owen, who had declared about the middle of the century his firm belief that at that time "purchasers of cotton, woollen, linen, and silk goods, of furniture, hardware, leather goods, and all other manufactured staples, lose, on the average, because of inferior quality, more than half of all the money they pay out."†

Nor let it be thought that such misdirected consumption is a mere transfer of wealth from buyers to sellers. For, apart from any question of morals, there is a triple waste: the failure of purpose for the consumer far exceeds the filling of pockets for the buyer; the frequent repair or renewal absorbs labor and capital that else might be set free; and the debility, illness, or death that might have been prevented by wholesome food, clothing, and dwellings, are a loss with scarce any even apparent compensation. And it is no explanation to say, even if it were true, that the cause of the mischief is "the insane craze of the public for cheapness," or to complain of "the tyranny of the consumer." For under the present conditions of industry, competitive, complicated, and world-wide, the public or the consumers are, ninety-nine per cent. of them, incapable of choosing the better in preference to the worse article; they lack time and knowledge, are not technical experts, have only the criteria of price and appearance to go by, and have no security if they pay more that they will get what in the end is really cheaper. And thus, what is known as "Gresham's law," that bad money drives out good money, can be extended; and we can affirm that in days of world-wide commerce and large-scale production, unless some protection is given to good workmanship and sanitary products, inferior merchandise will drive out the superior.

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* See Lord Wantage's testimony in the *Economic Review*, January, 1893; also D. Tallerman, "Farm Produce Realisation," 2d edit., 1893.

† "Outlines of an Industrial Science, 1876," p. 170.

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The reader will now perceive that we are rising from the low coast-land of technical calculations to the higher ground and purer air of moral judgments. For already he may have asked whether it is right to take advantage of the ignorance of buyers to sell boots that come to pieces in a month, or, if this is a dire necessity, lest all the custom go to the other boot-shop over the way, whether the body politic ought to allow such necessities to arise. Questions of this kind are highly pertinent, and illustrate the point for which I am constantly contending, that the economist is not like the teacher of any art, with whom moral philosophy is an irrelevance; and that though he is bound to pay constant attention to the rules of art, these technical prolegomena are after all only introductory and preparatory to his proper business, namely, the ethical inquiry that is to follow. He lives and breathes in a moral atmosphere; and if he dips into the great ocean of technical life, it is only like a sea-gull, to draw forth food for the denizens of the upper air.

Now, if we observe carefully the extended application of Gresham's law, resulting in the social malady of misdirected consumption, we shall see a milder form of the disease in one direction, and a more virulent in another. Let us look at the milder form first, which is a very old complaint, no other than the changes in consumption due to fashion. "Seest thou not what a deformed thief this fashion is," says our great poet, whose works, by the way, are a repertory of soundest economics; again, "the fashion wears out more apparel than the man," and—

> "New customs,
> Though they be never so ridiculous,
> Nay, let them be unmanly, yet are followed."

But this old ailment of men and women has changed in modern times, if we may speak medically, from being endemic to being epidemic. So Professor Marshall points out "that in all kinds of clothing and furniture it is every day more true that it is the pattern which sells the things," * and regrets the

* "Principles of Economics," p. 295, 4th edit.

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"rapid changes of fashion which now extend their baneful influence through almost every rank of society." (P. 367.) For among other unforeseen effects of the cheap press, one has been the marvellous extension of the empire of fashion; special magazines are altogether devoted to it, and even ordinary newspapers have mostly a fashion column at least once a week. The opinion of this press is a great economic force; it is an oracle for rich and poor; and by instantly diffusing every change of fashion over the whole country, causes these changes to be far more rapid and wide-spread than of old.* And clearly, the more rapidly fashions change, and the more universally they are obeyed, the greater the waste in the shape of unsalable goods among traders, and discarded goods among consumers.

In view of the foregoing "phenomena," I confess to doubts whether the elaborate calculations of some modern economists on marginal increments of utility and disutility have any explanatory, still less any didactic, value. And if, as I gather from a recent well-written manual by a follower of Dr. Patten, the task of economics is primarily to deal with "the free and effective workers, the intelligent users of wealth, . . . the economic man whose desires and capacities are normal,"† I fear economics will have primarily to deal with a very small fraction of the human race; and in view of the increasing changes of fashion, "the unit of all calculations . . . the economic man with clearly defined wants"‡ will be harder to find than ever, and reminds us of the late President Walker's conditions of perfect competition not possible on earth and not wanted in heaven; till we sigh for the day when Professor Von Wieser's exhortation will be obeyed: "After all, in economic theory, we must make up our minds whether we intend to explain economic life, or to pursue after useless and fanciful ideas."§

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* See two articles on fashion by Miss Foley and Mr. Firth in the *Economic Journal*, Sept. and Dec., 1893.

† Dr. E. T. Devine, "Economics," p. 5. ‡ Ibid., p. 9.

§ "Natural Value," p. 203.

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Let us turn from the mildest form of misdirected consumption to the most virulent and aggravated. This can be called depraved consumption; the liability to it is characteristic of historical man, civilized and uncivilized; the bridling of it a constant criterion of religions, of philosophies, of governments, the unbridling of it one of the gravest charges against economic liberalism from the days of Quesnay and Adam Smith onward. And there is the constant danger that the pecuniary interest of an active body of traders may give an artificial stimulus to morbid inclinations. Four examples of the present day from the British Isles will make the matter clearer.

The first is the incitement to extravagance by the system of credit, backed up by a cruel law of imprisonment for debt, which, abolished for the rich, has been aggravated for the poor. Thus, humble families are enticed to buy furniture and other goods on the ruinous hire system; and the desire of display is artfully stimulated by the ease of immediate gratification. Above all, the weak women-folk, in the absence of their husbands, are inveigled by sharp itinerant sellers of drapery and jewelry to buy all manner of finery on credit, and to enter the downward path towards the workhouse and the jail. This evil "tally system," though recognized as an evil at least a quarter of a century ago, and though perfectly remediable, being a mere creature of the law, remains yet unremedied.

Another example of incitement to depraved consumption is the work of the "music halls," which are twenty times as numerous as the theatres, and which supply the nightly recreation of an immense proportion of our people, women and children as well as men. The control exercised over these music halls is so imperfect that the extended Gresham's law works with hideous effect; healthy, not to say decent, entertainment is eliminated by the degrading and the obscene; and drunkenness, dishonesty, and immorality are held up to admiration. Many managers strive, indeed, to maintain a censorship, but in vain, for their "stars" in both senses are generally beyond their control; they cannot afford to be outdone in attractiveness by their rivals, and a horrible competition

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drags down players and audience—though the larger half may desire better things—to the low levels of iniquity.*

A third example is the artificial stimulus to gambling which has grown in recent years to a mighty evil through the operation of the press; and the seemingly beneficial inventions of cheap paper, of rapid machine printing, and of the telegraph, have been turned to strange uses. For it is no longer merely the *jeunesse dorée*, and a few older men among the wealthy or the disreputable, who frequent the betting-ring on the race-course; the betting-ring has been brought into every house and every workshop by the sporting press; and two professional classes—the book-makers and the press—are interested in fostering gambling. Not to speak of the sporting column in ordinary newspapers, the papers specially devoted to gambling have increased tenfold during the last quarter of a century. There has been a proportionate increase of the book-makers; they have agents in every town, and one recently acknowledged to making £1000 a week, largely on shilling bets from boys and women. And this constant temptation, to which all classes are exposed, to squander their own and other people's money, with the dishonesty and misery that result from it, is in greater part a mere factitious temptation, and could, therefore, in greater part be utterly removed in a brief space of time by a humane and reasonable government. †

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* For the actual condition of the music halls, see two striking letters in *The Times*, 26th Sept. and 8th Oct., 1898.

† See, for example, an interesting article by the Rev. A. T. Barnett, in the *Economic Review*, April, 1897. The following abridged prospectus of a sporting newspaper, though ten or eleven years ago, may serve as a good example of solicitation to depraved consumption:

THE LICENCED VICTUALLERS' MIRROR.

Price, one penny. A profusely illustrated sporting journal. The LICENCED VICTUALLERS' MIRROR will put hundreds of pounds in your pocket—will put hundreds of pounds in your pocket FOR ONE PENNY, if you are interested in the turf, as the L. V. M., published on Tuesdays only, contains:

WINNERS OF THE WEEK; the selections of that extraordinarily successful writer, Centaur, of "The Licenced Victuallers' Gazette."

TIPS FROM TATTERSALL'S, being exclusive sporting information contributed by writers from behind the scenes, and obtainable from no other source.

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The fourth example from the British Isles is the incitement of almost the whole of the working-people to intemperance, —intemperance meaning not the simple use of alcoholic drink, but the triple abuse by way of undue expenditure, of unhealthful excess, and, finally, of drunkenness. We are so familiar with the evil that we are liable to take it for granted, as a Roman of the Empire might have taken for granted the foulness of the stage and the cruelty of the amphitheatre. Moreover, the false issue raised by those who denounce all alcohol as poison and wickedness, cause many people to think the evil is irremediable, because they are confronted with an impracticable remedy. But in reality the horrible degradation of men and women, the unspeakable miseries, the hopeless poverty, the frequent crime that spring from the "public house," are, three-fourths of them, the product of our law, which has partly allowed and partly promoted the growth of a vast body of capital, surpassing £200,000,000, whose owners are directly interested in the spread of intemperance, whose agents are daily enticing to depraved consumption, whose influence has resisted all effective measures of reform. Yet the abolition of the "bar system," the transformation of every "public house" into a decent place of public refreshment, and the suppression of the sale of immature spirits and adulterated beer, are reforms that all sober reasoning tells us would be effective; and if they are withheld it will be a sad piece of evidence that the State, for all its imperial glory, does not

CHARACTERS ON THE COURSE, with full length portrait drawn from life of every notability in the world of sport.

LIFE IN LONDON. A brilliant novelty in journalism copiously illustrated.

FLASHES FROM THE FOOTLIGHTS, with portraits in character of Theatrical and Music Hall celebrities.

BOXERS AND THEIR BATTLES, charming chapters with glimpses of the old Gladiators of the Prize-Ring, accompanied by full length portraits of the men and their patrons.

TALES OF THE TOWN. Piquant Novelettes written for men of the world by men of the world.

THE LICENCED VICTUALLERS' MIRROR.

Absolutely unique among sporting journals. Of all News agents, at Smith's Bookstalls everywhere. Published on Tuesdays only. Price, one penny.

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control the liquor traffic, but that the liquor traffic controls the State.

Besides these four examples of a factitious stimulus given to morbid inclinations, others could be given from modern England; and if we travelled beyond these narrow limits of time and space we should soon be conscious, from the multitudinous examples of misdirected and depraved consumption, how wide was this department of economic history, how many chapters of economic science were needed for its treatment. And even then we should by no means exhaust the matter to be included under the moral aspect of consumption; for the general questions of luxury and extravagance have to be faced. On these matters, indeed, my present limits forbid me to enter; moreover, they have recently been treated in this JOURNAL (October, 1898) with admirable clearness and from the Christian stand-point by Professor Davidson. Rather let me draw the conclusion, on which Professor Davidson has acted, that if this vast province in economics is to be treated reasonably, it must be treated ethically. Every one remembers the remarkable passage in Mill's "Political Economy," given curiously as an abatement or exception to the proposition that the consumer is a competent judge of the commodity:

"Those who most need to be made wiser and better usually desire it least, and if they desired it, would be incapable of finding the way to it by their own lights. It will continually happen, on the voluntary system, that, the end not being desired, the means will not be provided at all, or that, the persons requiring improvement having an imperfect or altogether erroneous conception of what they want, the supply called forth by the demand of the market will be anything but what is really required." (Book V., Ch. XI., § 8)

And to pass to a modern authority, Professor Nicholson (in "Palgrave's Dictionary, s. v. *consumption*), declares that government control over consumption is justified "where the consumer is not the best judge of his own real interests or of the real value of the article consumed."

Plainly, then, if we are to continue our reasoning process, we must know what is being "wiser and better," what is an

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"improvement" of persons, what is "really required," what are "real interests." But are we helped forward towards this needful knowledge by being told, among a series of propositions concerning consumption, that "the final increments of the different commodities consumed tend to rise and fall together," and that "the margin of consumption is fixed by the relation between man and his environment"? I am quoting the little manual by Dr. Devine (pp. 104 and 107), already alluded to, and for the very reason that it is a manual and meant for University Extension courses, and typical of certain teaching. And I ask what help can we get from such teaching towards the apprehension or the solution either in America or in England of the drink problem and the dwellings problem, two prime matters of consumption? How impotent we become if we reduce economics to mere calculations of utility, and say:

"The whole science of economics rests upon the possibility of thus comparing pains, or subjective costs of production, with pleasures obtained as a result of economic activity." *

If we remain on this low level, how can we say that those people are blameworthy, or even mistaken, who think now, as in Plato's time, that the *summum bonum* is incessant intoxication? †

ἡγησάμενοι κάλλιστον ἀρετῆς μισθὸν μέθην αἰώνιον.

It is true that when Gryll repined at being changed back from the form of a hog, into which Acrasia had transformed him, Spenser suffers him to be spoken of very contemptuously: ‡

> The donghill kinde
> Delightes in filth and fowle incontinence:
> Let Gryll be Gryll and have his hoggish minde.

But Gryll might have replied that Spenser was almost as completely saturated with mediæval prejudices as Shakespeare; that he himself knew better than any one else his own wants,

* Dr. E. T. Devine, "Economics," p. 80.

† "Republic," p. 363. D.

‡ "Faery Queen," II., xii.

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both total and marginal; and that he himself was the best judge of how to satisfy them with the minimum of disutility.

So little it avails to speak of the satisfaction of wants unless we can distinguish those that are leading us to destruction, and unless we know what is the true good of man.*

And now, as the conclusion of this paper, and as the consequence of the grave facts of consumption which I have described or indicated, and of the grave need to act and to act intelligently, it seems time for economists—I speak primarily of British and American economists—to leave sterile discussions on words, and sterile calculations concerning impossible conditions, and sterile accumulations of unvivified facts; no longer to expose themselves and their anarchy to the mockery of educated public opinion; † but much rather to be so far united in their science, that eager youth, and anxious age, and hesitating governments may turn to them for leading and light. Under new auspices the *responsa prudentum* of ancient Roman law would be revived; and the liquor question, the gambling question, the debt question, the dwellings question, the recreation question, and divers others connected with consumption, not to speak of questions concerned with production and distribution (why, for example, the final confutation and crushing of Karl Marx has to be done over again every twelvemonth),—all these questions could be answered, not by irresponsible and ill-informed journalists, but by the authoritative voice of the college of economists. And one of the first and clearest and most unhesitating of the *responsa* would be to teach us to put away, among other idolatries, what may be called kapelolatry or huckster-worship; to teach us that British and other trade is for man, not man for British and other trade; and that compared with the antique immolation of children on the altar of Moloch, the immolation of the lives and morals of millions on the catallactic altar, the sacrifices offered to the drink-sellers, the money-lenders, the slum-speculators, the book-makers,

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* Professor J. S. Mackenzie, "Social Philosophy," p. 347.

† See the strictures in *The Times*, 3d Sept., 1898, and 5th of April, 1899.

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the outside brokers, the advertising quacks, the adulterators, the opium-dealers, the grain-monopolists, and other demigods in our new pantheon, are much more calamitous and much less excusable.

CHARLES S. DEVAS.

BATH, ENGLAND.

THE ETHICS OF RELIGIOUS CONFORMITY.

A RECENT controversy has given to the subject of religious conformity a special interest at the present time. Some three years ago an article by Professor Sidgwick on Religious Conformity appeared in the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, in which the writer dealt with the question as to how far "understandings" were permissible in interpreting the letter of the English Church doctrine. While admitting the necessity of *some* divergence of opinion within the pale of the Anglican Church, Professor Sidgwick ends by asserting that the exclusion of the miraculous element in the Gospel history is not compatible with the Anglican doctrine,—that in the case of a clergyman who rejects this element, the process of interpretation has gone too far. To this article Mr. Rashdall replied in the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL for January, 1897. His main contentions were, (1) That the evils of schism may often outweigh the advantages of a literal veracity. (2) That the Church has progressed through a process of "liberalizing interpretation" in the past, and there is no reason why it should not continue to do so in the future. (3) That there is no justification for drawing the line precisely at the point at which Professor Sidgwick would draw it,—for making a belief in the miraculous a *sine quâ non* of religious orthodoxy.

Professor Sidgwick's answer is contained in his volume on "Practical Ethics," in which his former article also is reprinted. In this he amplifies his original statements, insists on the dangers of too much "width of interpretation," and throws doubt upon the value of a κοινωνία which only exists in appearance. Here the controversy stands.

As I do not entirely agree either with Professor Sidgwick

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or Mr. Rashdall as to the value of veracity in general, it may be well to deal with the wider question first. Professor Sidgwick is frankly utilitarian in his view; Truth must be sacrificed, where necessary, for the attainment of the greatest human happiness. He takes the familiar instances of the murderer in pursuit of his victim, and the invalid to whom a shock might be fatal. In these cases he considers unveracity justifiable, and I suppose that few would be inclined to disagree with him. But when he uses the same test of social utility to justify the suppression of religious truth, he seems to me to disregard an essential difference between the cases. The untruthfulness practised towards the murderer or the invalid is almost verbal; it is at all events superficial; the patient, *e.g.*, will think no worse of his physician morally when he has recovered and learns of the deception practised upon him. It cannot be said in the true sense that any mutual understanding has been violated. In the case of a religious *suppressio veri* this is not the case. The victims of deception here may very probably never recover from the moral shock of finding that they have been deceived. For religious and moral questions are those which affect men most deeply; and in the case of ecclesiastical deception, what is to be feared is not merely the impairing of the general confidence, but also the weakening of the moral fibre of individual men. It is a case in which the spirit (if not the letter) of truthfulness is all-important. And I do not mean merely the truthfulness which one man can display to another, but no less the straightforwardness of a man with himself. There is no great risk that our supposed invalid, who has found himself deceived, will for that reason fall into the habit of deceiving himself about his own health; and if he did, it would hardly affect society at large. But the peculiar danger in the case of religious belief is that it is at any time difficult to be sincere with oneself, and this difficulty is increased tenfold by the sight of other well-informed or better-informed persons who are not sincere with themselves. So men come to say to themselves, "It is true that I don't believe this; but Mr. So-and-so says things that he doesn't believe, and *he* ought to know; besides, I do believe it

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in a kind of a way, though I need not tell every one *what* kind of a way." I do not know how this kind of moral evasiveness is to be weighed hedonistically against certain "social utilities" different in kind; but I am quite sure that things have come to a serious pass when it arouses no adverse comment whatever. And I cannot quite accept Mr. Rashdall's statement that truth may have to be sacrificed for a greater good; for, in the particular problem before us, I do not see how, in the present time, we are to obtain a "greater good" without the kind of truth which I mean. I must refer to the following pages for proof that the truth and falsehood involved are something more than verbal.

I am not protesting against all *suppressio veri.* I imagine that a few centuries ago an unrestricted right to speak their minds on the part of individuals would have brought any Church and any State to a speedy end. But we are not living in the Middle Ages, nor even in the early part of the nineteenth century; and one result of a half-century of criticism and controversy is that liberty of discussion is no longer dangerous to society. The importance of unfettered opinion, above all in the physical sciences, has put the method of "pious fraud" out of court; "the secret," as Professor Sidgwick says, "has leaked out;" and theology has so far come within the sphere of science that religious beliefs lie open to the attack, or the defence, of all. From this I conceive that we may draw the following conclusion. In a mediæval society, where intellectual convictions were comparatively unimportant, intellectual honesty formed but a small part of the "ideal human life;" but in an age of discussion, such as our own, truth for its own sake must bulk much more largely. At a time when we hear so much of a man's "position," of his "views," of his "opinions," our ideal of virtue ought surely to admit no intellectual dishonesty.

To pass on to the special question of conformity in matters of religion. I think we should do well to divide it into two parts, according as we are thinking of an uneducated or an educated congregation. To begin with the former. The question at issue is, To what extent should a clergyman teach

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doctrines which he does not fully believe to a congregation which is untouched by the so-called modern spirit, which would not even understand what his heterodoxy meant? I think the general principle may be admitted here that a man should teach what he believes in the words which his auditors will understand. If he speaks of the Bible as the "Word of God," I do not see that any great harm is done, even though he does not regard it as literally inspired, and his congregation has never dreamt of regarding it in any other light. And similarly, if he speaks of the Divinity of Christ, it matters comparatively little that he and his audience should interpret that divinity in very different ways. It is a case in which it would be pedantic to insist on verbal accuracy. But I think there remains the further question, How far such a congregation as I have pictured really exists. It may be too easily taken for granted that a working-class or country congregation remains unaffected by the spirit of inquiry which is active elsewhere. I suppose that there exists a certain proportion of intelligent people in any class, and amongst them it is almost inevitable that some should regard the established religion from a critical point of view. If our supposed clergyman should encounter such doubters, I think he may be placed in a difficult position; and it is an embarrassment which seems likely to increase in future with the advance in education. But perhaps the difficulty is not yet sufficiently pressing to require further attention here. Teachers of every kind, from parents to prophets, have been embarrassed from the beginning of time by the form their doctrines have assumed in the juvenile or popular consciousness. And Plato's device of political falsehood is not without its justification.

The case is different when we are dealing with a congregation of educated people; and especially with such a congregation in a University town, where ideas are always active, and opinions tend to have too much, and not too little, importance attached to them. It hardly requires pointing out how nearly this affects the present controversy; it has been carried on on the one side by a Professor in Cambridge, and on the other by a clerical Fellow of Oxford; and it has

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appeared for the most part in the pages of a journal which the outside world no doubt regards as somewhat academic. And so, in speaking of educated circles, I mean to narrow the question chiefly to this, What is the duty of conformity or of non-conformity for those who move in the intellectual atmosphere of a University?

To deal first with the case of lay members of a church. I am unable to find in Professor Sedgwick's article any clear distinction between the position of the layman, who is in the strictest sense a member, and that of a layman who merely takes part in a religious service. It is true that he begins by speaking expressly of "members;" but in a later passage he says "the mere presence at a religious service does not imply more than a general sympathy with its drifts and aims;" and further on he speaks simply of "taking part in a social act of religious worship." Now, surely a distinction is here very necessary. A layman who merely takes part in a religious service is not, I hope, regarded as *ipso facto* professing any of the doctrines which are taught in the course of it; he may interpret its significance in what way he pleases, and may attend purely from motives of curiosity, provided his curiosity be outwardly reverent. To take an analogy, where analogies are very difficult to find. A man who is a Liberal in politics and happens to be the guest of a Tory candidate is not compromised by driving about in his host's carriage on election day. He would be so compromised if he allowed his host to discuss politics with him on the assumption that they held the same opinions, and did not enlighten him as to the extent of their divergence. But it is universally recognized that his appearing in public in the company of a candidate for Parliament signifies only that there is a bond between them; there is no necessity that the bond should be one of political sympathy. And so in the case of the unattached layman; his presence at a religious service *may* indicate a general sympathy or may be due to other motives. But it certainly is not, or should not be, taken to indicate intellectual assent to the particular doctrines involved.

Now, such a position is obviously very different from that

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which is held by the members of a church, and I cannot but think that Professor Sidgwick's argument obscures this difference. He admits that a member of the Church of England is formally pledged to believe the Apostles' Creed; but two pages later, in speaking of a private member of the Church, he argues that "mere presence does not imply a belief in any particular statement." So his view seems to be that a member may continue as such, although he has ceased to believe in certain doctrines of his church, because he is not called upon to avow his beliefs. This seems to me to be far from obvious. An active member, I suppose, is one who communicates at least three times a year, and who has renewed at confirmation the vow made in his name at baptism; and I do not exactly see how, in the former case at least, he is going to shift the responsibility for his part of the service upon the officiating clergyman.

Furthermore, I think that Professor Sidgwick exaggerates the evils likely to result from severing religious ties, even where a man's religious habits have been closely connected with a particular form of worship. He seems to forget for the moment that the Church of England, though the most important, is not the only religious association in this country; and also that the very act of severance, if instigated by the higher motives, is a religious act, and, other things apart, stands high above a semi-hypocritical compliance. It may be granted that the temporary loss of religious fellowship is a very real loss, and yet denied that the problem is capable of solution on this consideration alone.

But important though the question of conformity may be in the case of laymen, it is obviously more so in the case of the clergy; and as it is this point to which Mr. Rashdall has directed attention, and to which Professor Sidgwick has devoted his second paper, I shall pass on to deal with it directly.

In the main, it must be agreed that literal exactness in matters of religious belief is impossible. So long as words mean different things to different men, so long as minds refuse to work in the same mould, it will remain impossible to bind

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down the religious thought of any age or any country into a set form of words. Fortunately, religion is not an affair of words (however much men may strive to make it so); nor is it even an affair of intellectual convictions only. And so long as this is generally recognized it would be useless and pernicious to insist that a man must believe every word he teaches. The members of a church may use the same formulæ; they cannot possibly attach precisely the same meaning to them; and, therefore, it must be admitted that an excessive insistence upon detail would destroy the possibility of common worship. The question remains, At what point does the process of neglecting the exact meaning of words become dishonorable? How far is conformity to go? Is a clergyman justified in conforming to *all* the doctrines of the Church of England, provided they only mean *something* to him? Is the question of their original signification irrelevant so long as he can attach to them some interpretation which satisfies himself? And if this process of "liberalizing interpretation" cannot fairly be applied to the *whole* body of doctrine, at what point is he to draw up and say, "I cannot honestly abandon the traditional view of this or that, and continue to remain within the Anglican Church"?

To this question Professor Sidgwick has given in his first paper a very definite answer: "There is one line of thought which is not compatible with these creeds, and that is the line of thought which . . . concludes against the miraculous element of the gospel history, and in particular rejects the story of the miraculous birth of Jesus." It is here that Mr. Rashdall joins issue. "Why the line is to be drawn exactly at this point," he says, "Professor Sidgwick fails to indicate;" and, later, "the question cannot be treated as a plain and straightforward question between miracles on the one hand, and modern science or criticism with no miracles on the other." He then proceeds to show that there may be, and are, very different interpretations of the recorded miraculous events. We may shade off by imperceptible gradations from the traditional view until we reach one which could only be called "non-natural,"—a view, that is, which no longer admits belief

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in miracles as in any sense physical facts. If this is so, Mr. Rashdall argues, the question of unveracious conformity cannot be settled out-of-hand by a mere reference to miracles.

As I remain unconvinced by Mr. Rashdall's arguments, I propose in what follows to give my reasons for believing that if the line is not to be drawn sooner, it must at all events be drawn at the point indicated by Professor Sidgwick: that there are good grounds for holding that the rejection of miracles ought to be viewed as something more than a new application of the "liberalizing spirit."

I am not enough of a theologian to know either in what ways miracles have actually been regarded at different periods in the history of dogma, or what the orthodox view of miracles may be at the present day. But I suppose it will hardly be denied that by the writers of the Gospels themselves the miraculous events they record were regarded in the light of physical facts; and so long as the Gospel narrative is what it is, physical facts they will remain to the popular consciousness in all countries and in all ages. Unless I am greatly mistaken, St. Luke, when he described the birth of Jesus, believed that He was the son of no earthly father; when he describes the raising of the widow's son from the dead, he means that the latter was literally dead, and came to life again; when he speaks of Christ stilling the tempest, he means that He was able to make the winds and water obey Him; and to the writer of the Gospel at all events the Christ who appeared to the assembled disciples was an actual bodily Christ, into whose side Thomas could thrust his hand. These were physical facts—things that could be seen and handled—in the sense in which the falling of stones and the solidity of the earth are physical facts. They could not possibly be otherwise; the men who wrote the narrative were plain men, who believed in their eyes and their hands, and to suppose that their words had some other less obvious meaning is much the same as suggesting that the "man in the street" has some transcendental meaning when he says that an omnibus has upset in front of him. The Gospel account must have meant to the writers and to those for whom they

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wrote what it means to the uneducated peasant to-day; and when the Creed was composed which states that Christ "was conceived by the Holy Ghost . . ., rose again from the dead and ascended into heaven," it may have had more than one meaning to its authors, but to the population of Christendom who were acquainted with the Gospels it can have had one meaning, and one meaning only. And one meaning only it can have for the ordinary man wherever he is found. The popular consciousness may be relied on for uniformity in its interpretation of miraculous events. If this is so, I cannot see how Mr. Rashdall's arguments apply. It is not a question whether miracles are, or are not, a breach in the order of nature; it is not a question whether theology is able to interpret them or not; it is a question whether these events did or did not happen. To this a negative answer may be given in two ways. It may be denied that miracles *can* happen; or it may be denied that these miracles happened in the manner supposed by the evangelists. But what I wish to insist on is that both of these are negative answers. In each case the Gospel narrative in the sense in which it was written is refused credence; and so such a statement as that of Dr. Abbott's (in which *e.g.* some miracles appear as phenomena of faith-healing) is not an acceptance of miracles; it is a rejection of them. For what he meant is not what the writers of the Gospels meant. Between the two meanings lies the gulf which separates a view of the world which we must call natural or popular, and a view which would best be termed spiritual.

Looked at in this light, the question of conformity is no longer whether miracles can be interpreted; it must take the form, Are the miraculous events of the Gospels believed in the sense in which they were recorded? I cannot better illustrate the difference between the two questions than by taking an example which Mr. Rashdall has himself supplied. On page 159 in the articles referred to, he says it is possible to interpret the Virgin Birth in the sense that Christ was without sin. I should be sorry to deny that it is so; but I suppose it will hardly be maintained that this is the obvious meaning, either in the case of the Gospel narrative or in that

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of the Creed. I imagine it to be an interpretation which would not even cross the mind of one man out of a thousand, who approached the Gospel account without bias or preparation. And I am somewhat sceptical as to the existence of any kind of general understanding which would justify a clergyman in tacitly adopting such an interpretation. As Professor Sidgwick says, he is only justified after his congregation has been educated up to his interpretation, not before. It is surely a significant and striking fact that men who repeat every week the Creed which states the barest elements of belief should require to write volumes to explain what it means.

In another passage, Mr. Rashdall states his belief that miracles are of secondary importance; "the question upon which the possibility of honestly taking orders depends is . . . primarily the question of the nature and historical position of Christ." Now that the nature of Christ is of much greater importance than any miracles recorded in the Bible or elsewhere, is a position which I should be sorry to dispute; but, of course, this is not the point at issue. What Mr. Rashdall means is that a clergyman who is uncertain about miracles (or about *some* miracles) may regard them as of lesser importance for the Christian congregation whom it is his office to teach. I do not think this can be admitted without considerable qualification. In the educated world it is possible (though I do not believe it is strictly the case) that miracles do not constitute an integral part, or a supremely important part, of Christian doctrine; that Christianity is not considered to stand or fall with the miraculous element involved in it. But I think that such an assertion, if made of the mass of Christians throughout this country, would entirely misrepresent the facts. It is surely true that Christianity is still in the main taught through miracles; children are led to believe in Christ with the help and through the medium of His miraculous acts (perhaps it would be difficult to teach them in any other way); and when they come to years of discretion, and begin to understand and repeat the Creeds, I cannot believe that, except in some rare cases, the miraculous element falls into a secondary position. If it were ever put clearly before the mass

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of Christians that miracles are of secondary importance, that the Church allows a doubting or liberal attitude towards some at least of them, the transition might take place naturally enough; but is it ever, or is it habitually so put? Instead of that, the man or boy who begins to question his belief finds the air filled with the sound of controversy; on the one side, he hears that miracles are impossible or ridiculous, on the other he is told with more or less vehemence and more or less circumstantiality that, whatever else is true or false, miracles did actually happen; that the only refuge from scepticism is the belief in a divine revelation as it is to be found in the orthodox doctrine; that with the truth of the Gospel miracles the existence of God and the possibility of a future life are bound up; that the English Church holds the doctrines to-day which she held centuries ago, and that outside her pale there is no salvation. And so it comes about that to one generation after another the religious question appears in the light of a great alternative,—on the one hand the abandonment of all that is held precious, and on the other the acceptance of a creed into which miracles are interwoven beyond all possibility of detachment. To the majority of those who grow up to be members of the English Church (for surely a larger part are not theologians and are innocent of a liberalizing theology) no opportunity is offered, even if it were desired, of relegating miracles to a secondary place.

Now, if this is the substructure upon which Christian belief is built up, I cannot see that a clergyman is justified in weakening or withdrawing it, without making a further avowal of his position than Mr. Rashdall demands. It may be fair enough that the clergy should be allowed to be silent on some matters; but I cannot see how miracles which are mentioned in the Creed can be brought under this head. The question is not whether the liberal clergyman regards a particular miracle as of no "spiritual importance," but whether it has such importance to a conservative congregation. And in an age when it is still believed in civilized countries that certain miracles are done every day, I think it would be rash to say that an ordinary Christian congregation has come

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to attach little importance to the miracles associated with Christ's life.

To pass on to the second of Professor Sidgwick's statements criticised by Mr. Rashdall,—viz., that a clergyman must believe in the most literal interpretation of everything contained in the Creeds. I confess I cannot understand how Mr. Rashdall can regard the "general declaration of assent" as applying to the Creeds in no other sense than it does to the rest of the Prayer-book and Articles (if I understand him aright). Whether it does so formally or not is a matter of comparative unimportance; but where the question of veracity depends on a general understanding, it surely makes some difference that a clergyman regularly expresses his belief in the Creeds, and not in the rest of the Prayer-book. When a doubt arises in the mind of a lay-member as to what his clergyman *does* believe, I do not think he will regard the latter's general acceptance of the Articles, and his continually expressed belief in the Creeds, as being upon the same footing. It is one thing to express general assent to a body of doctrine, and another to repeat at regular intervals a set form of words. In a later passage Mr. Rashdall says, "A man ought to satisfy himself that his disbelief is of the same order as those which public opinion has already recognized as falling within the permissible limits." It is here that the liberalizing spirit, as applied to the Creeds, is to enter in; and the question upon which I wish to concentrate attention in the rest of this article is, How far is this liberalizing spirit to go? Mr. Rashdall's attitude may be gathered from the following passage: "I should not admit that every man who went one step further in the latitudinarian direction than was recognized by the current morality of his day was doing a wrong act." He may "to some extent take the law into his own hands, and do what many of his best contemporaries would regard as dishonest or untruthful." Harm may be done by "weakening the respect for truth and sincerity," but it can be counterbalanced by the good. And so apparently it must go on. I think it would be well to remind ourselves that creeds exist for the sake of man, and not for the sake of creeds. It seems often to be

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taken for granted that a creed must remain unalterable throughout all changes of opinion. But Mr. Rashdall does admit the possibility of modification, and if it is agreed that creeds must alter in time, the question arises, in what way the alteration is to take place. I believe that there are ultimately two ways possible.

The first is the way of Obsolescence. It is that which is advocated, or at least suggested throughout Mr. Rashdall's article. Upon this method progress is possible, because a clergyman is allowed to use words not only in the sense which they generally bear, but also in the sense which he believes they ought to bear, and in course of time will come to bear. Good must in this sense come out of evil. "A more rational Sunday has largely been secured by the conduct of people who were acting against their consciences;" the possibility of a lady excusing herself as "Not at home" without deception is the beneficial result of a countless number of trivial fictions on the part of her predecessors; and similarly the good of religious κοινωνία and theological advance is to come out of the evil of clerical conformity. The clergyman, that is to say, must accept the Anglican doctrine as it is at the time of his taking orders, and endeavor to educate the Christian Church to accept the interpretation he would give it. His attitude to the Anglican community may, in an extreme case, be put thus, "I will repeat these words, and sign these articles, to please you; and later on I shall write a book to show that they do not mean what you think." And so when the leaven has spread, and enlightenment has fallen upon all educated men, the time-honored dogma of the Church will express once more in a new way the religious thought of the age. The deception will have ceased, and there will be no further necessity for an ambiguous conformity; and then the time will have come when unanimity can be found as to those portions of doctrine which have become obsolete. Certain omissions may be agreed upon, and Anglican theology will have taken a step forward. Thus, in a possible Church of England such as Canon Gore would approve, the Athanasian Creed might be abandoned as a creed. In such

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a state of opinion as some others would wish to see, universal consent might be obtained to the proposal to omit the Virgin Birth from the Creed. Other clergymen of the present day might prefer an ideal church in which the miraculous met with even less encouragement.

Now, these very divergences seem to me to bring to light the weak point in this method; for the difficulty is that the general agreement upon certain points, which it presupposes, is just what it seems impossible to find. Mr. Rashdall speaks somewhere of the "acceptance of the main results of the most advanced Old Testament criticism by the leaders of the High Church party." In such matters I have no technical knowledge, but I would fain know whether there is any general agreement in the Church of England to-day as to the occurrence, or non-occurrence, of the miracles recorded in the Old Testament. It was only last year that a churchman, possessed of the greatest intellect of this generation, passed away, and, without possessing any accurate knowledge of Gladstone's theological views, I imagine that the amount of general agreement he would have conceded to the results of Old Testament criticism would have been remarkably meagre. It will hardly be denied that Gladstone in his theological views represented a large and not inconsiderable section of the English Church, —that there are still many who are only too glad to prop their orthodoxy with the authority of his great name. And if this is so, if the co-existence of antagonistic doctrines within the same Church is still characteristic of the age, then the general understanding we are in search of would seem to fade into a distant future.

To me, at all events, it seems that there can be no such agreement so long as the Creeds themselves remain the same. To accept the Anglican doctrine as it is, and then endeavor to come to an understanding as to what part of it is unessential or untrue, is only a new way of attempting to put the cart before the horse. It surely stands to reason that a number of men who start from the same creed cannot go on to criticise or partially reject that creed without producing widely divergent or irreconcilable results. It is with the same

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doctrines that most of us begin as children; it is the same doctrines which numbers of clergymen accept at ordination, and trust to find their explanation as best they can in after-life. And the result is that the very "progressives" themselves differ as to their several lines of progress, and the most advanced critics within the Church are in no agreement as to how far criticism shall go. If a "general agreement" is to be found in this way, I cannot but think that it will come only with the millennium; and that when it does come, it will be an agreement about doctrines which have been obsolete through a number of centuries.

This is one way in which a creed may be altered with the lapse of time, and the other is the way of Protest. It is a method for which it is not difficult to find precedents in the past. The name of Luther may occur to the minds of those who do not regard the Reformation as a discreditable incident in the history of the Church; and it would be possible to find other instances, both before and after Luther's time, of men who were constrained to put the interests of truth above those of religious communion. I cannot agree with those who argue in opposition to this, "What good can one man do by emphasizing his non-conformity? What good can a single would-be candidate for orders do by clinging to a literal veracity, and declining the opportunity of leading the most useful kind of life? What influence has the attitude of any individual man in the sphere of opinion?" I am far from thinking that this reasoning is never sound, but in the case of the most "liberal" type of churchman in the present day I do not think it will hold good, for it amounts to the old line of argument, "Here is something which ought to be done, but why should I contribute to the doing of it?" And perhaps there has never been a reform of any note, either in religious thought or in moral practice, which did not spring in the first instance from the recording of an individual protest. It is not uncommon to hear it said in the present day, in reference to some so-called "heretic" of a past generation, that his dissent was based on a misunderstanding; if he had lived now he would have seen that his views were not really inconsistent

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with the orthodox doctrine; the Church has come to take a wider view of what orthodoxy means, and so on,—the dissentient being spoken of, with a kind of pity, as a man who misinterpreted the attitude of the Church. It seems to me that this is too often a turning of the facts upside down; that the truth is, that if the dissentient and others like him had conformed in their age, theological opinion would never have advanced to the broader view which is now able to tolerate their heterodoxy.

But, further, it may be urged (as it often is urged) that there exists no peculiar need at the present time of an alteration in religious doctrine; that the English Church, for example, has come through criticism triumphantly before now, and will continue to do so for a long time to come. In opposition to this, I believe that there is to-day a special need for protest, arising from the development of thought in the last half-century. That opinion of every kind has undergone a profound modification in that time would, I suppose, hardly be denied; but it seems to me, further, that religious thought of every kind has been, and is still, involved in such a crisis as has not occurred in the past, and will probably not occur again in the future. I think that three lines of thought may be distinguished in the last half-century which have contributed to this result.

In the first place, we have the theory of Evolution, which, however generously it may now be adapted to the doctrine of the English Church, was not regarded on its first appearance as complementary to the scheme of salvation. Secondly, the growth of Anthropology and the comparative study of early races have rendered more and more difficult the conviction that the Jews were a chosen race in the sense in which this was previously held. The comparison of other primitive religions has at least modified the statement that the Jews alone had knowledge of God. And, thirdly, in Oxford at least, various forms of philosophy have arisen, which agree in this, that they are impatient of physical facts as such, and would fain dissociate religion from a reliance upon external or merely historical occurrences. The mention of Green,

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Nettleship, and Wallace will be enough to show what is meant.

I cannot refrain from dwelling again for a moment upon the importance in academic circles of free scope for speculation of every kind. Above all, a philosophical faculty has the right to claim that no hinderances shall be thrown in the path of free inquiry. Philosophy has always flourished with difficulty in an atmosphere of convention or restraint; and its results, even if permanent, will bear for all time the stamp set upon them by the controversies of the age. And therefore it is unlikely that it will produce valuable results in any atmosphere tainted with theological and anti-theological prejudice. It is outside my province to speak specially of the philosophy of religion, but it may perhaps be admitted that it has proved a somewhat tender and reluctant growth in our own country, and I suspect that the reason is not very far to seek. Dispassionate speculation in these regions is not likely to thrive in a society where there still linger vestiges of an unmeaning and burdensome conformity.

In case I should seem to have digressed further than is right, I pass to consider the final objection which may be made to the views I have laid down in this paper. It may be asked, What harm does the Anglican doctrine actually do, compared with the advantage of the κοινωνία implied in a general conformity? This is practically the line taken by Mr. Rashdall near the conclusion of his paper. He speaks of "the non-natural interpretation of a clause or two" as "a very small evil compared with the importance of maintaining the communion." In conclusion, I should like to suggest two lines of answer to this, which I have not time to follow out further.

In the first place, I believe that such doctrines as are to be found in the Athanasian Creed do considerably more harm than is generally supposed by the theologians who are commendably ready at explaining them away. Not every one has a theologian or even a clergyman continually at his right hand; and the uneducated Christian who wanders into the Prayer-book, as it were, by accident, and reads through this

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Creed carefully, or who merely hears or repeats it, is not likely to be reassured by the eighth article, where he will find "that all three Creeds ought thoroughly to be received and believed, for they may be proved by most certain warrants of Holy Scripture." And when he is told by his clergyman that this exceedingly definite language is not to be taken in its obvious meaning, he will be apt to reply, "If it does not mean what it says, why don't you cut it out?" In all seriousness, I believe that an immense amount of harm is done by an undirected use of the Prayer-book; and the feeling will assert itself that a creed has no right to exist for the sake of the educated alone.

And, secondly, I should like to suggest that there is not much use in attempting to preserve κοινωνία in the church, if the κοινωνία is not there. Both Professor Sidgwick and Mr. Rashdall have spoken of the importance of religious communion, and I am far from wishing to detract from its value; but I doubt whether the picture of the English Church during the last forty years is calculated to supply the best historical example of it. It would be tiresome to narrate, even if I were capable of narrating, the disputes and dissensions which have disturbed the peace of the Church in that period; but to those who would contend that this is a diminishing evil, it may be pointed out that the present position of affairs hardly favors their contention. On the one border, if we may put it so, lies the controversy which is finding expression in anti-ritualistic riots; and on the other border arise unceasing murmurs of unrest from the liberalizing theologians of the day and their more orthodox opponents. So that the churchman stands between two fires—he has to distinguish and detach himself from the Roman Catholic on the one hand, and the Latitudinarian on the other. In the face of this, it is difficult to accept the fact, or the possibility, of κοινωνία without reservations which deprive it of much of its value. And in connection with the question of κοινωνία, I cannot but take exception to the assumption tacitly made by Mr. Rashdall that there is only one church which can be taken into account in speaking of religious communion. Professor Sidgwick touches a truer

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note when he says that "spiritual unity will only be completely possible for the modern mind when competent students of theology have come to an agreement on fundamental questions;" and when he mentions sympathy and co-operation between different churches as a means to this end. I think it is to a greater sympathy of this kind that we must look, to recompense ourselves for the loss of κοινωνία within any single church.

To conclude, both Professor Sidgwick and Mr. Rashdall, in dealing with the question of conformity, have spoken, expressly or otherwise, of a "balance of utilities." I have already expressed my doubt whether this is precisely the spirit in which to approach the question. Without indorsing all the conclusions to which Mr. John Morley comes in his work on "Compromise," I think that even this age may still have something to learn from the passage in which he says, "To those . . . who think that the new faith will come so slowly that it is not worth while for the poor mortal of a day to make himself a martyr, we may suggest that the new faith when it comes will be of little worth, unless it has been shaped by generations of honest and fearless men, and unless it finds in those who are to receive it an honest and fearless temper."

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THE FUTILITY OF THE KANTIAN DOCTRINE OF ETHICS.*

THE limits of the present article will only allow of touching on the salient points of Kant's ethical system as contained in the works referred to below, and whether such cursory treatment prove sufficient for the purpose indicated by its title the reader must judge.

Kant's first treatise opens with the inquiry whether it is possible to establish a system of Ethics that shall be a purely rational science, "perfectly cleared of everything which is only empirical and which belongs to anthropology,"—referring in these terms to the current doctrine, received from the Greeks, that a life of virtue is "a life according to nature." That such a rational science of Ethics is possible he takes to be "evident from the common idea of duty and the moral law." This is Kant's starting-point,—the moral law. This simple conception is the one thing in Ethics he distinctly sees; other things, such as freedom, autonomy, personality, he sees indistinctly, like the blind man of the gospel who saw men as trees walking. And so it may be questioned whether the moral law is for him really a starting-point,—whether he ever really gets beyond it. The correlative idea of duty Kant defines as "the necessity of acting solely from respect for the law." An act from inclination, then, is not an act of duty, even if it be such as would be an act of duty were it not for the inclination. To take his own illustration, beneficence is a duty, but if one is beneficent from the pleasure he takes in doing good to others, his acts are not acts of duty. To act from respect for the law is to act simply from the sense of obligation, and that involves acting against our inclination; and so Kant gives us a further definition of duty as "a compulsion to a purpose or aim unwillingly adopted."

Thus the will acknowledges the law to be the sole authority

* "Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten" and "Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft."

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that should regulate its action. In Kant's words, "every impulse being set aside, nothing remains but the universal conformity of action to law in general." Law, then, confronts the activity of will with its imperative command,—but to *do* what? *What* does it command? On the various answers to this question the various ethical systems are founded. Kant, however, gives no answer to the question, or only one that is singularly indirect. He only lays down the formal precept: Act always so that your "maxim"—your rule of action in a given case—shall be such as you would will to become a universal law, or, in other words, such as you judge fitting to become a universal law. This very abstract statement he illustrates by a practical application. He asks: May I ever make a promise with the intention of breaking it? We decide the question when we ask whether such a rule of action can ever be made a universal law, for, while I may will to lie, I cannot will that lying should be a universal law. *Why* not, Kant does not seek to explain. Fitness or unfitness to become a law does not appear as a result of external considerations, is not grounded in any relation to external interests. A practical universal law, we are told, is such in *form* only, apart from *matter*. This does not help us much, for form is defined to be fitness for universal legislation, and we only learn that a law is universal because it is fit to be. Kant says of it that it is purely rational; it would seem more exact to say that it is purely abstract. However that may be, we have here the criterion of all moral action,—fitness to become a universal law. What does this criterion mean? That conduct is right whose working rule is universally applicable, and to be that it only needs to be logically consistent and unvarying,—that is, to admit of no exception, or to be universally applicable. We seem unable to get any farther, and we are moved to ask, how does mere universality invest the law with any moral authority? As the criterion of an act of duty, the principle of universality, taken as purely formal or empty, seems, to say the least, unhelpful.

As such, however, Kant really does not take it. As the sagacious Bunsby has it, the bearing of his observations lies

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in the application of them; and when he comes to application, his criterion of right conduct becomes quite another thing, and the fitness of a law for universality, or the universal approval of it, appears to be nothing else than the mark and evidence of its fitness to promote the well-being of mankind. He gives us four examples of ill conduct: suicide, obtaining money on false pretences, non-exertion of one's capacities for usefulness, and indifference to the sufferings of others. In each case the conduct is condemned as morally wrong because it is not fit to furnish a universal law. But why? Evidently because of its effects and consequences if it were to be accepted and acted on by all men; because it would be socially injurious. The fact is, though Kant seems strangely unaware of it, something serious has happened to his principle, and the fitness or unfitness of a "maxim" to become a universal law now simply signifies its compatibility or incompatibility with the general welfare. With this the "Categorical Imperative"—the absolute command of the moral law—descends from its autocratic grandeur to a simple appeal to our instinctive sympathy with our kind and our instinctive desire for the well-being of society, while we for our part turn from the blind worship of that moral fatality to simple Utilitarianism and seeking "the greatest good of the greatest number." Worse than this: in the consideration of the fourth example we are surprised by a Homeric nod. Kant argues that a man cannot will that indifference to the wants and sorrows of mankind should be the universal law, because such a will would contradict itself, for many cases might occur in which he himself would have need of the sympathy and aid of his fellow-men, and of this he would by his own will have deprived himself. Thus all unconsciously the high-souled thinker drops from the transcendental empyrean to the depths of bald self-interest.

The general principle of action implicitly referred to in the discussion of the four examples is that of *adaptation to an end*, although it is one that has been expressly repudiated by Kant as a ground of moral obligation. Indeed, the new principle appears in explicit terms under the third example where Kant urges the duty of cultivating one's gifts on the ground that

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"a rational being must will that his faculties be developed, since they serve him for various purposes and have been given him for this end." Now this conception of end or finality as a principle of action is altogether out of place in a system of Ethics whose first principle is moral law as announced in the Categorical Imperative. For here abstract obligation is its own end. The law gives no reason for its command, for then its authority would not be absolute, but would depend upon the reason, or be transferred to it. On the other hand, the end of an action is just this reason for it, and the supreme end or reason of all action is, as such, and is recognized to be, the supreme law of all action. Something of this dawns dimly on the mind of Kant, but still his great Imperative—the foreign despot issuing its unreasoned commands to an unreasoning will—dominates his field of vision; and so the further he proceeds along the line of consideration he seems to have strayed into, the more pronounced becomes the inconsistency of his statements and the confusion of his thought. Thus when he tells us that "rational beings are indicated by nature as ends in themselves, and are consequently called persons," and thence deduces the imperative: "So act as to treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of others, as an end always and never as a means," it is plain that he now asserts what he has strenuously denied, that it is possible to derive the Categorical Imperative from investigation of the constitution of human nature. Moral philosophy, he has contended, does not borrow the least thing from the knowledge of man himself, but gives laws *a priori* to him as a rational being. That is to say, the nature of man can throw no light upon the ground of moral obligation, for the moral law is self-existent and absolutely binding upon the nature of man. This position, as we see, our philosopher cannot maintain. Though he would reduce duty to a purely formal and abstract relation, he soon finds himself—or rather we soon find him—following the method of psychological analysis which he has insisted must be carefully avoided. In other words, Kant has returned to the doctrine of the ancients, which he began with rejecting, that

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the supreme law of duty is to act "according to nature," and that the end of man's nature and its adaptations can be discerned. This return is unconscious on the part of Kant, because he does not understand what the doctrine is which the Greek thinkers set forth. The principle that every rational being is an end in and for itself is not one, he observes, that is borrowed from experience, but is an original rational axiom. As if any one had ever supposed it was borrowed from experience in Kant's limited sense of that term; as if the nature of man which is the end and law of his action were what Kant calls "empirical," or anything else than human nature in its essential universal rationality.

We find, then, that Kant comes in sight of the principle of finality, but does not reach an insight of the nature of its authority, and consequently does not abandon the Categorical Imperative. On his return to it, however, it seems to wear a new aspect, and he presents it under the new appellation of the autonomy of the will. Yet with the change of name we do not find a change of nature. We have, indeed, a term pregnant with deep meaning, but it seems that we have only the term without its meaning. The autonomy of the will appears only to signify its acknowledgment of the sovereign authority of law, or its constant obedience to duty. It is the direct subjection of the will to the moral law, as contrasted with its subjection to any impulse of desire, which latter is called the heteronomy of the will. If the word autonomy means more than this, there is an end of the Categorical Imperative. If it means what it says, self-government, it means something incompatible with a sovereign authority that gives law to its subjects. And hence the question arises, what, in Kant's view of it, is the relation of the autonomous will to the practical reason and its Categorical Imperative? To this we get no satisfactory answer. In fact, the whole matter is hopelessly obscured by Kant's singularly indefinite use of the term will. Does he mean by the will a faculty of human nature co-ordinate with the faculty of reason, and, if so, what are the specific functions of each? Or does the will include the reason, so that the subject of con-

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sideration is the rational will; or is it, on the other hand, the practical reason which has absorbed the will? All we can say is that the reason and the will seem to be blended together in some very mystifying way. And, meantime, what has become of the rational being called a person whom we met with a short time ago?

Not troubling himself with these questions, Kant goes on to tell us that the ground of the autonomy of the will is in its freedom,—which, indeed, is what we should expect. Here, again, we have a great word, and one that stirs the heart, but again we find Kant's notion so defective that the freedom he announces is freedom of a very limited description. The will is free, he says, in that it is independent of any agency foreign to itself,—or in that it is free. By *any* foreign agency, however, Kant means the emotions and desires; the will is free from the determinism of sensuous impulse. This freedom we are not directly conscious of, but it is a necessary inference from the Categorical Imperative. The response to that command is I *ought*, and this implies I *can*. This "can" is freedom; or freedom is simply the capacity to obey the law. So far as the will acts in response to the commands of reason, it is called free,—that is, free from sense and selfish motive; and this freedom would never have been dreamed of but that the moral law enforces obligations which necessarily imply it. It will be noted that all along freedom is viewed metaphysically, or simply as an unconditioned fact, implied in the moral law, which is the basis of all *a priori* knowledge; and we find Kant insisting that they who explain freedom on empirical principles and treat it as a physiological fact thereby deprive the soul of all knowledge of a supersensible or noumenal world. Still, he so far psychologizes in the matter as to make the dogmatic assertion that "man judges he can do a certain thing because he is conscious that he ought, and thus he recognizes that he is free, a fact which but for the moral law he never would have known." What warrant is there for this order of sequence which makes the consciousness of freedom derivative from the consciousness of obligation? It is easy to reverse it and say that, as matter of logical pri-

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ority, man first knows himself free, and thereupon knows the "ought." Of course, Kant must hold that freedom cannot be a fact of experimental knowledge, because for him experience is always sensible, and empirical implies contingent; and, therefore, if freedom were given in consciousness, or were not *a priori*, it would not be unconditioned, or it would not be freedom at all. The simple fact is, however, that freedom is integral with self-consciousness; my self that I am conscious of is self-active, or free from external determinism. The trouble with Kant is, as Hegel remarks, that he persists in occupying the point of view of consciousness as distinguished from self-consciousness; that is to say, he never really frees himself from the old sensational philosophy, with its postulates of dualism and mechanical connection.

And so it is with the dualism of the moral law and the will that is free to obey it that Kant begins and ends his system of Ethics. When he inadvertently makes the consequences of conduct the criterion of duty, and so is brought to end or purpose as a principle of action, he does not even see that he has entered on a path that will lead him to wider horizons; and the new ideas he encounters of autonomy and freedom he drags back under the despotism of the Categorical Imperative to mutilate on the Procrustean bed of its fixed limitation. It is true that now and again he emerges from his shadowland of unreal abstractions and touches the realm of the actual, but here he does not find himself at home, and he soon returns to the more congenial habitat. In one of these excursions he comes to a late and partial recognition of personality as "a faculty of a being free from the mechanism of nature but subject to special laws given by its own reason, so that the person as belonging to the sensible world is subject to his own personality as belonging to the intelligible world." Even thus defined as a "faculty," personality has revolutionary implications, and it is allowed to disappear from view after inspiring sundry eloquent passages which occur as *obiter dicta* in the exposition of the Kantian Ethics.

That Kant should hold to the Categorical Imperative and the autonomy of the will as the two metaphysical foundations

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of morals,—that a mind so acute as his should fail to see the utter incompatibility of these two principles—if autonomy is to mean autonomy—shows strikingly the blinding power of an obstinate preconception. Let us be honest with the Kantian dualism and not play fast and loose with it. It comes to this: The moral law imposes upon the will the obligation of obedience, and hence the law, whencesoever derived, is an authority over the will and foreign to the will. We confront an antithesis: on the one hand is the naked command of authority, on the other the volitional capacity solicited by the promptings of desire. Thus what ought to be done is a constraint upon the doer. Duty, as Kant says, is always a compulsion to an end unwillingly adopted. One of two things: the will must either disregard and defy the law, or it must efface itself and reluctantly submit to it. In the Kantian morality this antithesis is persistent and its elements are held apart in perpetual isolation. And hence under this despotism of the law all talk of the freedom or autonomy of the will is idle, unless these terms are to be eviscerated of their meaning, as in fact by Kant they are. For the moral law taken by itself is a necessity external to will, or laid upon the will; autonomy is an internal necessity, or the self-necessitation of the will; and this only is its true freedom. Now, autonomous will, or will in the whole truth of its nature, is the latent unity of the dualism of law and immediate (unmediated) will, and it comes to view as that dualism shows its dependence upon it. Let us see how it does so: The law of Right simply asserts itself, producing no credentials. It claims sovereignty over the will, but gives no hint of the grounds on which it rests the claim. Thus unexplained and unaccounted for Law is evidently an abstraction; that is, as the word imports, a severance from something—a part of a whole. To find, then, what Law is and why it is Law,—that is, to explain it and account for it,—we must find the whole of which it is a part; and to do that we must find the other part. But this latter is already found, for evidently it is the other abstraction of the moral antithesis, immediate will, or self-will. And the whole, the concrete unity of the abstract dualism, is not far to seek.

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In the antithesis, abstract liberty and abstract law are opposed to each other as mutually exclusive; but a closer scrutiny discovers them to be correlatives. Look at them: the first appears as an independent faculty of willing, of choosing,—an unlimited potentiality of action. Now, in order to be itself, to fulfil itself, a capacity of choice must choose something, a power to act must act somehow. That is, the immediate will require mediation; it implies an object, an end to determine it, if it is ever to choose or act at all. So, on the other hand, Law appears as the universal rule, or determiner of action, and, therefore, it requires for its own fulfilment an independent power to act. It imposed duty, or prescribes an "ought," and that is to imply a free agent. Thus each of the abstract elements is what it is only in reference to the other. To state one is to imply the other, and whatever their opposition in the antithetic statement, the underlying implication reveals their mutual dependence. Each of these opposites needs the other to complete itself, and viewed in their organic relation they are seen to be complementary factors of one concrete unity, Free Will.

To reach this unity we have started from its separate elements, and hence it may appear to *result* from their correlation. On the contrary, however, it is their *prius*, and that in which alone they have reality. This will be evident if we substitute analysis for synthesis and begin with the unity. First, then, Will appears immediately as bare capacity of willing; but as simply this it is evidently incomplete. As it is entirely independent, it is also entirely indeterminate. It is like a boat's rudder, swinging loose without a steersman. For want of specific direction of its activity, its power of willing everything in general remains an impotence to will anything in particular. Thus any usurper may seize the empty throne, and the control of action fall into the hands of a succession of fugitive desires. And so, secondly, in order to determine itself or realize itself, in order to exert its dormant energy, Will from simple unity falls into duality and apparent contradiction, through relation to that which shall determine it, that which appears in this antithesis as an external obligation, the moral

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law. Finally, the antithesis is resolved by this, that all along there is only one thing under consideration, namely, Will. From within this unity the antithesis develops, and therefore into the unity it must return. The law of Right is the determiner of Will; but Will is *e natura* self-determining; therefore, the law of Right is itself the Will. When it wills the Right it wills itself—wills Will; and, hence, then only it is free. When it wills what is not right, it wills what is foreign to itself; and that is to be subject to a foreign control. Thus righteousness is autonomy, or freedom, for these are precise synonyms, and there is no liberty except liberty to be the law unto oneself.

So, then, on the moral plane righteousness appears as the law *for* will—a positive law; on the spiritual plane it is seen to be an organic law; that is, it is the law *for* will only because it is the law *of* will, the will's own law or nature. With this, law, as positive, is done away; that is, not *what* the law commands, but that it should *command* it. One who is obedient to the Right, as to an authority set over him, is *obedient* from unconsciousness of his essential nature; let him see that righteousness is the very nature of spirit, and for him what was obedience becomes freedom. In Kant's abstract view of moral consciousness there are two principles—subject and object—mechanically related; in concrete reality there is one, a self-determining power. Will is that single energy whose subjectivity is volition and whose objectivity is righteousness; and thus human will is made in the image of the divine.

To speak of human will as by the law of its own being essentially righteous is, indeed, to regard it in its ideal perfection. Yet it is something to know that this ideal is not the unattainable beyond of the "infinite progress" that Kant makes it, but the potentiality of human spirit, for the potential is the actual in germ. Perfection is no dream of extravagant aspiration, but the fulfilment of a latent capacity; to become divinely good is within the power of the child of God, and his life is this becoming. That law merges in the larger truth of freedom, and that to realize this ideal freedom is the end of human life, we are taught explicitly in part and everywhere implicitly by the Christianity of the New Testament;

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and Kant's study of the Scripture must have been superficial, indeed, to allow him to say of its moral teaching that "by its suitability to the limitations of finite beings it brought all the conduct of man under the discipline of a duty, plainly set before their eyes, which does not permit them to indulge in dreams of imaginary moral perfection; and thus set the bounds of humility to self-conceit as well as to self-love, both of which are ready to mistake their limits."

And, now, if theoretically the Kantian doctrine of Ethics turns out incomplete, inconsistent, and unsatisfactory, practically it encounters these two objections, that it aims only at a spurious righteousness, and it fails even in that aim. Kant lays it down that "pure reason must be able to determine the will by the mere form of the practical rule, without supposing any feeling;" again, "What is essential in the moral worth of actions, is that the moral law should directly (exclusively) determine the will;" and again, "The objective principle of determination must alone be the subjectively sufficient determining principle;" and once more, "Practical reason forbids us to place the subjectively determining principle of right actions —that is, their moral motive—in anything but the law itself." Here we are in the moral antithesis, where the law assumes an authority over the will which it either defies or submits to. Suppose it obeys, what is the character of such legal righteousness? Kant has told us that acting from the sense of duty, or obligation, means a *reluctant* obedience to the right. In fact, law does not consult the inclinations, and does not care about them. It imposes an obligation, and it does not allow the will to have a will of its own. It is plain, then, that law cannot make the will a good will,—cannot in any way affect the will itself. The righteousness *of the will*, the agent's *own* righteousness, law cannot secure and does not seek. That men shall do right, not that they shall be good, is the law's concern. As the direct opposite of spontaneity, it seeks to subject the will, not to reform it; to regulate conduct, not to educate character; to compel good deeds, not to make good men. No system which begins and ends with duty, whose one principle is imperative obligation, and its one virtue

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unquestioning obedience, can get further than this. And so "by the works of the law shall no flesh be justified;" for though the subjection of conduct to mechanical control produces a superficial rectitude, the inward springs of character, the quality of the being that we are, remain unchanged.

The second objection to the Kantian Ethics is that practically it will not work, and since ethics is eminently a practical affair, this is a serious objection. Take this doctrine into the streets, preach it to ordinary men, and what effect will it have? Say to them, you *ought;* that is the supreme law for your action. *Après?* What then? Is this going to suppress the multitudinous motions of self-will, the insistent claims of passion? "The law is weak against the flesh," a saner psychologist has told us, for a mere moral imperative supplies no power to fulfil its behests. You may lay a railway track to a distant city, and place a locomotive on the rails; they will guide it to its destination, but you must *start* your locomotive. So you may lay down rules of action that you trust will guide a human life to the heavenly city, but you must furnish motive power to the will. Ethics may be called the science of life, and he who is instructed in ethics knows he ought to live. But after all, such knowledge is neither very difficult nor very valuable. Ethical truth is the simplest of all, and the least helpful. Matthew Arnold has said, "The object of systems of morality is to take possession of human life, to save it from being abandoned to passion or allowed to drift at hazard, to give it happiness by establishing it in the practice of virtue; and this object they seek to attain by prescribing to human life fixed principles of action, fixed rules of conduct. Thus human life has always a clue to follow, and may always be making way towards its goal." If only the matter were as simple as that! Human life has scarcely justified this innocent confidence in rules and regulations. Portia is a better moralist: "If to do were as easy as to know what were good to do, chapels had been churches, and poor men's cottages princes' palaces. I can easier tell twenty what were good to be done than be one of the twenty to follow mine own teaching." The truth is, life, as an affair of practice, is rather

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an art than a science, and in all art the first thing is power—power of soul. If it is the energy of creative imagination that produces immortal art-work, and not careful adherence to fixed rules, so it is with the art of living. Life means spontaneous initiative, and it is this that distinguishes vitality from mechanism. And so, "if there were a law that could give life, verily righteousness should be by the law;" and this was the aim of the most helpful of moral teachers, that men might have life, and have it more abundantly. He went direct to the heart of man, out of which are the issues of life. He saw that conduct is a result of the inward disposition, and He made that His chief concern; for could He reach and influence the sources of action, action might be left to take care of itself.* Therefore He sought to kindle an aspiration towards an infinite ideal which should work a transforming change of the inner man.† He sought to overcome the evil passions of men, not by restraint, but by a new and more powerful passion which should make His followers enthusiasts for goodness.‡ And so when the Christians appeared in a heathen city, it was not as persons of well-regulated conduct, but rather as fiery revolutionists, and men cried in alarm, "These that have turned the world upside down are come hither also."

So, then, what steam is to the locomotive, that the roused and energized emotions are to the will. And here we come to Kant's πρωτονψευδος, his initial and colossal error. He assumes that the feelings, owing to their instability, are incapable of any such fixed relations as involve universal principles, and so his purely rational science of ethics, which is to be cleared of everything empirical, excludes them from the realm of moral activity. This is to render such a science worthless, for a science must take account of all the facts presented to

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* "A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit."

† "Be ye perfect, even as your Father in heaven is perfect."

‡ "When a strong man armed, keepeth his palace, his goods are in peace; but when a stronger than he shall come upon him and overcome him, he taketh from him all his armor wherein he trusted and divideth his spoils. . . .

"The Kingdom of heaven suffereth violence, and the violent take it by force."

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it; morals must deal with the whole of human nature, and not rule one-third of it out of consideration. And if you do rule it out, it is there all the same. You do not extinguish a man you find objectionable by telling him that you propose to consider him as non-existent. The opposition that Kant sets up between the sensibilities and the practical reason, or the rational will, is one of those multifarious abstract distinctions by which he cuts up the spiritual organism into separate independent pieces, destroying with its unity its life. The element of feeling is contingent and variable, and Kant will have none of it. Well, "*souvent femme varie*," but we should be sorry to lose her. Human emotions are subject to whim and caprice, inconstant as the lawless wind, and so there shall be no more high affections inspiring to noble action, no more self-devotion of the patriot, no more religious enthusiasm calling the missionary to hardship and peril, no more eager thirst for knowledge such as makes Kant a life-long seeker of the truth. So far as affection prompts the devotee of duty to good actions, so far the morality of his motive will be vitiated. "It is a very beautiful thing," our philosopher remarks, "to do good to men from love to them and from sympathetic good will, but this is not the true moral maxim by which we pretend with fanciful pride to set ourselves above the thought of duty, like volunteers; and as if we were independent of the command, to want to do of our own good pleasure what we think we need no command to do. Duty and obligation are the only names that we must give to our relations to the moral law." Such extravagant austerity seems a reduction to the absurd, or at least to the righteousness of the Scribes and Pharisees; we prefer the latter teaching that love is the fulfilling of the law.

And if Kant's law-worship recalls that of the Pharisees, it is because he, like them, has lost sight of the giver of the law. What is the moral law, taken by itself? It is the indicator of right and wrong, the standard and rule of action, as a pair of scales is an instrument for measuring weight. When you give short weight to your neighbor, that is an offense against him,—not against the scales. You owe no duty to the scales.

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And why should we feel remorse for a sin against the law? It has no blood in its veins, no sensibility; it is as impassive, as lifeless, as the scales. The truth is, there are no moral relations that are not personal relations; and unless we speak in metaphor, hypostasizing a simple thought-object into a fancied personality, we cannot speak of the authority of a law or command; the authority belongs to the person who issues the command, and it is to that person we are under obligation. Man's relations of duty are his relations to God, to his fellow-men, and to *himself*. His relations to others are essential to man's being, but his whole being is not in those relations,—or out of himself,—as with the finite thing. In his religious dependence he still maintains his independence, for it is in his self-consciousness that he is conscious of the Divine, and it is himself he finds in organic unity with God. So with social membership. If the social environment is the essential condition of human existence, so that taken out of society the individual loses his humanity and lapses to the animal; if, in a word, individuality is only realized through organic relation to the social whole, it is because in that relation the individual is related to his true self.* When, however, man comes home to the inner being of his moral consciousness, the "other" has left him, and he stands alone in simple self-relation. In his freedom of self-determination he gives law to himself; he can obey or disobey himself, and punish or reward himself with condemnation or approval, thus binding himself to acts and feelings which he acknowledges to be right or wrong. He can propose to himself an ideal end, and in responding to it impose it on himself as law, freely choosing it to rule his life because his soul sees that it is good. And as he learns to reverence his conscience as his king he finds that in his duty to himself all others are included.

> "This above all—to thine own self be true,
> And it must follow, as the night and day,
> Thou canst not then be false to any man."

* It may be added that in both relations dependence is mutual. As a sun, to be a sun, must have its planets, so we are as necessary to God as He is to us; and but for its individual members there could be no social organism.

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Such as these, the most intimate of moral relations, can have no existence save in the experience of a personal being, nor can they exist in their highest form save where personality is most consciously and vividly intense.

That Kant's exposition of moral authority and obligation should ignore personality altogether, and for the true law-giver in morals substitute an abstraction whose reality is a figment of fancy, is only what must follow from the agnosticism which cuts him off from recognizing any other than a phantom Ego hovering beyond the limits of the knowable. And with agnosticism we are left at the end. The resort to the practical reason for the certainties refused by the pure reason recalls the clever feat of the man in the nursery rhyme who scratched out his eyes by jumping into one bush and scratched them in again by jumping into another. In Kant's case, however, it appears that eyes cannot be regained by any such second jump, and, like Rasselas, the "Critique of the Practical Reason" concludes with no conclusion. It tells us that the reality of our ethical beliefs is rooted only in our own conviction of their practical importance; and so far from restoring the truths that escaped the grasp of the speculative reason, it can only bid us forbear their quest and console ourselves for hopeless ignorance by looking up to the starry heavens above in wondering worship and down to the moral law within in reverent faith.

The truth is, Kant initiates a great movement of transition in philosophic thought which he does not carry out to its completion. Hence, while in relation to his successors his historical importance is of the greatest, the value of his actual achievement in view of its final result—or lack of result—is relatively small; and on the whole it must be said of him, as Arnold said of Maurice, that he passed his life beating the brush without starting the hare. Or we might liken him to a great captain who invades a land lying under the powers of darkness. By deep-laid strategy he gains the key of the situation, and the road to the capital lies open before him; when with a strange fatuity, blind to the significance of his own achievement, he renounces the conquest already within his grasp and concludes a peace with the enemy, by the terms

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of which he retains the restricted territory he now occupies in the character of tributary vassal to the defeated sovereign.

F. A. HENRY.

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THE PEACE THAT COMETH OF UNDERSTANDING:

A DISCOURSE FOR NECESSITARIANS.

I TRUST I may find favor with our scientific friends if I begin with a large assumption. I assume that from the planets in their orbits to the street-cabs in the thoroughfares the Universe is ruled by Law, and that though "Chance," "Contingency," "Caprice," and many another word still do duty in literature, they are recognized as but a decent veil for human ignorance, and not as implying a serious belief that at any given point, even the most insignificant, Law will be found to fail. I assume, by consequence, that every thing and every person are but "retainers to the rest of Nature," and stand indissolubly related by the ligaments of Law to the Cosmos in which each fills its insignificant yet indispensable place.

This assumption made, we may go on to consider the consolation it affords, for it is to be feared that the champions of Free Will sometimes do scant justice to the necessitarian. Terrified at the very thought that Freedom may be in danger, they seem quite to forget that a doctrine of necessity, whatever tidings of bondage it may seem to carry to the Will, brings, and brings just in proportion as it is thoroughgoing, nothing but encouragement to the understanding. It tells us that our actions, like all other events, are rigorously due to causes. Be it so. Just for that reason are they capable of explanation. Just for that reason can the understanding find in human life, as it has so often found in Nature, a new world, in the conquest of which it can attain a fuller development and a deeper satisfaction. Who will say that this is a little thing? Is there in all the round of man's endowments one

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that is more eminently human than this desire and capacity to know, to explain, to understand? And if Necessitarianism opens up new and splendid vistas to this, is it not rather to be regarded as a doctrine of emancipation—intellectual emancipation—than as a message of bondage? The more so if it should appear on closer examination that, in proportion as we succeed in understanding our lives, our lives themselves do not remain by any means just what they were before.

At least and lowest, the patient and engrossing study of life (our own lives or those of others) may furnish an anodyne. Biography tells us of Bastile prisoners who found in the daily observation of the very insects that infested their cells an intellectual antidote that saved them from despair. May we not learn from them? Prisoners within "that inverted bowl men call the sky," may we not touch the springs of pity, or of mirth, as the understanding eye marks the strange ongoings of "God's wondrous manikins here below"?

Anodyne, however, is not much. Far more important is the fact that by the study, as scientific as we can make it, of men's lives, and especially of our own, we can *rid ourselves of illusions*. Let us take an instance. Some one has had a cherished project. It has miscarried, and the blow is crushing. At first it is all unintelligible.

> "God's intimations fail
> In clearness rather than in energy,"

as Browning has it, and the man can think of nothing but his calamity, or at most of its quite immediate and obvious effects upon his life. But with time, and the calmness that time brings, comes reflection, and with reflection the perception, growing ever clearer, that, after all, the event could hardly have been otherwise. The sufferer follows up this clue. Going resolutely to work, he analyses out the conditions that have brought about the upshot,—his own share in it, the share of others, the share of circumstance, the whole complex web of conditions, so far at least as he can unravel it, till at last a multitude of conditions, of which at first he was wholly unconscious, comes into view; and he begins to see with ever

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clearer vision that when he initiated his project he was acting in great ignorance and blindness. He sees *now*, as he did not see at first, that the project of which the defeat was so bitter was formed in ignorance of the actual causes, the real conditions involved. If only he had understood them sooner! If only he had been wise in time! But of course he did not; he was not; and so undertook an impossible project and had his bitter disappointment. And what *now*,—now that he has come to understand how it all came about? Is he to laugh or weep or curse the day he was born, *or* is he not rather, if he be wise, likely to be, from his very soul, thankful *that he has got rid of an illusion?*

But there are subtler illusions than this, and among them are the illusions of the passions. These are not accidental, nor can man escape them. For, in truth, they are due to his very nature. For it is of the nature of man, at least to begin with, to be pictorial in his thinking. He craves for images, and he is not to be blamed for doing so. But he pays an inevitable penalty. For it is of the very essence of the imagination that it does its best to palm off upon us some partial aspect, some fragment of life, some quite limited experience as if it were everything. It seizes on some experience and figures it in such definite form and clothes it in such vivid colors that its real importance becomes grotesquely exaggerated; until at last, paltry fraction of a paltry experience though it be, it comes to usurp the whole mind and to crush out the greater things that are worth living for or worth dying for. Here lies the very secret of the awful, or ridiculous, tyranny of the passions. They feed upon the illusions of the imagination. The false perspective of imagination distorts the true and sober view of things. It forces into a false relief this or that episode or aim or object in life, and thereby succeeds in stirring within us that tumult of soul, that torrent of desire, which could never have so much as arisen had we been able from the first to see facts as they truly are. It is thus, by the very impact upon body and mind of the changing scene of his personal life, man falls victim to illusions—illusions of ambition, love, hatred, fear, hope, despair, of all the

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passions. Not one but brings its illusion. And the paradox is *that the passion is masterful just because its object is thus illusive.* Here is a man who is mastered by revenge till his most patient counsellors cease in despair to speak to him. And why? Because the image of his enemy, of his own fancied wrong, of his longed-for vengeance, so warps his imagination that he can think and dream of nothing else. Life, the apocalypse of a God, has shrunk to a poor melodramatic theatre for petty personal revenge. Here is another overmastered by despondency. And why? Because some picture of fancied misfortune to be encountered in some fancied future has so possessed his mind that it has already begun to produce the very suffering from which, spectre-ridden by anticipation, he shrinks. Here is a third carried off his feet by some hope, even when the most ordinary of onlookers can see that it is a hope doomed to disillusionment, a poor fool's paradise. And why? Once again, because the image of some longed-for end and his own fruition of it has so seized upon him that he can think of nothing else, even till the earth and the heavens have come in his distorted outlook to revolve around his liliputian expectations. And yet the remedy is so simple! If men would only *think!* If they would only think, not with the waywardness of reverie or the vagueness of desultory reflection, but with the same determination to *understand* with which they go to their lecture-rooms and laboratories!

For these passions can be understood. Have we not said (for it is the assumption upon which we are proceeding) that all things are under law, all things the products of causes, all things therefore fit matter for explanation. Human passions are no exception. We cannot escape them. They are the necessary effects of causes not of our making, not of our unmaking. By Law the stone falls, by Law the planet moves in its orbit, by Law the plant spreads out its leaves in the sunshine, and by Law—Law for which the whole compacted Cosmos is voucher—man is born, as the sparks fly upward, to illusions, and to the troubles, disquietudes, torments which illusions beget.

One thing, however, remains. From the very jaws of bond-

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age he can pluck deliverance. At least he can understand, or try to understand.

And what is it to understand? It is to discover the real conditions of events—to resolve facts into their causes—to recognize the dependence of the part on the whole to which it is retainer. In simpler words, it is to see things, at least in far-off approximation, as they truly are. And by consequence it is to supersede and to explode the false, limited, and illusive views of things as they are *not*, but only seem to be,—as they seem to be to us in the days of our passionate, deeply-agitated ignorance. Apply this to the passions. Revenge, despondency, hope—we have seen the secret of their mastery over us. They lord it over us *by fraud.* They are rooted in illusion,—that kind of illusion which so fills our mind with partial, fragmentary, narrow, and often paltry aspects of things that even the most ordinary onlooker will tell us that we are "blinded by our passions" and do not see facts as they really are.

It is from this the understanding can deliver us. It turns its scrutinizing eye upon these illusory objects of the passions; it bids us consider them in their relations to the larger world of fact, at the touch of which their exclusive claims upon us crumble and seem preposterous; and it ends by relegating them to their due significance, or insignificance, as the frail finite illusions of a very finite fraction of the great real world of fact. It detects the fraud, it explodes the illusion on which the tyranny of the passions rests.

Is it to be supposed that this later view will leave us just where we were before? Can we reasonably suppose that the passion, once it is thus understood, will continue to subjugate us as in those days—days of our ignorance—before we had ever even tried to understand it? *Then*—in those days of our illusion—it and its object were the one thing that seemed to give value to life, the one thing that blotted out all else, the one thing the defeat of which made life no longer worth living. That is what it *was.* But now, in the light of open-eyed and dispassionate contemplation, what can be clearer than that we were blind to the realities of things? We had our troubled

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and our stormy hour—in the days of our ignorance. Could we have had it, had we known *then* all that in the light of fuller understanding we know now—now that we begin to see that the real meaning of our frantic precipitances and bitter defeats was nothing other than that they were attempts to measure this well compacted and intelligible Universe by our own presumptuous ignorance.

Even to these bondsmen of passion themselves the rolling years bring the wiser mind which takes the larger and more understanding view of the world, which sees that so many things for which men struggle and torment themselves in vain, even to the sacrifice of body and soul, are illusive; that many possessions which they thought they could not do without were best withheld; that many a defeated hope was but a good in the process of making. Why, then, wait for years to bring this slow-footed wisdom? Why see things as they truly are only in retrospect? Why not be wise in time? Why not at least try at the outset to understand. So that thereby learning, as far as in us lies, the inexorable conditions under which we must needs live, we may neither have to embitter our days by vain regrets over what was impossible nor agitate it by illusory hopes for the unattainable.

Nor is it to be supposed that all the Understanding can do for us is summed up in this ridding us of illusions. It is a dubious boon to rid any man of an illusion till we know what we have to put in its place. And if this universe be—as the mystic tells us—unintelligible, or—as the sceptic tells us—hollow, then perhaps the Human Spirit had best be left to film the abyss with such thatchwork and patchwork of illusions as it can muster. It is, however, upon a very different assumption that we have been proceeding. We have been proceeding on the assumption—deny it who can—that law, coherence, order, intelligibility, run throughout. And this being so, no man who elects to follow where his understanding leads need ever fear that he will fail to find a supreme object which will profoundly satisfy at least some of the deepest instincts and faculties of his soul. For as the years go on there will shape itself with ever-growing clearness the vision, verifiable

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at least in part, of a system of Nature (and of Human Life as a part of Nature) infinitely vast and infinitely varied, compacted in every joint by an eternal necessity, and throughout its teeming infinitude intelligible down to the uttermost detail. Some will call it Nature, some will call it God, or the Infinite, or the Absolute, or Eternal Substance. It does not so greatly matter what they *call* it. Let them fill their souls with it and call it by what name they will. Enough for us that we should strive to understand it, and to understand our own finite necessary place within it. Small wonder if at times, in presence of this soul-satisfying object, all ordinary objects of human pursuit have seemed to dwindle to insignificance, and if against this cosmic background man's fieriest passions and most tumultuous emotions have sunk into the finitude of events not worthy to ruffle the soul, far less to toss it on the waves of this so troublesome world.

This is no fancied experience. There was a thinker—surely among the greatest of the modern world—who lived it. Most ways were barred to him. For he was outcast, friendless, poor, solitary, sickly. But one way was open—the path of understanding. In that way unfalteringly and cheerfully he walked; and if there be any truth in biography, in that way he walked to victory over the world. We do not need to cast about for his secret. For he has written it in that memorable declaration: "I resolved not to laugh or to weep over the actions of men, but simply to understand them." And of him it may be said that, thus seeking, he found, not the peace that passeth understanding, for that he had put far from him, but the peace and the fortitude which understanding can bring.

It may be worth while very briefly to anticipate a criticism upon these pages, a criticism which the spirit of the present day is quick to make. Man, it will be said, is not understanding only: he is also Heart and Will; and the Heart will not be still nor the Will satisfied, though you could offer them the Cosmos understood from end to end.

"Shatter it to bits
And then remould it nearer to the heart's desire."

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This is the language of the Heart. Let the heavens fall and the Universe disjoint, so be it that Duty be done,—this is the language of the Will. "Shatter it to bits," it is easy to say. But where are we to begin? Are we to wish that the angles of a triangle should not be equal to two right angles, or that bodies should not attract each other inversely to the square of the distance? Such things are past wishing for, past praying for, because by intelligible necessity triangles are triangles and attraction is attraction. And if the ways of men be, albeit in more complex fashion yet similarly, the products of an intelligible necessity (and this is our assumption), well, we may not say that they are past praying for, because, as matters stand with us, they are so far from being fully understood that we may pray with all our heart that to a deeper knowledge they may prove to be less in need of shattering than we in the impatience of ignorance are prone to imagine.

Similarly with the language of the Will. On our assumption there is manifestly no room for the freedom of the Will in any ordinary sense. Freedom of independent personal initiative at any rate becomes a species of illusion. For what this fancied freedom really means is, as Spinoza pointed out, that, while we are conscious that we act, we are not conscious, say rather we are profoundly ignorant, of the causes of our actions. So that if we knew all the causes of our actions, we should see that one and all of these are rigorously necessitated even as we know the stone is necessitated to fall downwards or the spark to fly upwards. I am not saying this is true. I am not saying it is false. I am not arguing against Free Will, or for it, at all. I am taking the necessitarians on their own ground. I am granting them all they seem to ask. I am assuming that Law is everywhere and everywhen. And I am contending that, even then, a way to Life lies open,—none other than that path of understanding which Spinoza trod.

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DISCUSSION.

DOES POLITICAL COMPULSION NEED TO BE JUSTIFIED?

DR. WILLOUGHBY thinks (JOURNAL, July, 1899, p. 473) that a moral justification of the State is not needed, because "the compulsion exercised by the State does not differ *in kind* from that which would exist without a State, and that therefore there is no *a priori* ground for demanding its ethical *quo warranto*,—no presumption against its moral right to be." But may not the rightfulness of the compulsion that arises in extra-political conditions be challenged? If so, how does it help to assimilate political compulsion to it? It still seems to me that force of whatever kind (when exercised not by nature, but by an intelligent being or beings) requires some sort of explanatory justification. Force means putting some one else's will in place of my own in determining my action. Surely, from the stand-point of personality, this gives rise to a problem.

I admit that Dr. Willoughby has, in a sense, put me in the wrong in saying that the State "limits freedom,"—*i.e.*, using this expression with the utmost strictness. The individual is not literally compelled to pay his taxes. He is simply liable to suffer heavily if he does not. He is not forced to go to war when drafted; he is only put in prison, if he refuses. Undoubtedly, the moral personality, in its most intimate sense, does survive any sort of external attack. One can even choose to be hanged rather than do what the State wants him to do. And yet I think that enforcing demands by penalties such as these would, colloquially, be spoken of as limiting freedom quite decidedly. It does not destroy "velleity," but it does make the choice of alternatives rather meagre. If I give up my purse to some one who points a pistol at me, saying, "Your money or your life," I still keep my essential freedom, and yet I should not be going far astray if I also said that I was forced to act as I did. Indeed, I should hardly be doing violence to language if I remarked that under such circumstances I was not free to *choose* what I would do. I had to do it, I should naturally say,—or else lose my life. Ordinary speech refuses to call acts done under such pressure of fear voluntary,—though, of course, in the last analysis they are so. Now, it was in this same looser sense that I said the individual *has* to pay his taxes. Indeed, the sort of necessity I had in mind was presumably none other than Dr. Willoughby has in

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mind when he contrasts "legal compulsion" with "voluntary action," or says, "where men obey from necessity the ethical duty is soon forgotten." Would not Dr. Willoughby give as instances of possible "legal compulsion" or obedience "from necessity," the payment of taxes or enforced military service? Well, in whatever sense compulsion may be real in these cases (and I am aware that it cannot be in all senses), in whatever sense man is made to obey instead of obeying voluntarily, to this extent the problem I raised seems to me a real one,—freedom of choice as well as of action being correspondingly limited. Why should such compulsion exist? Why should not moral means be used exclusively for social ends,—I mean, appeals to reason and conscience, and, in general, education? This is the fundamental political problem, and it is hardly faced by saying that force will be used anyway.

In stating the problem as I do, I by no means wish to imply that a justification of the force used by the State may not be given, or that Dr. Willoughby, in his ably-written book, has not himself given it, or at least pointed the way to it (see pp. 118, 119 of my review, JOURNAL, October, 1896).

WILLIAM M. SALTER.

CHICAGO.

BOOK REVIEWS.

LECTURES AND ESSAYS ON NATURAL THEOLOGY AND ETHICS. By William Wallace, late Fellow of Merton College, and Whyte's Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Oxford. Edited, with a Biographical Introduction, by Edward Caird, Master of Balliol College, Oxford. Clarendon Press, 1898. Pp. xl., 566.

This book falls into four divisions, the first of which is the Biographical Introduction by the Master of Balliol. In the other three we have (1) the lectures which have been preserved of the two courses of Gifford Lectures delivered by Professor Wallace in the University of Glasgow in 1894 and 1895. (2) Nine essays in Moral Philosophy, including such heads as "Person and Personality," "Duty," "Hedonism," "Utilitarianism," and (3) Four critical essays on Lotze, Nietzsche, and Mr. McTaggart's "Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic." One of the essays on Nietzsche ap-

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peared in the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, and the review of Mr. McTaggart's book came out in *Mind*.

It is perhaps unnecessary to say that the first division gives us just what we would be inclined to ask for in a biographical introduction. It furnishes a brief but sufficient outline of the circumstances of Professor Wallace's life,—so sadly and prematurely terminated by an accident in 1897—and a most sympathetic and interesting appreciation of his thought, work, and character. The biographer pictures for us, in few words, the earnest intellectual life, strong, simple, and intense, of a good man and single-hearted thinker, of one who both in private and in official life could inspire trust and sympathy and admiration.

When we are told that Professor Wallace in his teaching seemed to aim rather at showing his pupils how to think and feel than at equipping them with facts and details, that he was felt to be always stimulating and suggestive and was "in a sense always preaching," that he thought not with the intellect only, but with his whole soul, and that he tended rather "to see the whole in every part" than to trace out the connections and relations between the parts,—and then turn to a perusal of the lectures and essays which are here given to the public, we feel almost at every page confirmation of the estimate which Dr. Caird has put before us. We feel that we are listening to the impassioned pleading of a thinker who is indeed setting forth with his whole soul, with every rhetorical resource at his command, a philosophical view that he has accepted with intense conviction and that has become to him a religion,—a view that with persuasive insight he reads into all history and theory.

What Wallace sought both in literature and in philosophy, says Dr. Caird, was "not thought or system for itself, but rather as the concentrated expression of life, the quintessence of human experience. The Hegelian philosophy had its strong hold upon his mind, mainly because he seemed to find in Hegel one who united idealism with a more than positivist insistence upon the emptiness of abstract ideas, and whose thinking was a continual effort after the comprehension of the actual in its concreteness and complexity."

Another point in which a perusal of the lectures and essays seems to justify Dr. Caird's estimate is with regard to Wallace's criticism of other writers. This criticism, says Dr. Caird, is "almost always appreciative, and we might say at times appreciative to a fault. On the whole he disliked and avoided the atmosphere of controversy,

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and generally, when he thought an author worthy of study, he took infinite pains to enter into his point of view, and even to suggest reasons to justify what seemed paradoxical and extravagant." The two essays on Nietzsche perhaps afford some illustration of the suggested justifications of paradox and extravagance,—the result possibly quite as much of Wallace's predominant philosophical view or mood as of sympathetic insight towards Nietzsche,—while the sixth of the Gifford Lectures, on Mr. Balfour's "Foundations of Belief," seems in my judgment to be an example of painstaking and on the whole sympathetic study. Of the other and rarer mood of criticism, in which he was somewhat fierce and controversial, we find not much trace in the writings here brought together.

The already published works of Professor Wallace (chief among which are his translations and expositions of Hegel) are enumerated by Dr. Caird, but of them this is, of course, not the place to speak. Of the Gifford Lectures printed in the volume now before us, three belong to the first course delivered in 1894, and are entitled respectively, I. "The Scope of Natural Theology," II. "The Greek Origins of Theology," and III. "The Natural Theology of Christ."

In I., natural theology is explained to be "the attempt at a synthesis of two factors in human life, which at their first appearance and always present to each other a certain incompatibility, or it may be hostility. It is the application of science to religion, the interpretation of faith and worship by the intellectual principle, and in accordance with the results of ascertained knowledge." It is "the rationalization of belief, the naturalization of religion," which is "an inevitable problem." Professor Wallace discusses (with many historical references) the different phases of the solution which men have attempted of this problem,—the Physico-Theology of the early Boyle Lectures which argues from the evidences of design in Nature, and the Natural or Rational Religion of deeper thinkers. He concludes that "the note of naturalness in Theology lies in its superiority to restrictions due to special historic conditions. Natural theology, the theology of reason, claims the prerogative of man to examine all things, and is but an attempt in a special range of questions to carry out that purpose fully, without bar or check from any specially privileged province." It is practically the same as philosophy of religion, and signifies "a reflective study of the facts or phenomena of religion, when that study is methodically or systematically pursued."

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The lecture on "The Greek Origins of Theology" is interesting, but somewhat fanciful; its text is that "Theology, as we know it, is a product of Greek civilization." It concludes with saying that the Greek philosophers saw in God "the unity of nature, the source of life and motion, but Himself something above Nature and re-removed from the sphere of change. They were not interested in the religious acts and feelings in which He was efficient; they sought in the conception of Him rather a counterpart to their doctrine of the unity of all being."

In Lecture III., on "The Natural Theology of Christ," we learn that the Christian doctrine of God "is essentially a doctrine of the relation of man to God, and of God to man;" the realization of this sonship of man to God being, at first, "the work of one man, who brought life and immortality to light, and who might thus be described as the mediator between God and man." "The great deed that seems to emerge as the life of Christ is the bringing into one of God and man; the discovery that the supernatural is in the natural; the spiritual in the physical; the eternal life as the truth and basis of this; God manifest in the flesh,"—God, self, and neighbor form here an indissoluble trinity, but to try and balance the several claims of the three factors is casuistry, and worse.

This lecture seems certainly one of the places in which Professor Wallace, having "viewed the subject in aspect after aspect," calls upon his reader "to make the synthesis for himself;" and I think it is fair to say that what he puts before us here is not so much the Christianity of Christ as an exemplification of the way in which a particular philosophical view may be illustrated or embodied by historical Christianity.

The nine lectures which follow were part of the second Gifford course dealing with the relations of morality and religion, delivered by Professor Wallace in 1895. The first part of this course, consisting of five lectures, was taken up with a "review of the influences, ethical, literary, and scientific, which are affecting the religious thought of the present time, and changing the old dogmatic conceptions with which religion was formerly associated." Of these five, only two have been preserved,—Lecture IV., on Religion and Morality, and Lecture V., on the Ethical Movement in Religion. The remaining seven begin with a review of the "Foundations of Belief" (already referred to), and proceed to consider the general relations of morality and religion.

The discussion as a whole is interesting, and often elaborate,

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eloquent, and even brilliant; it amounts, for the most part, to an exposition of the solidarity of morality, science, and religion, the reciprocity of influence of all the factors spiritual and material of human life, the dependence of the individual upon environment, the oneness of man and man, and of man and God. This seems to be the pervading thought of the whole, expressed with great force and freshness, and looked at from many points of view; the general impression received is that of a striking restatement and reiteration of a way of regarding religion and its relation to the rest of life which is familiar to a generation that has more or less assimilated the thought of Darwin and Spencer, of Hegel and T. H. Green.

Broadly speaking, we have heard it all before; we have recognized that religion cannot be separated from reason, nor the individual from his environment, nor morality from civilization, nor ethics from economics, nor the things which are seen from the things which are not seen. But it would be presumptuous to affirm that there is not a large audience to which this presentation of a philosophy of religion will not appeal with fresh and special force; and there are also characteristics of style, and wealth of classic lore, of quotation, and of metaphor, which may help to secure for it a welcome from many to whom the doctrine set forth is already familiar.

The "Essays in Moral Philosophy," which follow the Gifford Lectures, seem on the whole rather disappointing, and the least valuable section of the book. That on *Hedonism*, for instance, consists to a large extent of observations and reflections which are partly obvious, and partly have been already better expressed elsewhere; and in reading that on Utilitarianism, one is puzzled to discover why it should have been labelled with this title. On the one hand, it does not say much about Utilitarianism of any kind; on the other hand, except for a passing reference to Herbert Spencer, it does not consider any exponent of utilitarian doctrine later than Bentham; and even of Bentham the account given almost approaches caricature. Bentham, with his rather appalling matter-of-fact definiteness, pedantic exactitude, minuteness of detail, and superfluity of distinction, furnishes a fabric of thought which no enthusiasm or ingenuity could coax into the fashion of Hegelian idealism.

If it should be asked, What does this book of lectures and essays add to our knowledge of Professor Wallace's philosophical views? I think the answer must be that what it chiefly does is to deepen

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and confirm the opinion produced by his previously published works, that he is a faithful disciple and distinguished exponent of Hegelianism. We learn here, what perhaps was not so easy to gather elsewhere, that it is from this philosophical stand-point that Professor Wallace apprehended and interpreted all facts and problems of practical life, of religion and morality. We learn, also, that to his other great intellectual gifts he joined that of an earnest, unwearied, and impassioned preacher of the doctrine in which he believed.

This reiteration and enlargement of previous opinion is very impressive, and seems to stamp very vividly in the reader's mind the general character of Wallace's philosophical view. If the effect here may be compared to that produced by a somewhat similar phenomenon in another department of imagination, I would liken it to the feeling one has after walking through an exhibition of Burne-Jones's pictures,—what remains in the mind, prominent above all other impressions, is that of the one face or type which, young or old, man or woman, sad or happy, is reproduced on every canvas, even, as it sometimes seems, in portraits of living men and women. In this there is both strength and weakness, and the gain in intensity of impression is to some extent counterbalanced by loss of adaptation to the infinite variety of reality.

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The Development of English Thought: A Study in the Economic Interpretation of History. By Simon N. Patten, Ph.D., Professor of Political Economy, University of Pennsylvania. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1899. Pp. 409.

England since the Reformation has been kept by the silver sea so free from foreign invasion, and the life of her people has been able so tranquilly to hold on its way unmolested, that English civilization is in that epoch more "normal" than that of any other nation (Preface, v.). Normal development begins in a struggle for possession of the good things of this life, including the means of defence, —a struggle leading to the survival of those best suited to their environment, the environment consisting in the aggregate of such good things. A race changes its conceptions of what is desirable or necessary; different objects become goods to it. The environment thus changed, there is a change in the character of the survivors: "the motives, instincts, and habits of the race are modified."

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Such changes take place in a regular order, in an ascertainable series, which "repeats itself in each environment." In the elucidation of this series consists the economic interpretation of history (Preface, vi., vii.).

Such is our author's starting-point. We need not enter deeply into his psychology, which is novel only in its terminology. There is a stimulus from without and there is a reaction against it. The apparent simplicity of the above conception of development soon disappears. "Men in progressive nations are never adjusted to their environment, if this word is to mean the sum of natural conditions which at a given time obtain in a nation. On the contrary, the striking features of every progressive nation are due to the breach between the national character and the present environment. Character is formed by the motor reactions which are created by the perception of certain sensory ideas. These motor reactions are the result of hereditary adjustment. They are slowly formed and still more slowly changed" (12). In other words, our character is made not merely by our own acts, but by the acts of our grandparents. There are therefore two "elemental forces always at work;" first, those due to the national character; second, those due to the present economic conditions. If these two are in harmony, the condition is "static"; if otherwise, we have the struggle of a period of transition; and whatever changes either of the two elemental forces will cause such a struggle (13, 14).

We might think from this account that Professor Patten's interpretation of history was, by many degrees, less narrow than that of Professor Loria or Karl Marx, for there are infinite possibilities of variety in a "motor reaction." The interpretation is, in fact, less narrow; but there is on Professor Patten's part a constant desire to make it narrow, if he can. In spite of his really wide grasp of human nature, he says, for example, "National character depends on the peculiarities of the locality in which the race was formed" (18); though he presently relieves our minds by saying that without an exchange of ideas with other races no one race will have continuous progress, and both imitation (in Tarde's sense) and conversion must go on to the benefit of the exchangers, the exchangers preserving all the time a certain similarity in the types that are so modified; a single environment could develop only one type of men (18–21, 41).

The Professor's analysis of the "types" is one of the chief features of his book. He tells us not to classify men by their wealth or their

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place in society, but by their mental characteristics (22). One group represents the men that depend on each other for support and leadership. They are "clingers," and their ancestors lived, we may suppose, in a sort of oasis, where food was strictly limited to particular localities, and where, accordingly, the whole mind of the people was concentrated on that spot and feared any movement away from it (23, 24). Where local conditions allowed of more movement, a different type, the "sensualists," would come into being,—men able to indulge appetite over a wider range, and therefore emboldened to venture forth for fresh means of indulgence, yet, from the needs of the case, disciplined and under control (25, 26).

These types reappear; but, in more advanced nations, a third would be added, the type of "stalwarts," or thoughtful enthusiasts, who measure and calculate, and love dogmas and doctrines and fixed limits of their own drawing (27, 28). In order to last, the stalwarts must have been "frugalists;" at first, even ascetics (29). Later still, in nations of more wealth and leisure, we have the thoughtful men who are not enthusiasts,—the men who "peep and botanize upon their mother's grave;" who dissect, analyze, and criticise for the love of it: the "mugwumps" (30, 31). These are the four permanent types of men, into which all others are resolved (33). Thus, the sensualists, to our surprise, include the warriors, priests, and capitalists (34). We need not have been surprised; we have here only one instance out of many where an old fact is disguised under a new term, or, to speak more strictly, under a perverted old term. In terminology, Professor Patten is a law to himself.

It is, as a rule, possible to gather his meaning in spite of his language; and there seems to be no ambiguity in such statements as the following, which give the essence of the book: "The history of thought has four stages, each of which has peculiarities of its own and must be studied by itself. The economic stage comes first, because its aggregates are the smallest and most capable of substitution. The æsthetic stage follows, in which the increments of economic welfare are united into harmonious groups. Later, the environment is conceived of as a unit, and its relations, when perceived, become moral rules. And, finally, other environments peopled with dissimilar beings are recognized, and upon this basis religion grows up. When a new environment is entered, this series of changes repeats itself,"—in a form complicated by the deposits of the preceding. The economic stage becomes doubly important

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for a while, till a reaction gives higher forms of thought a higher place than ever (42, 43). "In studying an epoch the economic conditions must be studied first, then the economic doctrines that follow from them, and, last, the æsthetic, moral, and religious ideas which follow from them" (44). "History, to be valuable, must be studied in epochs, and each group of ideas be connected with its roots in the underlying conditions, and not with its antecedents in the same group" (45),—that is to say, the ethical thought of one age, for example, must not be explained by the ethical thought of the preceding age, but by the economic basis of its own age. The explanation of a "group of ideas" is in the end economic. Hence we find Professor Patten turning upside down the ordinary accounts: first, of the philosophy of Hobbes (144 *seq.*), and, second, of the philosophy of the eighteenth century, from Locke through Hume to Kant (158 *seq.*). Hobbes's notion of the *bellum omnium contra omnes* was a pure after-thought "to bring the social sciences into harmony with his philosophical system" (146). "Before he had thought of the state of war, he found the natural motives for submitting to government in the love of peace, and in the economic motives that the love of well-being creates" (151). So our author will not allow that T. H. Green could rightly give the thought of Locke, "the first mugwump," (186), from the logic of his doctrines, still less that of Hume (212 *seq.*). In a purely empirical manner, it is true, the Professor allows that "a motor reaction, after losing its primal economic importance, responds to abstract instead of concrete phenomena" (51), but it begins in the concrete. "Even the Christianity of Germany at the Reformation was a group of foreign ideas impressed upon the German consciousness by the pressure of economic conditions" (103). Strange to say, "the Reformation could not have happened at a more unfortunate time" (104) than it did; and, strange to say, the final blending of the philosophies of Locke and Hume was an accident (213). It is clear that this economic interpretation of history falls very far short of a philosophy of history.

To do him justice, Professor Patten does not attempt the greater task. He is content to take the history of England since the Reformation and divide it into three stages: first, that of the Calvinists, stalwarts in reaction against sensualists, with Hobbes and afterwards Locke in reaction against them in their turn (ch. iii.); second, that of the moralists, with Mandeville, Hume, and Adam Smith bringing economics to light out of ethics (ch. iv.); and,

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third, that of the Economists (ch. v.), Malthus, Ricardo, James Mill, and John Mill. As has already been mentioned, we get some new readings of philosophical history. Hume is said to have got from Mandeville his view of reason as the slave of the passions, and to have recoiled from that position eventually in order to overtake his contemporaries (224)! The importance of the "Wealth of Nations" is its bearing on natural theology: "The old optimism was based on the thought that wickedness is always punished. The new economic optimism was based on the thought that the righteous are always rewarded" (242). Adam Smith thus became the means of reconciling men that had been fitted for the old environment of the Calvinists to the new environment created by the industrial revolution (243). Our author sometimes speaks as if the industrial revolution was in an advanced state at the beginning of the century. "The new religious movement of Whitefield and Wesley was the proper complement to the industrial changes of the eighteenth century," the new economic conditions being, indeed, the cause of the success of the religious movement (248). Over Methodism Professor Patten is sympathetic and suggestive, dropping, however, even here such paradoxes as the following (270): "An intensive religion, losing sight of the interests of the imperfect, demands only the success and survival of the perfect."

Our author follows his bent in regarding the French Revolution of 1789 as of no special importance. "The struggle of France was really a struggle for wheat," and began in 1757, when there was a short crop (278). Wheat was talked of in England in the eighteenth century as if nothing else were worth cultivating. "The struggle for equality," in which every man was to have enough wheat, and no more than enough (enough being a peck a week), "was the necessary consequence of this idealization of bread, and the French revolution must be regarded as a veritable bread-riot" (280). Between 1757 and 1873 the curve of wheat was also the curve of French power, and, when wheat is at its lowest, the power of France has also sunk to its lowest place (278, 283, 285). The French were placed in the same relation to England as Ireland had always been; the great wars ending in 1815 decided that England shall always have the bread, and should have the first choice when there is a general deficiency or a race for the best supplies (285). Our author thinks rightly that wheat was valued beyond its merits, but it is not that he thinks little of food as an economic element. There is perhaps no other that

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has, in his opinion, such an overmastering influence on human character and destiny.

This is not the place for a full discussion of the Economists. In John Mill, Professor Patten rests, to a large extent, satisfied. John Mill brought economics back to religion (331 *seq.*, *cf.* 364). The Utilitarians of the Old School are unmercifully handled (272, 293 *seq.*). Ricardo was the teacher of James Mill, but it was James Mill who "brought the ideas of Bentham and Ricardo down from the clouds" and gave them practical influence (311, 313). These are by no means the most disputable statements in our author's account of the Economists.

The result of the struggle of the Economists with the rival types of men is sufficiently cheerful. "Religion has gradually divorced itself from asceticism, and utilitarianism from sensualism, until the two occupy the same field and have the same rules of conduct. The religious and the economic motives and ideals are felt by the same men, and the forces that make society economic also make it religious" (366). We—the English-speaking race, English and Americans—are "no longer cosmopolitans who wish to merge our civilization in that of the world. We think of ours as the civilization, and seek to impress our standards and ideals on others." Yet we have no common environment; the unity of the race is an ideal unity, and what they seek to gain is a social Utopia (366, 367). In this view those who are farthest from the materialistic view of history might cordially agree; and their only difficulty would be to reconcile the position with the dogma of the overpowering influence of foods and drinks, clothing and lodging, not only on individual character but on national character, and not only on the life of the individual but on the future of the race (*e.g.*, 380).

We are told that even in the struggle between the drinkers of strong drinks and the abstainers "the real issue is economic, and it will work itself out with little regard for other considerations" (381). Progress by elimination has changed its form. "Formerly, the underfed failed to survive; now it is the overfed among whom the elimination is taking place" (382), more especially the women (384, top). The remedy is to devote less time to selfish gratification and more to promoting the welfare of others; those who follow this advice will survive, and the others will be eliminated (406). It is, indeed, easy to believe this if we can hold with our author that "bad judgments in the end eliminate the persons who act on them" (401).

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Professor Patten is always thoughtful, and is always (so far as he is aware) independent in his thinking. He has given us a body of observations on men and things that it will be well for writers on the philosophy of history to keep in mind. The present generation of economists and philosophers seems thus far to be capable of nothing beyond tentative efforts to consider economic history philosophically. From Bagehot to Patten, it would be hard to point to a single success in this field. But to have contributed a helpful draft, however rough, must be accounted some service both to philosophy and to economics.

J. BONAR.

LONDON.

THE ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIETY. By Achille Loria. Translated from the second French edition by Lindley M. Keasbey. With a new preface by the author. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., Limited. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1899. Pp. x., 385.

There is a kind of arithmetical exercise which was familiar to us in the school-room, which consists in "simplifying" a long jumble of arithmetical expressions. If we succeeded, we knew that we could reduce the bewildering mass of figures and letters to a bald statement of the type $2 + 5 = 7$; but if perverse fractions and decimals persisted we had not got our "answer." It is a process like this which M. Loria attempts to apply to the complicated phenomena of society; but he has the advantage of working by prophecy, and if an irrational element persists he assures us that it will drop out in the future. That future will be an ideal society of a type even simpler than the one above; it will be more like one + one + one; homogeneous units all pursuing the same calling, and actuated by one simple motive—Egoism.

For him all the more complex manifestations of social life are nothing but confusions and obscurations of the simple economic force, and can be "reduced" to this both in theory and in fact. "The positive theory of capitalistic property makes it possible to reduce the most diverse manifestations of social life to their lowest terms and analyze them scientifically" (p. 384). We are shown how, when once an irrational element, such as capitalism, appears it leads to other irrational elements such as morality, law, and politics; but we are not shown how, starting from the simple one plus one, human relations ever entered upon such a tangled way, nor

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again, when we have done our sum and reverted to the simple expression, why it will not immediately begin to tangle itself up again.

It is because human nature is far less simple to handle than figures, and does not proceed by mere addition and subtraction of its elements, that we think M. Loria's inquiry fails to be applicable to reality. Even if we grant him his major premise, that economic conditions are primary and form the basis of all future development, it does not follow that this future development continues to be subordinate to and dependent upon the economist conditions from which it sprang. Granting—but only for the sake of argument—that morality, law, and politics have their origin in the cunning devices of capitalistic property to exclude the toiling masses from the soil (p. 8), it still does not follow that these institutions are no greater than their origin, and will have no reason for existing when it ceases. The lark soaring in the sky had its origin in the egg, but no one has ever succeeded in confining it again in the narrow limits of the shell. So, too, the higher manifestations of social life when once they have broken through the forces in which they have their origin, and in which they are at first confined, have their independent life and meaning, which cannot be explained or explained away, by pointing to the source from which they arose.

But while we hold that the whole argument is an instance of the mistaken view that the derivative cannot be greater than that from which it is derived, we find, too, that the data from which the argument proceeds are seriously at fault. The opening sentence of the book presents the supposed fact which the book proceeds to analyze. "If we examine attentively the societies developing at the present day in the civilized countries of the old and new worlds, they present, we find, one common phenomenon: absolutely and irrevocably all of them fall into two distinct and separate classes; one class accumulates in utter idleness enormous and ever-increasing revenues, the other, far more numerous, labors life-long for miserable wages; one class lives without working, the other works without living,—without living a life, at least, worthy of the name."

Now, if M. Loria chose to say that this were true of his own country, and to confine his analysis to that, we should not be in a position to contradict him, though we might suspect exaggeration. But as regards England, at any rate, this picture is no better than an ignorant caricature. "Absolutely and irrevocably" society *cannot* be divided into two classes, take what ground of division we will

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(except, indeed, that of sex). Many capitalists are also wage-earners, the wage-earning class holds large amounts of capital; there are rich who toil, and poor who never do a stroke of work. The very division between rich and poor is an impossible one to draw in a society where the transition between wealth and poverty is made through an infinite series of gradations. An analysis of society in general must start with a better conception of its subject-matter than this, if it is to be scientific.

The development of society towards this hypothetical present has been, according to M. Loria, as follows: In a natural state of society the laborers "simply take possession of the free lands and apply their labor to the soil, adding to this the capital they accumulate." If the productivity of the land is great they produce in isolation, if low they co-operate. But under this arrangement the idle capitalist can acquire no profits, so the necessity arises of barring free access to the land, first by enslaving the laborers, and at a later stage by appropriating all the land which is cultivable by labor alone.

But at this stage arises the danger that the laborer may accumulate enough wealth to work upon the less productive land by himself. "Thus the reduction of wages to a minimum, preventing the possibility of accumulation, is the condition *sine quâ non* of the continuance of the capitalist economy; and it is, consequently, indispensable for the capitalists to reduce the remuneration of their laborers to the strictest necessities" (p. 4). The devices of the capitalist to this end are many, including actual lowering of wages, depreciation of money, introduction of machinery more costly than the labor which it replaces, the creation of a superfluous population producing competition among the workmen employed. And when we ask ourselves whether we are really intended to regard the capitalists as the actual authors of these unbusiness-like and omnipotent devices, we are obliged to answer yes; for it is straightway explained that "the proprietary classes cannot refuse to employ them, as they afford the only means of assuring the persistence of profits."

This stage is followed by the total suppression of all free lands, our present *régime;* and then we enter upon the region of prophecy. "The day is, therefore, bound to come, when production can no longer proceed under the capitalistic *régime.* And then, in order to avoid increasing penury, society will practically be compelled to re-establish free land, and accord to every individual the right to

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occupy as great an area as he can cultivate with his own labor. A voluntary system of co-operation will then establish itself spontaneously upon the basis of free ownership of the soil. This will constitute the only adequate economic form, and result in social equilibrium."

Under this ultimate organization only one motive will be needed to keep things going harmoniously, and that will be individual Egoism. This is because all acts injurious to collective well-being will immediately react injuriously upon the individual, while all acts promoting the welfare of society will promote welfare of the individual. Herein M. Loria does not seem to differ materially from such economists as Bastiat; but his point is that in a society thus simplified the connection between public and private welfare will immediately be obvious. But here we think that the members of his ideal society would prove to be shrewder reasoners than he is himself. For instance, we are told that "The associative character of the final economy of itself renders absolutely irrational all desire on the part of the strong to take advantage of their superiority to the detriment of the weak." But why? Because "any such attempt would only impel the weaker producers to retire from the association, and this in turn would render the labor of the strong less efficient, and consequently diminish the return formerly accruing to them." But this result depends entirely upon the principle of division, and we have already been told that "this system involves an equal division of the product . . ., and constitutes a social form which precludes all class differences, eliminates privilege, and does away with all manner of usurpation." Now, if there is to be equal division, it is quite obviously to the advantage of the strong to get rid of those who contribute a smaller share to the dividend; and if the individual Egoism is to have its way they will do so. Probably the author foresees this, for he goes on to suggest that "the better endowed may, indeed, profit from their superiority by producing more abundantly and in obtaining in return a greater reward;" but this is quite incompatible with equality of division, and by introducing the principle of remuneration according to merit starts society once more on its upward struggle to a realm of "morality, law, and politics," where individual Egoism may be transformed into something as much greater than itself as the spiritual life is greater than the mere life of the appetites.

The book is very long, and full of erudite allusions; but these, if we may judge from references to English matters, are frequently

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either antiquated or inaccurate. To instance only a few: Mayhew is quoted as an anthropologist, Toynbee is represented as saying "an augmentation of wages simply means an increase of crime," and we are invited to join with a certain Pelegrino Rossi in deploring the fact "that in a civilized country like England the indulgence of the law towards assassins should offer so striking a contrast with its severity towards thieves." Perhaps we must place to the printer's account such a blunder as "Dr. Tocqueville;" and there are others for which the translator is responsible; but on the whole, while we admit that the author takes a wide view of his subject and is original in the handling of it, we think that width of view and originality are more than counterbalanced by inaccuracy of observation and reasoning.

HELEN BOSANQUET.

CATERHAM.

AN OUTLINE OF THE HISTORY OF EDUCATIONAL THEORIES IN ENGLAND. By H. T. Mark, B.A. (Lond.), B.Sc. (Vict.). London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., Ltd. Pp. xi., 139.

"All that the writer ventures to hope is that he has suggested thoughts upon one of the most important problems in our national life, and that he has been able to give sufficient historical grounds for the suggestions made. The materials lay to hand; he has merely sought to weave them together."

The modest aspirations of the author have been amply realized in this little volume. Few young teachers will rise from the study of this "outline" without a broad and comprehensive view of the correlation of the history of education, with the social and economic changes which have been at the root of educational development in this country. Mr. Mark has succeeded in compressing within the compass of some one hundred and fifty pages a vast amount of information covering a wide field; but so well is the subject-matter grouped, so sound, so sober, and so discreet are his critical suggestions, that he sustains the interest of the reader from start to finish. And this is no ordinary praise. It would have been very easy to have made this volume intolerable. But, within the limits he has set himself, the author has handled his generalities so well, and produced so admirable an "outline," that I venture to express the hope that it may be the precursor of a more ambitious "treatise."

The author takes the logical course of beginning with mediævalism and classicism, carefully tracing those tendencies which illumined

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and transmuted without destroying the earlier ideals. He has wisely avoided the anecdotal treatment in his account of the "Fathers" of the successive educational transformations. I think that all students should cordially indorse his suggestion that other volumes than "The Positions" of the Elizabethan school-master Mulcaster might well be reprinted for our enlightenment. As a man of ideas, Mulcaster is rightly stated to have been abreast of the nineteenth century. Mr. Mark's summary of the main points in his system happily concludes with a remarkable instance of Mulcaster's keen educational insight,—his assertion that the best teachers are required for the lower forms, and that these teachers should be the best paid. In a future volume the author might well do worse than take Appendix A as the nucleus for a general disquisition on Quick's verdict: "It would have been a vast gain to Europe if Mulcaster had been followed instead of Sturm." No more striking contrast could be drawn than that between the broad and vigorous treatment of educational problems by Mulcaster and the narrow formalism of Sturm. I may also note that in Appendix B the essential difference between Locke on the one hand, and Montaigne and Rousseau on the other, may with advantage be compared with Chapter V. and pages 158 and 159 of Mr. Munro's "Educational Ideal."

The chapter on "The Development of the Theory of Moral Education" is one of the most interesting in the book. Few subjects at the present day require more delicacy of treatment, few subjects bristle with more difficulties, than the subject of moral education. To a large extent this is due to the wide-spread belief that there is a necessary antithesis between morals and religion. The majority would seem to hold that morality has no substantive existence of its own independent of religion. There is, however, a rapidly increasing section of the community which holds, with Newman, that "morals, of necessity, come earlier than spiritual religion," and with Arnold, that "religion is ethics, heightened, enkindled, lit up by feeling or touched with emotion." They hold that the touch of emotion and the impulse of religion will never be wanting. They believe that there is nothing more inherently vicious than the doctrine that denies the existence of lay morality, nothing more fraught with danger to religion itself, nothing more at variance with the history of the race. There are, they claim, maxims of universal application which may be regarded as utterances of the universal moral instinct; that these maxims retain

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their validity and remain immutable for all time; that they constitute a body of lay morality that is competent to regulate and to ennoble the individual conscience without the necessity of ultimate appeal to theological sanction of any kind. And, thirdly, there is a school of advanced thinkers who hold that all teaching must be based on the social character of the individual. For them, biology resolves the individual into a sum-total of living beings, which in its turn is nourished and developed by the never-dying influence of the past. Psychology teaches them that the individual consciousness is the resultant of a multitude of elementary tendencies, each developing a rudimentary consciousness. To them the study of social science exhibits a society preceding the life of the individual; man's life not merely individual but collective; the development, "the effect and average" of the social organism. Man must realize in himself the social ideal; education must subordinate the individual to the ends of the whole community. As Mill puts it, "in an improving state of the mind the influences are constantly on the increase which tend to generate in each individual a feeling of unity with all the rest; which feeling, if perfect, would make him never think of or desire any beneficial condition for himself in the benefits of which they are not included." This may be called the doctrine of the exploitation of the individual, and Mill shows that there is a distinct danger that this sense of solidarity may stunt human freedom and individuality. But between these various doctrines there is no collision on one point,—that the teacher is bound to attack that ignorance of the moral and social duties which, while it persists, leaves the individual a nuisance to society. They all agree that the child must not be left in ignorance of the duties he owes to his fellow-members of the community; that he must be instructed in the every-day requirements of law and order; that he must have some conception, however faint, of the whole circle of human duty; in a word, that England cannot expect every child to do his duty unless he is shown what that duty is. This has been called the Age of Compromise; and it does not seem that there is any *a priori* reason why some system of instruction in morals cannot be constructed which will give the minimum of offence to citizens of all shades of religious belief, and at the same time be adequate for the purpose in view. Apparently, the progress of thought in this direction has not struck Mr. Mark as distinctively English enough in its origin to come within the scope of his chapter on the development of

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moral education. But there is very little in what I have said which seriously traverses, or, indeed, is incompatible with, the views expressed in the volumes from which he quotes.

W. J. GREENSTREET.

STROUD, GLOUCESTERSHIRE.

ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS (Children Working for Wages): Return for England and Wales, giving the Number of Children attending Elementary Schools who are known to be Working for Wages or Employed for Profit, with their Ages, Standards, Occupations, Hours of Work, and Rates of Pay, and the Different Classes of Employment into which the Boys and Girls attending Elementary Schools in England and Wales went on leaving School during some Complete Year. Part I. and Part II.

Owing mainly to the efforts of the London Women's Industrial Council, we have now some statistical information upon an evil which every educationalist knew to exist, but the extent of which he could only conjecture. That school-children had to work hard for their parents out of school-hours, that many of them had regular employment both early in the morning and late at evening, that they went to school too tired to receive instruction, that the pay they got for their work was miserable, that they left school for occupations which gave them no training, are facts which every elementary school-teacher and manager knew, but they knew them only in connection with their own immediate localities. Fifteen months ago the Government consented to make inquiries upon these points throughout England and Wales, and this report is the result.

We must begin by pointing out its shortcomings. A circular with a schedule of questions was sent to every one of the 20,022 elementary schools in England and Wales, but so imperfectly was the idea of the Department explained that there has been the most perplexing confusion of thought among those whose duty it was to give the required information. 19,382 schools replied, and of these 9949 reported that the circular did not apply to them. But those who answered the questions did so with a great variety of ideas in their minds. Some believed that they were only being asked about children in regular employment; others that they had only to return children working for wages; others that they need notice only those employments prejudicial to the health of the children. An investigation into such a subject as this must always be marred by

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the impossibility of securing that all the returns shall be made from one standard; it is one of those bits of work where the risk of error increases with the number of workers. But we have just cause of complaint that the Education Department, especially when it saw the extraordinary importance of the information that was coming in, apparently did nothing to check mistakes or to secure uniform returns. Statistically, the report is valueless; but it serves, nevertheless, to give us a rough idea of the state of affairs upon which it was intended to throw light.

Nine thousand four hundred and thirty-three schools sent answers affecting 144,026 scholars, or about one in every thirty-nine on the school registers, and these were grouped as follows: 131 were under seven years of age; 38,489, or one in sixty-three of this age-period on the registers, were between seven and eleven; 104,589, or one in thirteen, were upwards of ten. It must be observed that the most certain thing about these figures is that they come far short of the truth, and so the above proportions, large as they are of themselves, do no more than suggest the magnitude of the evil. Of the 131 tiny wage-earners under seven years of age, 69 are boys and 62 girls,—three of the boys and five of the girls being only five. They work up to 20, 17, 12, 24, 28, 35, and 29 hours per week, and their wages range from one penny or "tea and a half-penny" to three shillings sixpence, which three boys under Standard 1 make by working fourteen to twenty-four hours per week at brickmaking, and one shilling and threepence, which a girl of five makes by picking peas for fifteen hours per week.

The following table, showing the distribution of the wage-earners according to standard, indicates how general the evil is right through every grade. The total numbers upon the registers are placed beneath for purposes of comparison:

Below a Standard.	Standard.								Standard not Stated.
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Ex. 7	
329	3890	11,686	24,624	36,907	37,315	21,975	6,382	382	536
2,875,088		723,582	679,096	500,850	421,728	212,546	66,442	7534	
Percentage, .15		1.6	3.6	6.2	8.8	10.3	9.6	5	

The nature of the work to which the children are put is varied, but in almost every case it is purely mechanical drudgery, which can

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have no good effect upon them. Of the boys, 15,182 sell newspapers; 2435 hawk goods; 76,173 run errands for shopkeepers and do odd jobs in shops; 10,636 clean boots, knives, etc.; 8627 take round dinners, knock workmen up in the morning, and so on. Of the girls, 11,585 mind babies. But if the nature of the work is such as to destroy spontaneity and joy in life, the long hours which the children engage in it are very much worse. Here are a few cases: "This boy rises between three and four every morning, starts out at 4.30 A.M. to waken up twenty-five working-men, each paying him threepence per week; returns from his rounds about 5.30, but does not go to bed again, as at six o'clock he has to go around as 'a newspaper boy' till nine o'clock, when he comes to school." "A boy acts as latherer to a barber for thirty-two hours [per week] for a wage of two shillings. He is at work for the whole of Saturday till 11 P.M., and for three hours on Sunday." One boy "begins work for his father as early as 3 A.M. and works again in the evening as late as 9 P.M." "This boy (a green-grocer's boy, aged twelve, in Standard 2) starts for London at 2.30 A.M., returns about 9.30, and then attends school." "One boy said he worked on Saturday from seven in the morning till twelve at night."

The second part of the report deals with the employments to which children go on leaving school, and again suffers statistically for want of fixed standards running throughout the enumeration. But we may safely draw two conclusions from it. In the first place, the number of children going into temporary and casual employment is truly alarming. In the West London District 7289 boys are returned as having left school during the year 1893–94, and of these 3317 are reported to have gone to work, and no fewer than 1533 went into casual employment,—became milkmen's boys, errand-boys, cart-boys, newspaper boys, etc. In North London 6032 went to work on leaving school; the occupations of 319 were unknown, and of the remainder at least 3115 went to casual employment. One-half the boy workers returned from Ipswich are errand-boys, newsboys, or cart-boys, and the same kind of work is responsible for about one in four in Norwich, two in five in Plymouth, about the same in Bristol, five in thirteen in Wolverhampton, one in three in Burton-on-Trent, two in five in Birmingham, three in ten in Liverpool, one in three in Manchester, three in seven in Newcastle on-Tyne. Of course, these figures do not bear the same significance in each of the places named, but in each case they are disquieting. In the next place, the tables in this part

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of the report show how very insignificant is the proportion of children who pass from elementary schools into higher grade schools.

The significance of this report, even when we allow for all its imperfections, cannot be overestimated. It shows how the casual laborer, the unskilled workman, the man undisciplined in the virtues of industry, the unemployed and the unemployable are made; it reveals a shockingly low sense of parental responsibility,—partly the result of a wearisome, heartless struggle among incompetent people for the means of a decent livelihood, partly the consequence of the utter lack of inspiring ideal in the lives of great sections of the English working-classes. I am told by one who has been investigating Scottish industrial conditions for a good number of years that child-labor has not developed there to such an extent as it has done in the sister kingdom; but it is to be regretted that the Secretary for Scotland has refused a return for that country.

Of course, the report suggests no remedies; but it is impossible to read its astonishing figures without thinking how the state of things which they reveal can be improved. It is difficult to say how effective the moral agencies at work are. It is to be feared that the honor for education which appeared to characterize democratic movements is not so active now as it was. Perhaps the explanation is that only the leading spirits held education in honor, and managed to make it appear that their reverence was the reverence of the whole movement, while it was not. It is easier, however, to write of the tendency in industry itself. Under pressure of a semi-panic relating to our trade on foreign markets, employers are beginning to be aware that spent human material and stupid workmen do not pay. There is in consequence a growing disposition to inquire into the neglected facts bearing upon human economy in production, and as a result we find, for instance, that the half-time system is gradually falling into disuse. The bill promoted by Mr. Robson to raise the age of the half-timer was, indeed, almost out of date before it left the House of Commons. Then, a Factory Law Amendment Bill is about due, and when it appears it will very likely make the existing law limiting the employment of children, especially in domestic workshops, more workable than it now is. Finally, an attempt will possibly be made to give local authorities —town councils, etc.—power to regulate the employment of children upon the streets much more thoroughly than is now done under the Prevention of Cruelty to Children Acts, and to enable school-managers to prosecute parents and employers who habitually

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work children of school-age so that they go to school too tired to do school-work.

J. R. MacDonald.

London.

The Effects of the Factory System. By Allen Clarke. London: Grant Richards, 1899. Pp. viii., 178.

Mr. Clarke has had an intimate acquaintance with the factory system, and his work shows it; but, nevertheless, his book seems to us out of proportion. We have many criticisms to offer. In the first place, though the book is entitled "The Effects of the Factory System," attempts are made only here and there to discover them. Our author describes industrial conditions as they are and have been, but he does not compare them closely with those existing before the so-called industrial revolution, nor does he endeavor to assign present social facts to the several influences which have been at work. All the hardships in the factory-worker's lot are vividly depicted, and these are assumed to be the effects of the factory system. The author thinks that he has "conclusively demonstrated that the factory system of to-day is an evil thing" (p. 174). He then proceeds to inform his reader what he would have in its place. But here we must not follow step by step. In effect, what is recommended is village communities, "each fixed solid on its own agricultural basis" (p. 174), which includes cotton growing in hot-houses (p. 175). "Modern science could soon overcome the few difficulties, which are practically none at all" (p. 176). We doubt whether modern science would agree with Mr. Clarke; certainly, modern political economy would not. Modern common sense, too, is coming to the opinion that it is folly to try to grow grapes on thorns and figs on thistles. The concluding chapters, which are devoted to recommendations are, beyond a doubt, the weakest parts of the book.

Our author's representation of the factory system is over-colored. But that it is not intentionally so, we quite believe. The earnestness of the book forces us to unreservedly accept Mr. Clarke's statement that he has "written these articles as truthfully and fairly as possible" (p. 158). But there is, nevertheless, serious misrepresentation, both of the past and present. The author has not got the feel of the earlier periods; and with respect to the present, he has not succeeded in sinking his own personal equation. The factory system is viewed by him with the eyes of the quiet-loving

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devotee of the country, we should judge. *Hinc illæ lachrymæ.* But it must not be supposed that we for one moment deny great and grave ills. We are told that "the glory of their" (the operatives) "occupation is gone; the days when their labor was not a weary burden are over" (p. 50) . . . "While the machines have almost become human, the human tenders of them have almost become machines" (p. 55). I should be inclined to say that the burden is passing, and that the glory is to come in a greater degree. To invent a machine, to understand and control a machine, is not to be a machine; but to constantly repeat some few actions is to be a machine. To tend six looms in a modern weaving-shed has less promise of slavery than to cast the shuttle in the hand-loom weaver's garret. That the operative to-day has less control over his own actions than he had in the past we admit and deplore. But organization has always come at first with subjugation; and yet in politics it has culminated in democracy. Nevertheless, our author is pessimistic about the future of the factory system. He can "hardly think that it ever will be good" (p. 157). All we can say is that we dissent. But with a good deal that Mr. Clarke says we agree. Because of the above criticisms, it must not be supposed that we think Mr. Clarke has written a valueless book. On the contrary, we think that very much may be learnt from it, for it presents an aspect of the factory system which the more orthodox incline to overlook, just as our author inclines to overlook the more cheerful side which they see. Mr. Clarke has therefore done us a service, though we cannot agree with his conclusions. The book is well written, and a word of praise is due to the publisher.

S. J. Chapman.

University College, Cardiff.

Religion in Greek Literature. A Sketch in Outline. By Lewis Campbell, M.A., LL.D. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1898.

As the title of his book indicates, Professor Campbell has been concerned not with Greek religion as a whole but with the larger conceptions and experiences of their leading poets and thinkers. With this in view, he travels lightly over the disputed question of early origin, recognizing different sources,—"aboriginal," Aryan, Phœnician, Egyptian,—but not committing himself to any estimate of their interconnection and relative importance, and passing on at once to a detailed account of religion as we meet it in Homer.

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This is one of the most interesting sections in the book. Professor Campbell brings out forcibly the significant contrasts to be noted in the Iliad: the dearth of abstract reflection and yet the deep and vital sense of character and the movement of life; the capacity for enjoyment combined with the underlying pessimism of the dreary outlook after death; the inconsistencies in the picture of the gods, from one point of view limited and capricious individuals, from another types of elemental powers; above all, the striking opposition between the nobleness of the human figures and the pettiness of the divine rulers. There can be little doubt that Professor Campbell is on the right line when he says, "the humanity of the age had far outgrown its theology," and again, "the interest in human things was far more vivid than the traditionally accepted notion of things divine. The heart of man was deeply engaged in the former, while the latter touched only his imagination or his fear." The recognition of this remarkable severance between the imagination and the heart is of high value, and one could wish Professor Campbell had used this key to unlock other problems he has to face. The discussion of the Odyssey is less satisfactory. Stress is laid, it is true, upon the poem as a drama of retribution; but there is no mention of the striking conception of Athene as a guiding power at one with the resolution and wise endurance of the hero, nor yet of the delicate allegorical fancy that plays round the vision of Circe and the Sirens. Yet it is probably in these three points that we should look for the real difference in religious thought between the Iliad and the Odyssey.

In the work of Hesiod Professor Campbell recognizes the first attempt to make a coherent cosmogony out of the scattered myths, and the definite emergence of conscious reflection in a didactic form. No doubt the conquest of the new form may be considered as a step in development; but it is odd to speak of Hesiod's commonplace morality as containing "an ethical ideal in some ways more advanced" than the unconscious wisdom that created Hector and Odysseus and Nausicaa. Professor Campbell then proceeds to a cursory account of the ensuing age, alive with the forces of personal thought and feeling that were pressing on to a more satisfying religion, from the speculative ardor of Heraclitus and Xenophanes to the human intensity of Sappho. This leads him to Pindar and Herodotus, as summing up the life and culture of the early fifth century. His account of Pindar is minute, but somewhat disconnected and inconclusive. He admits that Pindar's morality is

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"merged in opinion and convention," and at the same time speaks of an "advance in ethical reflection" and of mystical and philosophic elements, without explaining how the different phases come to be manifestations of the same personality. The truth about Pindar, one might suggest, is that his thought, as thought, was shallow and prejudiced; but that his vivid sense of beauty sometimes helped him to wider views, made him reject the grosser myths or accept with glad sympathy the new hope of a glorious life beyond death. Herodotus, Professor Campbell puts in effective contrast with Pindar, the representative of "the forward movement" as opposed to the aristocratic conservative. He might perhaps have ventured farther and taken Herodotus as the very embodiment of the inquiring Greek spirit at its normal level, criticising the action of the gods, but content with a superficial justification, speculating in science and philosophy, but ready enough to accept, at least provisionally, any pleasing tale of superstition. This union of profound and shallow is well illustrated by Professor Campbell's own words on the Herodotean doctrine of the "envy" of the gods, half "spiteful malignity," half "just severity."

Before dealing with the great Athenian outburst, Professor Campbell reviews the leading cults and beliefs that found a home at Athens. But the review is so discursive and the statements so vague that it is difficult to gather any clear idea of the varying tendencies at work. The most suggestive part is the account of Orphism, the belief in a child of Zeus, torn to pieces and devoured, mysteriously rescued by his father, and mysteriously present in the nature of men. It is disappointing, however, that nothing is said about the affinities of this doctrine with totemism on the one hand and Christianity on the other. Of the tragedians, it is evident that Professor Campbell is most in sympathy with Æschylus. He shows the final moralization under the poet's thought of the old irrational Nemesis; and he has an interesting suggestion that the Promethean trilogy may have represented the progress from Chaos to Cosmos, and the final union of liberty and order. Professor Campbell gives Sophocles credit for originality as a religious thinker, but does not place him so high as Æschylus. He appears to hold that his characteristic note is a belief in one supreme will "working according to eternal law," and guiding the noble spirits through suffering to redemption and peace in another world. Euripides is very hardly treated. Professor Campbell rejects the theory that the poet held the current mythology up to odium in the interests of a purer reli-

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gion, and is content to see in him a somewhat melodramatic and superficial artist who simply reflected the chaotic speculations of his time, with only here and there flashes of higher thought. In this connection it is impossible not to notice with amazement that Aristophanes is passed over in silence, and is barely mentioned even in the description of Socrates. As regards the latter, Professor Campbell has a keen sense of the peculiar contrasts in his temperament, "the passionate nature held in absolute self-control," "the sceptical attitude rooted in an absolutely firm conviction of the reality of truth and justice;" but there is a certain looseness in the statement of his ethical and philosophical position which is apt to bewilder. What is meant, for instance, by saying that "in the white light of Socrates the several rays which colored later ethics were combined"? This does not help us to realize the essential incoherencies in the Socratic conception of the good, (so well analyzed by Professor Sidgwick in his "History of Ethics,") the incoherencies which made it possible for Stoic and Epicurean alike to claim him as their master. The transition to Plato and the account of Platonism as a philosophic whole suffer from the same indefiniteness; but Professor Campbell is at his best in his appreciation of this Platonic effort to see the world as the expression of one great intelligence, an intelligence that was essentially good, and with which man could be united by becoming just and righteous. The book is practically closed by a brief estimate of Aristotle's religious position. This Professor Campbell considers closely akin to Plato's, the main difference being the greater stress laid by Aristotle on the intellectual element in his conception of the divine: "the chief attribute in the God of Aristotle is not justice in the human sense, but the energy of pure contemplation."

F. Melian Stawell.

London.

Roman Society in the Last Century of the Western Empire. By Samuel Dill, M.A., Professorof Greek in Queen's College, Belfast. London: Macmillan & Co., 1898.

Professor Dill's avowed intention in this volume is to touch in with some detail the features of an age whose grand lineaments are generally familiar to us, the age of the final German invasions. What were people doing, thinking, and saying to one another at this critical period? Can we approach more closely to them as human beings, not as the mere material for the deduction of general

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observations? How did they live? How did they make money? How did they view the momentous incidents of their time? Was the Roman world, as Salvianus says, *laughing* when it died? or the reverse?

In pursuit of an answer to these questions, the Professor has searched, and searched thoroughly, the literary remains of the period, chiefly those of Symmachus, Ausonius, Apollinaris Sidonius among the legatees of pagan culture, of Augustine, Jerome, Salvianus, and Orosius in the new literature of theology. Of his five books, the first enforces and explains the tenacity of paganism, the second endeavors to correct the moralists' denunciation of society by the testimony of men of the world, the third narrates the causes of municipal decay, the fourth describes Roman feeling towards the barbarian invader, and the last deals with the education and culture of the age. Such is the outline of this important work.

First, a word in criticism of the book's form. The style is so lucid and agreeable, gives evidence of such a power to please, that we regret it should suffer radically from the construction of the work itself. What we feel to be an inherent fault in a work of this kind is its *lack of evolution.* A moment's reflection on any great historical work,—for instance, that of Mommsen, where the value of climax is skilfully observed—will make clear what we mean. Professor Dill, whom we stop to criticise on this ground only because of his evident merits of style, gives us neither a series of animated tableaux nor a sure sense of development from start to finish. Consequently there is an uncomfortable feeling of aggregation about his chapters; many things overlap, many things are repeated; juxtaposition takes the place of perspective and due subordination.

Secondly, we are not confident of the feasibility of what the Professor attempts. When he tells us that in the fourth and fifth centuries people were thinking this or that, we are inclined to reply that only *some* people were so thinking; of the rest, of the majority, we simply do not know. Similarly, when Professor Dill in an excellent paragraph (p. 176) acquits the polished society of the Empire of the charges of gross immorality on the strength of their own epistolary correspondence, and accuses them rather of pride and cultivated selfishness, we are tempted to ask, Who would have surmised the moral laxity of the court of Versailles from the polite letters of the time? In fact, when Professor Dill comes to deal with the ruin of the middle class, he is compelled to add to the roll of aristocratic crimes rapacity and corruption, crimes which, in his previous

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chapter, he had not charged upon the upper class, simply because they were not to be found in the published letters of a Symmachus or a Sidonius! We are disposed to allow more weight than the Professor to the indictments of Jerome and Salvianus; but again and again we feel the flaw which lies at the bottom of most historical writing, that it rests on imperfect foundations, documentary or other, always incomplete and often unessential. In reading Professor Dill's pages we say to ourselves, Yes, probable enough; and so is the contrary. Again, the author deals fully with the upper class and with the curial class; but what of the plebeians? Barely a word. Why? Because there is no record of them. But are they on that account unimportant to society? We wish to insist that a book of this kind must be incomplete. We may know the right causes, but equally possibly we may not. We may appreciate some important feeling or opinion of the age; some we are sure to overlook.

With these reservations, Professor Dill's book seems to us good and thorough. He accounts for the tenacity of paganism partly by the religious conservatism of Roman character, partly by its identification with the glory of the old Roman state, but principally by the infusion of new vitality from Eastern sources. We think that he might have pointed a little more definitely the resemblance, and consequent rivalry, of the eastern cults and Christianity; but he clearly emphasizes the appeal made to superstition by the magic and divination of paganism, to sensuality by its theatre and circus, to devotees by the warmth of Isis or Mithra worship, to theorists by its Neoplatonic monotheism, and to all sorts and conditions of men by its elastic syncretism. In this book, as in every other which we have read on this subject, our sympathies are certainly not all on the Christian side,—perhaps, because it was the side that triumphed. It is interesting to read about the perplexities which prevailed in that age, no less than in our own, as to the literal observance of Christ's precepts among the sordid concerns of the world. But we cannot find that Professor Dill has given any adequate account of the asceticism which arose from a refusal to make a compromise with things temporal. He adverts to the fact, and that is all.

The second part of this work, in which the author first tells us all the bad things which Jerome and Salvianus have to say of the age, and then tries to mitigate them out of the mouth of Symmachus, Ausonius, and Sidonius Apollinaris, though in its side

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issues extremely interesting, appears to us on the whole to be faulty in its method. The advocates on either side do not meet each other squarely; if they are not talking about different things, one party is, anyhow, talking directly, and the other obliquely, about them. Then comes Professor Dill and endeavors to make the averted Ausonius turn full face to Jerome, call him an extravagant satirist and rhetorical moralist, discourse for a while on the conditions of country life in that age, and then walk down as having proved his case. There is much that is entertaining in these chapters, but we are not convinced on the main point. Society is treated too much as a homogeneous unity, and Professor Dill is too anxious to ascribe to it a uniform tone. After all, why need it have had one? Certain *sections* of society, no doubt, the Professor characterizes admirably, the Gallic aristocracy, for instance. But it would be absurd to meet one who denounced the social tone of the British empire with a description of the charming provincial life of Hampshire or Natal.

By far the most satisfactory portion of this volume is the second chapter of the third book, in which the writer expounds the causes of the decay of the middle class, and exceedingly good his exposition is. It is based on the edicts of the Theodosian code, which exhibit a senatorial class exempt from taxation and possessed of privilege, while the burdens of imperial expenditure fall more and more heavily on the evanescent middle class. In spite of the decrease of taxable capacity, no remission is allowed, and the curials are compelled to make up any deficit. The natural fruits of this iniquitous system are corruption, peculation, debt, and the absorption of the smaller by the greater landholders. Trade is carried on under great disabilities; wealth either diminishes or falls into the χεῖρας δὲ ἅπτους of the senatorial class. Aristocratic privileges more noxious than those of ancient France, landlords' agents more immoral than ever were known in Ireland, heredity of occupation more stereotyping than the system of Eastern castes, a central government impotent as the Mogul's to control its vast dominions, all these are some of the chief factors in the destruction of the ancient boast of Rome, her municipal life. We do not ever remember to have seen a better account of the social and economic laws which were inexorably disintegrating the Roman empire than is given in this book; and Professor Dill has here, at any rate, escaped the besetting temptation of even the best historians—a desire to prove his predecessors wrong.

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In the next book the author attempts to gauge the feelings of Romans towards the barbarian invaders, and once again we go through Jerome, Orosius, Sidonius, and the rest. The net result is what we should have expected,—there are all shades of feeling, all varieties of opinion. There is, on the one hand, a deep pessimism, a passionate regret for the violated sanctity of Rome; on the other, there is the cheerful optimism which believes in the civilizing mission, if not in the perpetual stability, of Rome, or which welcomes the German settlers as fresh blood within the frontiers of the Empire. But to conclude from a few separate expressions of feeling to the feelings of the whole society of the age appears to us impossible; and Professor Dill wisely admits as much himself (pp. 285, 286). The concluding book, which deals with the culture of the age, is sane and discriminating. Claudian is not a great name in literature, but he is the greatest of that period. We must, however, confess to a great interest in reading about Macrobius, Martianus Capella, and other names once famous, but now mostly quoted in commentaries. Professor Dill shows himself to be a tolerant and kindly man in his treatment of these literary circles; their pompousness and affectation make us, for our own part, a little impatient. But the whole tone of the Professor's book is, above everything, sympathetic and generous, and we lay it down with a feeling of gratitude for much agreeable writing and much sound information.

AUSTIN SMYTH.
TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

THE CHRISTIAN CONQUEST OF ASIA. Studies and Personal Observations of Religion. Being the Morse Lectures of 1898. By John Henry Barrows. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.

Dr. Barrows, who is chiefly known through the prominent part that he took in the organization of the Chicago Parliament of Religions, is a clear and pleasant writer. His latest work is far from being profound, but it is interesting and noteworthy for the broad spirit which, on the whole, pervades it. We say on the whole, for occasionally, when speaking of Islam, he falls back into the position of the controversialist, and at other times he assumes the *rôle* of the special pleader. The title of the book is not happily chosen. In fact, one is inclined to call it a misnomer, for "The Christian Conquest of Asia" is, to a large extent, a mere hope or a fond dream. One might with more justice speak of the Asiatic conquest of Christian Europe, for Dr. Barrows himself is free to admit

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the great influence of the East upon Western thought. The first two chapters are taken up with general essays upon Judaism and Islam. There is absolutely nothing new nor anything particularly suggestive in what Dr. Barrows tells us of these two religions. It is quite clear that he has not studied either of them from original sources, but he states well-known facts in an agreeable manner, and he must be commended, also, for his manifest desire to be fair to both Judaism and Islam, though fairer to the former than to the latter. No one must, of course, expect scholastic accuracy from a writer who is dependent upon translations for his knowledge of the Koran and Mohammedan theology, but the errors and slips are not numerous. The most serious defect in the chapter on Islam is the repetition of stories about Mohammed which scholars have long since thrown aside as spurious. To use such stories as the basis for passing a criticism upon Mohammedanism is clearly misleading.

When we come to Dr. Barrows's treatment of Popular and Philosophic Hinduism, there is much that is exceedingly interesting. He is evidently a careful observer, who travelled through India with his eyes open. At many places he held conversations with the learned native thinkers, and he shows an unusual ability for entering sympathetically into their point of view. But, after all, the question must be asked whether personal experience, even when combined with some general reading, furnishes a sufficient ground for forming an estimate of Hinduism? Long residence may, in a measure, be a compensation for the study of the original sources of a religion, but certainly a trip of a few months' duration is not. Had Dr. Barrows's aim in his lectures been merely to give an account of the impressions that he received, his book would be most satisfactory. But he claims much more. His lectures have what the Germans call a *Tendenz*. Their evident purpose is to stir, advocate, and justify the Christianizing of Asia, and more particularly of India, and he properly holds that if this is to be done with success, it is necessary for missionaries and people in general to study Hinduism and the peculiarities of the Hindu mind. Judged from this point of view, candor compels one to state that the lectures do not make a favorable impression, and Dr. Barrows's plea, in consequence, loses much of its force. Almost everything that he says about the "degrading" character of popular faith in India can be matched by an enumeration of conditions that prevail somewhere or the other in countries in which Christianity is the religion of the majority. It may be held that the superstitious practices of ignorant

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Christians are not an inherent part of Christianity; and this is undoubtedly true, at least in a large degree; but the same holds good of popular Hinduism. Dr. Barrows himself is not to blame for the great weakness of his book; it is his method which is at fault. One cannot understand a religion without a study of its sources. With the best possible intentions, mere observation of a religion furnishes a distorted view, simply because observation has its limitations. It is, to a large extent, accidental what one sees, and, what is more to the point, our impressions are too much influenced by the conditions under which we observe, to make this the basis for judging of so momentous a matter as a religion that has produced a most voluminous literature, that has behind it a long and varied history, and that presents so many phases as Hinduism. The closing chapter on "The Success of Asiatic Missions" is by far the strongest in the book. It reveals the fervency and earnestness of the author. His idea of Christianity is high and large, though correspondingly vague. While not pleading for any form of Christianity, yet it is manifest that preaching pure Christianity meets with serious obstacles of a practical character. As long as Christianity presents such various phases as at present, it seems futile to speak of "Asiatic Missions" as though they constituted a unit. The great variety of Christian sects, their divergences in forms of worship, constitute the weakness of the general policy of Christianizing the East. No one will gainsay the important services in the cause of civilization that have been rendered by Christian missionaries in the East, and before their devotion and frequent display of heroism every one must bow his head in deep respect; but successful conversions here and there—and even several thousand conversions would only be equivalent to a "here and there"—seem but a small return for the enormity of the effort involved. After all, there is considerable philosophy in the remark made by a young Brahmin to Dr. Barrows at the close of one of his lectures. "Dr. Barrows, you are right in saying that Hinduism has not been a missionary religion; but it is going to be." Dr. Barrows sees fit to characterize this remark as a "bit of airy vanity;" but is it not the natural and proper answer to the efforts which are being made by missionaries to wean people from a religion to which they are strongly attached, and of whose achievements they certainly have much reason to be proud? One need only reverse the situation to sympathize with the spirit that prompted the suggestion to offset missionary effort by missionary effort. If the Asiatic missions

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could divorce religious tenets from civilization and devote themselves to the improvement of the morals, and of the general condition of the sunken masses in the East, leaving the latter to work out their own scheme of salvation, the missions would be rendering the greatest possible service to humanity—a service in which they would have the aid and support of all serious-minded purposes, and one which could not fail of ultimate success.

MORRIS JASTROW, JR.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF HOLY SCRIPTURE, THE PRINCIPLES, METHODS, HISTORY, AND RESULTS OF ITS SEVERAL DEPARTMENTS AND OF THE WHOLE. By Charles Augustus Briggs, D.D., Edward Robinson Professor of Biblical Theology in Union Theological Seminary, New York City. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1899. 8vo. Pp. xxii., 688. $3.00.

To those who wish to be acquainted with the principles and methods of the modern literary and critical treatment of the Bible this book may be commended as a very useful guide. Without going into detail as to the origin of the several Biblical books (that is, without undertaking to be a history of old Hebrew literature), it gives the history of Biblical study, and indicates the lines along which fruitful study is to be conducted. Dr. Briggs accepts the supernatural point of view as to the origin of the Bible, but he holds at the same time that its essential divinity does not take it out of the domain of natural growth, and he feels at liberty to apply to it without limitation the principles of literary criticism. The doctrine of evolution is taken for granted throughout the book,—the history of Israel is treated as an evolution, and its unity is found in the gradual unfolding of the idea. While the author's main interest is theological, he has introduced here and there references to the ethics of the Bible. Here, also, it is evident, from his discussion, that the Biblical ethical conceptions show continuous progress. Dr. Briggs's reading is wide, and this volume is a storehouse of information (though it is much more than that), with numerous references to authorities. It is what its title declares it to be, an introduction to the study of the Bible. It is fresh and vigorous in style, and the critical and literary positions it takes are those of the most advanced line of Biblical science.

C. H. TOY.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

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MY INNER LIFE: Being a Chapter in Personal Evolution and Autobiography. By John Beattie Crozier. London: Longmans, 1898. Pp. xix., 562.

There is but little in Mr. Crozier's chapter in Personal Evolution and Autobiography (why "in"?) which concerns the moral philosopher. Not that the book is destitute of interest, but the interest is hardly philosophical. The first part of it contains an ample account of the author's childhood and upbringing in an out-of-the-way part of Canada. There is much description of his youthful sports and escapades, tobogganing, robbing pigeon-roosts, molestation of negro prayer-meetings, and strange experiences of a drunken uncle, who became less interesting in his later days as a total abstainer. Altogether, one is strongly reminded by these twelve chapters of Mark Twain's immortal romances "Tom Sawyer" and "Huckleberry Finn." After a very desultory education, in which the author seems to have suffered much from the incapacity of his teachers, he drifted into medicine, came to England, settled into a London practice, and after long struggling achieved recognition as a philosophical writer. Such has been the outward course of his existence. As a literary man and a thinker, he began with an interest in phrenology, in which for years he had implicit belief; spent several months in learning great quantities of "high-sounding, many-syllabled words,"—verbiage for verbiage's sake, an epoch which has left a permanent mark upon his literary manner; became completely enslaved by the Spencerian system, in which for many years he could find no chink or flaw of inconsistency (!); but finally circumvented Mr. Spencer to his own satisfaction, and thus recovered the "Ideal" of which materialism had robbed him. The only chapter of the book that really touches on philosophy is that entitled, My Contribution. The ethical gist of the contribution is that there is in the human mind an element of divine origin which pronounces authoritative judgment on moral values.

As the foregoing remarks are intended to indicate, Mr. Crozier is not to be regarded as a great thinker. But he has a genuine enthusiasm for his subject, and a flow of language which might have had a literary value, but for its extreme redundancy. It is impossible to be angry with him; and if his intellectual training had been more fortunate he might have done good work, for he is on the right path in the main. The tone of his book is wholesome, and his writings must appeal to a certain section of the reading

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public, if we may judge from the success of his previous works and the extensive press notices accorded to the present one.

HENRY STURT.

OXFORD.

CHARLES KINGSLEY AND THE CHRISTIAN SOCIAL MOVEMENT. By Charles William Stubbs, D.D., Dean of Ely. London: Blackie & Son. Pp. viii., 199.

Dean Stubbs has written a suggestive book, full of the spirit of the Christian Socialists, but one, nevertheless, which contains too much about the Christian Socialists to make it a satisfactory life of Kingsley, and too much about Kingsley to make it a satisfactory account of the Christian Socialists, as the author himself admits. It is, notwithstanding, to be welcomed as a stimulating introduction to an attractive and effective social movement, with which many great names are identified. One last word of complaint. The book seems to me to contain too many quotations; yet it cannot be denied that they are generally apt.

Chapter I., in which the writer deals with the philosophical and religious basis of middle-century socialism, and attempts to trace the forces initiated by Maurice through their changing forms to the present day; and Chapter VI., in which some account is given of the personalities and influences of those who formed the group of social thinkers and dreamers to which Kingsley belonged, appear to me the most valuable portions of this work. In dealing with the first subject, another writer might have laid less exclusive emphasis on theology, and have given less prominence to the doctrine of the Incarnation. The author's views on the connection between the opinions of Maurice and those expressed in parts of "Lux Mundi" are exceedingly interesting.

Finally, in this volume we have a vivid and, I am inclined to think, a correct representation, necessarily sketchy, of Kingsley's character. In estimating his hero, whether as thinker, enthusiast, novelist, or poet, Dean Stubbs is kindly just. But, with reference to Kingsley's socialism, it would, perhaps, be truer to say not that "the only revolution which Kingsley desired to see was a moral and religious revolution, not a political or a social one" (p. 116), but that he hoped for a political and social revolution based entirely on a moral and religious one.

S. J. CHAPMAN.

MANCHESTER.

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MORALITY AS A RELIGION. An Exposition of some First Principles. By W. R. Washington Sullivan. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., Limited. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1898.

This book consists of seventeen sermons by Mr. W. R. Washington Sullivan, the lecturer and leader of "the Ethical Religion Society," which meets at Steinway Hall, Portman Square, London. "It expresses," Mr. Sullivan says in the preface, "the Ethical interpretation with which the teaching of Kant and Emerson, and the Idealist School generally, have made us familiar."

The first three sermons—Ethics and Religion, Ethics and Science, Ethics and Theism—define the point of view. The remaining fourteen sermons are occupied, for the most part, with the discussion of moral questions.

The point of view may be given in the author's own words. He says: "Kant and Comte will be found to be, after Christ, the master-builders of the second temple which is to be the religious home of the ages to come" (p. 207). "I affix my two humble propositions to the postern of the ethical church, namely, first, that 'in the beginning was Mind', and next, that the moral law is the highest expression of that Mind" (p. 38). "To us theism means that at the ground of being, at the heart of existence, there is a self-subsistent reality, which we call by the highest name we know, viz., reason or mind" (p. 38). "In these definitions of conscience, as 'the voice of God,' and 'the voice of man,' we have an instance of propositions which in logic are called *contraries*" (p. 89).

From these quotations, it is apparent that Mr. Sullivan, while calling himself Idealist and founding himself on Kant, preaches a Theism which is incompatible with Idealism in its philosophic sense, which is haunted by a dualism, and which is disturbed by the intrusion into it of the ideas of time and space. The book is written with much animation, and is full of quotations from innumerable writers.

MARY GILLILAND HUSBAND.

LONDON.

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THE ENDS OF THE INDUSTRIAL ORGANISM.

THE object of this article is to indicate some of the chief problems, touching social philosophy, which political economy raises and generally abandons. Borderland problems they might be called, standing in a mixed atmosphere of ethics, economics, and sociology. Further definition of the subject is best left to the argument to unfold.

The first part deals with some old-fashioned aspects of these questions and with new points of view; the second with the nature of the industrial organism which static forces are inducing; the third with dynamic forces and social ideals. I use "static" and "dynamic" for want of better terms, for I know of no other pair which will at all adequately indicate the distinction intended, a distinction the nature of which must be gathered from the contexts in which the words occur in what follows.

I.

It is frequently said that students of political economy must remember from how much, when merely economists, they have abstracted; for there are many other motives besides the economic. The grounds for this charge in the past cannot be denied. We know that many early writers did, after analysis of the internal man, set apart certain

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motives as economic. We know, moreover, that some thinkers were even apt to identify the economic with the ethical; or at any rate to suppose that they both came to the same thing at the end, that the "unseen hand" worked if not by merit yet by grace. But master minds admitted exceptions. There are many in the "Wealth of Nations," but Adam Smith evidently thought them easily discoverable and capable of isolated but simple treatment by special arrangements. The father of English economics, indeed, is not without something of that breezy optimism which characterized many of the early writers, especially the popularizers. But there were others of the early school who kept the ethical and the economic apart, and assigned to each its own domain. And frequently a tone of depression is noticeable in the utterances of these thinkers—naturally, because the economic was half-conceived by them as a brass-bound system from which there was no escape. The rigid law was galling,—except to optimists,—and the best thing for the world to do, they held, was to acquiesce in the inevitable as patiently as it could. There were others, the emotionalists, some in quite recent times, who pictured the world as an arena in which the ethical and economic were fighting to the death.

We have above merely the extremes to which thinkers had a tendency to drift. Professor Marshall is certainly very close to a much neglected truth in his vindication of the earlier economists; and Ruskin was no doubt generally wrong when he denied,—as he denied. But, though many supposed errors can one by one be read out of the systems of the most mistaken economists, the tone and the tendency are still there. The economists who wrote at the end of the last century, and at the beginning of this, may have been in the main positive scientists and not artists; but in an age with a psychological bias, when the natural—sometimes so conceived as to be scarcely distinguishable from the actual—was identified with the ethical, an oscillation between the positive and normative standpoints was easy; and it was not uncommon. The merit of not cutting political economy adrift from ethics was

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due more to short-sightedness than to insight, for analysis had not yet completed its surgical operations upon the so-called moral sciences. Might we not say that these writers, even if they saw the one in the many, failed to see the many in the one?

But, say what you will of the grotesque absurdity of the narrow abstractions of the system based on motives, the fact remains that its results very frequently came out on the whole correct. "This rage was right i' the main," though it had a weakness for painting political economy as the make-believe science of a bogey-land of india-rubber abortions. It may have been defective, but it worked, and in many branches of economics, if cautiously used, it works still.

Economics for the most part no longer stands on the foundation of motives. We are therefore spared the difficulties, as regards the ethical and the economic, which the distinctions drawn by the earlier economists left them to face, and saw them passing by. Neither is it at all largely concerned with the sequences and coexistences of events capable only of inductive treatment; the dismal warnings of the ultra-historical school, notwithstanding. It has taken up a position midway between the two extremes on the basis of *normal action.* It seeks to discover uniformities of average behavior sufficiently fundamental to be suitable for wide application; and thus to provide a deductive basis free from the burr-like objections which cling to inferences from motives.

The statement with which we began, then, as it may be interpreted, has little application to the orthodox economists of to-day. Students are not always "forced to remember from how much, when merely economists, they have abstracted," for, in so far as they have been successful on the new lines, they have not abstracted in the sense intended at all.* They have generalized, but in their generalizations they have not ignored supposed negligible motives. Their generalizations are, in fact, nothing more nor less than the first

*Of course they have abstracted in the sense of not dealing directly with all social laws.

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resultants of the totality of motives of the typical or normal man. We must, however, hasten to add that the new laws are not yet quantitative; that they therefore have the old look, and that, in consequence, it is the easiest thing in the world to slip back into the old orthodoxy. In fact, until the new laws are quantified, the distinction between them and the old exists more in name than in reality. It is worthy of passing notice that the uniformities established by the old orthodox English school were not even capable of quantitative expression, for motives are measurable only by their effects; and it is impossible to isolate a single motive for observation, human actions being invariably the intermixed effects of a composition of motives.

At the outset we must remind ourselves that the economist of the new orthodoxy neither denies nor ignores moral forces. He takes men just as they are, with all their virtues and all their vices, and he tends to be a strictly positive scientist, to say just what will normally happen, and to meddle not at all with political and ethical issues. By "economic force" he understands any social force which is operative with respect to wealth. By "wealth" he means simply goods, or what is now demanded, whether for moral or entirely selfish reasons. Perhaps, indeed, he may qualify the term by the notions of transferability or of limitation in quantity; but the qualification is merely a harmless and unimportant subtlety.

II.

Do economic forces in the modern industrial world tend to produce a maximum of satisfaction? In asking this question, we have not of necessity happiness in mind. We only assume that people desire to satisfy their wants, good or bad, even if they want unhappiness. There is nothing at all to prevent us from being perfectionists, or anything else that we please. Moreover, we are altogether concerned with present valuations.

In seeking an answer to the inquiry propounded we soon find ourselves in a domain in which many a socialist exer-

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cises himself, and frequently with a confidence not to be shaken by the logic of mortals. But it is by no means certain that in their denials the socialists are not right, whatever they may be in their affirmations. We need not argue the point at length, since the ground has been well worked over, and we therefore could not hope for more than a few insignificant fragments as a reward of further investigation here. See, for instance, Professor Sidgwick's discussions in Book III. of his "Political Economy," especially Chapters VI. and VII. Take the following passage for example: "the more any society approximates to equality in the distribution of wealth among its members, the greater on the whole is the aggregate of satisfactions which the society in question derives from the wealth which it possesses." Take again Professor Marshall's criticism of the doctrine of maximum satisfaction. What it all comes to is that by a redistribution of rewards satisfactions may be increased. But the arbitrary rearrangement of rewards involves tampering with productive forces, and the result of interference may therefore be a greater loss than gain. The conclusion seemingly is, that you may be an optimist with regard to the effect of distribution determined by the interaction of social forces, if you like, but that, if you are, you walk by faith and not by sight.

It may be objected that the unqualified reference to Professor Sidgwick's results is inappropriate, as he is frankly a hedonist, whereas we are not necessarily so. In reply, it suffices to say that, in view of the fact that "the élite certainly disagree very much with the vulgar as to the real value of particular purchasable commodities," we can find no other common measure of wealth, from the positive standpoint, than satisfactions, having regard to the future as well as the present. But satisfactions need not be interpreted hedonistically. Professor Sidgwick's results really follow from the law of diminishing utility, a law which is capable of widely different interpretations. Expressed most cautiously, it merely asserts the normal variation of preferences with quantity: it is a law, therefore, which is equally true of the perfectionist and

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hedonist. And you can certainly measure the relations of satisfactions to each other.*

Now, casting behind us all questions of distribution primarily, and examining the other end of the consumption-production process, can we be sure that existing social forces are tending to bring about that condition of the industrial organism which is conducive to a maximum of satisfactions? In asking this question, we are supposing a condition which is never realized, for every change in the social organism as a productive agency involves changes in it as a distributive agency. We may take it, however, as roughly correct, that if all products increase and none diminish, possibilities of a greater aggregate satisfaction are opened up, other things being as before; and that if some increase and others diminish we shall arrive at a roughly correct result by weighing them against each other by the common measure of price.

Let us restate the question. Do economic forces conduce to the industrial arrangements productive of the greatest aggregate satisfaction? There is absolutely nothing to show it. The old argument which resulted in the doctrine of the economic harmonies is faulty, even assuming perfect mobility of labor and capital, and so forth. An existing combination of productive factors, which results, let us suppose, in 100 x, need not be the most productive arrangement. It is quite possible that another combination might turn out 150 x. And it is equally possible that the second organization may be impossible, in view of existing social forces, because the total supply prices of the factors may be greater than 150 x, or because the self-interest of the stronger class may induce the less productive combination. What economic forces are working towards is not a maximum aggregate net gain, but, roughly, a maximum in the formation of which the gain of each is weighted by his strength as a social force. This sounds indefinite. The reader will be much assisted in mak-

* See Marshall's "Principles," Bk. III., Ch. V., §2.

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ing it definite by referring to Professor Pantaleoni's article on "Strong and Weak" in the *Economic Journal* for June, 1898, especially Section VI. Not only is it a conceivable, but it has been and still very largely is the normal, state of affairs for one factor in production to be weak in the senses, among others, firstly, that when it bargains the rate of exchange finally determined invariably approximates to its supply price; and, secondly, that its supply price tends to take a lower level, with reference to its efficiency supply price, than that which we regard as normal. The second kind of weakness follows from the first; for the man who always gets more than he demands inclines to ask for more, and the man who never gets more is prepared to take less. Notice that the function of the employer as the medium through which the law of substitution acts gives him a peculiar strength; a strength upon which trade-unions are attempting to lay hands. It has been suggested, further, that the factor which consists in the combination of managing ability and capital may have the power which is born of the world's poverty in that particular compound.

We cannot now pause to classify "strengths." Suffice it to say that they are internal or external. As internal they are seated in character, and are largely formed by success and knowledge. As external they may consist solely in limited supply. And internal strength may act through the external by a self-limitation of numbers. For instance, we see some of the most vigorous unions regulating the number of apprentices in order to strengthen their position.

In the results of the above analysis we have the general form of the numerous reasons which may be advanced to meet the many different cases in which social forces do not conduce to a maximum of advantage. And notice particularly that the group of arguments of which we have provided the formula are not dependent upon any assumptions as to friction, immobility, unequal opportunity, and so forth. Were the opposites of these three ideas, and of those cloaked in the "so forth," in effective occupation of the world of industry,

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yet the reasoning put forth above would be cogent and valid. In short, assume the "economic man," and the "economic harmonies" are still untrue. Our results continue applicable to fact so long as there are unequal strengths exercised not for the good of the whole, and so long as mere wanton desires present themselves to regulate effort.

We may now pass from the bareness of the universal form to the varieties of living fact. Instances of the operation of the general cause which we have in mind might be indefinitely multiplied. We see it ruling among grades of employees as well as in their relations with the directors of industry. Suppose there is a piece of work to be done, and that it can be performed ill by a group, chiefly of unskilled labor, at a cost of £20, and well and in a shorter time by one chiefly of skilled labor, but at a cost of £30. We may frequently find it undertaken by the first group. That is (*ceteris paribus*) the less productive combination survives. Now I say nothing here of the reasons which may be assigned for the difference in the two supply prices. It may be that the former is too low because the latter is too high, or because some other element in remuneration is swollen through the exercise of an economic strength which unskilled labor has been less able to resist than skilled labor. In this connection, I cannot forbear quoting a forcible passage from Professor Marshall, who speaks of "the strange and paradoxical result that the dirtiness of some occupations is a cause of the lowness of the wages earned in them. For employers find that this dirtiness adds much to the wages they would have to pay to get the work done by skilled men of high character working with improved appliances; and so they often adhere to old methods which require only unskilled workers of but indifferent character, and who can be hired for low (time-) wages, because they are not worth much to any employer. There is no more urgent social need than that labor of this kind should be made scarce and dear."* Here is a very

* Page 590 of "Principles" (second edition). See also Book VI., ch. iv.

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striking example of existing economic forces resisting change to the most efficient social structure.

It may be argued that at any rate economic law must secure an efficiency wage to all labor, because, if it did not, the other factors in production would lose. This looks convincing, but it is ambiguous. If efficiency wage has reference only to the work to be done now in a particular combination, it is true; but if it means that which will produce the most efficient man,—that is, if efficiency wage means that which will result in factors which, but for unequal strengths in individuals, would incline to arrange themselves in the most productive organization,—then it is untrue. Hence a paradox which mocks while it comforts. The outcome is that efficiency wage is a relative term. Efficiency for what? If it is for a maximum result, so for as it is consistent with a given industrial structure, then we must hesitate before congratulating ourselves that all economic forces are working together for satisfaction. Consider, moreover, the well-worn remark upon this question, to the effect that it is only on the assumption that the future labor of the employee will be assured to the employer that he will find it to his interest to pay a full efficiency wage. Wherefore, apparently, free labor may be reduced to straits to which slave labor could not be reduced.

Let us consider as a second example the multiplication of retailers. We shall take it as established that the means for the distribution of products are not only uneconomical in their organization, but also excessive in quantity. The cause of the latter is that already adduced;—at the cause of the former we shall briefly glance later. Suppose that wages fall, then some who were employees, but who have or can raise a little capital, will go into small shops. If wages fall still more the number of little retailers will still further increase. Employees may still receive an efficiency wage, but retailers' profits give in addition a comfort-surplus. Now it is quite conceivable that the most economic industrial arrangement is one in which the number of retailers would be considerably less than it is.

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If we take within our purview social friction, we find that society has missed the mark of maximum satisfaction by much more than the previous class of instances indicates. It has been a commonplace since the publication of Gray's "Elegy" that the social machine is a depressingly inefficient instrument for distributing capacities wisely. Captains of industry, to the quality born, never find their companies, and regiments of labor have their leaders still to seek. Consider, moreover, the quantity of effort engaged in opening up markets and extending connections; the half of which is employed in counteracting the enterprises of rivals. Obviously, however, if effort so directed were needless, because custom and habit did not exist and consumers flowed readily from dealer to dealer at the beck of price, the law of increasing returns would lead rapidly to monopoly. But there would be the gain which the law of increasing returns supplied; provided that there was not less vitality in an organism with few centres, each heavily burdened with functions. Consider, further, the waste involved in the birth and decay of businesses. The normal life of the business is about three generations of owners, and the period of full efficiency is probably not more than one-half of this life. The work of business-making, truly, presents many distressing resemblances to the web-making of Penelope. A more cheerful light is, however, thrown on the situation by the suggestion that some loss is prevented by the modern tendency of private concerns to become joint-stock companies at a certain period in their existence. But a contemplation of joint-stock companies strengthens our conviction that there are few unmixed goods in this world.

We must now take up another subject of some importance in the question as a whole. We frequently hear systems, customs, and laws judged by the test of productivity. The inquiry immediately arises, is the most productive form which the industrial organism can take the most advantageous, as the use of such a test seems to imply? It most obviously is not. There may be two forms, A and B, and they may result respec-

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tively in x and $2x$. B is then the most productive, but it may not be the most advantageous, as the value of A may be $3x$ and that of B only x. By the value of a process is meant the satisfaction derived from the work itself, which it is needless to say, may be negative;—and, as things are, most likely it will be. But, quite apart from the satisfaction or dissatisfaction attaching to the process itself, the most productive need not be the most satisfactory for the reason, as Professor Patten would say, that the production period may in the one case eat into the consumption period. Take again the previously supposed cases: it may be that combination B will require more hours out of the twenty-four or more effort, and that in consequence the value of the $2x$ to the producers will be less—there being less time for the enjoyment of it—than that of x to the producers in combination A. It is just worthy of notice incidentally, as a rider to the above, that the most productive consumption is not therefore the most advantageous. One kind of consumption, for example, may produce ten units of present satisfaction and ten units (resulting from the efficiency given by the consumption) for the future; another one unit for the present and fourteen for the future. The latter line of consumption is the most productive, but the former is the most advantageous. This point has some interest, as we frequently find it assumed that it is desirable for the standard of life to make consumption the most productive. Apparently we are expected to put on a large optimism and take it for granted that the most productive system must give the most satisfaction,—perhaps must be the most moral.

III.

So far we have been concerned only with statical problems, so-called; but it must not be forgotten that there is a dynamic economics which should trace the changes continuously taking place in social forces. The realistic science must combine statics and dynamics. Society is like a ship acted on by wind and stream,—the former giving it, let us suppose, a northerly

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direction, and the latter a westerly direction; the two together driving it in consequence north-west. Is this analogy true to any extent, and, if so, to what extent? The reader must be warned that we are here in treacherous surroundings, where the exactness of full truth is at present an unattainable ideal.

Firstly, let it be observed that the dynamic process is not independent of the static. What we are determines what we are to be. But existing conditions are not the sole forces directing the dynamic process. Secondly, notice that the dynamic process cannot be represented as a mechanics so completely as the static process, since our knowledge of the former is less, and so our method of studying it approaches closer to that of biology. Of course neither can the static process be treated entirely by the aid of the mechanical analogy.

It has been remarked above that the real dynamic change which we see is not independent of the static process: that there is mutual determination. But, nevertheless, we can find in the former an independent tendency, the effect of which is to be seen in the progressive realization of an ideal. We discover it in varying conceptions of wealth, in the standard of life, in notions of just dealings, in the recognition of social responsibilities. But those structural changes of which the economist takes cognizance are a compound of the moral tendency and of the reaction of the static process. This fact raises grave questions.

Is there anything in the actual combinations which result from the static process to retard development? In biological language, do statical forces atrophy the industrial organism (judged by the ideal), and is the atrophied condition perpetuated?

This is not only a very disturbing question but it is also a very difficult one; and there are many thoughts which forbid too optimistic an answer. Consider, for instance, the passage in Professor Marshall's "Principles" about the fear that the *quality* of human life would be lowered on the Pacific slope. Consider, again, the following case. Social forces, say, bring it

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about that labor of quality x does not receive an efficiency wage; or suppose that conditions of work are such that a deleterious form of consumption is adopted, and that the labor in question loses its quality x and becomes $\frac{x}{2}$. The latter value may be perpetuated, and x may be irrecoverable. Can we deny the permanence of economic shocks? Do they cause mere oscillations from a type which tends to re-establish itself? Is it true or false that from him that hath not shall be taken away, and from his children; and is it unto the third and fourth generations; and does the deprivation, or the race, cease then? If the former, is there a return to the old status, or settlement about a lower type? Take, again, the action of the standard of life on population. We find that the lowest stratum is the most thoughtless, and that the birth-rate in this class is consequently higher than in any other; and moreover, although the death-rate is also highest here, that the rate of increase is greater generally than that of any other class; and that it is inclining to become even greater in this age of philanthropy and sanitation. Then apparently those in whom civilizing forces act the most strongly are much in the position in which peace-lovers acting on their convictions would be in a warlike age: the peace-lovers would find themselves enslaved; and the prudent are seemingly doomed to be displaced by the imprudent and—are we wrong in making the assumption?—by the less developed. Mitigating circumstances are no doubt discoverable. It seems quite likely that the submerged tenth will never become a ninth. Firstly, because education is sifting its young, which, according to most authorities, can only be subject to a limited contamination at birth. Secondly, because the standard of life may come to act more strongly there. Thirdly, because, if it does not, and the continuous action of the standard of life widens the gulf between the condition to which it raises those in whom it operates at all appreciably and that of the lowest stratum to-day, the latter may propagate less. A diminished rate of increase might easily result when those who remained in the lowest state experienced a bigger difference between

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themselves and their fellows than previously, and felt the mental depression which is engendered in an inferior grade of life when it faces a superior. Compare, for example, the disappearance of some aborigines, in all likelihood for this reason, among others, and largely for this reason.

The reader will see that we have really assumed a new law which requires proof. It might be stated thus: when different kinds of life are found together, the greater the quantity of difference the more rapidly the lower tends to increase when compared with the higher, but the greater the quality of difference the more rapidly the higher tends to increase when compared with the lower. The disappearance of the lower quality of life is explained by the hypothesis that each aggregation of human life inclines to become organic, and that one organism can contain only one quality of life. Sometimes, however, a compound organism, made up of organisms of different qualities, seems possible. Of course this law is a guess, and it is put forward as nothing else; but it is plausible, and to support it there are a few weak reasons, which limited space prevents me from stating here. To be of use for our purpose, however, it must imply that a quantitative change passes into a qualitative. But what is to be the distinction between them? It is very hard to say. Indeed, we are deplorably ignorant about the laws of population. The most we can say now is that it seems likely that the new population problem, which is created by the solution of the old one, must be solved in some such way as that crudely sketched above, for it is very certain that the struggle for existence cannot continue by means of the direct destruction of life among civilized races.

It has been pointed out that the law of survival in some manner tends to quench the highest types of life: prophets are always stoned before their tombs are builded, and those who are in advanee of their age live their ideas to their own hurt. Professor Marshall sees the slough of despond into which this generalization must lead us, and he suggests that the action of the popular law is tempered by that of heredity.

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But is the tempering adequate? It is tolerably certain that the law of survival provides chiefly for the continued existence of those who are most suited to their environment, not of those who most benefit it; and we have seen that it is quite likely that static social forces may be conducing to an environment not best for the whole, but only for the strongest part of the whole. Then, assuming devolution of this kind, as a race misses the mark, does it disappear? Is this the explanation of extinct civilizations? Or is the law of survival as much in fault with respect to races as it seems to be with regard to individuals?

In this final answer we shall assume much and guess much. From what has gone before, it appears probable that a nation is strongly protected against all forces directed to closing its line of advance. If it loses the path it may regain it, its loss being only in time. *Natura facit saltum*, the theory of evolution will probably have to be written in the future; if the type does not leap far enough it will come back like a boomerang to its starting-point. We might describe the tendency to the recovery of an original state by the word "elasticity," and say that the elasticity of the social organism prevents the effects of economic shocks of a limited force from being permanent. And protective functons operate in an even wider field. If a portion of a society leaps beyond the scope of the operation of elasticity, then the social organism may amputate the diseased member by the law of population given above. But once there comes to be a question of amputation, a great danger threatens. The chances are that the house divided against itself will not stand. Degeneration spreads; the outward disease generally indicating a subtle and more widely extended inward disease. Besides, when the members affected by the social lapse pass a certain limit, the organism inclines to sever itself not from the lower but from the higher type.

Let us now propound two more problems: (1) Would progress towards the ideal be furthered or further impeded if social forces tended to produce a maximum of satisfaction?

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(2) Is there any more desirable proximate end which can be consciously induced? These questions are of great practical importance since economic forces are modifiable by legislation and public opinion; and it is therefore most desirable that reformers and others should have a proximate end in mind to use as a criterion of social functioning. It is not every principle which can be so applied; but that of maximum satisfaction does happen to be moderately workable. As regards these questions, I can only say that I cannot pretend to answer them with my present knowledge and in the space at my disposal here. Nevertheless, they suggest some thoughts which may be briefly expressed.

The belief that the ideal is attainable by the steps of maximum satisfaction would be well founded if economic strength varied as moral insight and moral vigor, and satisfaction as the morality of wants. And we can trace growing relations of the kind: the moral wants are the least friable, and consequently the developed man, whose desires, shaped by a standard of life (with ethical implications), are welded into a rigid system, is less flexible in a bargain than he whose wants are keen but not rooted in his system—are not, in short, an essential part of his life. Adam Smith, somewhere in the "Wealth of Nations," in contrasting virtue and vice, gives the palm of strength to the former, for the reason that, although the latter may be the most importunate and undeniable, the former is the most continuous in its operation. There is much wisdom in the verdict. And may it not be said that the real, essential, or moral want, when met, gives rise to a greater intensity of satisfaction than the apparent want or wanton desire? Notice that if strength varies as the morality of the agent, and satisfaction as the morality of the want, that disproportionate strengths would be productive of maximum satisfaction; for the greater the strength combined with morality the greater would be the proportion of moral wants satisfied, since morality's object is the good of the whole.

A few words upon the standard of life may throw some light upon the problems we have in mind. We understand

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by the standard of life a constraint to live in a certain way; that is an internal force regulating the expenditure of productive energy and the direction of consumption. We can easily see that moral development has had much to do with the growth of the standard of life, and we can also see in it—especialy in conceptions of it—the effect of social forces. How is it moving now? Is it tending to induce (1) the most moral consumption and production, (2) the most productive or (3) maximum satisfaction? Under an appearance of great unanimity there is much disagreement among those who speak of the standard of life. We sometimes hear it said, for instance, that it is operating in securing for each just that which he is worth. Now you can certainly hold that in many cases remunerations approximate to the discounted value of labor; but you cannot say what any kind of labor is worth, if you measure worth by productiou. Industrial society to-day is so organized that you can no more estimate how much is due to the labor of each member than you can measure the proportion of a crop which is due to the sun and that which is due to the rain. No man can point to a commodity and say, "I made that," for production is more or less organized, not on the foundation of individuality, but on that of capacity. Distribution, in consequence, is tending to be determined more and more by wants.

Ideal distribution rests entirely on the basis of wants. The organism being what it ought to be, it will produce as it ought to produce: its product being real wealth, not that which has only "fancy value" The wants of its parts will be the expression of their real needs as parts of the whole, and they therefore will determine distribution. But, it may be argued, this supposes society to be qualitatively otherwise than it is, for to-day the supply of labor also determines distribution. The remuneration of a class of labor, for instance, is high; labor flows into that class and wages fall; and, if the work calls for special ability, so that the high wage is not followed by a flow of labor, then the wage remains high, unless the greater strength of some other factor with which it is asso-

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ciated can beat it down. In reply it may be counter-argued that such a state of affairs implies a multitude of wants which do not arise in a moral need. If wants express real needs and needs take their origin in function, then wages must vary with function. Hence work of one kind may receive one price, and yet distribution may be based on wants, since, if wants arise from function, identity of function means identity of wants. Lastly, since distribution is by wants, it must be a distribution which gives the greatest aggregate satisfaction.

When a productive system, assuming the organic nature of society, establishes itself, a scheme of distribution which also assumes that organic nature becomes inevitable. It is just because society has been getting more and more organic that the questions raised in this paper are acquiring such importance. When society had almost entirely an individual-unit industrial constitution, each man could be more independent in his ideals. The half of a community might plunge to its ruin, and the other half might climb the rugged steep of civilization. (All this, of course, is true only with numerous qualifications. Let me guard myself against the historian by adding that only possibility is asserted.) But now that we are approaching conditions under which society functions industrially as an organic whole, the individual finds his freedom cramped and discovers that the survival of a certain type only is assured. We must all go, between close-set confines, whither the dominant forces in the system would have us go. In most positions, now, it is only possible within narrow limits for a group to say, "we think otherwise," and to act on their thought, and yet continue in the society. And if a section in a civilized country to-day is mistaken, and it is a ruling element, the penalty has to be paid, as a rule, not by that section only, but by the whole organism. There is some lopping of branches, but also root and branch destruction.

If brief, here is the conclusion of the whole matter. There are momentous questions which a further division of the domain of knowledge has cut away almost completely from the modern study of political economy. Some of the old

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writers, who offered us results compounded of fragments of different sciences, answered many of these questions. But their arguments are refuted, and nothing else has taken their place. And as a result the old convictions are remaining,—as reliable as ice from under which the supporting water has been withdrawn,—or they have perished and left no successors but agnosticism. Social philosophy has apparently not yet acquired sufficient vigor to grapple with them. The vague optimism abroad is face to face with a less influential but a tumultuous pessimism. These are the questions which are upheaving socialist movements. And socialism sometimes means accepting a lower ideal in despair of ever attaining the higher. Here and there it determines to have outward conformity if it cannot begin with uniformity in belief. History repeats itself: we have in this determination the essence of the old notion of a national or universal church. The advice to "settle controversy by infallible artillery" is not new. To-day, of course, the artillery meant is simply the police. Conformity may work wonders; yet the compulsory sprinkling of holy water is full of dangers. But mere confessions of faith or scepticism are futile. The great need is profound analysis.

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THE HISTORICAL AND ETHICAL BASIS OF MONOGAMY.*

It is a commonplace that the social structure of modern civilization rests on monogamic marriage, but it is idle to suppose that the mere assertion of this patent fact carries with it proof of the ethical value of this institution. No practice and no ordinance enjoys an ethical imperative by virtue of its existence. Neither is it longer possible before any audience, least of all one devoted to the study of ethics, to base any ethical proposition on an external command. Even those who accept a divine command as the basis of ethics, to-day deem it necessary to establish the ethical wisdom of these commands by an appeal to human experience. The historical method has transformed literary criticism. It has made the development and working of institutions more important than either their description or the laws which embody them. As "evolution" it has made the record of science the larger history of the succession of nature. It has come to be accepted as the only sound basis of ethical discussion. There is a sense in which all human history is but the record of ethical experience as to the ways and works of man in national and social life. There is another sense in which the ethics of any particular period are but the sum of the previous historical experience of the race, the nation and the community. The historical and ethical basis of any accepted practice and principle are really two phases of the same record, one the stream of ethical acts and the other a cross section of this stream as it exists at any particular moment in the conviction and conscience of men.

No ethical proposition can be adequately discussed without considering both; but any candid man is perfectly aware of

* This subject was originally presented in an Address before the Philadelphia Society for Ethical Culture, March 26, 1899. The address has been rewritten for the purpose of publication in this JOURNAL.

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peculiar difficulties in establishing a logical ethical basis for monogamy. Theoretically, monogamy is legally and socially accepted by all civilized nations, but no wide investigation is necessary in order to show that the best of these nations, as sometimes the best of men, are but imperfectly monogamous. The indissoluble personal and social sexual union for life of a man and woman by free contract, creating a new corporate whole, the family, is subject by law and by habit to numerous exceptions, statutory, social and personal. The institution itself has been directly questioned in argument, and some lives revered for their good works and many famous for their genius, have challenged monogamy by their practice. When, as in many States, marriage are daily being dissolved, and when, as in some States, any marriage can be, when it becomes burdensome to either party, it is only too plain that the practice and principle of monogamy have a varying acceptance and conviction. There exists a very considerable belief that the hold of monogamic marriage has been widely weakened by American legislation on the subject of divorce, and this in its turn is but the expression of popular tendencies.

If vague ideas and loose thinking exist on this subject, it is undoubtedly because sexual inhibitions rest on the conventions,—in the higher sense on the convenience of society,—rather than on its necessities. In any treatise on ethics, every reader must be aware of a loosening of the links of logic and a weakening of the bands of authority as the author passes from the arguments against falsehood, murder and theft to the condemnation of permanent and still more of casual deflexion from the monogamic ideal. No human society can exist in which the protection of truth, property and life is not enforced; but, as we all know, human societies of a high order have existed and exist without monogamy. Where at other points in the ethical code, arguments patent to the narrowest experience and the simplest understanding can be presented, the moral teacher who urges monogamy and sexual restraint must fall back on the rights of children, the transmission of property and a host of subsidiary and secondary

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considerations, many of which are just as applicable to the defense of polygamy and are in daily use where Mohammedanism abuts on a barbarous promiscuity. So difficult is the creation of a weighty ethical argument in behalf of monogamy that while one may find on every side inculcations towards personal purity and the theoretical acceptance of monogamy is all but universal within the area of Christianity, one may search long for a sober marshalling of the reasons in its favor, independent of those based on a spiritual life and a divine command. Nor do there lack those who assert that without these, sexual license were certain. Nearly all treatises on ethics slide over this topic without discussing it. Recent investigators into the history of marriage have not scrupled to declare monogamy itself but a passing stage in human evolution. Any sincere and open minded persons whose lives have been loyally adjusted in an infiinite peace and calm to this high and reserved ideal, will discover that it is no easy matter to justify its claims, if they meet a direct challenge from one who hears not either Moses or the Prophets, but demands instead a plea and prohibition as concrete and as direct as can be levelled at infractions on the rights of truth, property and life.

Nor does the lesson of history, at first sight, seem clear and unmistakable. It is scarcely necessary to be a professional student of anthropology to be aware that there is no sexual practice so bizarre, no union so promiscuous and no domestic conditions so revolting that each has not at some period and by some people been accepted and held in honorable observance. Exactly as clothing and modesty are not reciprocal constants, so a sense of sexual virtue and sexual restraints have both existed and been accepted in an environment which to a monogamic imagination seems a bestial license. Thirty years ago, an indiscriminate promiscuity was accepted by anthropologists as the sexual pit out of which humanity had been digged and to which it was perpetually reverting in the innocent and surviving customs of the marriage ceremony and in the legalized license of our great cities, where

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Some things which are not yet enrolled
In market-lists are bought and sold.

A library of discovery and discussion based on this premise is to-day antiquated. The historical basis of monogamy begins with the weight of eminent authority in favor of the conclusion that man was originally monogamous and declined into promiscuity, not that he rose from promiscuity to monogamy.* The momentum of ancestral descent, running back to the primates, favors monogamy as the survival of the fittest union for the preservation, perpetuation and defense of the family group. Monogamy obtains to a much larger extent in the upper register of the animal kingdom than is ordinarily assumed. The higher primates are in many, if not in all cases, monogamous. So are the larger felidæ. The larger birds of prey form permanent unions. The observation of more than one nation has seen in the anseridæ the symbol of conjugal fidelity, and I have myself noted the testimony of a game-keeper that where among the migratory geese of our coast, accident deprives either male or female of its mate, neither can be induced to mate again. The promiscuous herd at certain stages of existence, not as yet easily defined, ceases to be the most effective organization in the struggle for life where individual power of offense and defense is highly developed. If monogamy exists among the primates, the larger felidæ and the greater falconidæ, it must be for the patent reason that the close union of two individuals over a long period, coterminous with the raising of offspring or longer, gives a certain advantage to the higher organization which may be unnecessary and ineffectual at a lower stage. Monogamy in primitive man antedated the accepted utterance of any law giver because the mutual knowledge, support and common action bred by a life union favored the survival of monogamous pairs. It is promiscuity, savage or civilized, which is the variation, and not monogamy, which is the alteration. The prevalence of monogamy in the higher civili-

* E. Westermarck, "History of Human Marriage," p. 51–153.

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zations is a reversion to the stable conditions and environment on which the advance of the race rested and to which it perpetually returns in moral health and normal existence. The myths which begin man in various monogamic Edens reflect sound ethnological observation. The man or woman who leaves this Eden turns back and declines from the first conquest which began the advance, bridging the passage from the "liquorish baits fit to ensnare the brute" to the beginnings of human love.

Observation has not completed the argument at this point. The utmost that can be said unhesitatingly is that as we rise in development we find in general a tendency to the union of one male and one female to produce and raise one brood of offspring. With exceptions, this tendency increases with development. It is most strongly marked in those terminal genera and species which to human observation and estimate mark the best of their kind in effective force. There is evidence, particularly in the falconidæ, that this union is for life. There is testimony, not yet complete, that in some primates the union is for a longer period than the nurture of young after a single gestation, but the primates are not all monogamous even for this brief space. The burden of anthropological evidence to-day is that before pressure begins and organized labor commences, while man is still in the frugivorous stage, with a population and space still within the means of subsistence, monogamy is the rule. The tendency is towards making this union permanent, and its permanence is most apparent where the conditions approach most nearly to those in which man originally passed the dividing line, as yet undefined, which separates man from the day which "let the ape and tiger die." From this early condition, as man passes through successive stages, there come various phases in sexual relations. Where food is scarce and existence difficult "beena" marriage appears, or some transitory form of the same union, in which the man seeks the woman's tent and leaves the child to her care and tribe. Where the industrial group is large and co-operative, promiscuity may appear.

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Polygamy marks another stage, and in each there is a close correspondence between economic and physical conditions and normal sexual practice, just as sexual aberrations reflect similar conditions.* But as these various forms of marriage began with monogamy, so as progress and civilization come they again return to the union of one man and one woman. At the very dawn of the race, as the first sign and promise of progress, shared as are all nobler human traits by the linked terms of his progression, we therefore find monogamy, representing those sexual tendencies which make for the welfare of the race, and no ethical imperative rests with more commanding weight on the individual than the glad acceptance of those limits and ideals which a long experience tells make for the emergence of man.

Earlier, the monogamic argument was frequently based on the nearly even birth of the sexes, which it was averred remained unchanged in polygamy. The usual proportion of twenty-one males to twenty females obtains almost inflexibly in British India, the largest population of polygamous habit submitted to a reasonably exact statistic.† There are, indeed, vague statements of an excess of women in some polygamous countries, as Morocco,†† but these have no sound statistical basis. In our own census in 1890 the proportion of female births was slightly larger in Utah than in the rest of the country. Biologically there appears to be no connection yet discovered between the method of union between the sexes and the product of one sex or the other in a greater or less preponderance. The English thoroughbred has now been for from thirty to forty generations bred under a stringent

* Seafaring races, as the Phœnicians and Caribs, are notorious for certain practices, as riding nations, the Scythians and Indians of our plains, fall into the same aberrant practice.

† The total population, 146,727,296 males and 140,496,135 females, is almost exactly this. It holds in the Hindus, 105,888,703 males and 101,843,024 females, and Mohammedans, 29,553,907 males and 27,767,257 females (adult proselyting adding to the men), but among the Buddhists there are 3,535,704 males and 3,595,652 females. "Statistical Abstract," 1897, p. 26.

†† E. Westermarck, p. 464.

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polygamous habit, in which one sire mates many mares—often his own offspring, to a degree, an extent, a persistence and a recorded experience unknown in any other of the larger mammals. Yet the progeny of the thoroughbred is still evenly divided between male and female. Under human polygamy the size of the family varies, or seems to vary, altogether with personal idiosyncrasy. The Sultans of the house of Othman have for six hundred years had always a small family. The Shahs of the Kajar dynasty, who for a century have ruled Persia, record their individual offspring by the hundreds. Both are polygamous and both Mohammedan; both are drawn from the same racial stock, and in both the harem is a state institution under similar guards and safeguards. The production of sex, however, in spite of these sporadic instances, appears in the present state of our knowledge and experiment to be a variant of the nutritive function, which itself bears a close relation to the original emergence and development of the sexual functions. When this precise riddle is unraveled light will doubtless be thrown on the tendency towards monogamy apparent in man and the higher animals, but for the present the entire question of the physical origin and the *causa causans* of sex in all its successive stages still waits on investigation, and is still too obscure to give support to any plea on the relation of the sexes in marriage.

Dogmatism is as unwise as to the early marriage relations of savage life as it emerges from its early stages, as it is as to the tendencies of sex unions among the higher animals. When one has passed the probability and tendency in early man towards monogamy and in certain of the larger animals towards the union, at least for the breeding season, of one male and one female, there opens in human society the long vista of promiscuous and polygamous intercourse. Like slavery itself, polygamy has been one ward in that iron prison-house through whose enforced restraint and labor the race has slowly passed from savagery to barbarism and thence to a semi-civilization. Just as no race has been free from slavery at some stage of its upward march, so none has been without

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the touch and taint of polygamy, at least, for its hereditary ruling class—if it has one—a taint which in the royal caste of Europe has not in all instances wholly disappeared, in some one of its modifications even in this century. Exactly as primitive man in his early and unfettered stages shows a tendency towards monogamy, so it is the general rule of history that as civilization brings an increasing freedom of choice and growing individual rights, monogamy begins to appear. As in China, the one complete legal and socially recognized marriage is the union of one man and one woman, though, as in China, this is often modified by an almost universal concubinage, wherever means permit. Even in polygamous countries, any personal acquaintance with the actual life of the family will lay bare the tendency in the head of a harem to establish individual and personal relations with some one woman, the monogamic idea asserting itself under a polygamous environment. Moslem law has deemed it necessary to meet this predisposition by stringent legislation, assuring to each wife her just share in the companionship of her spouse. The Koran itself suggests monogamy as the highest ideal. By the third century of the Faith, it was urged by the Mutazilah, the most advanced of Moslem schools. In India, where the spread of Mohammedanism is more rapid than that of any other faith, the custom has grown up of a pre-nuptial contract pledging the husband to contract no second marriage during the existence of the first. Economic and social causes tend in all Moslem countries to limit polygamy, though with a differing degree, least apparent in lands near the Negro race. Like all else, therefore, Chinese and Mohammedan civilization, one the most persistent and the other the most efficient of Asiatic cultures, show that same tendency towards first the recognition, next the practice, and lastly, the enforcement of monogamy which at each stage marks the progress of the race.

European monogamy by a wide popular theory rests on the good habits of our Germanic ancestors, who owe to Tacitus a reputation they could never have created alone. They

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undoubtedly shared in a larger degree than most races, at the same stage, the universal movement towards monogamy. Even Tacitus observed that their princes lacked this restraint. Reformers condoned what the Roman historian had earlier recorded. It is a fairer statement that the monogamy of Europe rests on the ethics of the Jew and the law of Rome. The Greek to the very day of Euripides was still polygamous, though tending to monogamy. The Semite, taken as a whole, has been polygamous. It is a far fetched hypothesis without an atom of evidence which finds the cause of the monogamy of the Aryan in the contracts necessary to the Westward march.* The Mediterranean peoples, like most others as they grew in civilization, grew toward the union of one man and one woman. This aspiration was enshrined in the verse of Homer, centuries before it appeared in Greek law. The Jew to this day remains in some lands polygamous. Mohammed borrowed his restriction of legal wives to four, as he did almost all else in his practice, from the Talmudic Jew, whose teaching in this, as in much else, offers any possible citation.† After long travail and approach to the higher, the teachings of Jesus at length asserted the imperative ethical claim of monogamy, and touched it with the emotion of a personal union, "and they twain shall be one flesh." What Christianity did in Ethics, Rome did in Law. Nor is it the least of the pleas for personal loyalty and purity in the marriage state and for its legal sanction and enforcement, that we owe one to the race and the Man which have taught the world righteousness and the other to the rule and the code which have taught the world law.

This twin descent from the world-fountains of morality and of law, which welled at Jerusalem and at Rome, are most completely blended in effective legislation and personal observance in the law and in the practice, the code and the

* R. v. Ihering. "Evolution of the Aryan," 1897, p. 334.

† "A man may marry many wives, for Rabba saith it is lawful so to do, if he can provide for them. Nevertheless, the wise men have given good advice, that a man should not marry more than four wives." Arbah Turim. Ev. Hazaer, 1.

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conduct, of the English speaking races.* Their code is stringent beyond any other in enforcing personal purity and treating with an even justice the conduct of each party to this great contract. In a subject which in the nature of things admits of no exact record of the personal virtue of women, or the lawless infidelity of men, illegitimacy† offers the fairest test of the general acceptance and practice of monogamy, and, parts of Scotland excepted, England, the United States and the English colonies show a lower proportion of such births than any other civilized lands. Maxim by maxim and rescript by rescript, Roman law built up the equal rights and obligations of the monogamic married state, which freed from the obligations of religion and treated as a civil contract, grew generation by generation more distinct in its requirements, its observance and its legal enforcement. The just and even-handed obligation of both sexes to practice a mutual loyalty, as binding on the man as on the woman, which Aristotle first enunciated, and which Seneca echoed, Ulpian reduced to a legal maxim and Antoninus Pius enforced by a decision refusing redress to an erring husband who sought it of a wife as errant. "It were iniquitous," ran the imperial decision, "that a husband should exact from his wife a fidelity he does not display,"—a principle to-day guiding by direct descent from the courts of Rome, through the civil and canon law, the practice of our own courts.

The form in which monogamy and its attendant enactments and penalties lies embedded in English common law is itself a sufficient proof that the theory of an exclusive Teutonic ancestry and origin must be abandoned. The English marriage law is not English, but Roman and ecclesiastical. It is based on the canon law, and this in its turn is a child of

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* "The common lawyers, who indeed have borrowed, especially in ancient times, almost all their notions of the legitimacy of marriage from the canon and civil laws." Blackstone, I : 434.

† Albert Leffingwell, "Illegitimacy," 1892, gives the most accessible summary of facts on this issue, though one open to much criticism in the conclusions drawn.

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the union between Christian ethics, ecclesiastical practice and Roman jurisprudence. Our concepts of Roman life are so exclusively drawn from the flagitious life of the few and the license of the many, that popular intelligence has never grasped the moral achievement of Rome as the decisions of Prætor and Princeps for three centuries before the imperial acceptance of Christianity raised the general level of ethical practice to a level from which the new Faith, corrupted by power, too often declined. Steadily, the definition of Modestinus, one of the last of the greater jurists of the Empire, "that marriage is the union of a man and a woman in a fellowship for life in all rights, human and divine," grew to be the guide both of marriage as a sacrament and of marriage as a civil contract.

This august descent of the monogamic ideal—born of the union of the highest ethics and the most just law the human race has known, sown in the fruitful soil of the foremost of the Germanic stock—to minds touched with the new ethical obligation, born of evolution, may well exceed in its categorical imperative any command transmitted by the mere mouths of men. But there still remains open the suggestion born of the flux of passing institutions, that monogany is itself but an incident in the progress and development of sexual relations which may, as other times come, breed other manners, methods and unions more flexible, less strenuous and less permanent.* The proposition that monogamy, like polygamy, is a phase in the development of the relation of the sexes, which will see its day and disappear, is widely held, and a vague general impression that the relation of the sexes needs recasting on a basis which will call for less self-restraint in man and less self-sacrifice in woman is still more widely diffused. Where one person of the philosophic and radical temperament has perceived the difficulties, tested the logic and proposed a new solution for the difficulties of the present situation, a very large number from observation or by experience

* Ch. Letourneau, 1891, "Evolution of Marriage," p. 357.

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have come to feel that monogamic marriage in its present development runs counter to the passions of one sex and the aspirations of the other. The union of the sexes for a romantic attachment, careless either of the present of society or of the future of children, however it may run counter to conventional ethics, is, at least, logical and consistent. For natures in which the sense of beauty is strong and the sense of morals weak, to which the action, emotion, outgo and creative instinct of the individual appeal with more force and effect than the responsibilities, the acquired instincts and the stored forces and momentum of society, taken as a whole—which have, in short, the artistic temperament—the claim of romantic attachments is often irresistible, as the biography of genius has but too frequently recorded. An American university professor has gravely argued that powers sufficiently great justify their use in romantic attachments for the creation of literary situations and material valuable to others.* The complementary view that the permanent monogamic union should be reserved for the transmission of property and honorable descent necessary to society, while more fugitive attachments satisfied the romantic attachments of the individual, developed at Rome in the distinction between the sacred and early indissoluble marriage, *confarreatio* and the other two forms of *usus* and *coemptio*. Japanese society has a not unlike view. The Shiite Moslem has developed the same difference between the Shari'ah marriage and the Mutah or contract union for a definite term. The society of Latin countries tends to this differencing, and if a distinction comes to be sharply drawn in this country between unions which the law recognizes and those which the church consecrates, another century will see here this differentiation in the mongamic union. Analagous to this antinomy, between the claims of

* "The domestic type of man who lives to propagate and to extract a fair amount of comfort out of life is so frequent that we need waste no regret because Goethe did not add to their number. * * * The world would, in that case, have been the loser." H. H. Bojesen. "Essays on German Literature." 1892. p. 161.

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society and the individual union of men and women, is the antinomy of sex which in all countries has given a laxity to men denied to women in the relations of life before, during, and after marriage. In principle, the sexes are under like ethical responsibilities. In the sexual practice of all lands hitherto they are not. The personal observance of monogamy might not unfairly be defined as a compromise between the tendency of man to fugitive and of woman to permanent alliances, just as in another view the social safeguards of the relation vibrate between the promptings of the individual and the demands of society. Under any of the various modifications of monogamy, as by concubinage, prostitution, secondary alliances or easy divorce, these antinomies receive a various solution and compromise. A modified monogamy of this character, and it is one which is known, recognized and accepted by all civilized lands, can be maintained with no great strain on the self-control of the individual. For the hardness of your hearts, all law from the Mosaic code on, has made its compromise at this point. The only code without a compromise is the Sermon on the Mount. To the pure and indissoluble union there prescribed, Roman law added the equal rights and claim of both sexes, and mediæval and modern life superadded a romantic and absorbing love as the only justification in the present or hope for the future of this communion of united souls.

After establishing the general tendency in history and society towards the permanent union of one man and one woman, its social and physical necessity and its mastering claim as the product of the morals and the law of the Jew and the Roman, the personal and penetrating issue still faces us whether that daily practice of ethics, which in the end determines the survival of conflicting theory, is to rest satisfied with some new differentiation of the marriage function, continue some one of the various compromises already detailed, or rise in the general observance to the high ideal which gives the lofty morality of the New Testament the stern support of law and the absorbing joy of romantic love expressed in

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lifelong devotion. Put in another form, this issue is whether the morals of men or the morals of women shall determine the sexual idea of humanity in that final redemption from the brute to which all look, hope and aspire, be their creed what it may.

Foremost in divining on which side of this broad and clearly defined watershed the stream of the tendency in morals shall flow, there fronts us the broad and significant fact that thus far in the development of the race the morals of woman have won. It is her moral seed, born in weakness and suckled in hope, which has set its heel on the serpent's head. The peace of the family, whose practice woman began, grows to the peace of the State. Her ethic of industry, of thrift, of prevision and provision, of self-sacrifice, of the disuse of arms, of a trust in the general ward rather than in individual guard, —these all prefigure the unarmed industrious peaceful life, which has become the ethical life of to-day. The mere mustard seed of ethical practice, which the protection of man enabled her to plant, has grown and spread until all birds of good omen for the State, the family and the individual rest and find comfort in its boughs. Dress was first hers and hers personal modesty. All the virtues which difference civilized from savage life were hers before they were practiced by man, and the pages of travel and exploration are sown thick with the higher moral life of women compared with men of like development. The experience of the race and the observation of many lands unite to establish the conclusion that what in a less developed stage is the ethical practice of women, in a more developed period will become the accepted ethical practice of men.

This general drift and sweeping curve, whose rising ordinates mark the advancing ethics of the race in matters of sex, has gone far enough to furnish the data for its farther calculation. It is not haphazard or by a careless march that "true allegiance, faith and love" have grown between true men and women. A clear succession appears in the advance. In that intermediate and more or less promiscuous period

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which succeeded a careless and preceded a careful monogamy, the first sign of sexual virtue is in the limit placed on the free license of women. Limited first to the tribe or family, the limit is more sharply drawn under polygamy by requiring the restraint—it can scarcely yet be called chastity—of a group of women to one man. Long after this is reached, the behavior of the woman before marriage is little regarded, and when marriage ceases by death various family claims exist on her person, often of a fugitive nature. The restraint of the woman during the marriage state once established, there early succeeds, first under polygamy and later as monogamy follows in a reversion to an earlier practice, restraint on the woman before marriage, and the chastity of the virgin precedes the virtue of the woman. Feminine virtue in the married relation is in due season inexorably succeeded under the law of ethical development by the claim on the part of the woman that the man shall preserve towards her "the unity and married calm" which he has required of her.

Neither law nor practice are quick to grant this. Our own American law long stood nobly alone in granting to a wife the same remedy for casual infidelity which it placed in the hands of the husband. English law and the law of every Continental State still disgracefully halts behind our own at this point. None the less, public opinion and the influence of Christianity have worked together to establish the moral claim of the woman to be set in man's equal love in the nuptial league. Visibly the demand for this has grown. Our own law but registers public opinion, and the American wife is justly known for exacting an unbroken allegiance which her civilized sisters in England and on the Continent less rigorously demand and whose breach they less vigorously resent. Everyone is perfectly well aware that the advance of women in education, in separate property rights, and in a general independence, has led them to exact more strongly with every decade the same faith from men during marriage which an immemorial practice has required of women. This is not yet fully established. Social convention visits the

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infidelities of the wife with a special penalty, but in spite of the physical reasons which render this natural and inevitable, which it were idle to gloss or omit in any consideration of the respective ethical claim on the two sexes, it is still clear that the growing tendency is towards requiring of a man after marriage the same reserve and restraint which is required of a woman. Our law already makes no distinction. The progress of the past century needs but to continue unbroken to establish in marriage the same moral restraint for the husband as already exists for the wife in public opinion and by social convention.

But it is plain that this extension to man of the ethical ideal and practice after marriage, already long practiced by woman, cannot stop at this point. The march and progress which has so long made female sexual restraint in one stage the measure of male sexual restraint in the next will continue. Precisely as woman began with a recognition of sexual loyalty only during marriage and succeeded this ethical crown of her mature years with the "maiden splendors" of her life, so when the personal fealty of men in marriage once comes to be of unbroken acceptance in practice, as it already is in theory, this step is logically certain to be followed by the same demand for purity before marriage, which has marked the emergence of woman from an earlier license.

Nor are there lacking all about signs of this change. I am arguing no moral claim of a theocratic code, however binding I may myself believe it. I am but recording the anthropological facts of the community of which we are a part. We are all aware of the increased public agitation on this subject. No one awake to the trend of feminine opinion but is aware of a new and sounder demand among educated young women for a continence in the future husband which shall match their own innocence. If this were a spasmodic and sporadic utterance, or a passing desire, it would be but a mere frothing eddy, signifying nothing, but when it falls precisely in line with the long succession of sexual morality in many lands and through many generations, in all of which the earlier

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restraint of women has been succeeded by a later like restraint for men, we are bound to believe that we are observing the slow but unerring development of this curve, distant in its origin but distinct in its progress, which steadily points to a day in which the full ethical claims of the monogamic ideal shall be impartially required of both sexes before as well as after marriage. In the two great systems which have dealt with this issue, the civil law has always leaned towards a freer divorce and the canon law towards an indissoluble union. In all Christian lands, this conflict exists between the restraint which the church seeks to impose and the freedom which the law tends to grant. A balance between these opposing tendencies can only come as the development of morals bring both sexes under this even parity of obligation to which the larger changes of the past point in the progress already apparent and just outlined.

The history, the development, the laws and the institutions of man at his highest and best converge upon this conclusion, which dignifies the long struggle with lust, sees in it not a blind submission to a command from without, but instead a steady and inevitable growth in ethical perception from within, as man in freedom followed his free and appointed path to light and to love.

"'Free love, so bound, were freest,' said the King."

In those hours, which early or late come to all and from which none are wholly free, in a world sown with the temptations and the weakness of sex, there is no such trumpet call to ingenuous and anxious youth as that which summons them to the preservation of this long and hardly won inheritance of personal purity. Heritors of the blended fruit of Christian morals and Roman law, expounded by Anglo-Saxon courts and cherished in the English speaking home, this trust of the sensual emancipation of the race is committed anew, a fresh charge, to the youth of each generation and to the conscience of each individual. Each in brief turn has the solemn privilege in the nascent hours and hot pulse of young

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years of deciding whether this high standard shall decline or this long assault be carried forward up the slope of pure desire. Nor is it to be thought of that this brave host of English speaking men and women, who have so long moved forward, "high above the ground their march," carrying this precious and life-giving advance from stage to stage, shall in our day decline and dissolve into a rabble rout and rude, blown about with every wind of lust.

TALCOTT WILLIAMS.

PHILADELPHIA.

THE ETHICS OF OPINION-MAKING.

IF one may judge from his own sensations, an unusually strong interest must have been aroused in some students of ethics by the title of Professor Fowler's lecture in the April number of this JOURNAL. The "ethics of intellectual life and work" is a theme of such prime importance, yet still so little handled on systematic lines, that to see it competently raised is to become at once more hopeful of something like a new departure in philosophy. And the eminently practical and judicial survey of the ground by Professor Fowler leaves the hope so well grounded as to make further discussion, one hopes, a matter of course. As having spent some thought on the problem, I venture to offer a contribution.

I.

One of the most striking of Professor Fowler's remarks is his proposition that the concern to get at truth for truth's sake appears to have been more common in ancient than in modern times, with its addendum that "the declension in this particular intellectual virtue, the love of truth, is largely due to the repressive influences of the Christian Church." This injurious influence of "ecclesiasticism" he traces historically, noting that Protestantism, as such, has counted for little in modifying it. I am conscious, for the moment at least, of

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freedom from bias in suggesting some modifications of a statement to which in large part I habitually subscribe, and for which Professor Fowler's authority will secure a much needed attention. Two questions arise: 1. What is special in the anti-veridical influence of Christian ecclesiasticism? 2. Can it be maintained that where Christian eeclesiasticism is directly impotent, modern thinking remains less concerned for truth-seeking than ancient.

I would posit the issue by saying No to the second question. It can be shown, I believe, that ancient thinking, though beyond question more truth-seeking and veridical than most of the specifically Christian thought which has intervened, is surpassed in these qualities by modern thought; that, in short, the Greek ethic of the intellectual life was relatively undeveloped. What happened under Christian ecclesiasticism was, after all, but a worsening of the anti-veridical action of religious and political sentiment already traceable. Not only in the positive prosecution of a series of heretics in pre-Alexandrian Athens, but in the essentially "ecclesiastic" tone in which Plato in the "Laws" denounces scientific views of the nature of the heavenly bodies; and yet again in the fashion in which Cicero, in the "De Natura Deorum," sets a principle of social expediency above that of truth-seeking, do we meet the spirit with which Christian eeclesiasticism has become so unhappily identified. The same tendency, again, is patent in Judaism and Islam. And that the Judaic, Moslem, and Christian systems have been so much more repressive of truth-seeking than the Pagan is due, probably, not wholly or essentially to the existence of their priestly organizations, but primarily to their common position as resting on Sacred Books.

If this view be right, the point is of some importance in an outline of the problem of intellectual ethic. The hindrances to ideally right practice in mental life and in conduct are substantially the same,—tendency to the blind gratification of bias, and the prosecution of outside self-interest. In the nature of things, Sacred Books will tend to represent both tendencies. Where they are not begun in the interest of a

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priestly system, but represent an ethical impulse, they can still be made instrumental to such interest. Thus the use of writing, which in every way complicated early moral and intellectual life, involved in matters religious as in commerce new possibilities of fraud, though tending in the main to further truth and justice. When the quasi-sacred document was seen to be a power, there was a great stimulus to forgery and interpolation.* Such a tendency, communicated from Judaism to Christianity, produced in the earlier centuries quite an epidemic of headlong forgery.

Concerning such practice, it is common to urge that the ancient consciousness could not see it in the modern light. But while that claim is psychologically important, and while it is very clear that of old even more clearly than to-day certain forms of technical fraud were relatively innocent, it is to be noted how the practice of the Church itself showed that normal reciprocity involved a resentment of the serious forms. To say that forgeries are strongly and generally resented is to say that they are acts of deviation from the current standard; and such resentment was rapidly developed in the Church. Thus the normal clash of interests secured an intellectual ethic (as it had done a social or commercial), to the extent of making the official texts rank as conventionally inviolable. They had become sacrosanct objects, analogous to temples and idols; and in this creation of sanctity for written dicta lay the unfortunate basis for the priestly repression of truth-seeking, in Christendom as in Islam. To reject a document or a dogma was on all fours, to the average sense, with outraging a sacred place or statue; and if Plato could be hotly indignant over the denial of the personality and divinity of the sun, smaller minds could be still more wroth with the negation of any thought or saying that for them had become sacred.

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* The principle is so obvious as perhaps to justify more suspicion than has yet been avowed as to the authorship of a good deal of the Koran, though the relative simplicity of early Islam counts the other way.

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Another aspect of the case is the contrast between the normal pagan tolerance of difference of creed, as distinct from derision of the believer's own creed, and the intolerance of Judaism, Christianity, and (in a measure) Islam. It might not unplausibly be argued, on behalf of the intolerant creeds, that their intolerance at least implied a keener concern about truth than underlay the attitude of the ordinary pagan. The true explanation, however, probably lies primarily in the documentary factor, the element of sacred books; secondarily, in the fact that the intolerant creeds all grew up in communities where political activity had ceased to be possible to the majority; and proximately in the economic interest of the priesthood concerned. In the Roman Empire, in particular, religions of the type of Christianity were the one serious general interest left to the multitude; hence their absorption in creed, with the same kind of passion as men formerly gave to normal war and political faction; and when Christianity became the State religion, the shibboleths of the sects became the war-cries of strifes psychologically on a level with the Blue and Green factions in the circus. Thus social degeneration primed ecclesiastical dogmatism; for, given such a populace, ecclesiastical organization was no less clearly the one alternative to furious anarchy on the theological ground than was despotism on the political. For the rest, the clergy found abundant justification in the sacred books themselves. Putting aside, here, the question of difference of source for the various Gospel doctrines, we must note the effect of such texts as Matt. x. 15; xi. 22, 27; John vi. 53; viii. 44; x. 8, passages presumably inspired at an early date by the ecclesiastical interest, as well as by the passionate bias set up when creed became for most men the one field for social self-assertion.

Professor Fowler's generalization, then, is not to be set aside, but is properly to be extended, I think, to the point of noting that ecclesiasticism grew from roots lying deep in the ancient world. We have but to read Cicero's dialogues of Stoic and Epicurean and Academic to realize how, when political exer-

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cise for the spirit of faction was being curtailed to the minimum, men spontaneously tended to become factions for the creed of their bias or their chance schooling; and how the typical priest, looking on, could either plead the political necessity of a fixed official creed, or find in the spectacle a special stimulus to the imposition of his own rule. St. Augustine, the great formulator of the principles of ecclesiasticism and intolerance, stands for both factors, at a time when, the cultured philosophic sects having given place to the uncultured sects of popular Christianity, the strife had grown proportionately passionate and insoluble. But it is clear that an intellectual ethic was far to seek, even as between the conflicting philosophies of the pre-Christian period. The lack of due concern for truth in our own day is only the old trouble over again; and, however far be the general practice from reaching the ideal standard, it will be found that the nature and pressure of the trouble, the need for a discipline of the will or the passions in matters of opinion, has been oftener and more clearly formulated in modern times than in ancient.

Beyond this qualification, the greater part of Professor Fowler's address admits of little demur. Its protests against coercion and against bribery of belief, against desertion from the battle-field of opinion, against neglect of due study before choosing sides, against undue confidence, against dissimulation, are parts of an almost unquestionable code. It is hardly so, however, with his perplexing reservations as to the treatment of "persons on a lower level of education," reservations which he follows up with a tribute of praise to teachers who as a rule have not acted on such a principle. To leave the matter in that state is to unsettle afresh all the points previously decided, since the very principle indicated may be and has been pleaded as a ground for coercing and bribing opinion, evading difficulties, and dissembling in writing as well as in talk. Dr. Fowler expressly censures Hume for leaving it often in doubt whether he is serious or ironical. But if the charge were strictly accurate—which I do not think it is—Hume could of all men most plausibly claim to be within the

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license Dr. Fowler has proffered. He might argue that he had to guard against making things too plain for "persons on a lower level of education"; and he could further plead that the constant menace to outspoken heresy in his day, and to himself in particular, forced a certain strategy on heretics. All things considered, this very tendeney to economize truth on the score that its free circulation may unsettle persons on a lower level of education, would seem to be itself one of the phenomena to be narrowly scrutinized in forming an intellectual ethic. If we agree that the hindrances to all right ethic are, broadly, objective self-interest and the gratification of bias, every restrainst put upon the veridical principle is open to suspicion as possibly representing, however unconsciously as regards a given teacher, one of these forces.

It is clear, however, that whatever rules we may fix for the process of disclosing opinion, the first difficulties of intellectual ethic are subjective, and concern the fashion in which we decide as to what is true. It is well, then, briefly to note historical developments in that connection.

II.

An introspetive consciousness of liability to the pressure of passion in matters of abstract opinion, as distinct from a mere charging of dishonesty on opponents, first emerges practically in Greek thought. To call an opponent stiff-necked in the Hebrew manner is, indeed, to recognize wilfulness as a possible hindrance to the perception of truth; but the notion does little for intellectual ethic until it opens men's eyes to their own obstinacies. Such an ethic, if ever born, is the child either of free debate or of much patient brooding. It is half delivered in early Eastern speculation as to the illusoriness of sense and the tyranny of desire, but for the Western "dispensation" it emerges in the discussions of the Greeks. Without dwelling on the earlier forms of the perception in the fragments of Herakleitos, and on the partial implications of it in portions of the Socratic dialectic in Plato, —for it can hardly be said that Socrates, at his best, is there

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made to affirm it fully, and he is often enough far from it,—we may note how the need and the nature of the required discipline are put by Aristotle in the "De Cœlo":

"It is, indeed, a habit with all of us to conduct our inquiries not with reference to the problem itself, but with reference to our special opponents. If we have no opponent, but are conducting our investigations alone, we pursue them as far as that point where we can make no further objections to ourselves. Whoever, therefore, intends to investigate completely must take care to make objections to himself upon all the points of objection which really belong to the subject, and this he can only do after having thoroughly surveyed all the differences of opinion and doctrine" (ii., c. 13. § 9, Grote's trans.).

The context is instructive. Aristotle deals with the fantasies of Anaximenes, Anaxagoras, and Demokritos as to the form and fixity of the earth, and with the Pythagorean and Platonic theories of its motion; and then proceeds (c. 14) to give his own opinion, to the effect that "if the Earth be carried round, whether in the centre or part from the centre, such motion must necessarily be violent and contra-natural;" which proposition, with others thereto appertaining, he goes about to demonstrate. Still, he must be admitted to have conducted his argument with fewer signs of foregone opinion than are presented by the theories of most of his predecessors; and it is noteworthy that, on a basis of geographical observation, he ends with the conclusion "that the body of the Earth is not only of spherical form, but also not large compared with the magnitude of the other Stars." It was probably this general superiority in point of ostensible open-mindedness that won Aristotle his large later following among alien schools, Arab and Christian; even as it was the aptitude of Platonism, on the other hand, to special uses, that primed the Platonic revival of the Renaissance.

In any case, save for the professed Pyrrhonists, who stand rather for a general and half-wilful revolt against all conviction as such than for a truly dispassionate discipline of opinion, it would be hard to find such another formulation of an ethic of belief as that above cited, between Aristotle and the age of Bacon and Descartes. Anselm adumbrates it, but is hardly so near it in spirit as Marcus Aurelius. The passage

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in the Gospels (Matt. xviii. 3), calling on listeners to "become as little children," is one of several that may conceivably have at first had a significance very different from that later attached to them. It might be regarded as an appeal for that absolute intellectual considerateness which is the height of reciprocity, and might be construed: "Let no foregone conclusion stand in the way of your acceptance of any doctrine; be utterly open-minded." But there is no trace in ancient Christian history—not in Paul, not in Origen, not in Augustine—of obedience to it in that sense; for the Pauline "prove all things" is a castaway counsel of perfection.

In no ancient writer, perhaps, is there a more emphatic putting of the ideal than in Bacon's demand in science for "minds washed clean from opinions."* This, the ground note of his teaching, may be said to mark the conscious beginning of the modern scientific era. The immediate stimulus, indeed, may very well have come from Montaigne; but in his polemic the principle never fully delivers itself from the negative motive, and stands rather as an excuse for rejecting alike the dogmatisms of Catholic and Protestant and the contrary confidence of the unbeliever, than for a discipline to the end of discovering new truth. Bacon himself, indeed, fails as a seeker, but rather for lack of the special gift of practical discovery than for lack of concern to be open-minded; though he, too, unconsciously illustrates the truth of his own sayings about the "idols" which are "the deepest fallacies of the human mind." As he puts it in the "Novum Organum" (B. i., Aph. 49), "the human understanding resembles not a dry light, but admits a tincture of the will† and passions, which generate their

* Preface to the "Natural History," trans. in Ellis and Spedding's ed., v. 132, 133.

† This view was, of course, implicit, and, indeed, explicit, in the ordinary theological feeling towards heresy; and in the preface to the apologetic treatise of Philippe de Mornay, "De la verité de la religion chrestienne" (1581), the reader is exhorted to bring to bear his wit rather than his will. "For foredeeming and foresettled opinions do bring in bondage the reason of them that have best wits; whereas, notwithstanding, it belongeth not to the will to overrule the wit, but to the wit to guide the will." (Eng. trans. by Sidney and Golding, 1587.)

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own system accordingly, for a man always believes more readily that which he prefers." This is the central trouble, the *fons mali*, with which an intellectual ethics has above all to deal. Taking Bacon himself as instance, we can readily discount his flattery of the King and his accommodations to the Church as sources of literary improbity: they are too obvious to need insisting on: it is the "tincture of the will and passions," the dislike to certain new theories, the determination to make out Copernicus wrong, that most fatally illustrate his own reiterated warning. Above all things he had impugned *apriorism*, whether Aristotelian or Platonic, logical or theological. It was his burden in the prelude to the "Instauratio" that "as the mind, hastily and without choice, imbibes and treasures up the first notices of things, from whence all the rest proceed, errors must forever prevail;" and he himself represents one of the most crushing of the proofs. Our practical problem is, where Bacon failed, shall the generality succeed? Can the intellectual life in general ever be raised to the plane of which he fell short?

III.

In so far as a minority have ever since approached the ideal practice, Bacon must assuredly have some of the credit. It is impossible to doubt his influence in this regard on Descartes, whose "Discourse on Method" is one of the classic documents of this branch of ethics. Never before had the duty of "washing the mind clean from opinions" been so implacably pressed as constituting the beginning and end of right thinking. And still Descartes exhibits quite as fully as Bacon the fatality of the "tincture of the will" and the "first notices of things." Even the plan and method of the discourse are almost certainly a strain on strict veracity. That a youth should from the start of his thinking have laid out his course with the rigor of vigilance Descartes describes would be hard to believe, even if he had himself thrown no doubt on the strict actuality of his narrative; but when he tells us that he has planned his book merely as a story (*his-*

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toire), "or, if you prefer it so, as a fable," it becomes fair to surmise that we are scanning rather an ideal construction than a faithful record of experience.

But however this may be, the appeal of Descartes, like that of Bacon, must have incalculably influenced intellectual life. When we realize, as ingenuous minds of that day might, at once the direct and the indirect bearing of these admonitions, their explicit stipulation for a dismissal of all preconceptions and their implicit rejection of those very claims of theology to which both writers proposed to submit, we may doubt whether any more rousing intellectual experience has been undergone by any generation before or since. So far as we can now gather, the appeal was something vitally new, carrying with it the vibration of a new self-consciousness. Of course it did not wholly transform the intellectual life: the teachers themselves were but half-alive to the force of their message, and their immediate pupils hardly outwent them. Robert Boyle, for instance, in "The Sceptical Chemist," moved on Bacon's impulse in physics, but in his theology remained as fixed in his "foredeemings" as any ecclesiastic of his day. Yet the general influence of the new canon was immeasurably great.

The first, and indeed almost the only, philosophic criticism of the demand of Bacon and Descartes for the rectification of "the will" in matters of opinion is the famous demurrer of Spinoza, on the ground of his special tenet that "the will" is misconceived as an entity capable of controlling either opinion or action. Belief, he insists, follows knowledge, and if men err it is from privation of the necessary knowledge, not from any arbitrary act of volition, the will being simply the judgment affirming conviction. Were it rejoined that two men with the same knowledge may form contrary opinions, Spinoza would doubtless have replied that the men differed in their powers of reception, and that each necessarily acted on his measure of cognition. The contention has every sign of being originally framed as a benevolent confutation of the malice of heresy-hunters, and for such practical purposes it

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doubtless availed considerably. The charge of perversity of will was the normal reproach of the priest to the heretic; and as the plea of Bacon and Descartes, however non-polemic, could serve as a turning of the doctrine to a contrary account, Spinoza might well have feared that on that footing no peace or progress was possible. Yet, as a philosophic criticism of the plea in hand, his teaching was astray, resting as it did, on a confusion of terms.

What Bacon meant by "the will," as the context shows, was not merely the faculty of choice, abstactly considered, but the element of desire or passion, necessarily recognized by Spinoza himself as swaying all men's course. Either "knowledge" is to be understood as including the bias of habit and the temper of blind resistance to criticism, or it is not. If not, these palpable factors in opinion-making must be separately reckoned with. If yes, a man's knowledge must be admitted to be vitally alterable by his simply becoming conscious that bias and temper have affected his reception of truth. Then an assertion that bias and temper (= "will") may so avail, and an appeal to overrule them, are ways of communicating vital knowledge. And it is fairly to be charged against Spinoza, as evincing the bias of the systemist, that he gave no recognition, in an express criticism,* to this practical concurrence of Bacon's counsel with his own theory. The point may be put also in term of Spinoza's own proposition† that "An affection can neither be checked nor overruled save by the coercion of a contrary and stronger affection." If Bacon's proposition be not defensible, neither is this; for how is a new affection to arise, on Spinoza's other principle, save on a new knowledge? But when both propositions are allowed as equipollent, the case is clear enough. Given that the passion of "self-maintenance" in its primary exercise sets a man against a new doctrine because it perturbs his habit, the purer desire for truth may be aroused to control the other.

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* Letter to Oldenburg, Cor., Ep. ii.

† "Ethics," Part iv., Prop. 7.

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And inasmuch as the rousing may be done by direct appeal, without the presentment of any other or "external" consideration, Bacon's appeal remains pertinent, whether or not we say it is a revival of knowledge previously possessed.

It may here be noted in passing, indeed, that if there be no potentiality of overruling the passion of resentment by the love of truth, the case is, in terms of Spinoza's psychology, hopeless. Only such an one can be intellectually moralized; and it is an anthropological fact that such a set of the affections is far from universal. Not that there is any gulf fixed between incapacity and capacity for the effective rule of the higher affection over the lower; rather there is every grade, within the bounds of average sanity, of readiness to respond to the higher appeal; and practically no one is absolutely and invariably responsive in the full receivable degree. Hence the immense importance of culture conditions, of right habit from childhood, of regular mental discipline. It is a commonplace that age brings with it an ataxy of the intellectual emotions; that the pain of change is in the ratio of the duration and the vivacity of any habit of belief. At the same time, there are obviously constitutional diversities; and where the passion for truth as such, apart from all considerations of social duty and convenience, is weak, there is little to be done. We have all met men who cared much for what they considered social justice, and little or nothing for the truth of any opinions as apart from their direct or obvious effect on social action. An imperfect utilitarianism can be seen to encourage such a procedure; but it would seem to be strictly a result of the sheer absence of a certain intellectual appetite. In that case there seems to be no cure, any more than for a lack of color sense or a lack of ear for music.

But inasmuch as many if not most of us are conscious of capacity to swerve from or to press towards a fair standard of unprejudice in given cases, it follows that there is room for a general raising of standards, at most levels of primary conscientiousness. And in such a movement, it seems to some of us, lies the main hope for a solution of age-long contro-

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versies, in which the first passion of resistance to new ideas inevitably generated some answering passion, in excess of the necessary indictment of the first. The balance of intellectual guilt, probably has always lain with the side of resistance to change; but seeing that no effort of innovation was ever wholly free from error, there can be no resort to the maxim, *Que messieurs les assassins commencent.* The sin on both sides, however it may vary in degree, is the same in kind; and the reform, if there is to be any, must be pervasive. To that end it seems necessary to keep the express purpose of a moral and psychological scrutiny of the process of conviction always present in thought.

If this be doubted, let the doubter consider and pronounce upon a certain gross contradiction in the ethical teaching of Kant, saying whether it is to be explained otherwise than in terms of the philosopher's failure to criticise his bias as distinct from the reasoning by which he justified it. On the old problem as to whether it is right to tell a lie to a would-be murderer by way of misleading him in his pursuit of his intended victim, Kant strenuously answers, No. If you tell what you believe to be the truth, he insists, you are blameless, whatever happens; whereas, should you, intending to lie, unknowingly tell the truth, and so really guide the murderer to his victim, you are guilty of the result.* This is quite intelligible as an extreme application of the *a priori* conception of duty. But when he comes to an incomparably more real and pressing problem, that of the duty of a pastor who, like him, holds the popular creed to be immoral and incredible, Kant no less expressly authorizes the priest (as did Strauss, later) to yield to the popular demand for an untrue doctrine. In the Sacred Books, he argues, "contortions of meaning" have clearly "led to good and useful ends," and are therefore permissible; and in general the popular belief

* Short essay of 1797, in reply to Constant, given by Rosenkranz as Appendix to Bd. vii., S. 295. Trans. by Abbott in same vol. with the "Critique of Judgment."

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("Faith Ecclesiastical") "cannot be neglected" because the populace are "rootedly fixed" in their views, and "clamor for a revelation from God." * The conflict is complete. In one case, though a life hangs in the balance, you are not to think of consequences at all, but to keep absolute truth; in the other, where there is no such excuse for equivocation, you are free to equivocate. *Populus vult decipi, et decipiatur.* One would be glad to discover any valid explanation save the obvious one that the ideal has been idly applied to a remote and imaginary problem, which the moralist had no fear of meeting in action; while the principle of accommodation is allowed the moment he is in contact with a real issue of the every-day life of his educated readers and neighbors. Pressures of comfort and self-interest coming into play, the *a priori* moralist gingerly but effectually descends to the common ethic of convenience and self-interest. The "tincture of passion" has availed in both cases; for each deliverence convicts the other of arbitrariness. Whatever advance there has been in metaphysic, there has been little, thus far, in intellectual ethic since Bacon.

IV.

Since Kant, happily, the conditions have on the whole made for freedom, which always favors the individual bias; and the scrutiny of the ethics of opinion-making has been carried to new lengths of self-consciousness. To take two voices for many, we have from John Mill and Clifford dicta which outgo Bacon and Descartes in their insistence on cleanness of heart for intellectual purposes. In the "Liberty," Mill puts the veto on persecution with new force in the argument that where a solitary man is punished by the rest for his opinion, "If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth; if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error;" and on this basis

* "Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft," Bd. iii., Apot. i., sect. 6.

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he developes the notable suggestion that it might be well to have some express contrivance for making the difficulties of every opinion as present to the consciousness of learners as if they were pressed upon him by an eager and capable opponent. "The fatal tendency of mankind to leave off thinking about a thing when it is no longer doubtful," he epigrammatically declares, "is the cause of half their errors."

Here we are near the verge of antinomy; and in the posthumous "Three Essays," Mill so far waives his claim as to incur the reproach of Clifford, inasmuch as he "seemed to say that in regard to questions of great public importance we might encourage a hope in excess of the evidence (which would infallibly grow into a belief and defy evidence) if we found that life was made easier by it." As if," cries Clifford, "we should not lose infinitely more by nourishing a tendency to falsehood than we could gain by the delusion of a pleasing fancy."* And Clifford proceeds in another essay to lay down the most stringent code of ethic for opinion-making yet framed. The challenging of it by Professor James, in his book on "The Will to Believe," brings us to the most modern aspect of our problem.

It should be at once granted, I think, that Clifford's way of putting things is at times excessive. Not only does he, in laying down his law of absolute non-belief without full inquiry, overlook the psychological impossibility of utter non-belief on all issues one has not fully investigated; not only does he seem to ignore the imperceptible transitions between a sense of plausability and an acquiescence, but he clearly demands of others a rigor of investigation which he has not practised. Like so many other physicists, he visibly accepts at times the deliverances of culture historians and even the current commonplaces of sectarian sociology without any sceptical scrutiny whatever. Thus we find him grafting his own hasty and untested surmise on an untested Protestant falsism, when he asserts that it was against the doctine of the

* Lecture on "Right and Wrong,"

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reference of right and wrong to the arbitrary will of God that "the Teutonic conscience protested at the Reformation."* He had never investigated and could not possibly substantiate this view, and on his own doctrine he should accordingly "have no time to believe it."† The ideal is good, but its application should begin at home; and if we are to cultivate what Voltaire called "the insane project of being perfectly wise," it is our own necks we should first venture, so to speak. As against Clifford's allocution, taken literally and solemnly as an excommunication of the normal fashion of believing things, there is a certain common-sense force in the rather man-of-the-worldly retort of Professor James, that "our errors are surely not such awfully solemn things" as all that. What Clifford prescribes for the preservation of our intellectual honesty, "a very fanaticism of jealous care," might conceivably become, like any other fanaticism, a blinding sense of superiority.

When, however, Professor James proceeds to develop his plea for a certain license of belief in the improbable, the essential rightness of Clifford's aspiration becomes, I think, relatively clear enough. Professor James (1) sets out with a simple claim that some indemonstrable propositions are, for some of us, still worth brooding over (expressly excluding, for his special audience, the Catholic beliefs which Pascal proposed to build up by habit);‡ (2) puts the case that some options to believe or not believe the indemonstrable may be highly "momentous;"§ (3) proceeds forgetfully to declare that *every* opinion (which must include the rejection of Catholicism) should be open to constant revision;‖ then, after (4) protesting that "our errors are surely not such awfully solemn things,"¶ (5) taunts the Cliffordian school with being ready to risk loss of truth rather than chance of error** (which

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* "Right and Wrong," in "Lectures and Essays," 2d ed., p. 335.
† "Ethics of Belief," id., p. 347.
‡ "Will to Believe," pp. 2, 6. § Id., pp. 3, 27. ‖ Id., p. 14.
¶ Id., p. 19. ** Id., pp. 11, 26.

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amounts to saying "risk one error rather than risk another error"); and finally insists (6) that the first error may be unspeakably "solemn," since he who ventures to believe may "triumph" enormously* at the judgment-day or thereabouts), while he who balked will by implication have a very bad time of it, having (7) "forfeited his sole chance in life of *getting upon the winning side.*"† The professor solemnly suggests that "God himself may draw vital strength and increase of very being from our fidelity."‡ While his whole argument thus avows fear of stupendous miscarriage in respect of omission or refusal to believe at a hazard, he professes to see an expression of intellectual fear in the refusal to believe without evidence, as if revolt from self-deception were timidity in contrast with the fear of Mrs. Browning's avenging Deity waiting round the corner for the dying unbeliever.

Under this main sequence of contradictions lie a series of others. In scientific questions, it is admitted, there is hardly ever any excuse for believing without evidence; and even in human affairs in general, the need of acting is *seldom* so urgent that a false belief to act on is better than no belief at all.§ Later, by way of supporting the (in this connection) paralogistic position that in matters of physical adventure confident audacity may be physical salvation, it is averred that such a case is one of "an *immense* class."‖ And, to say nothing of the extensive paralogism of likening such a case to that of choosing to believe in any set of propositions concerning the government of the universe, we find inserted in the argument the complaint that science (generalzed as *she*) "has *ceased* to care for truth *by itself* at all. It is only truth *as technically verified* that interests her."¶ Considering that even Professor James does not suggest that any proposition can become "science" before it is supposed to be verified, this implication that "science" is become one-sided in not calling an unverified proposition "truth," and that "she"

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* "Will to Believe," pp. 27, 95, 96, 109. † Id., pp. 27, 109.
‡ Id., p. 61. § Id., p. 20. ‖ Id., p. 97. ¶ Id., p. 21.

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once *did* "care for" truths recognized as unverified, seems open to most of the epithets he casts at the "positivists."

On the side of ordinary ethics, finally, Professor James of necessity repudiates the "subjectivism" which in cosmosophy he champions, and claims to be supporting morality by his doctrine, here repeated, that we may gradually will ourselves into a convinced belief of any moral or religious doctrine*—the proposition which, as put by Pascal, he has incidentally denied. His correction would presumably be that in order to succeed we must want to believe. It would take too long to track the theorem to the end of its metaphysic tether, but it may suffice here to put the final dilemma in the present connection. Either the voluntary origin of the given belief, in the case put, is remembered, or it is not. If it be remembered, and *no fresh evidence has supervened*, then in the terms of the case there is no conviction in the accepted sense of the term, the would-be believer standing just where he did at the outset. If fresh evidence has supervened, *that* is the determinant. If, on the other hand, it is asserted that a given belief began by arbitrary choice, but that such beginning is *not* remembered by the believer, where is the evidence? To make the affirmation of oneself would be a "bull." And how can we ever make it of another man? It would appear that Professor James has confused the true proposition that beliefs *can be* built up by mere habit with the false proposition that a man can of conscious choice set up the habit while believing or fearing that the given belief is baseless, and may so reach hallucination. Pascal hardly assumed that the alterative means was to be stupefaction. Professor James will not venture to such lengths, and so falls between the stools. And if, finally, his assertion were true, it would involve the corollary that if any man wished to *cancel* a moral conviction which hampered his appetites, he could do so in the same simple fashion.

The argument, then, for the legitimation of belief in the

* Compare the "Principles of Psychology," ii. 321, with the "Will to Believe," p. 77.

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unprovable at pleasure is so self-destructive, even in highly skilled hands, that it can hardly be reckoned a philosophic danger. No intelligence normally incapable of wilful sophistry can well be led to it by Professor James's argument, which is but an ingenuous avowal of a bias that at a certain point overrides the normal appetite for truth. People that way given will in general follow their bias with less scruple than is revealed in Professor James's strenuous tissue of inconsequences. The danger to true thinking lies, as of old, in the commonplace bias that is (*a*) unconscious of itself, or (*b*) easily constrains the weaker concern for loyalty to the rule of uncontaminate reason, or, (*c*) watchfully guards as far as may be against self-revelation; and the need is rather to turn the search-light on the bias itself than to labor over the confutation of its pretexts.

V.

The problem, the ideal, broadly speaking, is to develop, primarily among professed thinkers and secondarily among men and women in general, as regards all thinking on questions of creed and conduct, cosmosophy and sociology, some measure of the temper now held to be imperative in science. Professor James eloquently puts for us the law thereof:

> "When one turns to the magnificent edifice of the physical sciences, and sees how it was reared; what thousands of disinterested moral lives of men lie buried among its mere foundations; what patience and postponement, what choking down of preference, what submission to the icy laws of outer fact are wrought into its very stones and mortar; how absolutely impersonal it stands in its vast augustness,—then how besotted and contemptible seems every little sentimentalist who comes blowing his voluntary smoke-wreaths, and pretending to decide things from out of his private dream!"*

This, doubtless, is even an over-generous account. Not one of all the contributors, perhaps, but sometimes loved his own error better than another man's truth: the wind of passion blows at times even in the plane of mathematics. Darwin himself had his prejudices. And as regards the appalling levity with which many ostensibly educated people will accept

* "Will to Believe," p. 7.

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the mere word of a fluent charlatan for a theory revolutionizing the whole treatment of disease, it has to be remembered that the appalling blunders of expert men of science give a spur to such credulity.

But the great difference which here concerns us is that scientific thought, in the main, not only repudiates but escapes the "tincture of passion" which is normal in the disputes of men over their views of the universe, of political and social duty, and of the creeds handed down to them. The great trouble is that concrete self-interest enters vitally into every one of these disputes, whereas in those of science it rarely does. In science we endow research, not any one doctrine; hospitals and laboratories and observatories, not this or that theory of disease or physics. When endowment *is* attached to a particular prescription of science, as in the case of vaccination, trouble speedily and significantly arises. Apart from that, it rarely happens that a man's income is endangered by avowal of any scientific belief; and when the case arises the belief is apt to go by the board. But in the issues of human science, of public action, of current religion, self-interest interposes at every step. It is a commonplace that, for most men, social and political ethics take their cues from interests of property, from prejudices, from personal need; and that not one partisan in a hundred tries to see the element of truth contained in the opposing doctrine. And the pressure of passion is here so ubiquitous and so vigorous that it seems fully as reasonable to doubt whether there will ever be a generally accepted political ethic as to hope for the attainment of any Utopia whatever. When, again, we reflect that an enormous revenue attaches to the maintenance of every popular religious creed, and that there is thus far not one historical instance of a creed so endowed being discarded or overthrown save by violence, we find ourselves face to face with factors of complication which practically never trouble the man of science. Broadly speaking, the ethic of the intellectual life is hardly purer to-day, when tried by the current maxims as to what it ought to be,

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than was the ethic of social intercourse in the Dark Ages, tried by the abstract or Christian moralities then current. And though there are elements of amelioration, it seems perfectly likely that the process will be no quicker in the one case than it has been in the other.

Howsoever that may be, it seems warrantable to say that no Utopia worth sighing for will ever be realized until the ethic of opinion-making is overhauled all round with something of the austerity preached by Clifford, and with distinctly more vigilance than he practised. One of the first steps, I sometimes think, should be a writing of the history of philosophy afresh, to the end of noting the element and the quality of psychological or emotional bias in every leading thinker in turn,—the inherited habit, the degree of passion, the revolt against old dictation, the personal provocations, the financial and social interest. But there had need be few motes in the eye that seeks to make that survey.

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THE ETHICS OF FORGIVENESS.*

THE duty of forgiveness is a subject which obviously could not be thoroughly discussed without a previous investigation of the theory of punishment. The rationale of forgiveness must depend on the rationale of punishment. If I were to enter at any length upon such a discussion now, it would occupy all our time, and therefore I must be content with explaining and assuming a certain position in that matter without much argument, and then going on to apply it to the perhaps more difficult, and certainly less hackneyed, topic to which the present paper is devoted.*

This paper is written from the point of view of one who regards the retributive theory of punishment as irrational, immoral, and I may add wholly unchristian. The idea that

* A paper read before the Martineau Society in Manchester College, Oxford, March 3, 1899.

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punishment can be an end in itself apart from the effect which it is to produce upon some spiritual being is to my mind inconsistent with the very idea of rational morality. Nothing can be an end in itself except some state of a conscious being, and to say that a state of conscious being is an end in itself is to say that it is good. The essence of punishment is the endurance of pain or some other evil. In spite of the high authorities that may be quoted for the contrary view, I venture, under the ægis of Plato and the many Christian thinkers who have found his ideas on this subject in essential harmony with the Christian temper, to maintain that an evil cannot under any circumstances become a good except relatively—either positively as a means to some intrinsic good or ἐνφαρμάκου εἴδει medicinally, by way of remedy against some worse evil. If it be said that punishment is a good as a means to the vindication or the assertion or the avenging of the Moral Law, I should venture to ask how an abstract "vindication" or "assertion" can be a good—how a mere event or occurrence in nature can be a good except in so far as it is the expression of some spiritual state or a means of produciug such a state. Even the Moral Law itself is not an end in itself, but only souls or wills recognizing and regulating their action by the Moral Law. If it is said that the avenging of the Moral Law is right because it is the expression of the avenger's indignation, that is an intelligible answer; and I freely admit that the expression and cultivation of indignation is one of the purposes of punishment, though this can be hardly regarded as an end in itself, but rather a means to an end,—the spiritual good of the man himself. But if punishment is to be justified on account of the good it does to the punisher, we have already gone some way towards the abandonment of the retributory theory in its ordinary form; and further a question arises as to the punisher's right to inflict evil on another in order to cause

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* I have already dealt with the "Theory of Punishment" in the pages of this JOURNAL (October, 1891).

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good to himself. He—the punisher—is no doubt an end in himself, and is justified in seeking his own good; but what right has he to ignore another's good except as a means to some greater good of his own or of the society in which he lives? It will hardly be seriously contended that such and such a sentence of five years' penal servitude is to be justified because the pain involved is outweighed by the spiritual good which Mr. Justice So-and-so may have secured to himself by passing it. It may be suggested that it is justified because it is the expression of the indignation of society; that the sentence tends to promote in society a reverence for the law which the criminal has broken, or, again, that the punishment produces moral good in the offender. In either case we have now frankly abandoned the idea that punishment is an end in itself, and have adopted the view that it is a means to some good in society at large or to the criminal himself. It is true that the word "deterrence" hardly expresses adequately the fact that the good which punishment confers upon society is in part a spiritual good; that it tends not merely to deter men from committing crime, but to impress upon their minds the idea that crime is wrong,—something to be avoided and hated for its own sake. The word "reformation," again, hardly does justice to the idea that it is good for the criminal to feel the indignation of society, to feel the external effects of his wrong-doing; that that is itself a moral good in its way, one which it would be perhaps worth while (if we are to raise so abstract and unpractical a question) to promote, even if we knew that in this particular case it would not lead to that which is the ultimate object of punishment (so far as the criminal himself is concerned), the alteration of his will, the change of his character. It is at least good, as far as it goes, that the criminal should feel the external strength of the Moral Law, even if he cannot be made to feel or to respect its intrinsic authority. Both the "deterrent theory" and the "reformatory theory" are no doubt inadequate to express the whole truth about punishment. There is a side of punishment which might perhaps be best expressed by the term

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"educational theory"; or, perhaps, all the aspects of punishment might be recognized at once by saying that the end of punishment is partly deterrent or utilitarian, and partly *ethical.*

It is sometimes supposed that the utilitarian view of punishment is inconsistent with a proper respect for human personality: it involves, we are told, the treatment of humanity as an end and not as a means. If by "utilitarian" theory is meant a view resting upon a hedonistic theory of ethics, I have nothing to say in its favor; if by "utilitarian" is meant simply a view which treats punishment as a means to some good, spiritual or otherwise, of some conscious being, I should entirely deny the justice of the criticism. In the first place I should contend that in a sense it is quite right and inevitable that we should treat humanity as a means. When a servant is called upon to black the boots of his master, or a soldier to face death or disease in the service of his country, society is certainly treating humanity as a means: the men do these things not for their own sakes, but for the sake of other people. Kant himself never uttered anything so foolish as the maxim which indiscreet admirers are constantly putting into his mouth, that we should never treat humanity as a means: what he did say was that we should never treat humanity *only* as a means, but always *also* as an end. When a man is punished in the interest of society, he is indeed treated as a means, but his right to be treated as an end is not thereby violated, if his good is treated as of equal importance with the end of other human beings. Social life would not be possible without the constant subordination of the claims of individuals to the like claims of a greater number of individuals; and there may be occasions when in punishing a criminal we have to think more of the good of society generally than of the individual who is punished. No doubt it is a duty to think also of the good of the individual so far as that can be done consistently with justice to other individuals: it is obviously the duty of the state to endeavor to make its punishments as far as possible reformatory as well as deterrent and educational to others. And how the reformatory

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view of punishment can be accused of disrespect for human personality, because forsooth it uses a man's animal organism or his lower psychical nature as a means to the good of his higher self, I connot profess to understand. The retributive view of punishment justifies the infliction of evil upon a living soul, even though it will do neither him nor any one else any good whatever. If it is to do anybody any good, punishment is not inflicted for the sake of retribution. It is the retributive theory, to my mind, which shows a disrespect for human personality by proposing to sacrifice human life and human well-being to a lifeless fetich styled the Moral Law, which apparently, though unconscious, has a sense of dignity and demands the immolation of victims to avenge its injured *amour propre*.

The real basis and stronghold of the theory which I am investigating is to be found in the undoubted psychological fact that the sense of indignation or resentment at wrong arises naturally and spontaneously in the human mind without any calculation of the personal or social benefits to be derived from gratifying it, and in the profound ethical conviction that for societies—though not always for individuals—it is morally good and healthy that this indignation should be encouraged and expressed. "Revenge, my friends," says Carlyle, "revenge and the natural hatred of scoundrels, and the ineradicable tendency to *revancher* oneself upon them, and pay them what they have merited; this is forevermore intrinsically a correct, and even a divine feeling in the mind of every man." Such language I could cordially adopt, though with the proviso (of which more hereafter) that this feeling is not so divine as the love which the best men do succeed in feeling towards the worst, and that it must not be allowed to extinguish that higher feeling. The feeling of indignation is a natural and healthy one,—natural and healthy, we may add, in partial correction of Carlyle, in proportion to its disinterestedness. It is one great purpose of the Criminal Law to give expression to this natural indignation against wrong. But law, in the discharge of its ideal function as νοῦς ἄνευ πάθους, seeks not

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merely to express but to regulate, and to regulate with a view to an end. In the words of Sir James Stephen, "the criminal law regulates, sanctions, and provides a legitimate satisfaction for the passion of revenge; the criminal law stands to the passion of revenge in much the same relation as marriage to the sexual appetite." And in both cases the ultimate end of the regulation is to be found in a certain ideal of social well-being.

The mistake of the upholders of the retributive theory lies, as it seems to me, in representing a mere emotion or feeling—an emotion or feeling which in itself a good, an important element in every well-balanced character—for a judgment of the Moral Reason. The Moral Reason may often judge that the emotion should be freely indulged, though at other times it will no less emphatically pronounce that the most elementary requirements of social order demand its partial or entire restraint. The real question is whether it is right to punish simply because we feel inclined to do so, to gratify a natural passion simply because it is there, or whether in this, as in the case of other spontaneous emotions or desires (including the spontaneous impulses of affection and benevolence), we ought to regulate passion by reason, to act for an end, *i. e.*, for the promotion in ourselves and others of whatever we take to be the ideal kind of human life. How the existence of an instinctive resentment against personal wrong, or in good men against wrong to others or moral depravity, can suspend the one all-comprehensive duty of love to men (including, of course, ourselves) is a question which will, perhaps offer no difficulties to those philosophical moralists whose ethical system seems to consist in the mixture of a little truculent Theology borrowed from primitive Judaism with a good deal pure paganism; but which must, I think, be an embarrassing one to those Retributionists who profess any sympathy with Christian standards of Ethics. The most Christian of the Schoolmen (*e. g.*, Wycliffe) always maintained that God's punishments were, and man's should be, the expression of love.

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And this remark brings me to the proper subject of this paper. It is one of the great embarrassments of the retributive theory that it is unable to give any consistent account of the duty of forgiveness and its relations to the duty of punishment. It is seldom that one finds anybody so logical as to maintain that it is always a duty to punish, and never right to forgive, at least till the wrong-doing has been expiated by punishment,—a theory which runs counter to a strongly felt and widely diffused ethical sentiment and which makes the First Offenders' Act a piece of immoral legislation. Others seem to have no answer to the difficulty but the admission: "Here are two inconsistent moral precepts: it is a duty to punish and a duty to forgive: it is impossible to lay down any general principle in the matter: you must do what you can in each case as it arises." Such an answer may satisfy those who think that morality consists simply of a collection of isolated impulses, intuitions, or particular judgments, which Reason is incapable of reducing to any consistent or intelligible whole. It will hardly satisfy those who believe that our ethical judgments can be reduced to a system, and that the emergence of apparent ethical antinomies simply shows that we have not yet succeeded in getting to a really fundamental ethical principle. The absence of internal contradiction, though by itself it will supply no adequate content for the Moral Law, we may surely venture (with Kant) to regard as a necessary condition of any law which can really claim to be moral. If the duty of punishment is to rest upon an *a priori* deliverance of the moral consciousness which pronounces that, be the consequences what they may, sin must be punished, it is difficult to see how forgiveness ever can be lawful. If punishment is sometimes right and sometimes wrong, on what principle are we to distinguish between the two classes of cases? That is the problem to which, as it appears to me, no intelligible answer can be given on the retributive theory, but which is not insusceptible of a solution on the basis of the utilitarian or educational view.

Among the very few moral philosophers who have bestowed



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any serious attention upon this question of forgiveness is Bishop Butler. By him the duty of forgiveness is resolved into the duty of being "affected towards the injurious person in the same way in which any good men uninterested in the case would be if they had the same just sense, which we have supposed the injured person to have, of the fault. After which there will yet remain real good-will towards the offender" (Sermon IX.). The duty amounts to this: "that we should suppress that partial, that false self-love, which is the weakness of our nature; that uneasiness and misery should not be produced without any good purpose to be served by it; and that we should not be affected towards persons differently from what their nature and characters should require." "Resentment," he says again, "is not inconsistent with good-will; for we often see both together in very high degrees; not only in parents towards their children, but in cases of friendship and dependence, where there is no natural relation. These contrary passions, though they may lessen, do not necessarily destroy each other."

The duty of resentment and the duty of forgiveness are thus reduced to particular applications of the general law of promoting social well-being. It is our duty to make our own personal resentment subordinate to the general good of society, just as it is a duty to subordinate good-will towards individuals to the interests of other individuals. In determining whether we should resent or punish an injury (to ourselves or to others) or whether we should forgive, we should simply consider what is best for the interests alike of the individual himself and of society at large, the offender's good and the injured person's interest alike being assigned its due, and no more than its due, importance. The distribution (so to speak) of punishment and of forgiveness will alike be guided by the general principle of benevolence or good-will to society in general, the duty of promoting the greatest good on the whole,—guided and controlled by the Benthamite principles of "Equity," which will be generally accepted in the modified form, "everybody's good is of the same importance with

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the like good of any other man." And here I may add, once more, that in the social well-being or good I assign a paramount place to moral well-being.

It may also be observed incidentally that on this view of the duty of forgiveness as simply a particular manifestation of the general duty of love, we are able to clear up an ambiguity about the meaning of forgiveness which often occasions some difficulty in discussions of this kind. We are often told that forgiveness is not inconsistent with punishment; that we may punish first and forgive afterwards, at least where punishment is a duty arising out of some public function or parental relation and not a mere gratification by legal or extra-legal means of resentment against private wrong. And this is quite true as far as it goes; forgiveness may mean simply the cessation of personal resentment after the exaction of whatever penalty may be demanded by considerations of social well-being and public duty. But, although in practice the adoption of this attitude may no doubt be easier in the public official than in the private person, it is impossible to draw a hard and fast line between punishment inflicted by the official in the discharge of public duty and the resentment exhibited by the private person, or between the vengeance which takes the form of legal prosecution and that which shows itself in private remonstrance or the refusal of social intercourse. Even legal punishment generally requires private initiation, and the same considerations of social well-being which require legal punishment in some cases require private resentment in others. It would be to the last degree disastrous to the well-being of any society whatever if individuals altogether ceased to show anger or to express resentment at personal rudeness or personal liberties or general want of respect for one another's personality; and from the nature of the case it is usually the injured party who must take the initiative in such resentment, though it may be that the ideal society would save him such a necessity by anticipating the resentment,—an ideal which is already approximately realized in groups of people among

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whom good breeding is combined with the real good feeling of which good breeding is at the best the expression and at the worst the mere caricature.

All this shows that we cannot attain to the ideal combination of punishment with forgiveness by merely laying it down that in our public capacity we punish and in our private capacity forgive. Nor, again, can we merely say that the duty of forgiveness begins when the due punishment has been exacted. For what will forgiveness mean in this case? Are we to say that when the formal sentence has been served, it is the duty of the judge or of society generally to treat the criminal with the same cordiality with which we should have received him had he never offended? Undoubtedly society does not give its repentant criminals the fair chance that they may reasonably claim, but to say that we must treat them as though they had never done wrong or that former convictions should not aggravate the sentence is surely to demand what is impracticable and pernicious. Nor in private relations can we always be called upon to treat the man who has betrayed our trust—even after repentance or apology—as though he had not betrayed it; nor can a friend, after a quarrel which has revealed in him a character which we had not suspected, ever again be a friend in the same sense or degree as before, even after the most ample repentance or apology. Without, therefore, denying that there is a sense in which forgiveness may be combined with punishment, it is impossible to find for that forgiveness which is compatible with punishment a meaning more definite than this—that punishment should not exclude whatever kind of good-will can under the circumstances be properly combined with punishment. And that surely is something far too indefinite to satisfy the idea of forgiveness. It is impossible, in short, to get rid of the popular association of the idea of forgiveness with remission of penalty.

There is, then, a sense in which forgiveness is opposed to punishment. On the view that I have taken it will sometimes be a duty to punish and sometimes to forgive. In determining which we shall do in each particular case, the good man

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—whether the private individual or the public official, who is after all only the representative of a society of individuals who are as much bound by the law of love in their corporate as in their individual capacity—will consider which, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, will best serve those social ends to which punishment and forgiveness alike are means. The ideal punishment would no doubt be one which was the best alike in the interests of society and of the individual. Under our present systems of legal punishment it is to be feared that this is an ideal not very often attained. A man has often to be punished in the interest of society whose own well-being would be best promoted by forgiveness. In such a case we must balance the interest of society against the interest of the individual, or rather perhaps what the society gains by the moral improvement of the particular individual against what it gains from the deterrent and educative effect of the punishment upon other individuals.

And upon this view of the relation of punishment to forgiveness, there is no absolute antagonism between that sense of forgiveness in which it is opposed to punishment and that sense in which it is compatible with punishment. Just the same considerations which impose the duty of punishment will limit the measure of it; just those same considerations which allow of the total remission of penalty in some cases will allow of some mitigation of it in other cases, and will impose in all cases the duty of showing whatever benevolence and good-will towards the offender is compatible with that measure of punishment which social duty demands. Punishment and forgiveness, when they are what they ought to be, being alike the expression of love, the mode and degree of their combination will likewise be only the application of the general precept of love to the circumstances of the particular case.

In the main, then, we may accept Bishop Butler's interpretation of the proper relation between punishment and forgiveness, and yet we cannot but feel that something is missed in this cool and calculating utilitarian analysis. We feel that there must be something more in forgiveness than the mere

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limitation of vengeance by the demands of public welfare. The late Sir John Seeley, in one of the best chapters of "Ecce Homo," helps us to supply the deficiency. It is true that in its essence the duty of forgiveness is the duty of laying aside *private* or personal resentment,—of resenting the wrong because it is a wrong and not because I am the victim of it. But what Bishop Butler has missed is the fact that vengeance often loses its moral effect just because the avenger of the wrong is its victim, while forgiveness often strikes the heart just because the forgiver is the man who suffered by the wrong,—and therefore the man in whom it is hardest to forgive. The wronged man's forgiveness will often have a moral effect, awaken a gratitude and a penitence, which the forgiveness of the disinterested spectator or the remotely interested "society" would not secure. It is perfectly true, as Butler taught, that forgiveness is only a particular case of love; but he forgot that to a human being who has wronged his fellow, forgiveness is an infinitely more convincing proof of love than punishment can ever be, and may, therefore, touch the heart as punishment will seldom touch it. In the light of this principle nothing that has been said as to the duty of balancing the good effects of forgiveness against the good effects of punishment need be recalled; only, in choosing between them, this peculiar magic of the wronged person's forgiveness must needs be duly remembered.

I have been dealing with the question of forgiveness as a purely ethical problem, but, before I conclude, I cannot forebear to add a remark or two upon its theological applications. The foregoing principles will, I think, give us certain *τύποι περὶ θεολογίας* which it would be of the utmost importance to apply to the elucidation or (if need be) to the correction of our traditional Theology. I must be content with suggesting these theological applications in a few rather bald and dogmatic propositions:

(1) The forgiveness of God must not be represented as some separable accident (as it were) of the Divine Nature,—as a positive fact unconnected with the rest of the Divine

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character,—which might quite well be absent without that character being any the less perfect, and which can only be accepted on the strength of some special supernatural assurance distinct from any general revelation of the character of God (in whatever sense such a revelation may be believed in), but as an essential element, as simply a particular manifestation of the supreme divine quality of love.

(2) We must not think of divine punishment and divine forgiveness as revealing contradictory attributes of the divine nature; they are both of them expressions of the same character, the same changeless love or desire for the highest good of all creatures. We cannot, therefore, think of God as capriciously punishing where He might have served the ends of punishment by forgiveness, or as capriciously forgiving where a good end might have been served by punishment. Even the mediævals represented God's punishment as an act of love. Few of us will be able to follow them in conceiving of everlasting torments, allowing of no opportunity of repentance or amendment, as the expression of love; and if so, our acceptance of their perfectly true view of punishment will compel an important revision of the traditional eschatology. Instead of inventing arbitrary schemes by which some are to be punished everlastingly and some to escape without punishment altogether, we shall simply repose in the faith that the souls of the dead are "in the hands of God," who loves them and will by whatever means—by pain if pain be needed or without pain if it be needed not—carry on in them the education which earthly life has begun.

(3) When we look upon punishment and forgiveness alike as different ways of producing a moral result, when we have got rid of the notion that punishment can be either demanded or justified except as a means of producing an effect, or that forgiveness can be legitimate except where forgiveness will do the work of punishment, there will be an end of theories which represent the work of Christ as some mysterious device for cancelling past guilt or remitting a penalty which might justly have been inflicted. The atoning efficacy of the life and

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death of Christ will have to be found in their actual moral effects,—the actual effect made upon the human soul by Christ's teaching about God's Nature and God's Will, by the influence of His character, and by the conviction that in that human love of Christ there is a revelation of the Divine.

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THE RIGHTS OF ANIMALS.

I.

In a recent number of the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS there appeared a short notice of a little pamphlet of mine on "The Sanctity of Life," in which the critic concluded that "writers of the school of Mr. Salt seem to have an acquired incapacity for distinguishing between men and beasts." In view of the importance, from an ethical stand-point, of our relations to the lower animals, it may be of some interest to the readers of this JOURNAL to take a survey of the principle of Animals' Rights as it appeals to humanitarian minds.

Now instead of confusing men with other animals, we have often made objection to that popular method of describing animal life which consists in attributing to animals (as in Gay's "Fables," for example, or even, to take a modern instance, in Kipling's "Jungle Book") a number of quasi-human qualities, and making them "perform," so to speak, in human guise to tickle human vanity. We hold rather that animal life, to be really understood, will have to be studied, by sympathy, from within, and for its own sake, as Thoreau has remarked in a suggestive passage of his diaries:—

"How little we know of the inner life of animals! How few our facts are, and how little certain we are of them! What a huge book, and what an intensely interesting one, is waiting to be written on this subject by some great genius of the future! Surely it tells not a little for the in-curiosity and perhaps for the conceit of us humans that we have been taken up so entirely with our little selves for these many thousand years past . . . and all the time we have been acting as if we were alone in the world, and as if it were not inhabited by

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crowds of beings with ways towards us and towards each other which, seeing how much we depend upon the same animals, it behooves us most strongly to understand."

Humanitarians, then, are subject to no "incapacity," natural or acquired, for distinguishing between the human and the non-human races as far as *degree* is concerned; it is admitted on all hands that there is a great difference of degree between the human and the animal intelligence. But if we are asked to recognize a distinction not of degree but of *kind*, then we freely own to the incapacity aforesaid, an incapacity which, if it is not innate in us, may certainly have been "acquired" by study and observation.

Now to come to the point at once, we hold that all this talk about the difference, in kind, between men and animals, as if between *persons* and mere *things*, is thoroughly wrong and mistaken whether as ethics or science. Even the expression "man and the animals," though unavoidable in common parlance, is, strictly regarded, an absurdity; for in truth there is no such antithesis, and we ought rather to speak of "man and the *other* animals, since Man, for all his perogatives, is himself but a part of the great Animal Kingdom, and can no more disown the relationship than can the meanest of his fellow-beings. This is a fact which is fully recognized and admitted in modern scientific works, as in the following passage by a very able writer:

"The last great excursus of sympathy which has characterized the English Aryans—one dating its beginning to this century—is that relating to the rights of our domesticated animals. This has come about, like other movements, in a way unconsciously. Prophetic spirits have seen beyond the vision of their fellows; they have given their messages, which have found an echo in the souls of men. The motive originated in the recognition of the essential likeness of the minds of the lower animals to our own. But it has been greatly reinforced by the teachings of the naturalists to the effect that *all the life of this sphere is akin in its origin*, and that our subjects are not very far away from our own ancestral line." *

See, also, Mr. E. P. Evans's very interesting work on

* "Domesticated Animals: Their Relation to Man and to his Advancement in Civilization," by Nathaniel S. Shaler, Dean of the Lawrence Scientific School of Harvard University, 1896.

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"Evolution Ethics and Animal Psychology," where he combats the anthropocentric delusions which treat man as on a separate basis from other sentient beings. "Man," he says "is as truly a part and product of Nature as any other animal, and this attempt to set him up as an isolated point outside of it is philosophically false and morally pernicious."

So, too, Mr. Frederic Harrison in his essay on "The Ethical View" of Animals' Rights:*

"I regard man's morality towards the lower animals to be a vital and indeed fundamental part of his morality towards his fellow-men. I refuse to treat it as an extra, an appendix, or finishing touch superadded to our ethical creed. I do so, because I do not know what Ethics can mean, if it be not the due ordering of our own complex nature (a large and indispensable part of which is *animal*) towards the vast organic world in which we find ourselves. Of that organic world the animal kingdom is the predominant part, as Man is only the predominant member of the animal kingdom. That is, Man does not differ from animals in the same way that animals differ from vegetables, or vegetables differ from minerals or rocks. Zoölogically speaking, he is classed among *Primates*, as one of the highest order of mammals. His physical, moral, intellectual, and therefore his spiritual nature does not organically differ in kind from those of the highest mammals. It differs only in degree, and by a vast hereditary and secular evolution. And it does not differ in degree—absolutely and invariably."

We hold, then, that to draw an absolute line of demarcation between men, as "persons" and "ends," and animals as "mere means," is a thoroughly unsound basis for any ethical structure, inasmuch as the more highly organized animals possess, like men, though, of course, in a minor degree, the qualities of a true personality. "The senses and intuitions," says Darwin, "the various emotions and faculties, such as love, memory, attention, curiosity, imitation, reason, etc., of which man boasts, may be found in an incipient, or even sometimes in a well-developed, condition in the lower animals.† The attempt to hedge off the animals from mankind on the plea that they do not "reason" is equally futile. Note, for example, the following passage in Dr. Wesley Mills's suggestive book on "The Nature and Development of Animal Intelligence" (1898):

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* In "The New Charter."

† "Descent of Man," chap. iii.

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"The trend of investigation thus far goes to show that at least the germ of every human faculty does exist in some species of animal. . . . Formerly the line was drawn at reason. It was said that the brutes * cannot reason. Only persons who do not themselves reason about the subject, with the facts before them, can any longer occupy such a position. The evidence of reasoning power is overwhelming for the upper ranks of animals, and yearly the downward limits are being extended the more the inferior tribes are studied."

Nor is it true that the worth of an animal's life, any more than of a man's, can be measured simply by the amount of "agreeable sensation," a fallacy often put forward by those who cage animals in menageries, on the plea that they are there well tended and saved from the struggle for existence. To live one's own natural life, to realize one's self, is the true moral purpose of man and animal equally, and the wrong done by the unnecessary cramping and thwarting of animal individuality, as in the turning of an active intelligent being into a prisoner or pet, cannot really be compensated by the gift of any material "comforts." Compare the life of the wild bison with that of the stall-fed ox, or that of the sheep-dog with the pampered pug, and the moral can hardly be overlooked. An animal has his proper work to do in the world, his own life to live, as surely as a man ; and those who scoff at this idea, and deny individuality to animals, should remember that there was a time, under the Greek and Roman civilization, when it was held to be doubtful whether a *slave*, in like manner, had any claim to be regarded as a person. "Neither can men," says Aristotle, "have friendships with horses, cattle, or slaves, considered merely as such ; for a slave is merely a living instrument, and an instrument a life-less slave. Yet, considered as a man, a slave may be an object of friendship."† "Slaves," says Bentham, "have been treated by the law exactly upon the same footing as in England, for example, the inferior races of animals are still. The day *may* come when the rest of the animal creation may

* As a matter of fact, the very word *brute*, which means *irrational*, is a complete misnomer when applied to the higher and more intelligent animals. Dr. Wesley Mills contradicts his own arguments by using it.

† "Ethics," Book VIII.

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acquire those rights which could never have been withholden from them but by the hand of tyranny."*

The mention of "Rights" brings us to the core of our subject. We claim for animals, as for men, in so far as it is compatible with the public welfare, a measure of individuality and freedom, a space in which to live their own lives—in a word, Rights. Into the interminable field of discussion as to the fitness of this term I do not propose to enter, because my purpose is not an academic but a practical one, and in the redressing of social injustice Action cannot forever wait for the good pleasure of Logic. It may be that, from a strictly logical point of view, there are no such things as "Rights," in which case it is obvious that we cannot claim for animals what is denied to men; but if, as is usually conceded, there are rights of men, then we assert there are also, in due degree, rights of animals also. "Every man," says Herbert Spencer in his "Justice," "is free to do that which he wills, provided he infringes not the equal liberty of any other man;" and again, "Whoever admits that each man must have a certain restricted freedom, asserts that it is *right* he should have this restricted freedom. . . . and hence the several particular freedoms deducible may fitly be called, as they commonly are called, his *rights*." The essential part of my contention is that in this matter there is no absolute difference, no impassable gulf, between mankind and "the animals." If man has reason, animals have the germ of reason. If man has rights, animals have the same—in kind.

On the other hand, if objection be taken to the use of the word "rights," whether of men or of animals, it is open to us to consider the question from another side, and to arrive at the same result by a different process,—viz., by the way of "duties." Duties and rights, as Mr. G. W. Foote has pointed out in an admirable chapter on "The Kinship of Life," in "The New Charter," are in reality correlative. "A right is really a duty that some one owes to me, and a duty is a right

* "Principles of Morals and Legislation."

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that I owe to another; they are like the two halves of a pair of scissors, inoperative and unintelligible except in relation to each other." But if it be a satisfaction to any one to express it in this manner, and to say that men have duties towards animals, rather than that animals possess rights, I do not know that the difference is worth quarrelling over—provided always that the duties be acknowledged to be real and direct ones, a subject to which I will presently recur. In using the word "rights," therefore, I must premise that I do so, not because it is essential to my argument, but because it appears to be on the whole the best term available, and most expressive of what I have in mind. If a more suitable name can be found, I am quite ready to adopt it.

Like all other humanitarian docrines, the claim of "rights" for animals dates from the great revolutionary upheaval of a century back, though anticipations of such an idea may be traced in the Buddhist and Pythagorean canons, with their maxim of "not to kill or injure any innocent animal," and in the humane philosophers of the later Roman civilization, such as Seneca, Plutarch, and Porphyry. "Since justice is due to rational beings," said the last named, "how is it possible to evade the admission that we are bound also to act justly towards the races beneath us?" But it was not till the close of the eighteenth century that these principles began to be regarded as inherent in the creed of democracy; and even then, when such books as "The Rights of Man" and "A Vindication of the Rights of Women" were being fiercely discussed, so absurd did the new theories seem to many minds, and so incredible the notion of "mere animals" being ever included in the charter, that by way of satirising the rights of men and the rights of women an anonymous volume was published in 1892, entitled "A Vindication of the Rights of Brutes," in which the opinion was expressed that "after those wonderful productions of Mr. Paine and Mrs. Wollstonecraft such a theory as the present seems to be necessary."

There was more truth in that ironical suggestion than its

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author supposed: indeed the pioneers of modern humanitarianism were already asserting that even animals have rights. "Why," asked Jeremy Bentham, "should the law refuse its protection to any sensitive being? The time will come when humanity will extend its mantle over everything which breathes. We have begun by attending to the condition of slaves; we shall finish by softening that of all the animals which assist our labors or supply our wants."* A like opinion was expressed in 1796 by John Lawrence, author of "A Philosophical Treatise on the Moral Duties of Man Toward the Brute Creation." "No human government, I believe has ever recognized the *jus animalium*, which ought surely to form a part of the jurisprudence of every system founded on the principles of justice and humanity." Nor was it long before this claim was in some measure realized, for in spite of the mockery with which the proposal was at first greeted in Parliament, the year 1822 saw the passing of "Martin's Act," the earliest legal prohibition of cruelty to animals; and the protection thus given to cattle and "beasts of burden" was gradually extended to all animals that the law recognized as "domestic." Wretchedly inadequate as this was (and still is), we see in it at least a partial establishment of the principle of rights.

But what kind of rights? it will be asked; for it is plain that animals cannot possess *legal* rights in the full sense in which citizens possess them, that is, rights that the injured party can himself enforce in the law-courts. Even we humanitarians, for all our "incapacity for distinguishing between men and beasts," do not advise the ill-used cab-horse to take out a summons *in propriâ personâ* against the guilty driver; that is a function which must be performed by the benevolent agency of mankind. Are we to say, then, that the rights of animals are solely of the *moral* order?† I think not, seeing that we have an actual legislative assertion that

* "Principles of Penal Law," ch. xvi.

† I leave *natural* rights out of the question altogether, as the definition of the "natural" is a difficult point which need not here detain us.

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certain kinds of animals are not the mere property of their owners—that "cattle" are not mere "chattel," in short—but sentient creatures whom the State is pledged to defend from wanton harm, just as it defends those human beings who cannot protect themselves.

It is argued, however, that such protection does not imply rights on the part of the animal protected. "Because a work of art or some ancient monument," says Professor Ritchie in his book on "Natural Rights," "is protected by law from injury, do we speak of the *rights* of pictures or stones?" But here the logic of the Professor of Logic is sadly at fault, for he has overlooked the fact that pictures and stones are *not* protected by law—against their owners. If a man owns a work of art, however valuable, he is quite free, as far as the law is concerned, to smash it into atoms; but if he should do the same to his cat or dog, however valueless, he would quickly find himself before a magistrate. Of course, protection does not necessarily involve rights; but in some protective measures, such as the Factory Acts, rights are by implication admitted; and whereas the Game Laws, for instance, are a mere property act, denoting no right in the animals "preserved," the acts for the prevention of cruelty, on the contrary, are protective in the same sense as the Factory Acts—implying a definite duty on the part of the State towards the sentient beings concerned.

Mr. Shaler, from whose important work on "Domesticated Animals" I have already quoted, says:

> "A century ago a man, so far as the law was concerned, owned his living chattels as he did the inanimate things of his property. He could torture or slay them as whim or malice might dictate; there were no limitations by statute, and public opinion, where it might reprobate, was too weak to influence his conduct. Now the statute-books of all countries which are moving in the path of moral advance show that public opinion has attained the point where it begins to formulate itself in statutes which restrict the relations of men to their domestic animals—or, in other words, endow them with definite rights."

Nor, as I hinted above, can such obligations, whether legal or moral, be whittled away by the comfortable expedient of calling them "duties" instead of "rights," and here again I

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must take exception to Professor Ritchie's reasoning. "We may be said," he remarks, in a sentence which would sound fitter in the mouth of a Jesuitical casuist than of an ethical and rational writer, "to have duties of *kindness towards* the animals, but it is incorrect to represent these as strictly *duties towards* the animals themselves, as if they had rights against us." It is the "kindness" only, it seems, that has reference to the animal in this convenient arrangement, the "duty" being a private affair of the man's; or, to speak metaphorically, the "duty" is the handle of the tap, and the "kindness" the water which may be turned on or off at pleasure. But this arbitrary dictum obviously rests on nothing but the old belief, untenable in the light of fuller knowledge, that an animal is not a "person;" and in view of the fact that our legislation actually prohibits cruelty to domestic animals, it may pertinently be asked to whom *is* it, if not to the animal, that the man owes the "duty"? To himself, it can hardly be said; for surely the law does not step in when there is only one person concerned! To "human society," to "civilized life," says Professor Ritchie; but if this be so in the case of the Cruelty to Animals Acts, it may equally hold good of the Factory Acts or any other humane legislation, and so bring us to the absurd couclusion that state protection has no reference at all to the interests of the protected party, but only to the general standard of morality—whereas, obviously, it has direct regard to *both*.

No, I do not imagine that Professor Ritchie will be able to persuade any clear minded thinker that if (let us say) a drunken car-man brutally ill-treats a horse, and then brutally assaults a passer-by who remonstrates with him, he has committed a breach of duty against *one* person only. To twist and manipulate the doctrine of duties in this way is to make it merely ridiculous. "Flowers laugh before thee on their beds," sang Wordsworth, in his famous "Ode to Duty;" and well they might laugh at the very accommodating idea of moral obligations which some philosophers entertain. It is impossible (for a humanitarian, at any rate) to look in the

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eyes of an intelligent, highly-organized animal and doubt for a moment that we have a *direct* duty towards the races below us, a duty which is the same in kind as that which we owe to human beings, however greatly it may differ in degree. An ethical teacher who denies rights to animals, on the ground that they are not "persons," is practically relying on the same argument as that of the Catholic peasant who derides the idea of any duty towards animals because they are not Christians—"they have no souls." I venture to commend to Professor Ritchie's attention, as conveying in more forcible language the sum of his logic, the following from an entertaining American publication which rejoices in the title of "Anti-Dog":

"Now, my boy or girl, whichever you are, drop this nonsense about dogs. They are demanding valuable time that should be employed in teaching such as you. A dog cannot love you. You cannot love a dog. Naught beside a divine soul can love or be loved. Chloroform your dog, and take to reading your Testament."

But to do him justice, Professor Ritchie is half conscious of the weakness of his ground, and practically gives away his case, as far as the domestic animals are concerned, by the concession which he makes at the end of it. After scouting the idea that animals have rights, or men duties towards animals, he remarks: "We have admitted certain animals to a sort of honorary membership of our society; and we come to think of them as standing in a quasi-human relation to ourselves, especially when we give them names of their own, as if they were persons. . . . In a metaphorical sense we may be said to have duties towards these honorary human beings." Very delightful is the Pickwickian expression of "metaphorical" duties to "honorary" persons.

History repeats itself in these matters. There was a time when the slave's membership of human society was regarded as dubious and "honorary;" and the rights of women were slowly and painfully established, as our forefathers' sympathies expanded. For here is the key to the whole discussion—the *sympathy* that is the very essence of the human. "There is

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something in human nature," says an old writer,* "resulting from our very make and constitution, which renders us obnoxious to the pains of others, causes us to sympathize with them, and almost comprehends us in their case." And this sympathy, as Mr. Lecky has shown in his "History of European Morals," is ever gradually widening with a widening civilization.

"At one time," he says, "the benevolent affections embrace merely the family, soon the circle expanding includes first a class, then a nation, then a coalition of nations, then all humanity; and, finally, its influence is felt in the dealings of man with the animal world."

The gradual recognition of Rights keeps pace with the phases of this moral development, as mankind slowly wins its way from a narrow and selfish barbarism to a wide sense of brotherhood with all sentient beings.

II.

When we turn from the principle discussed above to the application of that principle to our treatment of the lower races, we are brought front to front with a series of vexed questions, each of which, if at all fully handled, would need an essay or a volume to itself; so that all I can do in this article is to glance briefly at the probable effect of a recognition of animals' rights on the use of animals for such purposes as draught, sport, food, dress, and scientific experimentation.

In the first place, humanitarians do not share the extreme view expressed by Lewis Gompertz in his "Moral Inquiries on the Situation of Man and Brutes" (1824), that mankind has no moral right to use the lower animals in its service—that "at least in the present state of society it is unjust, and considering the unnecessary abuse they suffer from being in the power of man, it is wrong to use them, and to encourage their being placed in his power." Being compelled to deal

* Wollaston, "Religion of Nature," 1759.

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with facts as we find them, and seeing that from immemorial ages the labor of animals has been interwoven with the labor of man in the fabric of human society, it seems wiser to claim for animals their due rights, as a part of that organization, than to insist on an abstract moral proposition which can neither be proved nor disproved, and is quite certain to be barren of any practical results. It is the fate not only of countless animals, but also of countless men, to be born into a life of unremitting, ill-requited drudgery; and it is the duty of the ethical reformer not to complain that either man or animal should thus be doomed to labor, but rather to quicken the sense of responsibility on the part of society as a whole towards its individual workers, with a view to the gradual humanizing of their lot.

"Man is indispensably bound," wrote John Lawrence, a hundred years ago, "to bestow upon animals, in return for the benefit he derives from their service, good and sufficient nourishment, comfortable shelter, and merciful treatment; to commit no wanton outrage upon their feelings whilst alive, and to put them to the speediest and least painful death when it shall be necessary to deprive them of life." This is now very commonly admitted in theory, but it is to be feared that at least another century will have to pass before precept and practice are in unison; indeed, under the present system of society, where almost everything is measured, even for men, by the merely *commercial* standard, it is impossible that animals should be generally treated with gentleness and consideration. The complaint made by Thoreau of man's "not educating the horse, not trying to develop his nature, but merely getting work out of him," is descriptive of our average attitude towards the domestic animals, except when we make "pets" of them—and then our kindness is perhaps more fatal than our cruelty. Must we not feel that the main cause of our wrong-doing, kind or cruel, is the lingering belief that animals are mere *things*, an irrational race of beings wholly separate from the human, and that, as this superstition dies out, our present stupid and unfeeling treatment of our "rudi-

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mentary brethren" will be replaced by a more sane and sympathetic one? It is the denial of "personality" to animals that is at the root of the evil.

So, too, as regards the wild animals; for though we have not the same social duties towards these, as towards the domestic, for services performed, yet we are morally bound to do them no unnecessary wrong, and it is to be hoped that the coming century will enforce this duty by legislation. The absurdity of the present state of the English law, which forbids cruelty to domestic animals, while it permits any sort of atrocity to be wreaked on wild ones, and further insists on classing as *ferœ naturœ* such practically domesticated, if not domestic, creatures as the park-fed stag, the bagged rabbit, the caged pigeon, and the "wild beast" in a menagerie, is acknowledged on all hands, and is rapidly becoming sufficiently scandalous to give some hope of a reform. For wild animals also have their own individuality and character; they are not stocks and stones but living, sentient beings; and the more this is felt and understood, the more their rights will be respected, and the less will rational and civilized persons be disposed to indulge in "sport" (or "blood-sport," as it should properly be called, to distinguish it from the manlier games of the gymnasium or cricket-field), that pastime of idle gentlemen who, in a civilized era, have not yet emerged from old-world savagery.

"Sport," says Robert Buchanan,* "in so far as it embraces the hunting and killing of wild animals is invariably more or less demoralizing—is, in fact, a relapse from Civilization to Barbarism. Therein lies its real fascination for men bored with the proprieties and duties of the nineteenth century. The instincts of the primeval man—food-hunting, predatory, self-preserving—re-emerge in the modern; moral sanctions are disregarded, the rights of inferior races are forgotten, and the hunter feels himself, figuratively speaking, naked, savage, bloodthirsty, and unashamed."

The distinctive feature of blood-sport, among the various traditional habits that infringe the rights of animals, is its *wantonness*. To kill may be justifiable, is often justifiable;

* Preface to "The Truth About the Game Laws," by J. Connell, 1898.

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but to take pleasure in killing can never be otherwise than immoral in a man who claims to be civilized.

In strong contrast to the childishness of sport stands the deliberateness of vivisection—yet I think it must be recognized that this, too, springs from a common origin—the lack of any real conception that the lower animals are intelligent beings with a rational purpose in their lives. Given a race of "brute beasts," which* [*sic*] are assumed to exist for the sole object of ministering to human convenience, and it was inevitable that they should be used and ill-used, in various ways according to the whims and fancies, or the more serious inclinations, of their masters. Thus regarded from the several stand-points of the human temperament—the impulse of hunger, of recreation, of curiosity—an animal is something to eat, something to hunt, something to vivisect ; and the contention of many zoophilists that the physiological experimentation on animals is an abnormal and monstrous cruelty quite apart from, and in excess of, all other cruelty to animals, seems to me to have no foundation in fact. The true reason for condemning vivisection appears to be this—that, like sport, it rests on a faulty ethical basis, the untenable notion that man has no direct duties to the animals, and that in dealing with them he may lawfully disregard all those promptings of sympathy and justice which he is so strongly exhorted to cultivate in his dealings with his fellow-men.

There are still scientists, it is said, who are not afraid to advocate a recurrence to the ancient habit of *human* vivisection, as in the case of hardened criminals and outlaws. To argue against such thinkers that *animal* vivisection is iniquitous would be idle, for how can one expect regard for the lower rights where there is none for the higher? But it may pertinently be asked of the great bulk of physiologists, who indignantly repudiate the idea of vivisecting human beings,

* Schopenhauer, in his "Foundation of Morality," has commented on the English use of the neuter pronoun, *it*, when animals are referred to, as if they were inanimate objects. "Nothing is more shocking," he says, "than this idiom, especially when the *primates* are spoken of."

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but are equally emphatic in their justification of experiments on animals, on what grounds they base this difference in their ethical principles. It is from the scientists themselves that we have the clearest assurance that man is an animal, and that the great gulf which has been supposed to yawn between the human and non-human has existed only in imagination. Where, then, do they find an ethical warrant for the infliction of prolonged and exquisite tortures on sentient beings who, by their own showing, are closely akin to mankind? If a mere difference in *degree* of sensibility and intelligence is held to be the justification, there must be equal sanction for the sacrifice of a savage or a criminal. Vivisection (*i. e.*, compulsory vicarious sacrifice) is simply a denial of the most elementary rights; and a sincere belief in the rights of animals would render all such practices unthinkable.

Again, differing widely in some respects from such usages as sport and vivisection, yet connected with these at root, is the time-honored habit of killing animals for food. I have no intention here of preaching "vegetarianism;"* but it must be briefly pointed out that if, as I anticipate, the society of the future will be inspired by a deeper and tenderer regard for animal sufferings, it is impossible to doubt that this sentiment will affect the food-question as much as any other question relating to the lower races. Here, too, the admission of "rights" will work a revolution in our attitude to the animal world. To those, of course, who are convinced that flesh-food is a necessity of human welfare, it is vain to suggest that it will form no part in the future dietary; that is a matter which time alone can decide. But I think we must all agree that at any rate the *humanizing* of our diet, to an extent which is not at present thought of, partly by the avoidance of those foods which cause the worst suffering, and partly by a drastic reform of the present cruel and clumsy methods of

* Nor will I now discuss the fallacy, so often exploded, that we do a *kindness* to animals by breeding and killing them, because otherwise they would not live at all!

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slaughter, will be a movement of no very distant date, and one in which all ethical teachers should co-operate. A subject of such vital importance as morality in diet should receive more attention, and such a book, for example, as Mr. Howard Williams's "Ethics of Diet" should be better known. It should be remembered that it is precisely in such personal matters as diet and dress that an individual may effect a reform for himself without waiting for legislation, and that therefore greater personal responsibility attaches to such habits. No one is obliged to wear sealskin or osprey plumes; and no one, I imagine, *would* wear them, if once the horrible deeds by which such articles are provided could be brought home to the mind of a thoughtless and indifferent public. In like manner, no one is compelled, for the support of health and strength, to eat those foods which cause the dreadful and disgusting incidents of the cattle-ship and the slaughter-house; and here, again, it may safely be asserted that a full knowledge of the facts would be effective in working a remedy. For myself, I cannot doubt that as our regard for animals increases, and as we become more aware that a large and growing number of people are living healthily in our midst without recourse to flesh-food, the adoption of a humaner diet-system will become inevitable. It is as inherent in the logic of development as is the discontinuance of sport or vivisection.

In conclusion, I would point out that this question of the rights of animals is an integral part of the great "social question" in which we are all concerned; it is, properly considered, a *human* question of great interest and importance, and one which ethical thinkers, least of all, can afford to neglect. Says Frederic Harrison:

"Our relation to the animals, at least to the nobler mammals, does not form an appendix to our human morality, much less does it form a distinct branch of Ethics, or an independent morality by itself. No, it is part and parcel of our human morality, and is interwoven with it and inseparable from it. Our duties towards our lower helpmates form part of our duties towards our fellow-beings. The highest 'brutes' are our fellow beings. Man can only regard himself as the advance-guard, or as the commanding officer and leader of a vast army of living, sentient, and moral beings, whose natural function is to use, improve, and make the best of this wondrous and complex earth."

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How, then, shall we sum up in a sentence the principle of our duties to the lower animals? I do not know that it can be better done than in the words of George Nicholson, one of those early pioneers to the influence of whose writings, though now almost forgotten, the cause of humaneness owes so much. "In our conduct to animals," he wrote, "one plain rule may determine what form it ought to take, and prove an effectual guard against an improper treatment of them—a rule universally admitted as a foundation of moral rectitude: Treat the animal in such a manner as you would willingly be treated, were you such an animal."* In our dealings with the non-human as with the human race, it is not "charity," or "self-sacrifice," or "mercy" that is required, but simple *justice* —an insistence on our own duties as on those of our neighbors, a recognition of our neighbors' rights as of our own.

The kinship of life is the only true basis of Ethics; and it is towards this sense of kinship, seen at first only by inspired poets and dreamers from afar, that science, no less than humanitarian sentiment, is now leading us. "Far as custom has carried man from man," says a great teacher, "yet when at last in the ever-branching series the complete human being is produced, it knows at once its kinship with all the other forms. More, it knows its kinship with the animals. It sees that it is only habit, an illusion of difference, that divides; and it perceives after all that it is the same human creature that flies in the air, and swims in the sea, or walks biped upon the land."†

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* "On the Conduct of Man to Inferior Animals," 1797.

† "Civilization: Its Cause and Cure." By Edward Carpenter, 1889.

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THE MORAL LAW.

We must examine the actions and motives commonly called good or bad, and try to discover the principle according to which they are judged. When this criterion has been found, we shall know what lies at the bottom of all morality and might then, if we choose, by considering the nature of man and the conditions of life, deduce an ethical system, containing at least the most general laws. For, as Höffding says: "The science of ethics is only a development of that which is implicitly contained in universal sympathy, as gradually developed in the human race.*

In our quest for the standard of morals, we are, however, to proceed inductively, leaving it to history to evolve the contents of the principle underlying moral progress. We shall, therefore, first consider the nature of the moral law.

The question here is to determine the characteristic quality of the moral law. Our attention must, therefore, be directed to the subject-matter of the laws. The particular moral laws deal with human conduct of which they prohibit some forms and enjoin others. Thus the injunctions, thou shalt not steal, thou shalt not kill, thou shalt not bear false witness, commit adultery, etc., all forbid actions detrimental to others. On the other hand, there are rules more positive in their demands: Be truthful, give each man his due, serve the society of which you are a member, assist those in distress, employ your powers for the advancement of humanity. These also ordain modes of behavior the neglect of which would cause harm to others.

It is therefore quite in accordance with the facts to say that such acts are called wrong as produce consequences detrimental to the well-being of others. And though moral laws chiefly prohibit the performance of harmful deeds, the exist-

* Höffding, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, October, 1890. See also Zeller, "Vorträge und Abhandlungen." 3. Samlung, *Ueber Begriff und Begründung sittlicher Gesetze.*

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ence of precepts asking for the removal of human suffering leads us to the conclusion, that morality enjoins not merely a passive avoidance of hurtful consequences, but a more active care for the safety and welfare of our fellows.

It is, therefore, characteristic of the moral law that it conduces to a certain end. This end taken in its smallest compass seems to be the welfare of others. Inasmuch as moral actions are the products of conscious human beings, the most reasonable inference is, that the above mentioned end is one *desired* by men. In other words, they care for the good of their fellows. The examination of the objective end of conduct and the conclusion, verified by our own self-consciousness, that such a purpose is really sought by agents, bring us to the very root of morality. The underlying principle is the desire for the welfare of others or sympathy. To this the evolution of morality must be ascribed. We are moral beings because there is in us a sympathetic impulse or instinct or love. Schopenhauer clearly recognizes this fact when he makes compassion the foundation of ethics (*Das Fundament der Moral*). Sympathy as expressed in the command, Love one another, is also regarded by Christ as the highest virtue, as the law on which all other laws are grounded. And even where it is not openly declared as such, it is nevertheless tacitly assumed. Every society that prefers order to internal war acts in accordance with it. All moral laws in the mechanical state of Hobbes aim at hindering the *bellum omnium contra omnes;* peace and social welfare are therefore the ends desired by its members. If there were not such a feeling of sympathy, the good of others could never be a human end; men would treat one another as they now treat lifeless objects, using them as means for selfish purposes. Society is based on the sympathetic impulse which seems to be an original possession of the human heart.

We aim at the good of others because we are sympathetic, because we care for them. The moral law grows in scope with the extension of human sympathy, which runs parallel with the progress of intelligence. Together with the con-

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sciousness of community of nature, that we are one with all mankind, good-will develops. The circle becomes wider and wider, until at last it may embrace the whole of humanity.

Special attention must here be called to the fact that the objective side of conduct frequently receives too much prominence. It cannot be denied that moral conduct has consequences beneficial not only to present society, but also to future humanity. So that if we emphasize the objective side of morality and speculate on the ultimate end of conduct, we finally adopt the theory of an Ihering or a Wundt. It is true that every moral action has its effects, that no effect can be destroyed, but becomes the means to further ends, and that such ends make room for other ends. Certain modes of behavior by benefiting individuals benefit society, humanity, and all the countless generations of mankind. Every good and evil deed has its place in and influence on the evolution of the human race.

> "Das ist der Fluch der bösen That,
> Dass sie fortwährend Böses muss erzeugen."

A man believing in and understanding the progress of the human race may experience the desire to contribute to its development by adapting his behavior to such high ideals. But the average human being is not of so idealistic a turn of mind and would doubtless snap his fingers at the ultimate perfection of humanity. Wundt's system falls into the error of pursuing the ends through the countless ages of time. If we view conduct under its objective aspect merely, and speculate on its teleology, we drift away to seemingly vague and irrelevant conclusions. Thus Wundt begins by examining the purpose of particular acts and ends by hypostasizing a metaphysical entity, the "*Gesammtville.*"

We must guard against losing ourselves in such speculations, and confine ourselves to the more *immediate* ends of the moral law. This procedure possesses the advantage of bringing the objective effect of the law into correspondence with the subjective purpose of the agent. The ethical rule forbids acts detrimental to others, and urges the performance of con-

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duct relieving suffering. This end achieved by the law itself agrees with the purpose of the subject. The feeling of sympathy has prompted men to set up as the end of their conduct the welfare of those whom they regard as their coequals, and the moral laws embody such actions as have been found by experience to attain the desired purpose. Since the greatest impediment to the sought-for object comes from certain modes of conduct, the chief stress is laid upon the *avoidance* of these. The disobedience of such laws would destroy all possibility of social life. The negative conditions of harmonious social life are, therefore, of immense importance and must occupy the most prominent position in the ethical code. Hence: thou shalt *not*! And, indeed, we find that primitive societies are satisfied with the *avoidance of harmful behavior*. It was left for Christ to urge a more positive exercise of the sympathetic impulses, and to give the command, Love one another.*

We observe, then, that the moral law tends at first to the avoidance of conditions pernicious to social life, and gradually extends until it embraces in its purposes not only the conservation, but even advancement of society. This does not imply, however, that the end is always actually before the individual's mind. He may act from altogether selfish motives in obeying the law. Yet the original purpose of the law, as well as the end at which it aims, can never be self-realization, as is sometimes maintained. It deals with the relations of the individual to other individuals, commanding him to sacrifice his welfare to that of his fellows, wherever a conflict arises between egoistic and altruistic impulses. The individualistic theory consequently errs in interpreting the law as aiming at individual welfare. Subject moral precepts to the closest scrutiny—if you find a single one enjoining renouncement of self, your individualistic theory falls to the ground. We are further borne out in our view by the com-

* Plato was the first in Europe to say: "It is better to suffer wrong than to do wrong." See "Rep.", bk. i.

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mon sense of mankind, which stamps every act as morally worthless that aims at a *selfish* end.

Make self-realization the moral aim, and he is the moral man who *consciously* seeks that end. This is in direct contradiction to common-sense morality, which would condemn such an agent as immoral. There can be no *self-sacrifice* in the code of the individualist. It is rather stretching the theory to declare that an individual is realizing his self in sacrificing his life for the good of others. And even granting this impossibility, would you call him subjectively good whose conduct is inspired by the love of fame or the desire to get to heaven?

Adherents of such theories seem to me to forget that it is not the business of the philosopher to establish a new ethical code, but to interpret the one existing, and to show to what principle it owes its origin. An examination of the laws commonly received as moral fails to yield the results claimed by individualists. Moral laws do not consider the individual, as such. They tend to regulate the relations existing between men, thereby ensuring the possibility of social welfare. The end sought is the good of the whole, not that of any particular individual. Only in so far as self-preservation and self-perfection affect the life of society can they be designated as moral. This does not mean that egoistic actions are *immoral*, but simply that they are not objects of moral reflection at all. No one means to exterminate egoistic impulses; no one asks that every human action be a conscious moral act.

Fichte consequently exaggerates when he says: "There is but one virtue: to forget oneself as a person; but one vice: to think of oneself. Whoever in the least thinks of himself as a person, and desires a life and an existence and any self-enjoyment whatever except *in* the race and *for* the race, that man is, in spite of all attempts to conceal his moral deformity under the guise of other good deeds, a mean, petty, reprehensible, and miserable wretch." This language is, of course, extreme. The statement that the moral law has for its end

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the good of others, does not mean that self-regarding impulses are to be exterminated. From the proposition: Morality consists in doing good to others, we cannot infer that immorality consists in doing good to self. Immorality is doing harm to others; doing good to self is not necessarily doing harm to others. The moral law was made for man, not man for the moral law. He may seek to realize himself to his heart's content, as long as his actions do not transcend the proper limits, that is, do not harm his fellows. You can love your fellow-man without hating yourself; you can be an altruist without being an ascetic. In fact, we need not consider egoistic impulses ethically at all except in so far as they result in injury or benefit to others. Up to a certain point a man may be an egoist without hurting anyone. Indeed, he must be an egoist in order to be an altruist; men who care for themselves are benefiting society more than men who, neglecting themselves and their families, are trying to help others all the time. "God helps the man who helps himself."

To say that an act has no moral worth is not to deny its right to existence any more than the characterization of an action as unæsthetic cancels its utility. Only when an act is followed by consequences beneficial or detrimental to the welfare of others does it become matter for moral reflection. Only when an egoistic impulse causes injury to others is it to be exterminated. As long as egoistic impulses act without colliding with the social welfare, so long the moral law remains in the back-ground. Our daily experience teaches us that such impulses occupy a wide range of undisturbed action. Morality is not the whole of life. It is not required that the individual extinguish all natural desires and live simply because his living benefits society. We may all walk on the high-way of life without tripping each other up.

The preceding discussion has been considering the objective characteristics or traits of the moral laws, that is, the actions with which these deal. Actions are called good when they benefit others; bad, when they have a tendency to injure others. It now behooves us to look at the *subjective* side, to

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notice the attitude of the consciousness of the agent toward conduct. Here the *purposes or motives* of the subject are called to account. Now the purposes of the subject and the end or purpose of the act may be identical, but frequently differ. I may obey the moral law, or be moral because I care for the good of others, or for the pleasure it gives me, or from fear of punishment in this world or the world to come, or because I believe the act to be pleasing to the Deity, or because I have been taught to consider it as right, or from habit, or because it is useful to the world or to myself, or because my conscience tells me so. When self-consciousness and introspection reach a high degree of development, motives are also judged, and the epithet *moral* no longer restricted to actions. Then morality becomes internal; the law does not look to the mere performance of acts, but condemns certain motives as immoral. Christ is not satisfied with mere outward conformity to the law. "Ye have heard that it was said by them of old time, thou shalt not commit adultery: But I say unto you, that whosoever looketh on a woman to lust after her hath committed adultery with her already in his heart." Christ's moral teaching is characterized by this, that it judges motives as well as acts, and lays stress on the fundamental law: Love one another. We have found the end of morality to be the good of our fellows. The agent is objectively moral when his actions conform to this principle, subjectively moral only when his motives are in harmony with it. It is quite possible that the motive be moral and the act the reverse, for the selection of the proper means necessary to achieve a certain end depends upon the intelligence of the agent. History and common experience furnish numerous examples of the discrepancies betweon motives and conduct. On the other hand, behavior inspired by non-moral impulses or purposes may nevertheless be moral in its effects.

In spite of this diversity of motives, we may safely assert that the end to which moral conduct tends was really the end implicitly sought by primitive mankind. When once certain lines of conduct become fixed the attitude of consciousness

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towards them begins to vary. We forget the reasons which led to their establishment. Time fixes them so firmly in our hearts and surrounds them with feelings of such reverence that we obey them for their own sake—we love virtue for virtue's sake. Yet the moral judgment excludes all motives running counter to the fundamental principle of good-will or sympathy. By this the moral worth of acts was measured; this also forms the standard for judging springs of conduct.

The man in whom intelligeuce and morality are combined is subjectively and objectively moral. That is to say, his actions are guided by human sympathy and a highly developed knowledge of means.

We are now prepared to cast a glance at the form of the moral law. The term law may be employed in two senses, meaning either a prescription for action or the statement of that which, under certain conditions, must and will always happen. In the former case its grammatical form is the imperative, in the latter the indicative mood. When we speak of moral laws we generally mean a precept, although, of course, the term may be applied to a proposition stating what occurs under certain conditions. All imperatives, unless they are the edicts of an idiot, rest upon some knowledge, which may be expressed in judgments. When I ask a person to perform a certain act, I expect that act to lead to a certain end.

Now, moral imperatives are neither divine decrees nor groundless injunctions, but commands given *for the purpose of reaching certain ends.* First, it was found by experience that certain acts were harmful, then the law forbidding them was given. Having the indicative moral law, the imperative is easily found. Stealing has such and such effects; these effects are undesirable; therefore do not steal. The grounds of all imperatives lie in their effects. If you would reach this end, you must perform this act. The imperative is hypothetical. In morality the end sought is the social welfare. Avoid such and such deeds. Why? Because they bring injury to your fellows. *Why care for the welfare of your fellows? No*

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answer can be given. We have struck the bedrock of ethics. The imperative "love thy neighbor" is categorical. This is the fundamental law of morality. This is the principle for which we have been seeking, from which all morality springs.

The question next arises: What is the range of the moral law? The moral laws are neither immutable nor valid for all members of society at all times. In the course of history the growth of knowledge and the change of conditions are accompanied by a corresponding change in morality. The end is the well-being of society. Ethical rules express the means found by men to reach that end. If we possessed a perfect knowledge of all the circumstances, we might possibly arrive at a perfect knowledge of the means. Then, if the conditions were *fixed*, the laws might be stable. But both our experience and life-conditions are variable quantities. The law embodies our experience up to date and may be changed by the addition of new knowledge. Given these conditions and this end, how is the end reached? That is the problem of morality, a problem which the race unconsciously solves according to its experiences. The answer varies with circumstances and degrees of intelligence. The diversity of ethical judgments at different times and in different societies is therefore easily explained. And even if the conditions and the state of intelligence were the same in different societies, yet there might be different solutions to the same problem: there may be different means of reaching the same end.

Let us consider the validity of the laws within a given society. They are neither absolute nor universal. Killing is prohibited, but may, under certain circumstances, become a matter of necessity. Not all laws hold for all members of a society alike, because there is a difference in conditions and dispositions of men. The thought of Hoffding is of importance here: "The several ethical theories," he says, "are clearly wrong in asserting that the same moral laws or commandments are valid for all men under the same circumstances; for on account of different capacities and impulses the demands will have a highly different practical bearing

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on individuals. The fulfillment of one and the same command may be a necessity for one man, a mighty difficulty for a second, and an absolute impossibility for a third."*

The greater your possibilities for doing good, the greater your obligations. *Noblesse oblige.*

To sum up: Moral laws differ for different stages of society; for different societies of the present, because conditions differ; within the limits of a given society, because the conditions and the individuals themselves differ.

The foregoing discussions can leave no one in doubt concerning our opinion of the origin of moral laws. Ethical precepts are based on natural laws. They are neither innate truths nor divine revelations, but empirical judgments. The end is social welfare. Experience teaches men how to realize that end.

Man is endowed with sympathetic instincts which impel him to care for others. At first these impulses act within a very narrow compass, being limited to the members of a tribe perhaps. And even here, as ever afterwards, they may be temporarily obscured by other impulses, just as selfish desires are frequently defeated by feelings of fear, superstition or anger. In the course of time the consciousness that we are one with all mankind grows upon us, and the feeling of sympathy extends to wider and wider circles, until, finally, it embraces humanity itself.† The latter stage in the evolution of sympathy has by no means been reached by all, but an intensification of social feeling has doubtless taken

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* See INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, October, 1896; also, Paulsen, "System der Ethik," Einleitung; also, Höffding, "Ethik," XI., 10, p. 154.

† A glance at the growth of religions, which always embody the conceptions and ideals of men, exemplifies this gradual extension of other-regarding or sympathetic feelings. There is an advance from the narrow family religion through the national type to the universal religion of Christianity. (See Sir Henry Maine, "Early Law and Custom," p. 57.) The history of Greece and Rome also shows a *gradual progress of sympathy.* (See Lecky, "History of European Morals," I., pp. 228–230.) Of Rome Lecky says: "The moral expression of the first period is obviously to be found in the narrower military and patriotic virtues; that of the second period, in enlarged philanthropy and sympathy," I., 239.

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place. Of course as the circle of sympathy grows the circle of morality grows. Moral forms are the product of history. It is not wonderful that they are multiplied and developed. Not only do the conditions of life become more complex and our knowledge deeper, but the ends themselves expand, as we have seen.

We cannot, however, agree with Ihering and derive everything from egoism. According to him the egoist is nature's work, the moral man the work of history. This complete change of the egoistic impulse into the altruistic he regards as the greatest masterpiece of history on earth.* It would indeed be a great masterpiece, miraculous enough to transcend our powers of comprehension. The adherents of the Hartleyan school held similar views, and tried to show how the transformation was effected.† We cannot conceive how egoism can be converted into its direct opposite, how it can negate itself. We must regard sympathy as an original part of the constitution of our nature. The evolution of sympathy and the conscious realization of the ends at which it unconsciously aims, that is the work of history. We refer again to Höffding's remark that the whole of morality is implicitly contained in this instinctive feeling.

The fundamental law of ethics gives expression to the sympathetic impulse. In its rudimentary form it demands that you love your neighbor. As the circle of sympathy extends to society and humanity, the fundamental law finds utterance in the imperative : have regard for society and humanity. In each case the ground-law is the source of a multitude of derivative rules. The larger part of these prohibit all acts opposing the realization of the general end, while others prescribe the removal of conditions unfavorable to its attainment.

Although the more limited command, love your neighbor, is not repeated by the social law, it must nevertheless yield to

* Ihering, "Der Zweck im Recht," vol. II. Das Sittliche, p. 95.

† Hartley, "On Man," pp. 473–475. vid. Lecky "History of European Morals," p. 25.

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the latter in case of collision. You may sympathize with the criminal, while your regard for a wider circle of beings will lead you to sacrifice him to their interests. The sentimental women who overload the guilty murderer with the flowers they should scatter on the grave of his victim, are narrow-hearted. They are unable to subordinate the sympathy they feel for an individual to the sympathy which they owe to humanity. The time may come when even social or national ends will be offered up on the altar of humanity. Then only will nations renounce advantages accruing to themselves in the interests of human welfare, using the term in its widest sense.

In the early stages of society when the altruistic feelings extend no further than to the members of a tribe, physical courage is the highest virtue, being the best means of securing welfare.* Ancient epic poetry teems with the praise of this virtue. The advance of civilization, however, deprives this quality of its importance; men are seldom called upon to exercise it. Moral laws tending to insure internal peace and order come into prominence. Moral courage becomes a better means of furthering the welfare of humanity than physical courage.

Veracity, honesty, justice, sexual fidelity, have been found to be qualities productive of good effects. If, under peculiar circumstances, such favorable results cannot be achieved except by breach of the law, it may be broken. If injury were caused by justice, we should soon dispense with it. The Roman patricians took high rates of interest from the plebeians: after accepting the money and agreeing to pay the stipulated sums, the latter unjustly refused to fulfill their promises. Absolute obedience to the law would have begotten direful consequences. Justice was therefore temporarily suspended and conditions changed. Shylock's demand was just enough, but we can get along without such justice.

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* Paulsen's "Ethik," Bk. III, ch. i.; Leslie Stephen, "Science of Ethics," ch. v.

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An examination of the different rules would yield similar results to those noticed above. We may say with Sidgwick: "No quality has ever been praised as excellent by mankind generally which cannot be shown to have some marked felicific effect, and to be within proper limits obviously conducive to the general happiness."* Or with Cicero who says: "How are such virtues as generosity, or love of country, or the desire to do good to your fellow-man, or gratitude possible? All of them spring from the fact that we are by nature impelled to love one another. This is the foundation of law!"

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DISCUSSION.

ETHICAL *versus* INTELLECTUAL IDEALISM.

PROFESSOR JOHN WATSON has, in his paper in the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS for July, 1899, set out very clearly and well the differences between current "Intellectual Idealism" and the new "Ethical Idealism." They each emphasize one set of elements without realizing how really similar in kind is the defect which they thus share in common.

The "ethical" idealism to which we prefer to ally ourselves is one in which Reason and Knowledge are certainly "the same in *kind*, though not in *extent*," as they are in God. We do not place any bar or limit to knowledge or man's receptiveness of the Divine, so "intellectual" at the same time is our idealism. Professor Watson belabors "ethical" idealism for its too exclusive stress on feeling and will, and fails to realize that he is in no better case because his "intellectual" idealism so magnifies knowledge or thought. He very properly says a true philosophy does not confine itself "to the intellectual side of man's nature, to the exclusion of the ethical and religious." But though in this,

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* "Methods of Ethics," B. V. p. 489.

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and very much else that he urges, we can cordially agree, he strangely fails to grapple with, or indeed even touch, the real objection to the Hegelian type of idealism with which he is identified, which, as is perfectly well known, is that it makes thought constitutive of reality instead of simply interpretative of it, and, in so doing, gives the categories of thought an unwarranted place in the interpretation of the Universe. Thought is for us also, in an important sense, the great reality, but the thought of man may not make or evolve the world of reality; its function is to interpret the world as actually given to it; the combining unity of Self-consciousness conditions that world of reality for us, but does not create it or impart to it objectivity. He tells us the indictment brought against "intellectual" idealism is its denial of the individuality, freedom, and moral responsibility of man. Why, then, did he not show that "ethical" idealism has no case, for that all these have unquestionable justice done to them by "intellectual" idealism? He makes attempt to show that "ethical" idealism mutilates the totality of experience which philosophy is called upon to interpret, but he ought to have vindicated "intellectual" idealism from the charge of mutilating in like manner, but in another direction. He cannot delude himself by thinking this has been done when it has been insisted that Philosophy is "intellectual" and deals with "truth." Philosophy may be as "intellectual" as he will, and yet may be perfectly capable of doing justice, in its intellectual treatment, to the "volitional and moral and social" aspects involved in the sphere of its thought and representation. The question is, Has "intellectual" idealism meted out such justice? "Ethical" idealism doubts it. Is its doubt justified? Professor Watson says Hegel "has not ignored feeling and will," and it may be granted that Hegel has said things that are good of spirit as will. But Professor Watson is too good a philosopher not to know that these things must be taken not by themselves, but as Hegel meant them to be taken, namely, in the light of the principles embedded in its theoretic system, since on these his treatment of the will is based. Besides, merely to say Hegel "has not ignored" feeling and will is a very lame way of meeting the assertion of "ethical" idealism that the volitional and moral elements receive in "intellectual" idealism a handling which is quite inadequate. It may be that Professor Caldwell is not cor-

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rect—as Professor Watson says he is not correct—in calling "ethical" idealism an "application" of the older idealism to the solution of Life's concrete problems: what is of far more importance is that a FULLER "application" is possible to a true idealism than any which has been made by "intellectual" idealism. Such drawing together, indeed, of the "intellectual" and the "ethical" lines of thought seems precisely the need of our time and an augury of Philosophic Good. "Ethical" idealism may be such corrective and supplement, as we have said, to those who yet regard it as "one of the immortal contributions" of Hegel to philosophy that he brought to men an altogether new sense of the power of thought or reason.

Professor Watson himself says, philosophy "is not reality, only the comprehension of what reality is. Thus Philosophy must "in its own way include the whole of possible 'experience.'" But, if "ethical" idealism finds that parts of reality or experience—even the "volitional and moral and social aspects"—are not having justice done to them by "intellectual" Philosophy, why, in the name of reason, should it not have the right to protest? A really broad "intellectual" philosophy would not object, but freely allow it to cry aloud and spare not. For it knows that in the end truth must be gainer, and that, as Professor Watson professes, is the one end to be desired. When "ethical" idealism charges "intellectual" idealism "with destroying the self-activity of individual subjects and identifying Humanity with God" in virtue of its organic whole of thought, Professor Watson replies that the charge is "preposterous." So it no doubt is, from the stand-point of thought and its "intelligible system"; but is there any reason why it may not be otherwise from the point of view of reality or experience? Granted that the individual is part of an organic whole, and ought to "comprehend in thought what the whole is," there is yet no room or reason for the purely evasive mode in which "intellectual" idealism deals with what may be due to "the individual man" as not simply existing for the organic whole, but as at the same time having worth in himself and being at the same time an end in himself. There is thus a sense in which the individual is a whole as well as a part. There is certainly nothing "preposterous" in the "individual man," as part of reality, crying out that very real sides of his nature are

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being sacrificed by an abstract or "intellectual" philosophy on the shrine of "organic" metaphor. In the "intellectual" idealism represented by Professor Watson there are not the "I" with its tendencies and moods, on the one hand, and the External World as something given, on the other: the I and the World are not two elements with any sort of independent existence: they are two differences merely of a fundamental unity. That is to say, a real identity radiates through all plurality and difference. Our individuality becomes at length lost in the Whole; but, related as all things are in the universe as a system which is one and rational, we cannot consent to things being thus thrown into one homogeneous heap. Professor Watson speaks as though the categories of his "intellectual" system were real and concrete. Hegel said the real is the rational. We are more concerned to insist that the real is the individual. For the mystery of the invidual and of things existent in time is nowise lightened for us in Hegelian idealism. The Universe is more and other to us than a mathematical theorem; 'tis a thing instinct with life and vital possibilities, which no setting forth of the formulas of Hegelian Logic can possibly exhaust. It is evident that personality—with all the mystery that encompasses the path of our personal responsibility—has here no justice done to it, is treated, in fact, pretty much as illusion. At most, it is the mere conjunction of thought and experience.

Having said so much by way of showing how far Professor Watson is from having made good his case against "ethical" idealism, we are now free to express some sense of the shortcomings of that type of idealism. Professor Watson has done well to point out the danger of minimizing thought, and the need to insist on saying of the world, as our great dramatist makes Ophelia say of the pansy, that "it's for thought." The universe must be intelligible to thought, for it is the revelation of reason,—the expression of rational thought. Nor do we like the way in which "ethical" idealism arrays the volitional and moral and social aspects of man's life against those of thought, as "things that take us further along the path of truth." No doubt, every ethical elevation takes us somewhat "along the path of truth," but does it effect this in separation from thought or knowledge or reason? There ought not to be the appearance of such separation, and, in the strength of the contrast it employs

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between the two sets of elements "ethical" idealism is not happy. That idealism, as represented in the moralism of Professor A. Seth,—to whom Professor Watson refers,—is distinctly one-sided in so lifting the ethical impulse to obey out of relation to "intellectual" interest. Rather should "intellectual" interest give base and depth to moralism. In his insistence on our knowledge of the Absolute as a knowledge only "for us," Professor Seth presses his doctrine of relativity so strongly as to come perilously near making his Absolute an unknowable thing-in-itself.

There *is* a truth in the Hegelian contention that the ultimate reality of the universe is thought. That truth we have no right to forget because "the Hegelian Philosopher" erroneously makes that thought something abstract and dissociate from being, rather than the thought of the Infinite Personality whom men call God.

It seems, too, as though "ethical" idealism were not quite fortunate in its account of our knowledge of the Absolute. Professor Watson says it amounts to "a disguised scepticism," and he seems to think it treats the universe as "incomprehensible." We have much sympathy with what Professor Watson here urges, and the point is one of great importance. "No one denies," he says, "that the Absolute cannot be *completely* comprehended," but he holds it must not be urged that "it cannot be comprehended AT ALL as it is in itself," for this would be "the same as saying that there is for us no Absolute." Our knowledge of the Absolute must be held to be a real knowledge of the Absolute. Professor A. Seth is so anxious to maintain its relativity, that he makes us careful rather to press its reality. Knowledge, to be knowledge at all, must be no merely subjective thing, but the apprehension of reality. It can only be "for us," of course, but it is of the Absolute—the Absolute as it is. The Absolute IS what it reveals itself as being, and is an infinite deal beyond all that is cognized or known, even by "the Hegelian Philosopher." The "ethical" philosopher must not, then, in his strongly antithetic way, contend that "the Truth is for God alone," for man has the Truth, and it is precisely the priceless possession of the truth that makes man what he is. Idealists, therefore, we must be content to remain in that the Universe is hidden from us by the veil of our ideas: before idealism of the

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"intellectual" type defended by Professor Watson we may yet sceptically ask, as is done in "Faust":

"Is it mere THOUGHT evolves all nature's course?"

For speculative thought must take reality, not as it should be to the dialectical movement of "intellectual" or constructive thought; but, as it is empirically presented to it. This is where "intellectual" idealism fails. It remains in the region of the dialectics of the understanding and never gets the length of really concrete truth. It rests on what is merely *thought* and reaches not after what may be *cognized.* And the ethicist is right in insisting that the truth at which man arrives must not be held in unfruitful mode of the intellect alone, must be translated into action, that atrophy of his nature may not ensue. He is right in his contention that logical forms of argumentation must be made to fit in with the data of actual experience, the facts of real life. He is wrong only when he falters in following the sway of reason and the sweep of thought till these are really universal.

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SEXUAL EDUCATION FOR THE YOUNG.

CANON LYTTELTON'S thoughtful article in the July number of the JOURNAL on this important and difficult subject compels assent on many points, not only of his general contention but of his specific proposals. It will occur to some readers, however, that the admitted evils of an undirected curiosity and an unrestrained egoism in sexual matters among the young can be dealt with effectively only by more radical methods than he advocates. It is natural that the head-master of a public school should be inclined to accept our existing educational arrangements as part of the established order of things, and to confine his attention to lessening their incidental disadvantages, but it may be suggested that the greater part of the evils in question are due to the essential faults of an unnatural and pernicious system of upbringing. In the notes that are appended to another article in the same number,—"Affection in Education," by Mr. E. Carpenter,—two points of consideration are raised that have a vital bearing on the problem. So long as we suffer the disruption of family life by the practice of sending children to boarding-schools, and so long as we shrink from the co-education of boys

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and girls, we must be prepared for difficulties that may be lessened but can never be wholly removed. It is the conventual system that is really responsible for almost all the mischief, not only through its opportunities for evil communications and vicious practices, but owing to its inevitable effect of weakening home ties and starving healthy affections. Of what avail is it to devise a method of communicating information on sexual matters when the general conditions of sympathetic intercourse between the sexes are so defective? On the other hand, if a boy has been brought up to feel that his father and mother are his intimate friends, who will answer all his questions as far as may be possible, and that their loving care for his interests deserves all the affection he can give them in return; if through his appreciation of his mother's goodness he has learned to respect all good women; if through sympathy with his sisters and with other girls whom he freely meets, he finds a natural outlet for the emotional impulses that accompany his physical development; if his imagination has been cultivated by the presentation to him in due season of examples of the ideal treatment of love in its highest issues and in its tragedies; if these conditions are fulfilled,—and they are within the reach of all in sufficient measure,—there will be little to fear either from the chance contact with degrading influences, or from the promptings of passion from within.

JAMES OLIPHANT.

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BOOK REVIEWS

SPINOZA: HIS LIFE AND PHILOSOPHY. By Sir Frederick Pollock, Bart., etc. Second Edition. London: Duckworth & Co.; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1899. Pp. xxiv., 427.

In 1880, when the first edition of Sir F. Pollock's "Spinoza" was published, the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS had not come into existence, and accordingly the book has not yet been reviewed here. The new edition does not differ substantially from the old; but it has been improved in detail by changes suggested by the recent literature of the subject, and it will be specially welcomed by those who had not the good fortune to

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own a copy of the first edition, which for some years had been out of print. The alterations in the new edition have mainly to do with matters of fact. The biography of Spinoza has been carefully revised and modified in detail so as to embody the results of the recent researches of Meinsma, Freudenthal, and Stein. As to "matters of speculative opinion, or merely probable interpretation of Spinoza's opinions," Sir F. Pollock says: "I could not undertake to revise my estimate of Spinoza's philosophy as a whole, or to examine and weigh all the meritorious contributions of recent writers to the subject, without far more leisure than is at my disposal, or likely to be. Moreover, I should have no assurance that all or any of my readers would agree with me in preferring my later opinions to my earlier ones in case of difference. I have, therefore, confined myself to adding a few explanatory and supplementary passages, and altering such parts of the text as appeared to me, on returning to them, clearly erroneous or misleading. The most considerable changes are in the chapter on the 'Tractatus Politicus.' I know, or ought to know, Hobbes better than I did in 1880, and have now tried to do him better justice on some points which have to be considered with regard to Spinoza's modification of his doctrine" (p. xiii.).

This is a little disconcerting to a reviewer, who can have no good means of guessing what his author's later opinions may be; but one is thankful that at least his earlier opinions are made more accessible, and Sir F. Pollock would doubtless say that the main matter is not the change in his opinions, but the meaning and value of Spinoza's philosophy. Nevertheless, it is a serious loss to the student of Spinoza that he should be unable to get the last word of so learned, so accurate, and so sympathetic an expositor as Sir F. Pollock.

"The purpose of this book is to put before English readers an account, fairly complete in itself and on a fairly adequate scale, of the life and philosophy of Spinoza." The structure of the book is mainly determined by its purpose. A brief Introduction enumerates the editions of Spinoza's works and indicates the leading authorities for his life. Most of the bibliographical matter which was given in the first edition is now omitted as being incomplete, though probably most readers would have been glad if it had been retained. The first chapter is devoted to a very

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clear and skilful biography of Spinoza, neither dry nor diffuse, but full of light, so that the character of Spinoza shines through the facts. A similar line of exposition is followed in the second chapter, where the non-philosophical parts of Spinoza's correspondence are used to indicate his attitude of mind regarding various theological and other questions. There follows a careful and learned account of the leading ideas and sources of Spinoza's philosophy, the main sources being found in Judaism and Neoplatonism on the one hand, and in the physics of Descartes on the other. Then in Chapters IV. to XI. there is a critical exposition of Spinoza's principal writings, namely, the treatise "De Intellectus Emendatione," which explains Spinoza's doctrine of method; the five parts of the "Ethics," the "Tractatus Politicus," and the "Tractatus Theologico-Politicus," from which last, in connection with Part I. of the "Ethics" and some of the letters, Spinoza's theology may be gathered. A concluding chapter traces the direct influence of Spinoza on the thought and literature of Holland, France, Germany, and England. The English translation of Colerus's "Life of Benedict de Spinosa" (published in 1706) is printed as an appendix. The other appendices which appeared in the first edition are now omitted, and one misses the interesting (if rather curious) "Table showing Spinoza's position in the history of philosophy."

The method of exposition which Sir F. Pollock has thus adopted has the advantage of following closely Spinoza's own statements. But, on the other hand, it has defects like those which are inseparable from a running commentary. There is a tendency to treat each part too much by itself, and the unity of the whole is hardly emphasized enough. This, however, is doubtless not altogether out of harmony with the author's purpose. He wishes to show how erroneous is the view, whether it be held by admirers or by critics, that Spinoza's system is rigidly dogmatic, so that it must either stand in all its detail or fall with the overthrow of one or two of its definitions. Spinoza's philosophy, according to Sir F. Pollock, is really, though not apparently, experiential, and our attention is repeatedly drawn to coincidences between Spinoza's results and those of modern empiricism. Thus, in the psychological part of the "Ethics," Spinoza starts from premises which are in appearance dogmatic and transcendental; and yet his conclusions are the same that

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have been independently reached by inquirers who acknowledged no source of knowledge but experience" (p. 175). And again, Sir F. Pollock holds that the importance of the geometrical method in the "Ethics" has been over-emphasized. He speaks of it as an "artificial mode of exposition," in the use of which Spinoza "follows a suggestion made by Descartes," and he regards it as having in various ways misled both the critics and the admirers of Spinoza, while "it is very possible that in some ways it had an unfavorable influence on Spinoza himself" (p. 148). And he contends that Spinoza's geometrical exposition of a portion of Descartes' "Principia" (with which Spinoza himself did not agree) establishes the fact that Spinoza did not regard the geometrical method as an infallible means of reaching philosophical truth" (p. 29).

This insistence on the experiential side of Spinoza's thinking is a thoroughly just piece of philosophical criticism. But I venture to think that Sir F. Pollock goes rather too far in reaction from the views of earlier writers. Spinoza is certainly not a barren dogmatist, thinking *in vacuo:* he endeavors to think with his whole nature and (if one may say so) with the whole nature of things. But he is far from being empirical in the sense of unsystematic. It seems to me that he does believe in the coherence of all his views as firmly as any man who propounds a system, and that to him the geometrical method of exposition is the guarantee of this coherence. In other words, he is so far from being an empiricist that he is not satisfied with the implicit coherence which is the only justification of the empiricist appeal to coordinate "facts," but requires that the coherence be made explicit. And the self-consistency of geometry is his ideal of coherence, of clear and adequate thinking, as it was the scientific ideal of his time. It is true that he did not regard the geometrical form as "an infallible method of arriving at philosophical truth," if that means that the geometrical method is a lever without a fulcrum; but, granted the fulcrum in the shape of self-evident truths, the geometrical method seemed perfect. And Spinoza could not himself have accepted as self-evident the axioms on which his geometrical exposition of Descartes is based, any more than he accepted the consequences which the method evolved from these premises.

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Indeed, the geometrical form of Spinoza's argument seems to be the most natural expression of one side of his thinking,—the side which, on the whole, Sir F. Pollock least emphasizes, though it seems to me at least as essential as the other. The geometrical form is the best expression for any reasoning which proceeds from self-evident truths ; and the "Tractatus de Int. Emend.," with its account of a right method as proceeding from "true ideas," the *innata instrumenta* of the mind, shows clearly that this was the line which Spinoza deliberately endeavored to follow. Sir F. Pollock himself declares Spinoza's meaning to be "that by no logical device whatever can we escape the necessity of starting from something or other as self-evident, and throwing on its self-evidence the whole weight of all the subsequent knowledge we may build on our leading assumptions" (p. 121). Now there is a certain ambiguity about this position, an ambiguity of which the sources lie deep in Spinoza's thought. There is no doubt that we can never reach truth unless we start from truth, that "truth is the measure of itself and of falsehood." But surely this is not equivalent to saying that we must start from a "true idea," a truth which is complete, definite, specific, and which, nevertheless, has no "other" on which it depends. Does it mean any more than that there must be truth in our knowledge from the first, though that truth may not be lodged in any individual "self-evident" judgment? That which we must assume at the outset is the whole system of things (as an indivisible system), and not any particular element in it. In a sense the whole is given from the first, but no part can be said to be given or self-evident in contradistinction to other parts which are not given. We must certainly assume "something," but not "something or *other*." As Sir F. Pollock says, "there is ultimately no external test of truth ;" but I am unable to see that this is, as he thinks, equivalent to the statement that "we must be content in the last resort, with the clear and persistent witness of consciousness," a view which is "compatible with a purely empirical account of the origin of all our knowledge," and more especially with Mr. Herbert Spencer's use of the inconceivability of the opposite as a test of truth (p. 122). The "clear and persistent witness of consciousness" is of the same nature as induction by simple enumeration. It indicates the probability of a connection between things, without establishing the connection by explaining it. A statement is not true because it is self-evident ; it is self-

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evident because it is true, and because its conditions are so simple and universal that it seems unnecessary to state them formally. And Sir F. Pollock admirably points out that "some of the current notions in philosophy and psychology, which Spinoza makes the objects of his most unsparing attack, are precisely those which have been most commonly maintained on the ground that they are principles given by consciousness as clear, ultimate, and self-evident" (p. 123). I take this as meaning that what is self-evident to one man is not necessarily self-evident to another, and accordingly I fail to see how self-evidence can be taken as the ground of truth, on which is to be thrown "the whole weight of all the subsequent knowledge we may build on our leading assumptions, "unless, indeed, we are to accept a sceptical or agnostic position.

The point may be illustrated by Spinoza's own argument. He says (in the "Tractatus de Int. Emend.") that, in seeking the best method of discovering the truth, we need not seek a method to discover this, and another method to discover the second method, and so on. But his contention that we must therefore fall back upon certain *innata instrumenta*, in the shape of self-evidently true ideas, is simply a cutting of the knot, an escape from the *regressus ad infinitum* by the irrational expedient of saying that we must stop somewhere. And Sir F. Pollock's explanation does not carry us any further. If Spinoza could be regarded as meaning that, in order to attain to perfect truth, we must begin with imperfect truth, and that knowledge is a growth or development of that which is comparatively vague and confused into that which is clearer and more definite, there would be no ground for criticism of his position. But I do not see that this can fairly be supposed. There is possibly a suggestion of it in the illustration from the making of tools, and it is doubtless implied to some extent in his conception of the highest knowledge as being a knowledge of ideas in an eternal and necessary order or system. But the notion of development is not explicit in Spinoza's thought. It is inconsistent with the parallelism of the attributes, and with the sharp distinction between understanding and imagination, not to speak of other important features of the system. And yet the tantalizing fascination of Spinoza's writings is, I think, largely due to the fact that in his philosophy the notion of development is struggling into light. I can give no better instance of this than the subtle and far-reaching argument by which Sir F. Pollock shows

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that when Spinoza's doctrine of substance, with an infinity of parallel attributes, is thought out thoroughly, "thought swallows up all the other attributes," and "Spinoza's doctrine, when reduced to its simplest terms, is that nothing exists but thought and its modifications" (pp. 159–168). That is to say, the static substance—and attribute view of the universe—is passing in Spinoza's hands into the view of the universe as a living system of thought relations. Yet surely it cannot be denied that the substance and attribute view is dominant in Spinoza's thinking.

This ambiguity also lies at the root of Spinoza's double use of *idea*, as representative (concept) and as correlate, which Sir F. Pollock clearly explains. Spinoza's identification of these two senses of the word *idea* is an inevitable consequence of his doctrine that thought and extension are parallel attributes (or aspects, according to Sir F. Pollock's interpretation) of the one substance. In discussing the meaning of the "eternity of the mind" ("Ethics," Part V.), Sir F. Pollock says: "The mind's eternal knowledge of the body, as understood by Spinoza, is not a knowledge of the human body generically, but a relation between the particular mind and the particular body which we should not now think of calling knowledge at all" (p. 277). But is not "this relation which we should not now think of calling knowledge" the very relation which Spinoza *must* call knowledge, if the parallelism of the attributes is to be maintained? And does not "self-evidence" or "the persistent witness of consciousness" imply this parallelism? The confusion, then, is due not so much to the fact that "in Spinoza's time psychology was really in its infancy" (p. 278) as to the fact (which Sir F. Pollock makes clear) that the strict parallelism of the attributes disappears when Spinoza's own principles are cordially thought out.

One cannot in an ordinary review attempt to discuss all the interesting problems which are raised in Sir F. Pollock's book, and I must therefore pass over such questions as how Spinoza's "thoroughgoing nominalism" is to be reconciled with his insistence on "the single and universal order of nature" what is meant by the "constant and eternal things" of the "Tractatus de Int. Emend." (which Sir F. Pollock identifies with the "infinite modes" of the "Ethics"); whether or not substance is to be conceived as "at the back of the attributes;" whether experience and knowledge "out of time" are possible, and so on. But

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some reference must be made to the ethical part of Spinoza's philosophy. Its psychological side, including "Spinoza's masterpiece," the account of the passions, is expounded in Chap. VII. with admirable clearness and felicity of expression. Apart from the definitions of the emotions, there are here two main points of interest,—the meaning of the *conatus* and the significance of Spinoza's statements that "desire is appetite with consciousness thereof," and that "whether a a man be conscious of his appetite or not, yet the appetite is still one and the same." As to the *conatus* the main metaphysical problems of the earlier parts of the "Ethics" return upon us. The *conatus* or self-preserving tendency is the "essence" of the thing, "the thing's being what it is" (p. 202). And "a thing," says Sir F. Pollock, "is a group of phenomena which persists" (p. 204). Does this mean that it persists unchangeably or that it varies within limits? The former of these alternatives is the one which follows from Spinoza's view of the universe as substance and attributes, from his mathematical ideal of the nature of things, expressed in his conception of a "timeless" eternal order of reality and in his complete rejection of final cause. The second alternative is the true one. But Spinoza does not clearly distinguish between them. Thus, it is not merely "as regards life" (p. 207) that Spinoza omits to take into account "a factor of great importance" which (as regards life) is noted by Mr. Herbert Spencer, namely, "that external relations are constantly changing and requiring adjustments to be effected." If the *conatus* is the timeless essence of the thing, how is there room for change or development, and consequently for the ethical theories which Spinoza bases upon the *conatus?* And if it is not the timeless essence of the thing, how is it to be reconciled with the main principles of Spinoza's metaphysics? Has a thing two essences? Here again, as it appears to me, the difficulty arises from the fact that the notion of development is implicit in Spinoza's thinking without being properly recognized. For the same reason it is difficult to see how, on Spinoza's principle that desire is conscious appetite (the consciousness making no essential difference), while appetite is the *conatus* or essence of man, there is any room for the duty of virtue, which is "nothing else than acting by the proper laws of one's own nature." If the essence of each man is absolutely unchangeable, everything he does is virtuous, being the effect of an impulse to self-maintenance, while, on the other

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hand, if man is capable of development, there must be a difference between conscious desire and appetite, for unconscious appetite can never be more than the expression of an undeveloped nature.

"Spinoza's view of ethical good and evil, and consequently his whole theory of ethics," depends, as Sir F. Pollock maintains, on his argument against the idea of design in nature or (what comes to much the same thing) his rejection of final causes. At the beginning of Chap. VIII. Sir F. Pollock sets forth a clear and cleverly argued case against the common forms of the argument from design. The gist of his contention may be put in his own words: "All our ideas of design and perfection are derived from the efforts of man, a finite being, working for definite objects and with such instruments as he can procure: and the attempt to find something answering to them in the constitution of the universe leads to nothing but insoluble perplexities" (p. 233). This, of course, is on the lines of the quotation he makes from the preface to the "Ethics," Part IV., in which Spinoza says: "If a man sees a work the like whereof he hath never seen, nor knows the mind of the workman, 'tis plain he cannot tell whether that work be perfect or not." Now in both of these statements it is taken for granted that the notion of design or final cause implies a world made by an independent workman with a mind inaccessible to human knowledge. In other words, the argument implies that the finite and the infinite are entirely exclusive of one another. On such a supposition, it is not difficult to find "insoluble perplexities." If there is an inscrutable workman of the universe, we have certainly no right to attribute our ideas and habits of mind to him, any more than we have a right to read our thoughts into the mind of an animal. But the argument has point only against a somewhat crude view of final cause. What right have we to cut ourselves from the universe and to speak of the mind of the universe as if it were inaccessible to us? That the universe has no design or final cause external to itself does not necessarily mean that it has no design or final cause at all. On p. 230, Sir. F. Pollock says that "existence is not a bare fact but a continuing process, and at every moment of the process the particular set of conditions has one and only one possible result." And on p. 231 he declares that "the frame of nature is what it is, neither more

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nor less." How are these two statements to be reconciled except by the tacit assumption of the notion of final cause? If nature is a continuing process, account must be taken not merely of "what it is" at any particular moment, but also of what it is in it to be. And that means the admission of final cause.

Spinoza's opposition to the idea of final cause is closely connected with his view that perfection and imperfection, good and evil, etc., are "relative notions or ways of thinking, dependent on our classification and comparison of things" (p. 234). In each case he regards the standard or criterion as a class-notion, *i. e.*, a notion of what is common to the members of the class. Such a notion is, of course, merely a convenient fiction. But Spinoza identifies this with something quite different, namely, the type or ideal of the class. This is really the standard of perfection, goodness, etc. And it is at the same time a standard of truth. It is not a fiction, like the class-notion : it is the truth of the individuals, their real nature as distinct from their actual accidental perversities. It is not an impossible heap of qualities that will not combine into anything, but a system with a real unity. And thus it cannot rightly be said "if we try to apply the notions of perfection and imperfection on a universal scale, the only class-notion remaining with us for the purpose is the *genus generalissimum* of mere being, and we must measure perfection by amount of being or reality" (p. 234). The standard of perfection or imperfection is not the class-notion of mere being, but the universe as an organic system more or less adequately known. Sir F. Pollock contends (p. 323) that "the objects of morality being particular and relative to man, there appears to be no convenient mean between refraining from the application of moral ideas to the order of nature as a whole and asserting that the universe exists for the sake of man." In a sense it is true that moral ideas are not applicable to the order of nature as a whole, just as all other "ideas," *i. e.*, qualities are inapplicable to it. The universe cannot adequately be comprehended as a substance with attributes. The atttempt to think it under such a notion inevitably leads to contradictions, and therefore there is a sense in which it may be said that the universe is no more good or bad than it is round or square, true or false. But this means, not that the universe excludes or rejects these distinctions (for if that were so the universe would be an unknowable thing-in-itself, *i.e.*,

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nothing pretending to be something), but that it is the ground of these distinctions, the system which gives them meaning. The distinctions are relative, but they are not on that account unreal. If, therefore, we say that the universe is non-moral, we cannot mean the same thing as when we say that a stone is non-moral. The stone is non-moral because it is outside of the system of human society, which is the immediate ground of moral distinctions; but the system of human society is an integral element in the system of the universe. As Sir F. Pollock himself puts it (p. 324): "The principles of right and wrong may be called eternal and immutable in a sense to which no serious exception can be taken, namely, that these principles are necessary consequences of the constitution of man, which itself is part of the universal order of nature, and that they are as permanent as mankind itself." But has this any meaning if mankind is merely a class-notion and if the constitution of man is no more than a loose jumble of common qualities? Morality is relative to man in a sense similar to that in which truth is relative to man, and the relativity is no more inconsistent with universality in the one case than in the other. Human society is the basis of morality, but not human society apart from the rest of the universe. Actual moral judgments are largely determined by knowledge of the physical world and by theological and other beliefs which are themselves parts of the universal order of nature. It may be perfectly true that the universe does not exist for the sake of man *alone;* but it does not follow that the good of man (*i. e.*, ultimately his nature, his ideal as a being that grows) is not an essential element in the system of the universe. "There are no harder illusions to get rid of than anthropomorphic ones (or perhaps it would be better to say anthropocentric)" (p. 324); but we must the more beware lest, in violently getting rid of them, we turn man altogether out of doors.

This review has run to such a length that I must reluctantly forego the discussion of many other tempting questions that are suggested by Spinoza's ethics and theology. To students of Spinoza it is unnecessary to praise Sir F. Pollock's work. That it is full of good thought in good words is known to all men. Sir F. Pollock's interpretations may not commend themselves to all (since everybody has a Spinoza of his own); but they are never to be lightly passed over, for they are always the fruit of

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deep and thorough study. There are hints in the second edition (*e. g.*, p. 168) that Sir F. Pollock tends to become more idealist in his own way of looking at things; but he retains his peculiar irritation against "transcendentalists," and he still says that he has not "the transcendental faculty." Perhaps he uses the word "transcendental" in some esoteric sense.

In the second edition there are several misprints, some of which will be puzzling to readers who have not access to the older volume. The most considerable is that on p. 148, where, at the beginning of line 16, the words "except for the higher geometry" have to be supplied; and on p. 221, line 9 from foot, "pleasure and" should be read before "pain." Others I had noted are sufficiently obvious not to require special mention.

R. LATTA.

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FROM COMTE TO BENJAMIN KIDD: THE APPEAL TO BIOLOGY OR EVOLUTION FOR HUMAN GUIDANCE. By Robert Mackintosh, B.D. (Edin.), M.A., D.D. (Glasg.), Professor at Lancashire Independent College; Author of "Christ and the Jewish Law," etc, London; Macmillan & Co., Limited; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1899. Pp. xxii., 287.

The author tells us in his preface that this work had its proximate origin in the teaching of sociology to a class in Lancashire College, a college where students are prepared for the Congregationalist ministry. In one year essays were prescribed on topics suggested by Mr. Benjamin Kidd's "Social Evolution;" while the seniors of the next year attended lectures covering rather more ground. The origin and primary purpose of the author's criticism of "the appeal to biology for human guidance" explain a good deal in the merits and defects of the volume. For persons likely to fall victims to the dogmatic exaggerations of Mr. Benjamin Kidd or the facile metaphors of the late Henry Drummond the book may be thoroughly recommended. As a philosophical, or even as an historical, study of the relations between biology and sociology, Mr. Mackintosh's work is somewhat unsatisfactory, though it contains a number of interesting and suggestive criticisms. We are warned, near the outset, that what is assumed in the following essay is "the trustworthiness of the moral consciousness or the reality of the

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distinction between right and wrong. This test will not be formally set aside, except by a few wild thinkers; but it may be objected that assumptions ought to be vindicated, ought to be justified. Very true; our test needs justification by philosophy, and we believe that philosophy can do the necessary work, but not here. We cannot incorporate *en passant* a body of metaphysical prolegomena to ethics. We must be allowed to let our point of view stand as an assumption." But what *is* the point of view? "The reality of the distinction between right and wrong" is certainly accepted by all except a few "wild thinkers." But Mr. Mackintosh seems by his "or" to identify this reality with "the trustworthiness of the moral consciousness," and that in some extreme intuitionalist sense. In criticising Professor S. Alexander's attempt to explain historically the evolution of our moral ideas, Mr. Mackintosh charges Professor Alexander with maintaining a theory of progress "which sets morality at defiance" (p. 128). "Intuitionalism," we are told, in one of the few sentences where Mr. Mackintosh reveals his own point of view explicitly, "holds that the good, like other primary elements of consciousness, cannot be decomposed, and neither can nor need be defined" (p. 129). Now to an intuitionalist of this type any attempt to explain the historical evolution of moral ideas is necessarily impossible; and philosophical discussion is unprofitable with a critic who simply falls back upon the infallible Pope in his own breast and tells us, without any effort at proof, that "Progress by struggle—*this* morality thrusting down *that* morality and reigning in its stead—is not exhibited in the facts of history to any one who can look ever so little below the surface" (p. 136). Mr. Mackintosh might surely have allowed us to share in his superior power of seeing underground by giving at least some illustration of the unity amid difference in moral progress. Towards the close of the volume we are told that people will come to see that biology—or more particularly the theory of evolution—gives no guide to conduct, and that, "when this is more generally recognized, we shall see a return of men's minds to the rejected authorities. Religion, conscience, philosophy, even intuitionalism, they will all come back, 'trooping all together.'" The four rejected authorities here named do not seem quite symmetrical in character. Does Mr. Mackintosh mean that "intuitional*ism*," *i. e.*, a particular philo-

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sophical (or unphilosophical) theory, is an "authority" in the same sense as conscience or religion? And when he talks of religion, he might explain how all the different religions of the world constitute one authority.

There is, moreover, in this passage the primary assumption, which runs through the whole volume, that every attempt to give an historical account of the origin of moral ideas necessarily conflicts with the authority of moral ideas for the individual conscience, and that the interests of practical morality somehow demand the discomfiture of Darwin. Is this not just a revival of the old pulpit attitude towards every science in succession?

Mr. Mackintosh, indeed, admits the theory of natural selection (with an inclination to minimize it) in biology, but affirms that it cannot be applied in sociology or morals (p. 162). Now, it seems to me, that, if natural selection be once admitted in biology (and I cannot see how any one who has ever watched a neglected garden can deny it), it must be admitted in sociology; for, what ever else they may be, men are animal organisms with a tendency to increase beyond the means of subsistence. And the question is not, whether natural selection can apply in sociology, but with what differences and modifications it must apply to the more complicated sphere. By the application of natural selection to morals, Mr. Mackintosh seems to mean the application of a scientific theory to the *practical* guidance of conduct.

Now these two problems—(1) with what differences does the law of natural selection apply to human society and moral institutions and ideas? and (2) what practical consequences follow from its acceptance?—have occupied me a good deal; and I have published a few contributions to the discussion of them, to some of which (viz., the three essays included in a little volume called "Darwinism and Politics") Mr. Mackintosh devotes a few criticisms. I did not know, when I undertook to review his book, that any of my own writings were criticised; and I must ask the readers of the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS to excuse the appearance of disproportion, if I say something about Mr. Mackintosh's brief reference to my attempt to deal with these problems instead of discussing directly his more elaborate criticisms of the evolutionary leaders—Comte, Spencer, Darwin, Mr. Leslie Stephen, etc. I know that Mr. Mackintosh has misunderstood and unconsciously misrepresented my own views,

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and I therefore feel the more confirmed in my opinion that he has misunderstood to a great extent the views of others.

Mr. Mackintosh says (p. 76) that I seem "quite unwarranted in explaining Spencer's *laissez faire* individualism by his bigoted attachment to the doctrine of natural selection by struggle." My warrant will be found in many passages in "The Man *versus* the State," *e. g.*, where Mr. Spencer speaks of the beneficent working of the survival of the fittest which foolish social reformers are attempting to neutralize. In "Darwinism and Politics" (second or any later edition) p. 9, I referred expressly to the two essays of Spencer's in which such expressions will be found. At the same time I should quite agree with Mr. Mackintosh that Mr. Spencer's conception of evolution is to a great extent unaffected by, and independent of, the theory of natural selection. And I think he makes a very acute remark, when he says that "Spencer is perhaps the least thoroughly biological of all the evolutionary thinkers, whether moralists or sociologists, whom we shall have to pass in review" (p. 61), and when he points out that the famous metaphor of the social organism is only "an ornamental excrescence on Spencer's teaching, not an essential or even a significant part" (p. 94). I have tried to show at some length elsewhere that Mr. Spencer's *laissez faire* individualism is really a survival from old-fashioned Radicalism, and has (as Mr. Mackintosh recognizes, p. 90) more affinity with intuitionalism than with the evolution theory. But Mr. Spencer undoubtedly *thinks* that his political theories are based upon his biological conceptions.

Mr. Mackintosh (pp. 122, 123) summarizes the bearing of my essay on "Darwinism and Politics" as follows: "Whatever presumptions are established by a Darwinian view of the origin of man, there is no ground for believing that social progress necessarily implies struggle; reason has come in to change all things." Then he summarizes the two other essays in the volume as follows: "The analysis of evolution by Darwinism is absolutely trustworthy, and may assuredly be extended to human society *mutatis mutandis*." "This implies, he proceeds, that reason has made only minute changes. [Where did he find me saying that?] Yet the first essay teaches that reason has . . . suspended the necessity for struggle." Now I never said that reason can change "all things," nor that reason can suspend all

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necessity for struggle or eliminate struggle completely. My whole point was to show that natural selection in social evolution is not necessarily of the same simple kind (working by the death of the unsuccessful) as in the purely biological sphere, and that in all human societies artificial selection (wise or unwise) co-operates with, and sometimes counteracts, natural selection. My phrase "*mutandis mutandis*," which Mr. Mackintosh meets with a mark of exclamation and a reference to Wallenstein's horse (p. 260), was carefully, though briefly, explained by me in "Darwinism and Politics" (pp. 139–141). When Mr. Mackintosh, on p. 263, says that "reason is the fulfilment (as well as the transformation) of nature," he says precisely what I meant to say; though, in criticising me, he speaks as if a "transformation" could not possibly be a "fulfilment;" whereas I have tried to show that natural selection is simply the dialectic movement of reason as it appears in the merely biological sphere. Now it is a perfectly fair criticism to object to the *phrase* "struggle between ideals" as not "a struggle of the Darwinian order" (p. 134; cf. Professor Lloyds Morgan's objections to Professor Alexander and myself because we confuse natural selection and conscious choice, "Habit and Instinct," pp. 335 note, 342 note); but it is a complete misunderstanding of Darwin and of the whole theory of natural selection to suppose that "struggle for existence" necessarily means fighting in the literal sense. "If the child of vicious or criminal or heartless parents is neglected and dies, while the child of honest, pure, and affectionate parents survives, there is no struggle" (pp. 169, 170). There is, *in Darwin's sense:* just as when a sturdy, well-nourished plant survives where a delicate plant, or one attacked by parasites, succumbs. Two rival doctors are struggling for existence, though they may not shoot each other, but be on perfectly friendly terms. As, I think, Mr. Mackintosh himself cleverly says somewhere [I cannot find the passage again]: "Nowadays we do not cut throats; we cut prices." Commercial competition is the struggle for existence in Darwin's sense much more truly than the struggle of the battle-field. Now it seems to me a perfectly legitimate extension of the terms "struggle for existence" and "natural selection" to apply them to the competition between ideas and ideals which goes on whenever we are debating and discussing or even thinking out a problem in solitude, though

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of course we must recognize the difference introduced by any transition from the unconscious struggle of "nature" to the more or less conscious struggles of mind. But the gap between "Nature" and "Reason" is not absolute, unless we adopt the strange dualism of Huxley's lecture on "Evolution and Ethics," in criticising which Mr. Mackintosh writes: "A fuller answer to Huxley's perplexities regarding the moral bearings of evolution is to be found in a better view of reason. Morality is a new thing in the creation with the advent of rational man, yet not wholly new. It is the *transformation* and perfecting of animal ethics, not the simple inversion of the cosmic process" (p. 141). This is an excellent piece of criticism, but it seems inconsistent with Mr. Mackintosh's "intuitionalist" rejection of the attempts to reconcile idealism with evolutionary ethics.*

I have left many things in Mr. Mackintosh's book untouched. As we might expect from his "Intuitionalism," he proclaims himself "an impenitent free-willer" (p. 49) without defining "free-will;" and in one place (p. 175) he recognizes, like Professor W. James, that "No contingency in nature, would imply, No free-will in man!" Yet, on p. 264, in summing up the results obtained from his criticism of naturalistic schemes, he says, "The universe will be revealed on deeper and fuller study as a system, not a chance aggregation of disconnected parts, but a *cosmos*. Chaos and chance will be banished to the region of bad dreams" (p. 264). What, then, will become of the free-will which depends upon contingency in nature? On p. 182, Mr. Mackintosh says that Darwin treated variations as casual, "almost as if uncaused." Now Darwin and all his more careful followers have always made it quite clear that, when they speak of "accidental" or "spontaneous" variations, they mean simply variations of which as yet we do not know the causes. Like some other critics or minimizers of Darwinism, Mr. Mackintosh lays stress on the merely negative character of natural selection, and compares "our modern evolutionists" (*whom?*) to a pig-driver who should say he got his pigs to market by heading them off at the cross-roads, "as if barricading the wrong roads not

* Those who care to follow out my line of criticism at greater length may refer to an article on "Social Evolution," in the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, January, 1896, or to my essay on "Darwin and Hegel."

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only kept the pigs from straying, but actually taught them for the first time to walk" (p. 188). Now, just as every pig-driver knows that pigs do move and that the problem is to get them to move the way you wish, so every evolutionist knows that organisms vary (look at the flowers on the same plant, the puppies of the same litter!); but the problem for Darwin was how to explain the relative fixity of species, given the facts of variation and heredity; and the problem for the sociologist is how to explain the diversity among the social and moral institutions of mankind, given the tendency to strike out new lines ("invention") and the tendency to follow existing usage ("imitation"). And to these problems natural selection—"weeding out"—seems a very good answer, though it most certainly leaves the *facts* of variation and heredity unexplained.

Any detailed account, however, of the various ways in which the law of natural selection comes to be modified, complicated, or restricted by the exercise of more or less conscious choice, would occupy a good deal of space, and cannot be attempted here.

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A MANUAL OF PSYCHOLOGY. By G. F. Stout, M.A., LL.D. (The University Tutorial Series). University Correspondence College Press: London, W. B. Clive; New York, Hinds & Noble. 1899. Pp. xvi., 643.

The Editor of *Mind* and the author of the well known "Analytic Psychology" (London, 1896) here presents a text book of Psychology, intended for beginners, and specially adjusted to the purpose of preparing students for examinations, yet of solid interest to properly prepared readers of all grades. The general point of view of the author is known from his previous work. The method of this book has also the features for which his former publications have prepared us. A wide acquaintance with the literature of Experimental Psychology, and a recognition of the most permanently valuable tendencies of the older English Psychology, a frequent use of anthropological illustrations of mental processes, and a strong interest in the philosophical bearings of the problems of Psychology, all appear as auxiliaries to the main special interest that the author takes in the problems of mental development. This main interest lies in a

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relatively teleological interpretation of mental processes in terms of the the theory of conation which the author set forth in the "Analytic Psychology." While this theory is here by no means one-sidedly emphasized, it is still throughout very prominent, despite the judicial discussion which all the various fundamental problems of Genetic Psychology receive, whether or no they directly bear upon the author's main interest.

After the Introduction (in three chapters), Book I. proceeds to a "general analysis." Here, in Chapter I. (p. 56 sqq.), a three-fold division of the facts of consciousness is accepted: the "cognitive attitude"; the "feeling attitude," and the "conative attitude." The first, cognition, is defined as covering "all modes and degrees of being aware of or cognizant of an object"; and cognitive consciousness is carefully distinguished from its object, with which Dr. Stout refuses, under any circumstances, to identify it. Thus a sensation is cognitive of a sensible quality, and must not be confounded with the latter. The "feeling attitude" is that of pleasure or displeasure with the object cognized. The "conative attitude," that of longing, desire, endeavor, wish, or will, needs a fuller characterization. In all conation (p. 63) "there is an inherent tendency to pass beyond" the desire, wish, or endeavor, and to "become something different." This tendency "is not only a fact but an experience; and the peculiar mode of being conscious, which constitutes the experience is called *conation.*" The process of consciousness, with its incessant change "is partly self determining." "The stream of consciousness has a current; and its course is determined not merely by external conditions, but by its own drift at any moment. Considered in relation to the presented object, conation is a tendency to alter it, or make some difference in it, to expel it from consciousness, or to bring it more vividly before consciousness." "The end to which" conation (p. 64) is directed "is always some change in consciousness itself." Conation includes all activities of attention (p. 64). It has for its "end" such a passage to a different state as, satisfying the conation, will lead it to disappear; so that the term "end" has a literal as well a metaphorical meaning (p. 66).

Each of these three aspects of consciousness finds of course its place in our author's further treatment of Psychology; and the prominent place which Experimental Psychology has given

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to the elementary phenomena of the cognitive aspect of mental life, insures that this book should devote many pages to Sensation and Perception. But the peculiar interest of our author's procedure lies in the way in which his account of all aspects of mind is colored by the general view of conation just suggested. Consciousness has its "conative unity" and its "conative continuity" (p. 73, p. 77, sqq.), the unity and continuity, namely, which characterize conscious processes that tend towards some one goal (as when one plays a game or fashions a work of some art, or thinks over a problem). "In the development of mental life, conative unity and continuity is of altogether predominant importance. Such psychical relations as depend on mere proximity in time are subsidiary, and may, in a broad view of mental evolution, be neglected. Thus, in what follows, we shall almost entirely confine our attention to those mental connexions which arise from the combination of mental elements as constituent parts of the same conative process" (p. 76). When facts of consciousness form part of a conative whole, the way in which retentiveness keeps the traces of them, and revives these traces, is such as to give, in the end, every state of consciousness a "meaning" with reference to the whole of which it is a part. This meaning may be "primary" or "secondary," but it is by virtue of such meaning that every mental fact comes to get its relation to the entire process of mental development. Cognitive values are therefore, in general, for Dr. Stout, secondary to conative values; in other words, our sensations, perceptions, ideas, mean objects, or enable us to know objects, only through the relation of such cognitive data to our conscious conative activities. Perceptual processes are guided by impressions, but are mental activities "directly worked out in bodily movements" (p. 393). Ideational processes "reach their end through mental images succeeding each other in a series independently of actual perception." But both the perceptual and the ideational trains "have in general a certain unity and continuity of interest" (p. 418). In consequence, the laws of association, so far as they have explanatory value, are, for Dr. Stout, related to conation. "The fundamental principle of association is not *contiguity* in the strict sense of the word, but rather *continuity of interest*" (p. 422). "Ideational activity," involving "conceptual analysis and synthesis" (p. 448), is the characteristic form

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of the intellectual life. The External World comes to be known as such by virtue of its relation to the control and to the adaptation of our activities (p. 321, sqq.; and p. 490, sqq.), both direct, as in case of the perceptual world, and indirect, as in case of our more ideal constructions. The Self also is an "ideal construction." Belief is both "conditioned by mental activity" and also involves "restriction of mental activity" (pp. 547 sqq.). As for the whole life of Feeling, the most general theory, for Dr. Stout, is (p. 234) that "whatever conditions further and favor conation in the attainment of its end, yield pleasure. Whatever conditions obstruct conation in the attainment of its end, are sources of displeasure."

Mental life thus comes to centre around conation, and this member in the threefold division assumes a significance to which the other aspects of mental life are distinctly contributory, rather than merely coordinated. This view is, of course, not peculiar to Dr. Stout, but is here developed with all the skill of the author of the "Analytic Psychology." Any discussion of its theoretical value for the work of Psychology as a science is here out of place. But the interest of such a conception of mental life for the student of Ethics is obvious, and warrants a special notice of this decidedly important work in this place. The range of the treatment, the compendious form, and the admirable use of illustrations combine to give the book importance for both teacher and student.

JOSIAH ROYCE.

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ELEMENTS OF THE SCIENCE OF RELIGION. Vol. II. By C. P. Tiele. Edinburgh: W. Blackwood & Sons, 1899. Pp. 286.

In this valuable and interesting second series of his Gifford Lectures Professor Tiele discusses in outline what he calls the ontological part of the science of religion. The previous series of lectures dealt with the morphology or development of the religious consciousness; the present ontological inquiry has for its aim to ascertain and examine the permanent elements which constitute the essence of religion. In this inquiry, however, Professor Tiele wishes to adhere strictly to the scientific point of view. His aim is neither apologetic nor dogmatic, although naturally the scientific conclusions as to the psychological nature

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of religion which are derived from the study of its history have an important bearing upon the further philosophical inquiry as to its ultimate truth. And certainly a conspicuous merit of Professor Tiele's treatment of his subject, and one which results from his close adherence to and intimate knowlede of the history of religion, is his remarkable freedom from metaphysical preconceptions. He does not come to the study of religion with a ready-made conception of its nature, but is content to form his conception in accordance with the facts of the religious consciousness itself. It is the more to be regretted that the somewhat general and semi-popular character of the lectures has on several important points prevented him from stating his views with the greater fulness and precision which would have been appropriate in a systematic treatise.

After an introductory chapter, in which he distinguishes the constituents of religion from its manifestations, Professor Tiele proceeds to discuss the nature of religious conceptions, the permanent elements in religious conceptions, the permanent forms of the manifestation of religion, and, finally, the essence and origin of religion, with a concluding chapter on the place of religion in spiritual life.

The preliminary analysis of the constituents of religion is somewhat obscured by an unfortunate terminology. "The true constituents of religion are emotions, conceptions, and sentiments, of which words and deeds are at once the offspring and the index" (pp. 6, 7). "Sentiment" is explained later (p. 18) as "the direction of the will which impels to action," while "emotion" is used in a very wide sense (cf. analysis on p. 15), and later bracketed with "experience." The relation of religious conceptions to the emotions by which they are preceded is not very clear, and the whole analysis is complicated by a distinction on which Professor Tiele repeatedly insists between "the awakening of religious consciousness" and "the origin of religion" ("its source in man's spiritual life," p. 209).

The chapters on the nature of religious conceptions and their relation to scientific and philosophical conceptions are suggestive, but are directed more to a discussion of different points of view than to the formulation of a precise theory.

Perhaps the most important, or at any rate disputed, question that emerges in the later discussions is that of the relation between

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the religious and the moral consciousness. We first meet it in connection with the problem of defining the essential and permanent elements in the conception of God. Having defined the essential element in the conception of deity as that of superhuman power, Professor Tiele finds himself at variance with Rauwenhoff, who argued that "To be a power of nature or to be a spirit is yet to be a god. Such a power only becomes a god when it is worshipped" (p. 94). Now, if the point of Rauwenhoff's argument is, as I take it to be, that worship necessarily implies that the worshipper sees more in his god than a mere power, that he attributes to his god some character which calls forth his reverence, and that the possession of such a character is part of the very meaning of deity, then it seems to me that Professor Tiele's own view does not really differ very greatly from Rauwenhoff's. For we are told later, *e. g.*, that "to a power which he regards as superhuman man looks up with awe, and he speaks of it with reverence" (p. 98). That is to say, God is conceived as superhuman not only in a merely physical sense, so to speak, but in a more or less ethical sense as well. The term "superhuman" already implies for Professor Tiele what Rauwenhoff would have regarded as an ethical element. Substantially the same question arises when Professor Tiele comes to discuss various theories of the origin of religion. The view of Rauwenhoff that religion springs from "the coincidence of man's moral consciousness with the naturalistic and animistic views of the world" (p. 217) is rejected mainly because of the defective nature of Rauhenhoff's theory of the moral consciousness itself, but this ground of objection seems not strictly relevant to the problem in hand.

Professor Tiele's own view of the nature and origin of religion suffers from the brevity with which it is stated. When we are told that the essence of religion is piety, and piety is further explained as a spirit of adoration, we do not seem to get much further forward, while the objection (stated by Professor Tiele himself) that adoration or devotion is directed to other objects than the Deity seems to receive no very satisfactory answer. His explanation of the origin of religion as due to "the fact that man has the Infinite within him, even before he is himself conscious of it, and whether he recognizes it or not" (p. 230) involves the distinction already mentioned between the beginning or awaken-

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ing and the origin or source of the religious consciousness, and seems to require a fuller discussion of the relation between the two points of view indicated in the distinction than the scope of the present work permits.

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THE DAWN OF REASON, OR MENTAL TRAITS IN THE LOWER ANIMALS. By James Wier, M.D. The Macmillan Company: New York. Pp. xiii., 234.

There is little of direct philosophical value in this volume, the character of which is much better described by the subtitle than by its primary designation. The author gives us here the results of prolonged investigation into what may be called the conscious activity of animals belonging to the lower plains of life. His plan is to quote instances in detail of the action of lowly animals which indicate, as the author thinks conclusively, that they possess capacities or functions identical in kind with those of man. The faculties he illustrates are, besides the senses (to the usual number of which the author would add the "sense of direction" and "tinctumutation"), (p. 181 ff.), conscious determination, memory, emotion, æstheticism, parental affection, and reason. The author skilfully narrates his instances so as to give the illustrations precisely that *nuance* which will lend verisimilitude to his general thesis, and succeeds in weaving together very ingeniously the bare narration of fact, with the explanation of it which he seeks to furnish. But on the whole his volume is much rather a collection of material of a very striking and suggestive character, which might be used for comparative and for animal psychology, than an elaborated and carefully thought out psychology of animal life. The author apparently takes these to be one and the same thing; but it surely requires only to be pointed out to be admitted, that no possible accumulation of instances, however striking, in defence of a position already assumed to be tenable or valid, will ever satisfy the demand for a critical analysis of the assumptions and concepts which form the groundwork of that position itself.

The author approaches his subject as a skilled biologist, without apparently any accurate notion of the meaning of psychological terms or the correct use of them. His attitude towards

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conscious phenomena is, if anything, frankly materialistic (pp. 1, 43, 44). But it is difficult to extract his precise position on a purely psychological or philosophical question. Even the distinction between reason and instinct (p. 147) is not clearly stated. But, fortunately, there is not much attempt at pure psychology in the volume, the author being far more interested, and certainly more successful, in the mere narration of the outward actions which he illustrates. Indeed, the author at certain points (cf. pp. 100, 114) himself seems to suggest a doubt regarding his whole thesis by pointing out that it is well-nigh impossible for us accurately to determine the exact contents of the psychical life of lower animals. In spite, however, of his special pleading for a case which it is doubtful if he fully realizes in all its significance, and which is in any circumstances particularly difficult to establish, the author has here given a distinct contribution to our knowledge of animal life.

J. B. BAILLIE.

ST. ANDREWS UNIVERSITY.

THE KINGDOM (BASILEIA). An Exegetical Study. By George Dana Boardman, Author of "Studies in the Creative Week," "Epiphanies of the Risen Lord," "The Divine Man," "University Lectures on the Ten Commandments," "Coronation of Love," "The Problem of Jesus," etc. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1899. Small 8vo. Pp. x., 348.

In simple and attractive style Dr. Boardman describes the characteristics of the ideal society which has been the dream of saints and sages from time immemorial. The frame of his picture is religious: his "kingdom" is that which has been set up by Jesus of Nazareth, the Divine Man, who has given it its laws and assures its triumphs. There is a delightful tone of trustful and confident loyalty in the book; the author is conscious of being a citizen of a great spiritual commonwealth, to whose head he gives unreserved obedience and devotion. The portraiture is largely ethical, and deals with some prominent questions of the day. Jesus, Dr. Boardman remarks, instituted no political or economical system, and laid down no rules for the control of international relations or for the guidance of money corporations, but he announced principles which go to the roots of human nature, and are competent to direct all human life.

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The central principle is love. What of the rule of non-resistance? Dr. Boardman holds that, while it does not apply to civic and international relations, it enjoins patience under private injuries; avoidance of retaliation, he thinks, would lead to private peace; non-resistance is to be treated not as a hard-and-fast rule, but as a principle of love, to be interpreted by every man for himself in every particular case. War, he holds, is sometimes necessary, but is always an evil,—the nations of the earth should form a peaceful brotherhood; he refers to his address at Washington in 1890, advocating disarmament. The book is full of terse remarks and quotations from the poets. And it may be regarded as a contribution to the solution of the question how far devotion to a personal religious ideal is ethically effective.

C. H. Toy.

Harvard University.

Landmarks in English Industrial History. By George Townsend Warner, M.A., Sometime Fellow of Jesus College, Cambridge. London: Blackie & Son, Ltd., 1899. Pp. vii., 368.

Of the many new branches of history that have lately sprung up, Economic History undoubtedly is the most important, and has the greatest future before it. This new study has been set in the good position it holds in the learned and educational worlds, largely by Dr. Cunningham and Professor Ashley's well-known books. But there is a felt want of a text-book for beginners, that will put the events of English economic history in their true proportions, sum up the controversies, and state the salient facts concisely. Professor Ashley's book covers so small a part of the whole area of English Economic History, that it by no means fulfils these conditions; Dr. Cunningham's great work is to some degree marred by want of arrangement, as well as by the want of proportion inevitable in the work of a pioneer who clears new grounds, and a controversialist who fights joyously for every new position. A brief and well proportioned summary is therefore much needed by beginners, and ought to be of service in education. The person who has undertaken this task is well fitted to do so. Mr. Warner is known to Cambridge men as a sound historian, and to Harrow boys as a good teacher. He has a special knowledge of economic history, and, although

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he has not had time for much original research, he is thoroughly versed in the existing literature of the subject, and is possessed of a good historical judgment. As outsiders see most of the game, if they watch it closely and know the rules, he is perhaps in this respect better fitted to draw up a well-proportioned survey of the whole subject than Dr. Cunningham or Professor Ashley themselves.

The problem which Mr. Warner has set himself to solve is no easy one. It is, how to put the whole history of England, in its economic aspect, into three hundred and sixty not very large pages. The difficulty of the task is increased by the fact that English economic history is highly contentious ground, and bristles with unsolved problems, where past and present masters differ without hope of reconcilement. To state the "pros" and "cons" in every case would have been to lose the proportion which it was Mr. Warner's first object to preserve. The attempt to sum up one of these long controversies which he makes on pp. 19, 20 does not seem very happy; more space is required for the purpose; and on the whole we think he is justified in his more usual practice of giving his own, generally a very sane view on a moot point, without much controversy. He has stated his ideas clearly, one by one, and has achieved his purpose of writing an intelligible and well-proportioned history within the given space. At the same time that space is so small and the subject so big, that though all the points are clear, few of them are illustrated or expanded. Therefore the book is only an introductory text-book, and does not pretend to give new information to more advanced students.

The book gets better as it goes on, and his account of the "Industrial Revolution" is perhaps the best part. His judgment of the conduct of the manufacturers at the beginning of this century (pp. 310, 311) is excellent. The one big omission which we perceive in the book, the chief sin against the sense of proportion which he has on the whole so excellently preserved, is his scanty notice (p. 223) of the intentional destruction of Ireland's commerce and prosperity by the English Parliament. It is one of the two worst crimes of the Mercantile System; he has fully described the second, the loss of America, on pp. 257–260. But there is no blacker page in English history than that which tells how, after slaughtering and dispossessing the Celts in

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order to make room for a Protestant and Anglo-Saxon population, that population, for whose establishment such crimes had been committed, was itself ruthlessly sacrificed to the base jealousies of English manufacturers. If it had not been for the selfish ideals of the eighteenth century mercantile system, Ireland might perhaps now be English and Protestant, with a fringe of Celts along the south and west coasts. Lastly, Mr. Warner does not realize sufficiently, in summing up (p. 114) the effects of the Peasants' rising of 1381, that the rebellious attitude of the peasantry must certainly have frightened many lords into granting their terms. "Freedom," he says, "came not through violence." But violence probably had more influence than he allows. Although agrarian crime in Ireland never become successful revolution, it helped to bring on the Land Bills. Probably the continued violence of the English peasantry between 1350 and 1400 had a similar influence in hastening concessions, which, in spite of the wishes of the landlords, were very frequent at this period. Mr. Warner has made a useful addition to the literature of economic history.

G. M. Trevelyan.

Trinity College, Cambridge.

The Right to the Whole Produce of Labour. By Dr. Anton Menger. Translated by M. E. Tanner, with an Introduction and Bibliography by H. S. Foxwell, M. A. 8vo. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1899.

It is always a favorite pastime for social reformers and other revolutionists to search for "rights" which will support their claims. It not infrequently happens that the ardent reformer will assert his belief in several mutually contradictory abstract rights. In particular, Socialists have at times asserted that every man had a right to the whole product of his labor, a right to subsistence and a right to work. Dr. Menger has described historically the views of Socialists on these three alleged rights. As a history of the progress of these socialistic ideas his work is interesting; we are mercifully spared an elaborate discussion of the exact nature of the "Urrecht" of German jurisprudence. It would have been instructive, if dull, to have been told why these particular rights with which this book deals are inherent or natural rights,—that is, rights appertaining to every individual

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by virtue of his existence. But no doubt the right to the whole produce of labor (so long as we take care not to make clear what this means, and it is hard to see that it can mean anything) is for purposes of political agitation as good a specimen of natural right as we can conveniently find. The aspirations of different sections of mankind are often so conveniently indicated by their views on "rights" that a historical discussion of these rights may become a most useful piece of history. Dr. Menger's own description of his book is that he follows out the fundamental ideas of socialism from the point of view of a jurist. The chief fault of the book—if it be one—is that the material is too compressed; but this compression does not make the book dull to read. The English edition contains a most useful bibliography as well as a most excellent introduction by Professor Foxwell. Probably few Englishmen are aware how great was Marx's debt to the early English Socialists. It is curious that it should have been left to an Austrian to point out this fact. Probably the reason why Englishmen were so ill informed as to the writings of English Socialists is to be found in the scarceness of their works. We may hope that the result of an English translation of Dr. Menger's work and Professor Foxwell's bibliography will be that for the future students will become better acquainted with English Socialist literature.

C. P. SANGER.

INNER TEMPLE, LONDON.

KANT ON EDUCATION (Ueber Pädagogik). Translated into English by Annette Churton. London: Kegan Paul & Co., 1899. Pp. xix., 121.

Kant's notes on education were certainly worth translating, and Miss Churton has executed the task well. Her translation is clear and readable, and it is preceded by a bright and interesting Introduction by Mrs. Rhys Davids, in which the place of Kant in the educational movements of his time is discussed, with special reference to Rousseau's influence upon him.

The book itself, as is well known, was not written by Kant, but was compiled under his authority by his pupil Rink, from the notes of his lectures on pedagogics. We have in it no methodical working out of a complete system of educational doctrine, but rather a series of suggestive chapters of a thoroughly prac-

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tical character. The influence of Rousseau is plain, but it is everywhere modified by Kant's unemotional common sense and calm rationality. On one fundamental point there appears a contradiction which is not resolved. On p. 15, we read, "The rudiments of evil are not to be found in the natural disposition of man," which is a simple echo of Rosseau. But on p. 100 Kant says, "One may say, however, that [man] has a natural inclination to every vice," and this seems more in agreement with his general treatment of the subject of moral training. What he says on this is certainly based on his ethics, but nowhere does his ethical theory appear on the surface. Throughout he is strictly practical. But to most of us his conception of the good character which the educator has to aim at forming will appear both too formal and too purely intellectual. "Character consists in the firm purpose to accomplish something, and then also in the actual accomplishing of it," is surely lacking in content, even though we are told that if the purpose is wrong "we do not call it 'character' any longer, but obstinacy." As might be expected, too, Kant minimizes the emotional factor in life, and consequently in education. Thus we read, "Moral culture must be based upon 'maxims,' not upon discipline," and throughout the influence of indirect moral training through example seems to us inadequately conceived. On the other hand, Kant's outlook over the whole subject is emphatically sane and wise, and is one which we need to keep continually in mind. "Children ought to be educated, not for the present, but for a possibly improved condition of man in the future." We may not think all Kant's practical suggestions worthy of adoption, but it is impossible to read his book without finding help and suggestion. We are grateful to Miss Churton for giving us the work in an English dress, and we hope that a call for a new edition may very soon give her the opportunity of supplying an index, a help to the student which has unfortunately been omitted.

J. WELTON.

THE YORKSHIRE COLLEGE, LEEDS.

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

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INTERNATIONAL

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APRIL, 1900.

OXFORD UNIVERSITY SOCIETY

THE NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF MONOPOLIES AND TRUSTS.*

THE subject upon which I have been asked to speak to you is a large one, and it is possible to do nothing more than to bring before you a few leading thoughts concerning the nature of monopolies and trusts, and to point out in a general way what seem to me to be correct lines of public action with reference to the problems which industrial evolution has presented to us in these portentious formations.

First of all, it is essential that we should have a clear idea of monopoly as a starting point. To use the language of the philosopher Locke, the word monopoly is a sign standing for an idea. What is that idea? Unless we know exactly what it is that we are talking about when we are discussing monopoly, our own thought will be confused, and the confusion will be multiplied many fold when the discussion becomes general. There can be no doubt that in economic literature, as well as in the periodical press, this one word-sign "monopoly" has been made to stand for many different and more or less antagonistic ideas; and, as a consequence, the controversies in which we have been engaged concerning monopoly have produced con-

* An Address given before the Philadelphia Ethical Society, December 17, 1899.

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paratively little action and even less light. I must say very frankly that, in my opinion, the economists are quite largely responsible for the confusion of thought which has been introduced into the discussion of monopoly; for, extending the term to cover related but quite different economic concepts, they have departed from the best usage of the English language. The courts in their decisions have not gotten so far away from the correct use of language, but their decisions also show confusion of thought, due to the fact that they have frequently attempted to introduce ideas appropriate to the seventeenth century into the latter part of the nineteenth, without that modification which the mighty industrial evolution of three centuries has necessitated.

To what do we oppose most sharply the word monopoly in our thought? I think you will at once answer, competition. Monopoly is the opposite of competition. Competition means, among other things, rivalry in the offer of services or commodities. When each one of two or more persons seeks to induce us to purchase of him, and not of the others, services or commodities which he has for sale, we have a condition of competition. Whenever, on the contrary, we have only one seller we have a condition of monopoly; and we have only one seller when all those who have services or commodities of a particular kind for sale have so bound themselves together that they act as one man. What has been said with respect to sales would hold equally true with respect to purchases. It is unity in some one kind of business which gives us monopoly. I offer then this definition of monopoly, which seems to me to accord with good English usage: *Monopoly means that substantial unity of action on the part of one or more persons engaged in some one kind of business which gives exclusive control more particularly, although not solely, with respect to price.*

It is not possible at this time and place to comment at such length as I would like upon this definition. One or two things, however, I must say. What is essential is control over price. The other things which monopoly carries with it flow from such control and are not secure without it. In the second place, I must emphasize the fact that absolute unity of action

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is not requisite. The essence of monopoly is *substantial and controlling* unity of action, and this is given when a combination of men acting together as a unit have a dominating position over the sale of some one kind of commodity or service Mr. Havemeyer, President of the American Sugar Refining Company, at one time said that a man producing eighty per cent. of the product had such a position. The percentage, however, is a variable one.

The definition which I have given of monopoly brings before us its social significance in several most important particulars. As it is the opposite of competition, so the protection which competition gives to society is removed by monopoly. The theory of competition is that we are protected against unreasonable demands by the rivalry existing among competitors. The farmer who is tempted to ask an exorbitant price for his potatoes is held in check by his neighbors who have potatoes which they likewise desire to sell. The retail merchant who places an excessive valuation upon his services finds that his rivals, more moderate in their demands, take away his customers from him. This is all simple enough, but it has a profound meaning which has made a deep impress upon English common law. Competition has been regarded for ages as the corner-stone of our industrial order, while monopoly has been held to be a menace to that order. The decisions of courts, both in our own country and England proceed upon the hypothesis that competition is the palladium of our industrial liberties. It is true that competition is the corner-stone of our present social order. If competition is removed something else must be put in place of it. It is because this truth has been so clearly grasped by socialism, and because socialism does propose to put something else in the place of competition, that the logical position of socialism has proved so strong. It is essential that we should clearly grasp the fact that we must have competition or something else in the place of it. If this is so, the popular apprehension in regard to the growth of monopoly does not exaggerate its significance, however confused and perplexed public opinion may be in other particulars.

The next question which suggests itself naturally is this: to

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what extent does monopoly actually prevail? Has competition been replaced to such an extent that the competitive order has been seriously disturbed? If we cannot give a precise and definite answer to the first question, there can be no doubt that the second question calls for a decided affirmation in reply. Appeal may be made to the common familiar experience of all. We continually run up against monopoly in one way and another, and we feel that we lack the protection which full and free competition would afford. It may be that we have to do practically with one employer wherever we seek work. It may be that in the sale of our product we encounter purchasers so allied that they act as one man. It may be that in our own purchases of service we feel ourselves powerless because we are pitted against vast combinations of interests which are completely unified. Probably there is no one now listening to my words who has not felt himself hurt and aggrieved by what he deemed the conscienceless action of monopoly. We may, however, approach the subject more analytically and scientifically if we examine into the classification and causes of monopoly. I cannot undertake to go into this subject fully on the present occasion. If it be not improper to refer to my own book on "Monopolies and Trusts," I may say that I have there given seven different classifications of monopolies, each one from its own point of view, and that all seven classifications in my opinion have their significance. I attach most importance, however, to the second classification, which is as follows:

(*a*) Social Monopolies.
  I. General Welfare Monopolies.
    1. Patents.
    2. Copyrights.
    3. Public Consumption Monopolies.
    4. Trade-marks.
    5. Fiscal Monopolies.
  II. Special Privilege Monopolies.
    1. Those based on Public Favoritism.
    2. Those based on Private Favoritism.

(*b*) Natural Monopolies.
  I. Those arising from a Limited Supply of Raw Material.
  II. Those arising from Properties Inherent in the Business.
  III. Those arising from Secrecy.

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The purpose which I have in presenting this classification of monopolies is to bring before you, by the analysis which it presents, the wide sweep of monopoly in modern industrial society. I think the simple enumeration itself does that, even without explanation of the various classes and sub-classes. I will add, however, just one or two words about a few sub-classes, in order that you may know what I have in mind.

Public Consumption Monopolies are monopolies designed to regulate consumption beneficially; either to promote some desirable consumption or to restrict and confine within limits deleterious and injurious consumption. The alcohol monopoly of Switzerland and the South Carolina dispensary system afford illustrations. Fiscal Monopolies are monopolies which are created primarily in the interest of the public treasury. The tobacco monopoly of France affords the best illustration. Monopolies based on public favoritism are monopolies which are due primarily to the action of public authority exerted in the interest of favorites. The old Tudor monopolies, against which protest was made so frequently in our early Constitutions, afford abundant illustrations. Hume gives a vivid description of them in the reign of Elizabeth in his "History of England." Private Favoritism Monopolies are businesses not naturally monopolistic which have become monopolies by virtue of an alliance with another monopoly, especially a natural monopoly, whereby they partake of the properties of the latter. Here special reference is made to the favoritism of railways, which has been so potent a cause of monopoly in the United States. This is well known probably to most of you, and so far as the sceptical are concerned I would in this place simply refer to the reports of the Interstate Commerce Commission.

Those monopolies arising from properties inherent in the business are those ordinarily designated as natural monopolies, although I make them simply one sub-class under the general term. They are railways, telephones, gas works, etc.

It is hardly too much to say that the value of all monopolized businesses in the United States more probably exceeds a sixth of the entire valuation of property in the United States than falls short of this proportion.

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If we have now a clear idea of what monopoly means, and of the extent to which it prevails, the next question which naturally suggests itself is this: What precisely is the power of monopoly? The specific power of monopoly is that which arises from unified action on the part of the monopolists. It is especially, although not exclusively, a power over price, and has been felicitously described by a German economist as unified tactics with respect to price. We should, however, in connection with our inquiries into the power of monopoly, give attention to the other things than the power to raise price which monopoly carries with it. This is especially important inasmuch as almost exclusive attention has been directed to the power of monopoly to raise price. The one who is a monopolist, as he has exclusive control over his products, can, for that very reason, withhold supplies or services or furnish them irregularly. If we examine into the power of railways to help forward their favorites and to crush those whom they will, we must not think by any means merely of freight rates. If rates are uniform, but of two competitors one always receives cars when he wants them and the other has difficulty in securing cars for shipment, if the freight of the one is forwarded promptly while the freight of the other is frequently sidetracked, this alone will sometimes be sufficient to build up the one and to ruin the other. But in addition to the power to raise price, we must also take into account the power to lower price which is often equally effective. If, after I get in my supplies, you, my rival, order yours and secure transportation at lower rates, you have an advantage over me which may prove sufficient to enable you to drive me from business. How easy it is for those in a secret combination to aid one another with advance information concerning changes in monopolistic prices! And frequently it will make no difference whether prices are to be raised or lowered.

It is true, however, that what we have to consider principally in the case of monopoly is the high profits which the monopolist can secure. It is this excess of price especially which is of vital significance in the distribution of wealth. It has long been said that the monopolist charges that price which enables him

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to secure the highest net returns. The monopolist having control over supply may in one way charge what he pleases, as the courts so often state that he does. He must, however, charge a price which will enable him to dispose of his product. He does have control over supply, but he does not have control over consumption. If people refuse to buy his service or commodity he has no sales and no profits. He must reduce prices until he has that combination of sales and profits on each sale which will give him the highest net returns.

This is all more or less familiar ground, but there is something that is still more fundamental, and that I have endeavored to formulate in a new law of monopoly price, which is as follows: *Other things being equal, the greater the intensity of customary use, the higher the general average of economic well-being, and the more readily wealth is generally expended, the higher the monopoly charge which will yield the largest net returns.* The significance of the intensity of customary use is something into which I cannot now enter; but I wish to direct your attention particularly to the other features of this law of monopoly price. The higher the general average of well-being, other things being equal, the higher the price which people will pay for commodities or services rather than go without them. Consequently, this furnishes the monopolist with an opportunity for greater gains than those which could be reaped in a country with a lower average of well-being. Similarly, the more readily people spend money, the higher will be the price which will yield largest net returns, because the higher the price which people will pay for commodities or services rather than forego their enjoyment. We find these two conditions in high degree meeting together in the United States, and this explains why it is that monopoly is so especially profitable in the United States. Probably there is no country in the world in which monopoly if let alone yields such large returns as in our own country. Again, there is no other country among the great civilized nations of the world in which monopoly has been so let alone, so far as any real effective control is concerned, as it has been in the United States. We have then in the law of monopoly price a partial explanation of the

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vast concentration of wealth in the United States. We have abundant illustrations on every hand of the vast fortunes which monopolistic pursuits have yielded in our country, and we have an explanation of them which will, I think, appeal to you, and which indeed, in my opinion, will grow upon you the more you think about it. I may take as an illustration, street-car fares in our own country and in other countries. I believe there is evidence going to show that the price for street-car service in our great American cities which yields the largest net returns to the street-car monopolist is five cents. Apart from all legislative control, I do not believe that in our great cities it is in the interest of the owners of street-car property to charge more than five cents. With our high average of well-being and our readiness in the expenditure of money a five-cent fare reaches down into the masses of the people. Doubtless it is too high a fare for the lowest social strata, and yet it reaches so far down that in all probability the increase in traffic from a lower fare would not offset the loss in profit on each passenger transported. I believe in a country like Germany a five-cent fare would be too high to yield the largest net return to the monopolist, inasmuch as with the lower general average of economic well-being and the greater frugality a fare so high would not reach down far enough into the masses of the people to induce a sufficiently large traffic to be most remunerative. The fare in Berlin for one of their zones is ten pfennigs or two and four-tenths cents, and I am strongly inclined to think that that is the fare which, apart from legislation, would yield the largest net returns. Our telephone service affords another illustration. I am strongly of the opinion that in a city like Berlin the charges for telephone service which large numbers pay in New York and Chicago would so reduce the use of the telephone that it would not be highly remunerative.

Our discussion of monopolies has brought before us the evils of monopoly. It may be well to add, in further elucidation of these evils, a quotation from a leading English case known as the Case of Monopolies. It is the case of Darcy *vs.* Allein, of 1602. The court stated the evils of monopoly in these words:

"First. The price of the same commodity will be raised, for he who has the sole selling of any commodity, may and will make the price as he

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pleases. . . . . The second incident to a monopoly is that after the monopoly granted the commodity is not so good and merchantable as it was before; for the patentee, having the sole trade, regards only his private benefit, and not the commonwealth. Third. It tends to the impoverishment of divers artificers and others, who, before, by the labor of their hands in their art or trade, have maintained themselves and their families, who now will of necessity be constrained to live in idleness and beggary."

This exposition of evils has been very frequently endorsed by American courts, and one of these courts adds this comment upon the third ground mentioned:

"The third objection, though frequently overlooked, is none the less important. A society in which a few men are the employers and the great body are merely employés or servants, is not the most desirable in a republic; and it should be as much the policy of the laws to multiply the numbers engaged in independent pursuits or in the profits of production as to cheapen the price to the consumer. Such policy would tend to an equality of fortunes among its citizens, thought to be so desirable in a republic, and lessen the amount of pauperism and crime."

We have then, on the one hand the oppression and tyranny which must flow from monopoly in a society composed of human beings, and on the other hand we have the inequalities in opportunity which discourage effort in two directions. Those who have these exclusive opportunities are not so alert and active as they would be otherwise, inasmuch as they rely upon monopoly rather than upon excellence and energy in their economic efforts, while those who find themselves so handicapped in the race for economic well-being are apt to become listless and indifferent as the result of discouragement. I am speaking now not about what happens in the early days of monopoly, but what must happen in the long run as the result of well-known principles of human nature. We have then, as a further outcome of the evils already mentioned, a degree of concentration of wealth which affords to some, opportunities for indulgence of every whim and caprice, with wild extravagance as the result, while others lack the opportunities for a full and harmonious development of their faculties. I cannot go into this further in the time allotted to me, but I claim that history furnishes abundant evidence of the pernicious social effects of wanton luxury confronted by poverty. I refer you

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to Lecky's "History of European Morals" for a conservative statement of the ethical consequences of a distribution of wealth brought about by monopoly, and I refer you to that great thinker, Aristotle, whose wise words still have deep meaning, for a discussion of the difficulties of uniting wide extremes in the distribution of wealth with political democracy. I do not think, then, that our courts at all exaggerate the dangers of monopoly, even if they do not always clearly see the direction in which remedies must be sought.

Before I pass on to a discussion of remedies, you may very properly say to me: You have entitled your address "Monopolies and Trusts," but you have not yet said a word about Trusts. The reason why I have said nothing about trusts is because, in the strict sense of the word, there is no such thing as a trust problem. Until we have this clearly in mind, we can make no progress in our discussion of monopolies and trusts. The trust in itself is no problem. But do not misunderstand me. When men talk about trusts they are discussing real and vital problems, and analysis will show that in so far as the discussion of the trust problem is an intelligent discussion it resolves itself into three problems: first of all and chiefly a monopoly problem, secondly a problem of concentration of production, and thirdly a problem of wealth concentration,—quite a different thing from the problem of concentration of production. Concentration of production means large-scale production. It means the great factory and the mammoth department store. Concentration of production has its own problems, but they may coëxist with the keenest competition, as it usually does in both the cases I have mentioned. Large-scale production, when it comes about as the result of the free play of economic forces, is justified by its efficiency. When it is able to maintain itself in a fair field without favors it gives a large return for expenditures of capital power and human labor power. It adds thus to the provision for human comfort and should be no more antagonized than machinery should be. The real problem is to utilize it fully while reducing to a minimum any evils incident to it. Many of the evils which large-scale production originally brought have already been mitigated by humane legislation which has regu-

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lated conditions of employment. I refer especially to what is popularly known as factory legislation, which prohibits the employment of young children and regulates beneficially sanitary conditions surrounding wage earners and otherwise helps them to maintain wholesome conditions of life. Other evils which concentration of production has brought are those which investors have suffered on account of dishonest management of great enterprises, and for this, relief must be sought in the improvement of our law governing private corporations. About this remedy I will have a word to say presently.

The concentration of wealth is a different problem, because with widely diffused wealth through the private corporations we may have a high degree of concentration of production.

I will now take up remedies and discuss them in the fewest possible words, for I cannot hope to do more than throw out here and there a suggestion. First of all, you are doubtless already prepared for the statement that I have not the slightest confidence in any measures which forbid the growth of business or combinations on the part of persons engaged in business when they find it advantageous for them to enter into combinations. The so-called anti-trust legislation, in my opinion, has produced harm and can produce nothing but harm. So far from lessening the concentration of production, it has rather increased it. Looser forms of combination in the face of anti-trust legislation have made way for closer and more effective unions. How these are to be prevented while the laws of private property are still maintained, is something which I for my part cannot well understand. Nor do I see precisely what it is hoped will be accomplished by the sort of legislation which has been tried in so many of our States and also by our Federal Government. It does not at all deal with causes, but touches only surface phenomena. We must go down far enough to reach underlying causes if we would accomplish any results.

Among remedies, first of all I would mention education. I would have general education so developed as to prepare every boy and girl for life. I would have the same earnest attention given by our commonwealth to the education of our youth for civic life, which Germany gives to the preparation of her young

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men for military life. If the best brains of the country were earnestly devoted to the preparation of our young people for civic life, and money was as freely expended for this preparation, as in Germany for the army, we would have wonderful results. We have a struggle for life. This it is not desirable to abolish. It is desirable to give for it the most thorough preparation. I have spoken about general education. I would have in addition a training in economics which would lift to a higher plane our economic discussions and would render impossible the serious consideration which is so often given among us to quack remedies for economic evils.

In the second place, we must take up earnestly the problem of natural monopolies. The time has gone by for a discussion of the question, Shall monopolies be publicly controlled or not? The principle of control is accepted by every thinking person and is a well-recognized principle of jurisprudence in every civilized land. The question which has not been fully decided is this: Shall we have public control of private property interests in undertakings which fall under the head of natural monopolies, or shall social control be an outcome of public property with public management? To put it more concretely, Shall we have private gas works with a State Gas Commission to exercise control over them, as in Massachusetts, or shall we have municipal gas works and allow social control to proceed naturally and spontaneously from municipal ownership and management? Shall we maintain our private railways and attempt to control them through a further development of State Railway Commissions and the Interstate Commerce Commission, or shall we have public ownership with public operation? We must take the one alternative or the other, and either one is beset with immense difficulties. I cannot now undertake to state which method of social control seems to me to promise in the long run the best results. In either case the ends to be achieved are similar, and there is not so much room for controversy concerning these ends as there is for controversy concerning the methods whereby they are to be attained.

We must bring it about that those who own and manage such businesses as gas works, railways, and the like—that is,

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if we are to retain private property in these enterprises—have no advantage over those engaged in other kinds of business. We must have no privileged classes composed of monopolists. We must not think that in the abolition of politically privileged classes we have accomplished the abolition of special privileges. Economic privileges are of greater significance than political privileges, and we may have privileged classes although they do not go by the name of duke and lord; they may be simply magnates and kings, as gas magnates and railway kings. Through social control, property and enterprise invested in monopolistic businesses must be placed on the same footing with property and enterprise invested in competitive businesses. It is idle to claim that such is the case now, when franchises for which no one has toiled in any honorable and legitimate way yield to their owners millions upon millions of dollars of unearned wealth.

In the next place, it must be brought about that those who have dealings with monopolistic enterprises are fairly and impartially treated. Tyranny and oppression, whether directed against the general public or employés, must be abolished. War must be waged upon monopolies founded on private favoritism until they become a thing of the past. They must take their place in history alongside of monopolies granted by the Tudor kings to their favorites.

The third class of remedies is found in the regulation of the transmission of property from generation to generation, and this must be brought about in part by taxation, in part by laws which aim otherwise to secure a wide diffusion of wealth. A very strong movement in this direction has already set in and it deserves encouragement. I say this, although I cannot just now undertake to explain what in my opinion is its full significance as an anti-monopoly measure. I believe, however, that it is entirely safe to say that it will accomplish infinitely more in this direction than all the constitutional prohibitions of trusts which have ever as yet been suggested.

I mention tariff reform as a fourth remedy, attaching, however, far less importance to it than many others do. Wherever monopoly clearly rests upon the tariff I am prepared to endorse a reform of the tariff.

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The fifth measure of reform which I recommend is the reform of the patent law. Not an abolition, be it understood, but such a reform along well-approved lines as will render patents of less significance as a foundation of monopolies. It is quite practicable to accomplish this end and still maintain a patent system which will afford as great a stimulus to invention as does our present patent law.

The sixth line of reform is one which is still more important, and that is the reform of the law of private corporations. I have already mentioned this subject. As coöperation takes place so largely through private corporations, which afford to persons of the smallest means opportunities for participation in the largest enterprises, I have no sympathy with any proposal to abolish or limit private corporations. I would, however, bring them under effective public control, the sole purpose of which should be honesty and individual responsibility. To secure this, several things are needed. One is complete publicity, with such extension of the criminal law as would send to the penitentiary as quickly the man guilty of theft through the medium of a corporation as the man guilty of theft in his individual capacity. We need, for effective control, Bureaus of Corporations in our States, and I am prepared to endorse the proposal for an Interstate Bureau of Corporations, even if it involves a change in the Federal Constitution. As a model for the general law of incorporation, I would recommend the national banking act, although I recognize that to adapt this to manufacturing and commercial purposes a few minor changes would be necessary.

I have touched upon the main classes of remedies which in my opinion are needed to meet the present situation. I have, while advocating an extension of governmental activity along several lines, recognized as desirable a large competitive field in which it is socially beneficial to allow a wide scope for the spontaneous play of economic forces. I reject decidedly plans for detailed public control of private business in general, and consequently I am unable to endorse the recommendation of various economists that a commission should be appointed to regulate trusts. If we deal adequately with the causes of

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monopoly, I do not believe that we need entertain apprehensions concerning the concentration of business.

As regards the peculiarly ethical aspects of my subject, I would say, first of all, that as rational beings we must endeavor to understand what we are about before we undertake important public action. We need light for guidance as well as heat as a motive power. Another thought is this: We need purity of purpose to see the light. Every ethical teacher recognizes the heart as an organ of light. This is another side of the truth "none are so blind as they who will not see." We who occupy positions of privilege must not allow our privilege to blind us to the rights of others.

Another ethical thought is, that we must rely for social improvement upon social self-help. Despotism, either industrial or political, is something which is not beneficial in a civilized community. In certain low stages of evolution, despotism, both political and industrial, may be necessary, but only as a transitional stage making way for something higher. If we could have a good despot in political life, he would do many things for us which we cannot at once do for ourselves. Similarly, the despotism of monopoly can accomplish some things which it is not easy at once to achieve through social self-help. We do not on that account, however, any more desire despotism in the latter case than in the former. To paraphrase an utterance of the Ohio Supreme Court, experience shows that we dare not trust human nature when through monopoly it has a chance to grow fat at the cost of others.

Finally, while it does not seem to be in the order of nature that we should be able to rely on a privileged class to do for us things which as a society we want to have done, individuals in the privileged class may rise above their class and enter the service of society. Great leaders of men, especially those who have been great reformers, have frequently been individuals who have risen superior to their class and have used their position of privilege not for themselves, but for others. When one of the privileged class thus conscientiously takes upon himself the burdens of the unprivileged, he has a power which is commensurate with his privileged position. It behooves us,

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then, who are privileged to toil for the non-privileged, and especially to see to it that a fair and open field for discussion and reform is maintained. Here and there we have evidences of a desire on the part of the privileged classes to hem in and limit freedom of discussion, and to oppress those who would show us the way to better things. One of the strongest ethical obligations resting upon us at the present time is to spread the light which we have, and to fight with all our powers to maintain a wide open way for those who would bring us a fullness of light which we do not now enjoy.

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THE ETHICS OF EXPANSION.

The discussion of the ethics of the new expansion policy of the United States seems to have suffered much from uncertainty in its fundamental assumptions. By what criterion are we to judge the ethics of larger human relations? Some quote Scripture or other venerable authority, only to be met by a counter-quotation, and the effort to determine who has wrested the Scripture to his own destruction brings back the original question. Others apply the rules governing individual relations and construe the commands against killing and theft into prohibitions of war and conquest. But are the cases really analogous? This is the original question in another form. As usual, we make no progress by elaborating primary equivocations. Very much recent argument seems to have been of this character. This is my excuse for calling brief attention to certain primary truths which are generally accepted as principles and regularly ignored in their practical applications.

Wherever there is life there is growth, and wherever there is growth there must sooner or later be competition. Inevitably the stronger forms of life displace the weaker and progress is the result. Progress is nothing else, can be nothing else in nature, than the substitution of the more efficient for the less efficient forms of life. This process, too, is one in which we

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have no choice but to acquiesce. Inefficiency can neither long maintain itself nor be long maintained against efficiency. This law is as universal as it is inexorable, and all other vital principles are its servants, never its rivals.

It is as useless to speculate about the ethics of this universal competition as to speculate about the ethics of gravitation. So far as we can see, the process is non-ethical, altogether transcending the limits of moral obligation. But ethical or not, it is absolutely universal. The notion that other laws are opposed to this and tend to displace it, is utterly unfounded. They are but refinements of it, and exist and develop solely on condition that they increase its efficiency. Ethical phenomena, therefore, like all other special phenomena, are resolvable into more fundamental elements, which are non-ethical or super-ethical.

Strictly subsidiary to this fundamental process of selective competition stands the seemingly opposite process of association. Individuals cringing by a common impulse before a superior foe, find themselves masters by virtue of accidental coöperation, and the experience, repeated by accident, becomes systematized into a process of nature. Association becomes permanent and evolves the necessary adaptations and instincts. Where these instincts come from we need not stop to inquire. They come as other instincts come, appearing where they are needed and developing in power and precision in proportion to the permanency and importance of the interests which they conserve. The question for us is, what are the interests of which the moral instincts are the appointed guardians?

The answer is plain. These interests are group interests. The formation of groups, which we have seen is a natural result of the struggle for existence, requires certain concessions on the part of individuals and guarantees of mutual forbearance. Without these there could be no coöperation and no increase of efficiency in this way. These concessions and restraints the moral instincts are invoked to secure. Their field is the field of association. That and that only. Where there is no coöperation, no mutual dependence and trust, there is no moral relation; and, correspondingly, where relations of dependence and coöperation are necessarily few and slight the competitive

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struggle is but little limited by moral obligation. The important fact for us to remember is that moral relations are not universal, but strictly special and limited. Beyond these limits the moral instincts are neither potent nor legitimate, because they do not minister unto life.

It must be confessed that this distinction is not generally recognized and that there is a tendency to assume that all relations are potentially moral. The reason is that we are in an intensely dynamic stage of social evolution. Of all the devices for furthering competitive efficiency, association is the latest to find extensive application. The development of muscular strength, fleetness, cunning and numberless other advantages, is still going on, but it has passed into an advanced stage of diminishing returns. The limpet has not improved perceptibly in millions of years, while the adaptations which characterize the lion or the antelope remain essentially static for millenniums. But association seems to be one of nature's recent discoveries, and the new principle is being exploited with feverish precipitancy. In this unprecedentedly dynamic development the capital of accumulated social instincts is constantly inadequate. Coöperation is being extended, organization refined and dependence made more absolute, while as yet the slowly evolving sympathies lag behind. Society is justly anxious lest its moral resources prove insufficient and involve its vast undertakings in bankruptcy. Rights and duties are pushed into the foreground of consciousness and are thought of as universal relations. The gods, hitherto exempt from moral relations, become their chief exponent. Philosophers, under the influence of the dominant anxiety, speculate on the ethics of the universe, while benevolent souls turn vegetarian and wonder how a righteous God can let pelicans catch fish. Social necessities are conserved by the temporary oversight of scientific verities.

It is at such times of exceptional ethical prepossession that speculative statesmen declare that "all men are by nature equal and are endowed with certain inalienable rights, among which are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." It matters not that "Nature, red in tooth and claw with ravine, shrieks against their creed;" the all-engrossing care of their age; the moral

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prepossession of men, absorbed in a mighty work of social construction, projects itself upon all phenomena out to the utmost confines of thought, and becomes a fantastic theory of nature. Nature is beneficent and rights go hand in hand with life; society is based on voluntary contract and citizenship is terminable at will; "governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed," etc. It is unnecessary to enumerate farther or to discuss these propositions. Our four years debate with those who took them too seriously is too painfully fresh in memory to incline us to reopen the question. Nor has the conclusion then reached, that social obligations were not terminable at will or governmental authority dependent upon the consent of the governed, been reversed by subsequent experience.

I am not disparaging the moral instincts or deriding the founders of our state. We shall do well if we perform our task as well as they did theirs, and may be thankful if our prepossessions prove as serviceable to us as did those to which they owed their singleness of purpose. Moral obligation is a tremendous reality, and it is still the chief concern of society to strengthen its hold upon the minds of men. But the field of moral obligation is strictly limited, and we gain nothing for morals by claiming for them a fictitious universality. Where there is no combination for competitive efficiency there is no moral relation. The ethics of evolution is a conception precisely comparable to the music of the spheres. Because men keep time to music they imagine that the planets do the same; because the moral instincts regulate society men imagine that they regulate the universe.

So long as this confusion remains, however, it must necessarily modify our action. The moral instincts are not to be ignored even when they are out of place. Instincts are sensitive things and are greatly weakened by action in violation of their behests. All such concessions to misapplied scruples are something of an impairment of vital efficiency, but to weaken these instincts would impair that efficiency in an even higher degree. The action of all competing groups is therefore hesitant and inconsistent. When the moral instincts, exercised in individual

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relations, interpose too strong an objection, the group forbears to take a competitive advantage, and when the disadvantage of this action is apparent there is a reaction and the moral instincts are crowded aside. But, significantly enough, society never admits that it is doing violence to its moral instincts. The necessity of treating them with deference in cases where they are not pertinent, results in an ingenious system of pretexts and subterfuges by which their integrity is preserved in normal relations. Hence result those strange moral paradoxes to be met with in the history of all efficient societies. Bismarck said that in individual relations Englishmen were patterns of honesty, but that their diplomacy was a tissue of lies. Yet the English recognize no conscious double standard. The strength of their moral instincts and the skill with which they evade them in non-ethical relations are equally conditions of their national efficiency.

This brings us to the main question at issue. What is the ethical character of international relations? No answer can be given that is wholly comprehensive, but the general truth is clear. The relation between groups formed for competitive efficiency is primarily a competitive relation. There is no such dependence between them as exists between individuals within the group, nor does forbearance tend in any such degree to promote collective efficiency. The struggle for race supremacy is but a phase of that deeper conflict which we have seen to be universal in nature, and it cannot be condemned without condemning the whole process of nature. In this struggle, coöperation and all its attendant instincts are but incidents, strategic moves, dictated by considerations of expediency.

Like every phase of the struggle for existence, race competition is constructive. It develops not only increasingly hardy and efficient groups, but a progressive consolidation of groups looking towards an ultimate synthesis. With this tendency the higher social instincts are in universal accord. All look forward to a "parliament of man, a federation of the world." But it is urged that this synthesis should be voluntary and not coerced, that it should be accomplished by federation rather than conquest. That means that we should wait till the social

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instincts of men are sufficiently developed to draw us all together. But this is impossible under the existing conditions of social progress. The social instincts do not precede social experience, they proceed from it. Individuals unite from necessity and only after long adaptation does necessity pass over into choice. Whatever may be true of the future, federation is as yet merely a by-product of war. How soon would the Swiss cantons, the German States or the American colonies have united in pursuit of peaceful advantage? Even if the nations of mankind should at last effect a peaceable union, it could be little else than a potential conquest, an intelligent forecast of the inevitable outcome. Such a forecast implies a long experience in vast societies with world-wide interests, and these must be the product of conquest. It is impossible to believe that even the highest races have the intelligence to recognize the ascendencies and elect the affinities which must govern the future. Still less can we believe that the uncivilized races will develop that intelligence within any calculable period. Must we wait their time and leave them in festering disorganization in the midst of an organized humanity? It should not and it will not be.

We are confronted, therefore, with an ultimate synthesis of humanity, perhaps not far remote as such things go, the main lines of which we can already trace. Like every adjustment effected by nature, it will be based, not upon the equality but upon the inequality of its component parts. Some race, more virile and constructive than the rest, will get the ascendency. Other races, though nominally independent, will take their cue from this, recognizing at first by vehement denials and then by sullen acquiescence a hegemony which will at last pass over into automatic and even enthusiastic allegiance as time brings its inevitable adaptations. In attaining this result the weak races of the temperate zones seem destined to extinction, those of the tropics to subjection. What else should or can be the fate of inferiority?

I know there is a feeling in some quarters that all this should somehow be prevented, that venerable civilizations should be

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preserved and vanishing races artificially protected. There is undoubtedly an element of tragedy in it all. The successive wane of Moorish, Spanish and Romance civilization has its pathetic aspect to which the most relentless rival cannot be insensible. But dying races suffer little and dead races suffer naught. To bewail the process is to misconceive its import and to squander sympathies which spent elsewhere would minister unto life. For happiness, however dependent for the moment on tottering institutions and obsolete adjustments, is ultimately synonymous with adaptation and health. What if Boer or Maori or Castillian be eliminated or lost to view! Will there be less of life where they have been, or that life be less worthy or less human? Is it a loss that the pterodactyle has vanished and that "Nature brings not back the mastodon"? Only those who conceive of the earth as intended for an ethnological museum can regret the progressive displacement of the lower by the higher races of mankind. If it be said that we can educate these races up to our level the reply is that it will not be done, because it is not the economical thing to do. It is vastly easier to displace a feeble stock than to assimilate it upward by education, and if we invest our vital capital in a losing process, a thriftier race will dispossess both our protégés and us.

It is clear that the organization of mankind will be as little hampered in the future as it has been in the past by such considerations as inalienable rights and the consent of the governed. Weakness has everywhere yielded to strength, sullenly and resistingly but inevitably. Yet out of these stern coercions have grown some of the stablest and most efficient governments on earth. It was not with their consent that the Danes passed under the rule of Alfred, or the Welsh under that of Edward. It was not with alacrity that the Southern States renewed their allegiance to the government at Washington. But these governments are stable, efficient and prosperous. They have followed the universal law of social evolution. Coerced into union, that union has become indissoluble through adaptations of structure and feeling effected by experience. Such governments may not be just (I confess I never did know what that word meant) but they rally all sympathies about them and are

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enduring monuments of social achievement. Voluntary unions may have some sacerdotal superiority, but it is one not easily translated into terms of efficiency or happiness. Even the union of which we are so proud knew no stability till the compact was ratified by the sword.

If my reasoning is correct the process with which we have here to do, coercive consolidation and the establishment of universal order, is inherently normal and wholesome. Should the United States participate or hold aloof?

It should be apparent from the foregoing pages that the question is primarily one of expediency. We are not estopped by any moral consideration from extending our territory at the expense of Spain or any other power. It is inherently as admissible to subjugate the Philippines with the sword as it is to subjugate France by industrial superiority. The subjugation is not more real or more painful. The question of ways and means is merely one of tactical advantage.

But while we are not restrained by any sweeping moral prohibition, moral factors enter largely into the question of expediency. The first of these factors is the one already referred to, the confusion of moral judgment, the tendency to interpret all relations by the analogy of those more intimate relations with which experience makes us familiar. It is evident that whatever of error is involved in these judgments can only be in the direction of exaggeration, since the less intimate relation is interpreted by the more intimate one. The right of Spain to Cuba is very different from the right of a Spaniard to his Cuban estate, but the tender conscience is at first inclined to assign it equal validity. Our "century of dishonor" in connection with the Indian race is merely a continuous attempt to reconcile sub-ethical relations with full ethical standards. The discovery that these judgments are erroneous does not obviate the necessity of showing deference to the instincts involved, for they are at best scarcely sufficient for the task legitimately required of them, and the least discouragement may have disastrous consequences. The ability to justify necessary action to these somewhat undiscriminating monitors is an indispensable condition of that union of inner forbearance and outward aggressiveness which makes nations great.

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Fortunately, the American people is quite equal to all such emergencies. Its readiness to emancipate Cuba from oppression and to confer the blessing of American institutions on the benighted Philippines, and its ability to take such arguments seriously, fully convinced that they are the real ground of its action, are an admirable example of this necessary reconciliation of seemingly incompatible functions. It is idle to object that such devices are disingenuous and illogical. The whole social fabric is a tissue of beneficent fictions, of contradictory instincts specialized for divergent functions and harmonized by pseudo-logic. The veriest tyro in the study of society should know better than to take its logic seriously.

In one respect the moral sense of the American people is peculiarly adapted to this *role* of constructive aggression. Our whole experience has accustomed us to honor dynamic rather than static rights. Our territory has been appropriated, our wealth created and our authority established by our strong arm. When Spain, resting back upon centuries of undisputed possession, passionately declared, "Cuba is ours," she obeyed an impulse born of centuries of status and decay. America challenged this title with characteristic vigor and conviction. No title was valid which did not rest upon power to hold and use in the interests of humanity. And we said it in all conscience, for such is our only title to all we possess. This moral temper which is thus adjusted to the necessities of constructive aggression in a degree peculiarly fits us for the great struggle.

One further moral factor of the greatest importance remains to be considered. I have said that the relation between nations is primarily competitive rather than coöperative, but it is not exclusively so. Relations of forbearance and dependence recognized by each party do exist in varying degrees between nations. I confess that in the great majority of cases these international relations which may be called ethical seem to me extremely rudimentary. No greater tactical blunder could be made than to place serious reliance upon the most of these in practical affairs. If it be argued that with sufficient deference these feelings will grow to the degree necessary to meet all requirements, I reply that this is neither probable nor certainly

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desirable. It is in the highest degree unlikely that a peaceful organization of existing human elements into a world society on the basis of the present status, would be either possible or desirable. War, aggression, constructive conquest have not yet done their work. It is scarcely too much to say that a peaceful federation of mankind at the present juncture would be a misfortune, over-burdening the delicate selective agencies working within organized society with the gross, heavy work which should be done by the powerful enginery of race conflict. And as long as that work is not done we must not lose the power or the will to do it. Woe to the nation that unlearns war too soon while as yet cruder and hardier peoples have not done with its schooling and have not learned the scruples that paralyze its rival's arm. The great majority of these incipient moral relations between races are destined to collapse before the stress of race conflict, and, as the feebler contestants are eliminated by incorporation or extinction, the budding sentiments of international comity will blast, which were not destined to bear fruit. There is reason to believe that there will be exceptions to this rule, that some existing international relations will develop into strictly social relations, merging the nations in question in a common social life. Where inner development has proceeded far enough to make such a union stable and efficient, the ethics of such international relations are not open to dispute.

The moral factors that complicate the problem of expediency are thus of a varied character, requiring sometimes restraint, sometimes encouragement, and always tactful management. We can hardly close our inquiry, however, without considering briefly some of the more exclusively prudential factors which enter into the problem. Is our proposed move good strategy?

Three classes of objections are raised. The first have to do with our constitution and its alleged limitations. These questions I shall not discuss, both because a lay opinion is of little value and because I do not imagine the obstacle to be very serious. If the move we are contemplating is important the constitution is not likely to stand in its way. If we cannot amend it we can "interpret" it, which is quite as effectual and a

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far more normal method of adaptation. The task now imposed upon our Supreme Court is certainly easy as compared with former tasks, no matter which way the decision must eventually go.

A more serious objection is that based upon the nature of our government and its supposed ideals. We have founded a democracy the essence of which is the participation of all citizens in the duties and privileges of government. The advantages claimed for such a system are two-fold. It prevents tyranny, or the exploitation of society in the interest of a governing class, and it develops the individual by the constant exercise of faculties of a high order. It is interesting to note the *role* played by these arguments.

A century ago the first was considered the sufficient as it was virtually the only argument for democracy. Hatred of tyranny and sublime confidence in the power of the people, clothed with political rights, to avert that dread enemy of mankind is strangely prominent in the writings of our statesmen. The reason is, of course, to be found in contemporary experience. But from the time of John Stuart Mill much less attention has been given to this argument, while the educational function of democracy has risen to unwonted honor. Mill declares it to be more important that a government should educate than that it should maintain order. The same sentiment is vigorously expressed by a well-known writer in the assertion that the best government is not that which governs best but that which produces the best men.

It is hardly too much to say that this shifting in the line of defense is also due to political experience. The first century of democracy has been disappointing. I do not claim that democracy has failed in the United States, though its achievements have been finite, but certainly none of our imitators have even passably succeeded. Even France has probably achieved no substantial amelioration of her social conditions by adopting a popular government. This comparative failure of American democracy is tacitly confessed by one of its ablest defenders in a recent article, in which he argues that we have not yet given it a fair trial and must not throw it overboard.

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Under such circumstances we can understand the emphasis upon the other argument. Democracy is a very congenial idea to certain temperaments and it is not likely to be readily abandoned. But whatever its merits, the argument now urged in its defense must be received with caution. Democracy, like any other social institution, educates men in that it adapts them to its own requirements. The assertion that it makes men or that it educates men implies that it fits men for requirements in general. But however near the truth this may happen to be, it is in principle false. All such education is special rather than general. Exercise in politics fits a man for politics, but not necessarily for other functions. The value of this education will depend primarily upon the necessity of these functions. If democracy is to be the government of the future, then to educate men for it is worth some blundering, but if not, then men had better be educated for what is actually in store for them. I am not disparaging democracy, as I shall presently make clear, but I much prefer to drive with the horse before the cart. To urge that a government be retained which does not govern well on the ground that it is an educator, is to overlook the fact that by the inexorable law of functional adaptation such a government must become a miseducator. To plead for the retention of democracy on the ground that it makes good citizens is like pleading for war on the ground that it makes good soldiers. All social functions and activities tend to fit men for their exercise, and in this respect democracy can have no preëminence. To say that the best government is the one that makes the best men is merely reasoning in a circle, since the best men are merely those that are the best adapted to the conditions, political and social, of their existence.

The criterion of government is the same as that of all other things, adaptation to the conditions of existence. That arrangement is best, here as everywhere, which is most workable, most efficient, best able to resist destroying forces, and those men are best who are best adapted to these arrangements. To assign to one government the function of establishing order and to another that of educating men is quite beyond our power. The function of government is determined by the ne-

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cessities of human society, necessities to which it owes its being and which are sufficiently known to us to put that function beyond doubt. Government must maintain that equilibrium between liberty and control which will conduce to the highest social efficiency. It must not sacrifice efficiency in the interest of man-making any more than in the interest of machine-making, and the one is as possible as the other. The test of government is, first, last and always, its ability to govern, to perpetuate itself by perpetuating the society committed to its keeping.

We are told that either the Philippines must be admitted to full participation in our government (a proposal happily not widely entertained), or the whole theory of democracy falls. Apparently that would be about the extent of the damage. It is not plain why our government should not go on otherwise much as before. The exclusion from political rights is not of a kind to prove insidious, nor is the Anglo-Saxon inclined to carry out principles to their logical conclusion. Whatever works well in our institutions is likely to be retained.

But it is urged that under the new conditions our institutions will not work well and we shall be forced in the interest of efficiency to adopt an "oligarchical" government like that of England, a necessity only to be averted by sticking to our proper function of making men. Anything so abhorrent to our instincts as an "oligarchy" should not be accepted without careful consideration. It may not be amiss, therefore, to inquire more closely into the nature of those institutions with which we are menaced.

In England as in America there is freedom of speech, freedom of the press and effective education of public opinion. In both there is substantially universal manhood suffrage, representative and responsible government and the amplest guarantee of civil rights. In some of these the advantage is certainly with England, in not one is it on our side. But in England the experts in charge of government are entrusted with a real power of initiative, a trust for which they are held hourly responsible, while in the United States that right of initiative is less centralized and less definite and is coupled with a corres-

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pondingly feeble and inefficient responsibility. The English Cabinet can make treaties or declare war on its own motion, while ours can do so only in consultation and with the approval of the Senate, a body with which it is in well-nigh constant feud. But while the former can be overturned in an hour if its action is not approved, the other can browbeat public opinion with impunity to the end of its allotted term. Both governments do, however, in practice, have regard for the popular will and execute its behests. Our own statesmen are notoriously deferential, too often mere fawning puppets of public opinion. On the other hand no government on earth is more effectively controlled by public opinion than that of England. The men who can alienate an Empire of their own volition, cannot build a torpedo-boat or appoint a postmaster without the consent of the people. They are untrammeled, but not irresponsible. Perhaps it would be too much to claim that a government whose every act is criticized, whose lease of power is but from hour to hour, which must answer interpellations in Parliament regarding every rumor of its intended action, a government that never concludes a treaty or conducts an important negotiation without defending itself in public addresses or issuing a blue-book to secure the fuller expression of popular opinion,— it would be too much, I say, to claim that such a government did anything in the way of educating or making men, because, forsooth, it is an oligarchy and as such must content itself with the ignoble function of schooling the world in peace and order and making glad its desolate places. However this may be, I suggest that if it be our fate to undergo the threatened transformation, there is a fair chance that our days may be long in the land by way of partial compensation. Nor does a worse fate seem to be demonstrably in store for us. It is largely in the settlement of such questions as this that the British government has become strong and efficient. If we cannot learn efficiency in the same school it will be because we are made of poorer stuff, and if so we shall finally show it, whether we expand or not.

I cannot but regard the assumption of these objectors as otherwise significant and far more serious than they admit.

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Can it be true that our government has not the capacity, present or potential, to deal efficiently with world problems? Are we unable to trust ourselves, or any whom we may designate from our number, with such discretionary power as that enjoyed by the English government in matters requiring promptness, decision and even occasional secrecy, without running the risk of cæsarism and the subversion of our liberties? Have we no hope of a decent civil service, an efficient army organization and a respectable diplomacy? Must we stay at home because we are not fit to go abroad? Such is the too frequent implication of these arguments. If such be our plight, which I, for one, do not believe, is there not need of something rather more radical than "minding our own business"? Are the nations that have best minded their own business, in this gratuitous sense of the term, the ones that have progressed most rapidly toward the attainment of high ideals? It is true, we have problems enough already to tax our wisdom and our patriotism to the utmost, but these problems are not lightened by isolation. Abuses intrench themselves in the consciousness of security, and governments grow rotten and impotent in prosperity and peace. Every new burden laid upon our civil service increases the demand for its purification; every responsibility from without heals a dissension within; and closer contact with foreign powers and foreign problems cannot but favor that knowledge and adaptation, on the development of which the ultimate unity must depend.

The changes which our new responsibilities seem likely to effect in our democracy are precisely those which our present conditions require. Efficiency requires that initiative and direction be in the hands of the few and that they be untrammeled; safety requires that these few be held strictly responsible. Government, to be successful under any form, must be by the will of the many and by the wisdom of the few. The advantage of democracy is that it better reconciles the will of the many with the wisdom of the few than any other form. Its danger lies in confusing the two *roles,* in failing to recognize the few who are competent to direct or in failing to retain their services. Then its representatives become puppets, not direct-

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ing but waiting for directions, and by shirking initiative contriving to shirk responsibility.

If the policy of participation in world affairs involves dangers of conflict and disaster, no less does the policy of isolation. Our advantageous position between two seas offers no guarantee against ultimate aggression. A nation with a world commerce such as we certainly covet and expect, has interests as wide as the planet, and no one will effectually guard or adequately respect those interests if we are supine and impotent. To guard these interests we may not need war, but we shall certainly need readiness for it, readiness in arsenal and fleet, but above all readiness in the national temper. "They have rights who dare maintain them."

But the protection of our commerce is not the only interest which enjoins upon us the maintenance of a certain military efficiency. European nations have not recognized the Monroe Doctrine or guaranteed the independence of any portion of the American continent. Some of them confidently expect to get a foothold upon it. A single well-equipped nation established in South America in a favorable latitude and with a rapidly-multiplying population would soon control the whole. What that would mean to us it is not difficult to see. We may smile at such projects, and fancy that Europe will stand in awe of us, but nobody stands in awe of bigness. The time will come when we must choose between a more vigorous assertion and a complete abandonment of that policy upon which our much-prized isolation depends.

To those who are content with the forecast of a decade or a generation the following considerations will have little interest. But it is not for such that I write. Larger forecasts are necessary if we are in any degree to wisely modify the course of human events.

The balance of power in Europe, never more than a temporary expedient, is tottering to its fall. Half the countries that once composed it have sunk into insignificance, while dual and triple alliances are becoming more frequent and permanent, foreshadowing an inevitable consolidation. Not that states will become conquered provinces governed by pro-

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consuls from London, Berlin or St. Petersburg, but some one power will acquire an ascendency which will more and more influence and ultimately determine the action of the rest. Such ascendency will doubtless be fluctuating and intermittent, changing perhaps more than once its headquarters from one capital to another. But that which is of concern to us is the possibility of even a temporary unification of Europe or of the Continental powers. I will not say that such a combination would be certain to injure us, but it is certain that it might do so, not necessarily by armed invasion but by checkmating us in matters of vital policy, as, for instance, in getting a foothold on this continent. How long is it since Mexico was occupied by such a coalition, and who will say that under other and perfectly possible circumstances, the occupation might not have been permanent? Anything like a stable unification of Europe, involving as it would the whole of the Old World, would eventually dictate terms to us. This might not be the worst of evils, but it is plain that such a supremacy of any people would tend to make it the leader and determiner of the world's culture as well as of its government. The customs, manners, ideals and language,—in a word, the civilization of such a directive centre, would have an enormous advantage over all others and would tend to become universal.

If we remain aloof, the world power can hardly fail to be a continental nation, presumably Russia, whose resources and capacity for growth will easily distance all competitors. Against Russian growth the other half of the Anglo-Saxon race will not permanently make headway, and the Saxon opposition, divided and ineffectual, will leave Russian civilization in the ascendant so far as political conditions can make it so. It may be said that this is no disaster, that eliminating our present feelings and habits from the problem, it is as well to have the world organized under Russian or even Mongolian ascendency as under that of the Anglo-Saxon. Perhaps so, but I see no occasion for eliminating those feelings of love and enthusiasm for our civilization which are the common birthright of all peoples and the measure of their virility. There is the less reason for so doing because I belong to the potentially dominant

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race; dominant beyond controversy, but upon one inexorable condition. That race must pursue a common policy, a policy of cautious but energetic self-assertion, neglecting no advantage, granting no concession, casting the weight of its undivided influence into every scale into which the interests of the common civilization enter ever so little. Every strategic point, military, industrial and cultural, must be occupied, habitable territory must be peopled and controlled. The coal fields and mines that condition the industry of the future must be acquired. The order and freedom of intercourse necessary for the fullest internal development and the strongest cohesion must be unremittingly sought. This policy will require great patience, forbearance and sagacity, but not more, I am persuaded, than the intelligence of England and America can muster. Of all possible combinations looking toward world dominion, this is the only one likely to secure a bloodless supremacy. From beginning to end it is most nearly identical with universal interests, unless indeed the civilization itself prove deficient in capacity for growth and adaptation, and on this point we may take our chances.

It will be apparent how little such a course is compatible with a policy of isolation, and how far from final such objections as those based on the present accidents of our government must appear in the light of such a possibility and such a necessity as now confronts us. If it be urged that it is too early to talk about such things, the reply is that it is not too early to be determining them by our action in critical moments. They must be considered now, if consideration is to have any effect on their ultimate decision.

I have said that the struggle between nations is of the essence of that process which is deeper than all ethical relations, and that such relations inhere solely where there is association, dependence and trust. We are commissioned by the most supreme of all authorities, the inexorable necessity of nature, to participate in the struggle where expediency may dictate, having a care only for the moral sentiments which rightly or wrongly urge their claims, and for such of those incipient moral relations between nations as are likely to have permanent

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significance. In the case we have just been considering, these relations exist in the highest degree ever realized between independent powers. Not only are we bound to Great Britain by an extensive commerce and community of foreign interests, but we feel in the highest degree the sentiments that arise from conscious community of origin, speech, civilization, social and religious ideals. We have but to compare the friendship between England and America with that between Russia and France to appreciate how peculiar is the relation in question, and how heavy the moral obligation it involves. To prove recreant to that obligation would, as in moral relations between individuals, bring demoralization and disgrace. While the policy of expansion is primarily a question of expediency, it thus becomes in one most important connection a matter of sacred obligation.

Fortunately our policy in its essence is little determined by argument and deliberation. To the question, shall we hold aloof, we have yet to hear the most significant answer. *We cannot hold aloof.* The instincts which control the action of masses of men respond to appropriate stimuli with a regularity that suggests little dependence on argument and deliberation. The crisis came and we acted as our impulse dictated and then talked it over afterward. We have done so before and are likely to do so again. The consciousness of power as naturally expresses itself in self-assertion as the consciousness of weakness does in submission. Reason has vast influence in determining the details of the struggle, but scarce any in determining its essence. When the slumbering instincts of race unity and action are aroused, they brush aside the petty barriers of logic and pseudo-obligation without apology or hesitation. It behooves us who are compelled to recognize the supremacy of these instincts to remember that in the course of social evolution the instinct of dominion has been as constructive as that of moral obligation, and that the preservation of society and of moral relations themselves requires that this instinct should not become extinct.

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THE ETHICS OF OUR PHILIPPINE POLICY.

It is to be regretted that the Peace Conference held at The Hague last summer, in which the leading civilized nations of the world shared, could not have been taken more seriously by those who participated in it. Two of the nations prominent in the deliberations of the Conference, Great Britain and the United States, are at present engaged in sanguinary and costly wars. The fundamental purpose of the Conference was the substitution of ethical principles and reasonable methods, for arbitrary ideas and violent methods in the settlement of international disputes. The conclusions to which the Conference came opened a way by which any nation so disposed might, when occasion required, avail itself of the rational and ethical method as expressed in arbitration.

The differences existing between Great Britain and the Transvaal have resulted in an exceptionally severe war, which began before what is generally regarded as a *casus belli* had been reached. This circumstance shows the crudity often involved in the war method. Could the question in dispute have been submitted, by the consent of both parties, to a duly-constituted court of arbitration, the dispute might have been amicably settled. The adoption of this expedient would have required some sacrifice of natural pride—not perhaps a serious loss, in view of the abundance of that staple—but would not the gain to humanity have been greater? Would not the cause of civilization have been better promoted by an announcement to the world of the exact merits of this controversy, made by men of learning and impartiality—(such would presumably have constituted the arbitration court)—rather than by the victory of the stronger or more skillful martial power? Trial by battle will tell us which of the combatants has the better generals and soldiers, or the greater number of men and the more money, but it leaves us more befogged than before as to the real merits of the controversy. It is a fair presumption that the general prosperity of South Africa would have been better attained by

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a settlement of the dispute through arbitration—the ethical method—than by war. Such a settlement would have left the two races, now so sharply separated by the animosities of conflict, to unite quietly through trade relations and intermarriage. The superiority of British civilization would quietly have asserted itself through such means, and would gradually have established a peaceable and genuine paramountcy. Will the real gain to either of the parties in conflict, or to the world at large, be greater by the violent method? An enormous incentive has been given to the increase of European armaments,—already an intolerable burden,—while South Africa will be left with gaping wounds for at least a generation.

In regard to our relations with the Filipinos, this should be said: If our Administration at Washington had been actuated by the high purpose of promoting the welfare of the inhabitants of the archipelago, aiming only to obtain such commercial advantages as were consistent with that object, it would not have treated with Spain alone in determining the disposition of the islands, but would have granted the fullest opportunity to the Filipinos themselves to make known their wishes in that regard. This policy would have been a recognition, on our part, of the belief that the law of growth and civilization should act in harmony with the ethical law. If in the application of such a policy we had encountered objections so great, on the part of those whose interests we sincerely sought to protect, that those obstacles seemed insurmountable without war, then we could have invoked the principle and expedient of arbitration, in order to determine the equities of the case and that all parties in the controversy might agree as to a wise and just policy to be pursued.

But what is to be said of the ethics of the policy we did adopt? A just judgment upon the merits of any public question should be sought first, by determining the fundamental principles from which it is to be viewed, and then by gaining an accurate and comprehensive knowledge of the facts. We cannot interpret the facts satisfactorily without first fixing our point of view in well-defined principles; while our principles will be more or less misty and bodiless unless we incarnate them

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in facts. The seed thought of the American democracy, as well as the Golden Rule, offers perfectly clear and definite ideas by which we may judge ethically the Philippine question and determine our duty to the people of those islands. If we are sincere and loyal Americans, the convictions of duty to which those ideas lead us will at once determine our action.

There are those who would teach us that the practical principles of morality, which we find produce such admirable results in guiding us through the tangled path of personal duty, do not apply to the wider questions of national duty. It is most important, of course, to determine whether such teaching is valid: whether it is really true that we ought to cultivate feelings of love and justice toward men and women whom we meet in personal or business relations, while we must be compelled by some inexorable law at once to abandon these cherished ideas, when we are to deal with these same persons in nationalities; whether it is somehow ordained that upon passing the boundary line that runs between relationships among individuals and relationships among groups or nations, we must at once change our feelings, our code of morals, and our methods, from tenderness, sympathy, consideration, justice, to merciless hardness of heart, adopting methods which entail devastation, destruction and death. If this be true, a horrible anarchy is introduced into man's life, a double nature is required of him, a combination of saint and fiend which possibly is necessary, but which seems to me infinitely revolting to the intelligent and rational mind. Such a mind looks for order, continuity, and harmony of result throughout the entire range of human life. Let us try to discover whether this is really true; whether the seed thought of Christianity and of democracy, which are essentially the same, and from which we propose to regard this question, will not show us a way, or at least the approach to a way, for harmonizing the smaller and the greater duty;—the law of growth with the law of ethics. I cannot conceive a truly just-minded man in action who does not at least try in all his relations with his fellow-men to do to them as he would have them do to him under like circumstances; who does not feel himself obliged to work toward conditions under which these

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extremely simple, but most comprehensive, principles shall govern every relationship of life. This is a principle that not only commends itself most fully to the uncorrupted mind, but one which ultimately will prove to be the richest in its fruitage. This idea is now, of course, as it ever will be, obnoxious to the spirit of human selfishness.

The thought of American democracy reasons broadly thus: Men are created to be equal; not equal in talent or wealth, of course, but in rights: equal in the right to develop, without a straight-jacket being put on them by others, such dormant abilities as God has endowed them with. Government which is true,—government *par excellence,* derives its just powers from the consent of the governed. There may be moments when those powers are held in suspense by the necessities of the case, but always back of that temporary suspense must be an acknowledgment of the right to the full enjoyment of those powers. Government by force is tyranny. There is profound truth in this, but like the great truths of the Gospel, there are many who stumble at it as they do over the Sermon on the Mount. The government of arbitrary force is attractive, for it produces quick results, but they are not sure or strong results. The autocrat is wasting his own finest power because he is irresponsible; while his subject-slave lies dwarfed and stunted at his feet, because the rain and sunshine of liberty, that greatest of all forces in promoting moral and mental growth, have been denied him. The fault on one side is power squandered. On the other, it is power too weak to come to the birth. This is the wisdom of Abraham Lincoln when he said: "No man is good enough to govern another without that other's consent." Negro slavery in America illustrated perfectly the vice of absolute power in practice. It gave us on the one side the irresponsible tyrant; on the other the irresponsible slave. It was criminal in its nature, though that criminality rested not alone upon any one man, or any section of the country, because it was a violation of fundamental rights. That violation cursed alike the man who seemed to profit by and to enjoy the wrong, and he who most obviously suffered from it. It developed in the master this idea of irresponsibility; it pandered to his vices,

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whether of greed or of lust. It prevented all growth—true growth—on the part of the slave. It violated in practice so evidently the Eighth and the Seventh Commandments that one can hardly understand how it could have been defended as it was by those who professed belief in the decalogue. But a great commercial interest was in those days as clever in juggling with ethical law as a similar interest is in our day. Slavery was defended along the same general lines which have been followed in apology for our Philippine war.

Let us now glance at the essential facts of the Philippine case, having stated the basis of ethical theory from which we propose to view them. It is important to understand what these facts are, for they have been most persistently misrepresented alike by the authorities and a large part of the press. Granting, for argument's sake, that war was necessary as a means for doing away with the incompetent and cruel power of Spain in Cuba, and giving to the people of that distracted island liberty and order under which to pursue their life, the declaration with which we began that war was unexceptionable. We declared that Cuba was, and of right ought to be, free and independent. This declaration, as Carl Schurz has ably pointed out, was made on the supposition that Spain had forfeited the rights which she originally possessed by the persistent cruelty and incompetency of her rule. This declaration signified that the Spanish title to Cuba, for these reasons, was extinguished. It is clear, therefore, as Mr. Schurz argues, with convincing logic, that if the Spanish title in Cuba was extinguished thus, so that we felt justified in going to war to drive her authority from the island, then in the case of any other islands owned by Spain, where equal or even greater cruelty and incompetency had existed, where moreover we had driven her authority out by force of arms, the Spanish title was completely extinguished, and therefore was not a purchasable commodity. The force of this reasoning would seem to be irresistible, and the facts on which it rests in the case of the Philippines are even stronger than those relating to Cuba. How then were we morally justified in paying twenty million dollars for this extinguished title under which Spain had once held the Philippines? Or how are

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we further justified in claiming that this purchase gave us the right to assert our authority over the inhabitants of the islands, whom we had urged to revolt against Spain, and who had incidentally, without objection from us, organized a government of their own which had extended its authority over practically the whole of the Island of Luzon, and to parts of other islands? Is there any law of social or national progress which compelled us to fall into such a manifest logical and moral contradiction as this situation presents? The treatment which Spain had accorded the Philippines was more extreme and aggravated in its cruel oppression than that which she had given Cuba. The most cursory glance at the facts revealed in the Filipino insurrection of 1896 against Spanish authority shows this to be the case.

Let us glance at these facts. An insurrection breaks out, caused mainly by cruel taxation and extortion practised upon the people, for which the Spanish government is partly to blame, but mainly the *imperium in imperio* of Spanish ecclesiastical domination. The revolt, like that in France during the great Revolution, manifests itself first, by reasonable protests and efforts at the reformation of abuses on the part of a group of more or less highly educated and civilized Filipinos, of whom such men as José Rizal and Emilio Aguinaldo are examples. The aims and methods of these men are patriotic and honorable. They seek to reform abuses and to avoid cruel and barbarous methods of warfare. The common people commit upon occasion some terrible excesses, just as was the case in France, but the behavior of the Spaniards naturally provokes such outrages. Hundreds of the insurgents are shot upon mere suspicion or without trial, while, at the instigation of some of the ecclesiasts themselves, the tortures of the Inquisition are employed to extort confessions of guilt or evidence against suspected persons. A merciful Captain General, Blanco, will not serve the bloodthirsty purposes of such men. A Polavieja is necessary. Rizal, guilty of no crime that anyone in England or America would judge as such, at the instigation of the clerical party was shot. The insurrection for the time expires with the treaty of Biacnabato, under which reforms asked for are promised, but never

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given by the Spanish Governor General Rivera. Deportation of Aguinaldo and his associates is agreed to in consideration of the reforms promised and of $800,000 in silver to be paid in compensation for losses sustained by the Filipinos during the insurrection. Only a half of this money, $400,000, is paid over and deposited in bank at Hongkong to be held there untouched by individual Filipinos. This is ultimately released to purchase arms and ammunition for a renewal of the insurrection, which was prompted by Consul General Pratt and Admiral Dewey, under the understanding on Aguinaldo's part that treatment similar to that promised Cuba—ultimate independence under an American protectorate—was to be granted by us. It was upon this understanding, clearly stated by Aguinaldo in interviews held in Singapore on and about the 24th of April, 1898, that he was to lift again the banner of insurrection against Spain. There can be no question as to this understanding, for it was printed in detail in the Singapore *Free Press* of May 4th, certified to as substantially correct by Consul General Pratt, and it now forms a part of the record of our State Department in Washington.

The insurrection thus organized ten days before the sinking of the Spanish fleet in Manila evidently had as its object the extinction of the Spanish power in the Islands, for Admiral Dewey's telegram to Washington, of March 31, which has only recently come to light, stated that upon the fall of Manila, which would occur almost immediately upon attack, the islands would come into our hands, or into those of the insurgents. This would seem to show that the claim is unfounded which has been made and generally accepted by the American people, that responsibility for these islands was providentially given to us, that it was unsought and unexpected until after the battle of Manila effected the destruction of the Spanish fleet. It now seems clear that this, instead of being unexpected, had been carefully arranged for previous to the battle of Manila.

Under what code of ethics accepted among men can the treatment which these Filipino chiefs received be excused? What law of social evolution required such treatment? As Rear-Admiral Bradford testified before the Peace Commission in

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Paris, Aguinaldo was our ally. We were responsible for all his acts; we were bound to protect him. Our two leading representatives in the East, Admiral Dewey and Mr. Pratt, arranged that he should conduct an insurrection in the islands against Spain, with the understanding that the same treatment was to be accorded him and his people that had been given Cuba; that they were to have independence. The authorities in Washington knew what had occurred, and whether or not they authorized the arrangement, they did not protest against it. They took their share of the results, in taking possession of Manila; and then, after the insurgents had driven out the Spaniards under our general directions, and had organized a government which their understanding of the bargain justified them in doing, we proceeded, without asking their consent, to buy sovereignty over them from that nation which, according to the theory we had ourselves announced, had lost all just title to their territory. When they objected, as naturally they would to such a transaction, those in authority declared war upon them; a war unjustified by the American Constitution. War was forced on the Filipinos in two ways. First, by issuing a proclamation on December 21, 1898, seven weeks before the treaty of peace was ratified, claiming sovereignty over the islands. Second, by firing the first shot on the night of February 4, at a point outside the limits of Manila, and therefore outside territory to which we were entitled under the terms of the protocol. The fight which then immediately ensued between our forces and the Filipinos stationed near that place, was promptly disavowed by the insurgent leader, but the American general, apparently acting under orders from his home government, insisted upon continuing the conflict.

We have here every condition which justifies the assertion that this was a war of "criminal aggression." It has continued up to the present time at great cost to us, with much loss to our troops, and of course, with a far greater loss to those whom we obliged to be our enemies. This transaction certainly is contrary to all sound ethical principles, and to the American political idea. It has involved the grossest violation of the declaration upon which we entered the Spanish war, a most striking

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betrayal of the faith of a simple and trusting people, enormous financial losses, as well as sacrifices of human life and happiness. Up to this time it does not seem to have yielded either the return, or the prospect of a return, in commercial advantages, which its advocates have anticipated, and consequently it does not seem to have been justified even by that plausible theory which demands a violation of humane sentiments and hitherto accepted notions of duty, in the interest of national expansion and the spread of a higher civilization.

What would have been the result had we pursued a different course; had we nourished, instead of seeking to destroy, the natural growth of a free government, and had we fulfilled the understanding and realized the hopes of Aguinaldo and his associates who were brought over from Hongkong to Manila? It does not seem difficult to answer that question. These men organized a government which had peaceable possession of almost the entire island of Luzon, and which exerted an evident influence in nearly all the islands, if not quite all, which did not fall within the Mohammedan group. Had we said to them, as it is evident Admiral Dewey and our other representatives in the East had first thought we intended to do: We sympathize with you; we will protect you in your experiment. Show that you can be as humane and just in the exercise of your authority as you have been already, and we will engage to prevent other nations from encroaching upon your liberty. By such treatment we would have retained the affection and sympathy of these people. Would we not have demonstrated to the entire East that the United States is a country capable of resisting the temptation to which others have succumbed? That we are not guilty of deceiving and oppressing those who are not strong enough to enforce their rights by power of arms? The moral influence so exerted would have given us prestige not only in the East but in South America, to the great benefit of our commercial interests.

There is an old adage that "honesty is the best policy"; while it does not reach so far or strike as deep as an exact code of ethics, it seems at least superior to that doctrine which teaches that the moment we get beyond the individual and reach the

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larger social group or nation we must, in order to promote our strength and growth, violate the rights of others, and even rob and kill them. There are those who point to our national growth on this continent in its apparent disregard of the rights of the Indians, to justify this theory. They say extermination, removal, or wrong of some kind, was a hard necessity in our treatment of the Indians, in order that a greater good might come to civilized humanity in our own advancement. The writer knows something of our Indian question, both from the theoretical and the practical point of view, having been for many years actively engaged in efforts for its solution. It was indeed necessary that our national growth should not have been impeded; necessary, too, that the Indians' old condition should not have been maintained; but it was nevertheless quite possible, and is still, to bow to the law of growth and yet not violate the higher law of justice in this regard—quite possible to harmonize the two laws. Where they have not been harmonized is generally in cases where some individual man or some group of men who wished to fill their own pockets at the expenses of their neighbors, came in to manipulate the functions of government. It is perfectly possible to meet all the needs of the growing race in the best and most practical way, and yet to preserve to the individual of the weaker race his rights and opportunities. It is not the people as a whole who benefit by the contrary policy. They often have to pay a great price in war or other loss, for the immoral act; but it is the dishonest, unprincipled individual man who reaps the benefit of it. At this very time a bill is pending in the United States Congress, backed by a powerful lobby, which, if enacted into law, will rob an entire Indian tribe of its land and will violate the solemn treaty made with it by the United States Government. It will do more. It will put in jeopardy every other Indian reservation held under treaty and teach every Indian in the United States that a solemn promise from this government is worthless. Such an iniquity if perpetrated will not be done in obedience to any just law of growth. That law can operate in entire harmony with the other law of moral right. Such lands as these Indians do not need for their own sustenance, when brought to a civi-

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lized state, they can readily be persuaded to sell for the benefit of *bona fide* white settlers. Thus the two laws can be made to work in unity. It is so in most other cases, not excluding those which come within international relations. Back of the specious philosophy which urges the other course will be found, in almost every instance, the lurking hand of selfish greed. This selfishness which would leap moral boundaries to gratify its desires, is not strength, after all, but weakness. The decay of nations begins when they habitually turn a deaf ear to the teachings of the ethical law, and a willing one to the delusive whisperings of greed and power.

HERBERT WELSH.

PHILADELPHIA.

"LADIES AND GENTLEMEN."

1. The occasion of these remarks was a correspondence in the *Daily Chronicle* a few months back. I refer to it only from memory, and I believe that it contained some good letters; but taken as a whole, it impressed me painfully. I thought that there was little if any attempt to go below the purely conventional point of view, and to ask what these symbols—the terms Lady and Gentleman—really mean, and whether or no they carry a tradition of value to mankind.

The discussion appeared to me to go off into considerations about the ratio between the cubic content of the front hall in a man's house, and his gentlemanly qualities. It is a kind of calculation in which I have no skill.

According to my recollection, no one definitely asked the question: "Is there anything, precious to humanity, represented by these titles; and if so, what is it?"

I believe in Ladies and Gentlemen, and this ignoring the point at issue seemed to me very sad.

2. There is a difficulty or paradox threatening every approach to this subject; and in a blundering way even that correspondence showed it to have been felt.

It springs, perhaps, from the very ardor of our Christianity,

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our democratic spirit, and our Teutonic gospel of work. We have learned to say, What *really matters* in human nature is—goodness, perhaps, or ability, or "backbone"; all that we call "character." And having said this, we really do not know where to put certain other human qualities; we have, in our rough working theory, simply no place left for them.

And so we get our puzzle. The man who has the root of the matter in him (say, in religion, character, courage, disinterestedness,) is any man's equal. "A man's a man for a' that." "The honest man 's the noblest work of God." Nothing can be better than the best, and a strong inner life, or a great definite achievement, a great mind or heart or will, *is* the best. To be Lady or Gentleman adds nothing. How can any qualities add anything to the best?

And yet, "the quality"—what a significant phrase—is valued. There is something in it which appeals to man wherever he is civilized in any degree worth mentioning. The very efforts made to explain it away are proofs of it. "Nature's gentlemen," "true" ladies and gentlemen, we are told, may be found in any rank or country. Very likely; but the suggestion shows that they have a quality which is valued, and which is not possessed by all.

Thus we are in a contradiction; and because in a contradiction we are also in an uneasy sensitive frame of mind. We admit that the quality exists—the quality of being a lady or gentleman—and we show in practice that we value it. But still not really knowing what to make of it we turn round and disparage it, and grumble that the distinction indicated has no real basis, and would be better away.

We want some intelligible account of the relation of these qualities to the recognized sterling attributes of human character.

3. Let us take some examples of defect in these qualities, from which we may form a rough judgment of their nature. And for our purpose, we may omit what in some respects is the most important case. That is to say, we need not give examples of acknowledged badness of mind or character making people unladylike or ungentlemanlike. They would give

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us too much for our purpose. Our puzzle is, in brief, the question what is added to a *good* man or woman by being a gentleman or lady. In the case of a bad man or woman the basis of excellence is lacking, and the absence of the superstructure is no paradox. The paradox would be if it were present; if bad people could be real ladies and gentlemen. Something like this can happen; and we will say a brief word on it below.

But our examples, to solve our main paradox, must show us the difference, the addendum by which one who has sterling worth, and is a lady or gentleman, excels one who has sterling worth and is not. If a thoroughly good man or woman can fail in these qualities, what do they lose by it? What does humanity lose by it?

We begin from the outside, with examples which may perhaps be thought wholly irrelevant, and work inwards to mind and character.

I. Some of us need not go far to find a man who cannot raise his hat to a lady while he is riding a bicycle. Here we have a little failure in a matter of bodily training, and consequently a little failure to be equal to a certain trivial situation. Take another trivial case. It is noticeable nowadays, that in traveling by rail, especially in cold weather, a man who has lowered the carriage window to let himself out will usually replace it before closing the door. This is one of the little democratic courtesies which we learn in the train and the omnibus, and which it is so pleasant to see making progress amongst us. But to replace the window when the door is open, and often with only one hand free, is just a little difficult, and one envies the people who can jerk it into place with a motion of their left hand. If you fumble with it, the little act of courtesy is spoilt; the people for whom it is being done are more put out than if you had let it alone. There are many other little instances where bodily skill makes life easier; a whole tableful of people may be disconcerted because you cannot carve properly at dinner. From these cases we naturally pass to dancing and athletic exercises, riding, skating, rowing. Without suggesting that it is a serious duty for every one to be good at all

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these things, we see quite plainly that each one of them is a means of being equal to a certain set of situations, in other words, of being pleasant and serviceable in certain ways and on certain occasions. An old gentleman in a novel by Wilkie Collins says that when he was young, people were expected to bring social qualities with them on social occasions, and now, as he sees that a croquet mallet and ball are the social qualities in demand, he will not fail to employ them. Some people, who detest croquet, may feel a little rebuked by this old gentleman.

In short, as we have been told that all Fine Art is athletic, it would seem that the same is true of some qualities of the lady or gentleman. This was a Greek and mediæval idea, an idea powerful among ourselves almost down to the last generation, and probably, *mutatis mutandis*, it ought not to be lost.

II. Let us turn to another set of defects, still half bodily, and, as I think, highly suggestive for our subject; defects in expression by language. The simplest and typical case is being in a foreign country, and either unable, or very imperfectly able, to speak the language. Under such conditions one is apt to feel oneself simply a brute beast; one cannot explain, nor apologize, nor thank any one for a courtesy. If conversation is attempted, the sentences are certain to be awkward and abrupt, and very likely take a shape which, according to the idiom of the country, is imperative or rude. I remember a German who had really assisted me in explaining my ticket coupon to the guard of the train, saying to me when the explanation was ended, "You can retain your seat." To an English ear the form of that sentence implies a permission which might have been refused; and as I was in the right throughout, I was half annoyed, though in fact the speaker had rendered me a great service. Or again, when we made use of the club hut on a hill in Norway, and some Norwegians, apparently club members, were there, we could not say a word of thanks for the courtesy by which English travelers were allowed to lunch in the room. The Norwegians, indeed, were cleverer than we, for as there was a schoolboy in our party, and also one in theirs, they sent their schoolboy to ours to offer him a piece of cake, a pleasant courtesy, which we had no way

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of returning. Here, too, is a comic incident, with a serious side. A friend of mine, bold, but not strong, in the French language, was staying somewhere in Brittany, and at table d'hote the conversation turned on French and English bathing fashions. My friend did his best to explain that in England we do not commonly wear costumes, but that men and women have separate bathing places. An elderly Frenchman regarded him with a horrified gaze, and then turned to his own party and reported to them in French that the Englishman had just told him how in England bathers do not wear costumes, and the men and women have the same bathing place. My friend was at the end of his French, and was forced to let the impression remain. This is bad enough, but in even more serious matters what an impression of brutality such a misunderstanding might produce! It seems hardly too much to say that if we really knew each other's language half the international complications would disappear. The same is obviously true, in the most literal as well as the most metaphorical sense, of intercourse between different classes, professions, political parties and other distinct elements within the same country. Offence, given and taken, depends very largely upon defects of language.

III. Following the same clue we may now come closer to intelligence and will. In passing, we should once more note the instance of games, speaking now of those which demand some little attention and mental effort, but are in no way athletic. The principle is the same as before. For want of a modicum of skill and practice, in the present case not involving any special bodily gifts, we are unable to be pleasant and useful in certain ways. We may have good reason for the line we take, but the fact remains. One has heard a saying, "If the Queen asked you to play whist with her, and you could not, you would have to be a great philosopher not to feel a fool." Or we may put it more strongly by saying, "If any old person or invalid desired you to play with him——." Then we come to a set of defects almost affecting morality and intelligence, but yet on the whole compatible with "sterling worth." Of these is slowness in recognizing people whom you meet, owing

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frequently to pre-occupation or again to what may be called student's paralysis—the tendency to hesitate too long when some simple thing is to be done suddenly. This may of course give most serious annoyance absolutely without intention. The same result may be produced by strictly physical drawbacks—short sight for example. It has been said of Lord Sherbrooke (Mr. Lowe) that he simply could not see to find the people by talking to whom he might have made friends and become more popular than he was; so that a wholly false impression of him became current. Shyness, impatience, the flurry which prevents one from attending to others, may all be pretty much of this type, and are quite compatible with real readiness to do service. A very young and nervous lecturer, having been conscious of a bustle in the middle of his lecture, observed afterwards to a friend that he feared people had found him dull and gone out. On being answered that Miss X. had fainted from the heat, he exclaimed cheerfully, "Oh, that is all right then." "Except for Miss X.," his friend replied. But the lecturer was not a bad man. There is one opportunity which I should very much like to have over again. After lecturing at Plymouth, in New England, I was going down to the station on my way West, when a gentleman who had been among my audience met me and offered me some flowers. They were some specimens of the Sabbatia which is a striking feature of the wet woods near Plymouth, and which would have been a pleasant memorial of the place. But I was fretted about my journey, and was carrying, I suppose, my bag and coat, and had, or thought I had, no hand to spare for the flowers, and declined to take them with me. It was not bad intention; it was quite unnecessary flurry. My action, however, distresses me when I recall it.

Closely akin to these is lack of conversation, a more inward phase corresponding to ignorance of another's language. It is a good old ideal that a gentleman should be able to talk properly to any one. Inability to do so is bad in any case, but worst of all as a class barrier. It may be urged that this is a symptom of a deeper want and not in itself a cause. But that is only half true. Even if you argue that learning to talk

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means acquiring sympathy and intelligence which you had not before, still it is the case that they can be acquired in this way; but, really, to say that unexpressed sympathy is non-existent is pressing a good idea too far. You may have a true sympathy and understanding, and yet, from comparatively minor causes, fail to give it effect. This inarticulateness is like not knowing the language; and like it, makes you *pro tanto* inhuman.

Another defect closely connected with this is "saying the wrong thing." It is the greatest of errors to suppose that the first thing a man blurts out is what he really meant to say. To say what we mean needs training. What Ruskin says of telling truth applies to it. "Telling truth is like writing fair; it comes only by practice."

Always excluding malicious intention, we may treat inconsiderateness from this same point of view. It means want of facility in picking up a new context. The persons we meet are more or less "unseen pieces" whom we have to construe. If we have no gift or no practice, we construe them all wrong; we fail, that is, to piece together their real thought and wish out of the acts and words which we have to go by.

All these latter and more intimate defects might be brought under the general heading of want of presence of mind. We are supposing that the man or woman has sterling worth; but there is, so to speak, an "uncultivated" margin all round his centre of thought and conduct. It is a margin which his mind has never thoroughly "cultivated"; has never worked over or been worked into, and therefore is not readily present in.

Of course there are people who have a quality which is an opposite of this, and yet is also a defect—the defect of "having all their money in small change," of being equal to small and every-day situations, and to no others. There is no difficulty of principle in this fact. All defects have false opposites which are as much defects as themselves. That is why people are half proud of certain faults; because they seem opposed to faults which are even worse. All sound characters, then, have their caricatures—the false opposites of those faults to which the sound characters are the true opposites. We are looking

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for the nature of the sound character, and the existence of the caricature does not trouble us.

IV. We are now ready to throw out one or two suggestions for a conclusion. If we review these groups of examples, they all seem to be obstructions or impediments; failures, by reason of external or comparatively external incompetence, to express or display the intelligence or good-will that we really have. Either the body, or the mind in some special phase of activity—and we have plainly seen that these two regions are continuous—has not been successfully made instrumental to working out the great ends of life in details, in the sphere of little things or of daily routine.

But these terms "obstructions" or "impediments" are metaphors, and in this reference are a little dangerous. They favor unduly the popular view from which we started. They suggest the notion of "sterling worth" which is really and completely there, but somehow screened off, like the sun behind a cloud.

But we should bear in mind what the "obstruction" in these cases really means. It is this, that a certain margin of positive work, of the same kind as all moral growth and will-formation, has been left undone. Morality, we know, is a *second* nature. All that is good and human in us means that a work has been accomplished; mind and body have been disciplined, impulses have been harmonized, the power of intelligence has asserted itself, right through and in our habits of thought and action. At the beginning of our development we are not a moral self, perhaps not a self at all. The self, certainly at least the moral self, is not born but made. Obstruction of the kind we have indicated, means that this work has been left imperfect.

Thus it is only a first approximation to say in the ordinary sense of the words, that the qualities of ladies and gentlemen are *expressions* of humanity and goodness, and the defect of them is a mere obstruction, a cloud which prevents us from seeing a humanity and goodness which are really there. If we say this, we have to remember that expression gives perfection and existence to what it expresses, and if there were no ex-

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pression there could be nothing to express. The "obstruction" in these cases does not leave the soul and its qualities intact behind it like a fire behind a screen. It means that the process of making the soul actual, of making the man or woman, has never been completed. A quality may be real, though unexpressed in minor ways, if it is expressed in great ones. But for all that it is the less real in as far as it is not expressed.

The idea that goodness or sterling worth is somehow and in some way real, when it seems not to be actual at all, is sometimes a very touching self-deception. We remember Dickens' Joe Gargery, whose father was simply a ruffian, and who always ended any allusion to him by saying, "But my father were that good in his 'art, don't you see."

On a first reading of Aristotle's Ethics we are apt to complain that the excellences of social intercourse—agreeableness, true modesty, and wit or the power of saying the right thing, ought hardly to be prominent in a serious treatise on moral qualities. But on further consideration we see how thorough and effective is the Greek moral idea of a life that embodies the right ratio in every situation—the beautiful life. We certainly need to bear it in mind in correction of the more modern ideal of "sterling worth."

Thus I am led to suggest a simple account of the difference between the "quality" of lady and gentleman, and those solid endowments of intellect, heart, or character, which we have learned chiefly to value to-day. It is a question of nothing other than the degree in which intelligence and good-will have found expression in the detailed behavior of body and of mind. *In this sense* we may fearlessly say that a lady is higher than a mere woman, and a gentleman than a mere man. For, other things being equal, the lady is more of a woman, and the gentleman more of a man. Humanity is in them more thoroughly achieved; something is perfected in them which is present, but not perfected, in the others. The human nature, which is a rough sketch in the one, is a finished work in the other. We may say if we like that to be a lady or a gentleman is only an expression or manifestation of "sterling worth," but, in saying it, we have to bear in mind that expression, if not the whole

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of the reality, is at least something apart from which there is no reality at all.

V. Finally, we must say a word on the troublesome subject of the current usage of these terms in designating social classes.

I am not in the very least degree frightened on behalf of my theory by the existence of sham ladies and gentlemen. No marked type, I should imagine, can exist without giving rise to its caricature. It is as in bad art—the expression of a genuine meaning can in some degree be imitated by a trick, and you can have a thing that looks clever or attractive, and yet has no idea in it, or a bad one. To some extent we are all of us continually playing a trick like this. In trying to be like what we admire we hit off the emphasis wrongly, and reproduce less of its merits than of its defects. The point is too obvious to press, but it is sufficient to account for any quantity of false pretension to qualities which have something admirable in them. And then we may admit that all have defects, and the possession of the qualities is a matter of degree—and of direction. This latter point is highly illustrative of our principle, and the facts seem to me unquestionable, though much everyday prejudice contradicts them. A man who is a gentleman in one direction, in one section of his mind, so to speak, often, if not always, fails to be so in another. And, as a rule, he is a gentleman in what he understands, and less so, or not at all, in what he is ignorant of. I believe it to be merely prejudice which affirms that knowledge and experience generate an overbearing temper. A man who is accustomed to be heard with respect on one subject is often overbearing when he meets with opposition on some other matter, but not, I think, as a rule, in dealing with the matter which he has made his own. It must have struck others besides myself that men unaccustomed to writing seem sometimes to lose all self-restraint when they put pen to paper, and though good enough gentlemen in private life, seem not to know how to behave in the republic of letters. They never were there before, and they do not know the traditions and conventions of the place. So a soldier will become violent in a political discussion, but yet will treat a difference of opinion on a point of military technique with candor and with respect

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for the views of others. We have long ago condemned the doctrine that virtue is knowledge; but this is partly because it has depths of meaning which we have never sounded.

But all this makes no difference to the important question which is, not whether there is much of the false and much failure in the world; but whether there is enough of the true to be recognizable, in the intention which on the whole governs the application of the words Lady and Gentleman.

There is one difficulty in asserting this, on the principle above suggested, which seems to me serious though not fatal. It may be said: "Well, grant that these terms are meant to mean the completest expression of humanity. You will judge, I suppose, where this is to be found, by considering who in fact can be said to make their humanity effectually felt; who are at home and at ease with the greatest number and variety of mankind. And these, surely, are the poor and the manual workers. They are at their ease, comfortable and kindly with a far larger part of mankind than "Ladies and Gentlemen" in the usual sense. On your principle, the application of the term should be reversed, and the qualities usually indicated by them should be condemned as a ground of exclusiveness."

I believe the fact alleged by the supposed objector to be true, and it seems to me very important, and not, as a rule, sufficiently considered. We have to think not merely of the kindness of the poor to one another, but of the free-masonry of the poor and the manual workers generally with one another, both with those of their own country and to a great extent with foreigners. The very definite and direct common experience of work, hardship and simple pleasures, seems to give them a power of being easily at home with one another. It is needless to enlarge on this. I take it to be unquestioned that, unless some special cause of quarrel exists, a workman will be welcomed by others, treated as a friend, and shown what courtesy and hospitality is in their power, pretty nearly all the world over. Of course in laying stress upon this point, I do not mean that this is all that could be said if our object were to form an estimate of their social qualities throughout. But this is the one point in which it might be urged that their life is on

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an absolutely different footing from that of the more leisured classes. "C'est le peuple qui compose le genre humain," and to be in touch with the people, it may be said, is to have mastered the full expression of humanity.

Still, we must never judge by numbers in a question of completeness. We must consider how far the possibilities of human nature, as experience vouches for them, are realized. And it seems clear that what forms the strength of the life of manual workers is also, for our present purpose, its weakness; that is the simplicity of its situations. For this has the result of leaving, as a rule, a great part of human nature in them "uncultivated." We have found that the defects which we passed in review amounted pretty much to forms of inarticulateness; and inarticulateness* is a leading characteristic of manual workers. The frightful language which some of them habitually use means, I take it, merely this; they feel emphatic about something, and the accustomed epithet presents itself because truer modes of emphasis are not at command. Ultra refinement here joins hands with its opposite. The use of "jolly" in University talk seems a counterpart, for inarticulateness, to the costermonger's most deeply tinted epithet. And the best workmen would themselves, I think, deplore as a misfortune incident to the simplicity of their training what might be called the passive form of inarticulateness, inability to meet a new point of view or another person's position with sympathetic appreciation. The power to respond in this way is a thing which I believe they are eager to acquire, but no one who observes them in controversy can think that they have attained it.

I have ascribed certain limitations to the hardness and simplicity of the workman's life. But before concluding this article I should like to refer to an utterance which shows the immense importance of training and family tradition quite apart from differences of income. It is contained in the views ex-

* It is very striking that workmen, especially in the country, will often show an articulateness in their work, which they are trained in, entirely beyond anything they can express in speech, which they are not trained in. They will execute carefully and precisely a piece of work, which you can't feel at all assured that they have understood when you talk it over beforehand.

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pressed by the late T. H. Green in consequence of his work as an assistant commissioner of the Endowed Schools Commission of 1864. He found at that time in the course of his very careful personal investigation, a most remarkable difference between the start in school life obtained by children of the professional and those of the commercial class, owing entirely to the difference of educational standard between the two classes. This difference need not in the least coincide with a difference of income. It depends on the love of culture, and the habit of using books, and speaking English correctly, and the recognition of knowledge as something worth having. It is to be hoped that things are not now as they were thirty years ago. The Board Schools are changing many things, and this perhaps among them. But if it were true that between any two contiguous social strata there was a difference of this kind, or in as far as there is such a difference, man's natural respect for complete humanity will probably insist on marking it by the use of the terms which we are discussing.

Thus I suggest that the qualities pointed out by the words Lady and Gentleman *are* precious to humanity; they are its completion by effective utterance; and, roughly speaking, social usage intends to teach us to look for them in dispositions formed by careful and high-minded education, within families or schools where it has been an object to train the bodily and mental habits to be in detail the efficient expression of human nature at its best.

B. Bosanquet.

London.

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AIMS AND ILLUSTRATIONS IN PRACTICAL ETHICS.

My intention, in this paper, is to consider, in the first place, certain general aims in Practical Ethics, apropos of what Professor Sidgwick calls, in his latest book, "Practical Ethics," the "aims of the London Ethical Society," but which may now be described as the aims of "the Union of Ethical Societies." In connection with the general aims, I shall then give, at considerable length, examples of discrepancies between current ethical views and what I concede to be utilitarian morality. In a subsequent article, I intend to deal with obstacles in practical ethics.

I have explained elsewhere why I have allied myself to the utilitarian school of ethics, and, I may add, that, almost invariably, throughout this paper, I shall adhere to the terms "utilitarian" and "utilitarianism." I do not accept the objections urged against these terms; they are manifestly more convenient than the lengthy "universalistic hedonism"; while the mere hedonism alone, hedonic or hedonistic, although they may, with advantage, be used occasionally to vary the phraseology, are admittedly not sufficiently distinctive.

Referring to the "London Ethical Society," Professor Sidgwick writes: "The first and most important of the aims that we have stated is, 'To assist individual and social efforts after right living.'"

Well, this at once suggests the very big and difficult question—co-extensive with the whole of ethics—What *is* right living?

After enunciating the primary aim, Professor Sidgwick alludes to various obstacles that stand in the way of its fulfillment, and enlarges on the intellectual obstacles, as summed up in the phrase, "the imperfection of knowledge." Later on, however, in connection with what appears to be the second aim of the ethical society or societies, after explaining that he does not say "there is no important difference of opinion

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amongst philosophers," with regard to "the details and particulars of morality," he contends that "it is, at any rate, not sufficient to prevent a broad, substantial agreement as to the practical ideal of a good life." He adds: "And I think that philosophers of the most diverse schools may combine on the basis of this broad and general agreement with each other, and with earnest and thoughtful persons who are not philosophers in their practical ideals."

While it may, no doubt, be said that there is a broad and substantial agreement among philosophers and others as to a considerable part of the practical ideal of a good life, in like manner, it may be maintained, that here, also, there is a wide and substantial disagreement. Indeed, such disagreement is involved in Professor Sidgwick's admission, in effect, that there is an important difference of opinion among philosophers with regard to the details and particulars of morality.

Again, although Professor Sidgwick informs us that it is one of the express principles of the "Ethical Society" that "the good life is to be realized by accepting and acting in the spirit of such common obligations as are enjoined by the relationship of family and society," he goes on to say that, "when we look closer at these common obligations, we find that they are actually determined by tradition and custom to so great an extent that, if we subtracted the traditional element, it would be very difficult to say what the spirit of the obligation was." He proceeds to refer to the historic change in the family relations, and afterwards writes: "When, then, from this historic survey, we turn to scrutinize our own ideal of family duty, how are we to tell how much of it belongs to mere tradition, which the river of progress will sweep away, and how much belongs to the indestructible conditions of the well-being of life, propagated as human life must be propagated?" "The same, too," he remarks, "may be said of social relations—what social classes owe to each other, according to our commonly accepted ideal of morality, depends on traditions which result from a gradual development, are going through a process of change, and are actually assailed by doubts and controversies, often of a deep and far-reaching kind."

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Surely all this seems to show that there is an aim which should take precedence of the aim of assisting efforts after right living, and that that aim may be put thus: To help to discover what *is* right living,—or what is wrong and wanting in the current conception of right living.

I have also to suggest an aim which may be taken in conjunction with, or as supplementary to the aims of helping to discover what is right living and of assisting efforts towards such living. It may be expressed as follows: By means of ample demonstration of how modes of conduct may respectively injure and benefit others, to try to foster, through the sympathies, the desire to do what is right.

A further aim of the "Ethical Society" is to "invite all its members 'to assist in constructing a Theory or Science of Right, which, starting with the reality and validity of moral distinctions, shall explain their mental and social origin, and connect them in a logical system of thought.' " Belonging, as this does, to the domain of theoretical ethics, it is beyond the scope of my paper. Nevertheless, I may observe that, to ask those members of an ethical society who have allied themselves to distinct and very different schools of ethics to co-operate in constructing a *Theory* of right, appears to me to propose an impossibility, if not an absurdity. Mr. Sidgwick seems to expect much from "sympathetic efforts at mutual understanding and interpenetration of ideas." But looking at actual facts, we find there is, as yet, hardly an approach to agreement upon fundamental points. And this aim is not presented as a vague, future ideal, but as a proposal applicable to the present time. Again, with regard to inviting the so-called "plain man" to take part in the theoretical treatment of ethics—or any theoretical treatment that can be called science—surely this means to ask the unscientific to attempt scientific work, without scientific study. Even supposing it should be admitted that "the judgments of practical men as to what ought to be done in particular circumstances are often far sounder than the reasons they give for them," in the aim before us, it is not the practical conclusions, but the *reasons* that are required.

It may be supposed that the second aim of the ethical society,

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not before stated,—"to free the current ideal of what is right from all that is merely traditional and self-contradictory, and thus to widen and perfect it"—practically amounts to the same thing as the aim of helping to discover what is right living. But I hold that the two are not identical. We have not simply to free the current ideal from what is traditional and self-contradictory: there is, in my opinion, a large amount of discrepancy, of different kinds, between it and a more correct or really utilitarian ideal, which would therefore to a considerable extent require to be remodelled, rather than merely widened and perfected.

To exemplify, let us return to the family relations, and after these have furnished us with a set of examples, we shall look for further instances to the social relations. My purpose being to emphasize my contention by bringing together a number of illustrations within a limited space, to refer systematically to the origin and growth of the family and social relations would, of course, be an impossibility. Nor do I intend to make any pronouncement as to changes that may occur in a future more or less remote.*

Proceeding to the family, we shall take first the relation of parenthood. That the duty of endeavoring to preserve health is very specially and in the highest degree obligatory upon those likely to become parents would certainly form part of a utilitarian morality, but it is not—or not to any marked extent —embodied in the current ethical ideal. Then, while popular opinion may be held to condemn the parenthood of those manifestly suffering, say, from tubercular or mental disease, it does not condemn that of many others who would rightly come under the category of the parentally unfit. As regards physical unfitness, I refer, for instance, to those who, while not actually

* I may also add that space does not permit allusion to more than a few of the objections that have been, or may be raised to the instances I mean to give: little more than an epitome of these examples is practicable. And, as regards illustrations, I intend to borrow from Spencer, while part of them—but only part of them, by his own admission—may have been derived from the teachings of Biology, they can all, I consider, be readily upheld from the standpoint of non-evolutional utilitarianism.

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declared to be in consumption, have inherited a strongly consumptive taint, or have otherwise naturally poor constitutions, and those who have become enfeebled by over-work, afflictions excesses, etc. It is hardly necessary to explain that it is of incalculable moment to human well-being that there should be an inheritance of, at least, fairly sound constitutions, and non-inheritance of unsound, or thoroughly enfeebled constitutions. As Mill argues in the "Liberty": "The fact of causing the existence of a human being is one of the most responsible actions in the range of human life. To undertake this responsibility—to bestow a life which may either be a curse or a blessing—unless the being on whom it is to be bestowed will have, at least, the ordinary chances of a desirable existence, is a crime against that being." He might have added—and a crime against society. Of mental unfitness for parenthood, apart from actual mental disease, there is hereditary tendency to insanity, such stupidity or incapacity as results, for example, in a man's proving himself to be an utter failure in whatever occupation he may have engaged, or, in the case of a woman who has never been a bread-winner, one who would justly be described as excessively or incorrigibly silly,—and who, I may add, is generally, if not nearly always specially prone to deceit. (That there is a wide experience in support of this idea is evidenced by the well-known Scotch saying: "Wiles help weak folk.") Finally, as to moral unfitness, the current ethics can scarcely be said to give a distinct veto against the procreation even of the convicted criminal and confirmed drunkard, and still less does it condemn that of those, for instance, who are notoriously shady in business transactions, and those known to be thoroughly unreliable as regards debts and obligations generally: in a word, the conspicuously dishonorable. A utilitarian ideal would begin with endeavor to lessen inherited weaknesses and evil tendencies by striving to promote a public opinion opposed to the multiplication of the weaklings and the unworthy. But such endeavor has no place amongst the duties of the ordinary or current ideal.

Again, the received ethics does not include the duty of limiting offspring, which, in utilitarian morality, would be im-

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perative from different points of view. There is the pressure of population, an immensely important consideration when we take into account the many evils, physical, mental and moral, that spring from undue pressure. As an instance of a moral evil, I may mention Dr. Bain's having frequently remarked to me that, since he can recollect, there has been a large increase of manœuvering and unveracity in connection with appointments of all kinds; a result which he attributes mainly to excessive competition—*i. e.,* overcrowding. Again, while, of late, there has been much talk of the "demoralization of literature," little or nothing has been said as to what is certainly an essential factor in the case, and, indeed, may be called the first cause of whatever deterioration exists—excess of population forcing so many into literary as well as into other fields of work. Then, as Mill writes: "In a country either overpeopled, or threatened with being so, to produce children beyond a very small number, with the effect of reducing the reward of labor by their competition, is a serious offence against all who live by the remuneration of their labors." In respect of the children themselves, that the family should be very small is necessary in order that the parents may do anything like justice to each child. And as to the generality of the mothers of large families, in particular those of the poorer classes, when in addition to household duties otherwise, they try to attend properly, even to the more obvious wants of their children—apart from the laborious and most difficult task of adequate training—unless they are exceptionally strong, they cannot fail to be over-worked and more or less enfeebled. It has been popularly supposed that limitation of offspring was objected to by the evolutional school; but let us note what Mr. Spencer writes in his latest volume on ethics. Referring to a future period, he speaks of the pressure of population being rendered small—"*proximately by prudential restraints,* and ultimately by decrease of fertility." The doctrine referred to is also frequently met by the argument that our pressure of population leads to colonization, and hence to extension of empire. Well, the counter arguments to this, of course, are that we may be over-burdened with territory, that in "providing

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new fields for our surplus population,"—as the phrase goes,—we may have weighted ourselves with an altogether excessive load of responsibility, and increased far too much the risks of war with all its horrors, and its terribly retrograde influence upon the course of civilization; moreover, that we have taken too little into account climatic effects upon races, and the fact that there are regions unsuitable for being inhabited by natives of our country. Once more, the younger members of large families, born when their parents have, to some extent at least, been weakened by the toil and troubles of life, are, for the most part, feebler physically than their older brothers and sisters, and therefore more likely to swell the ranks of the unfit.

Regarding the duties of parents to children, as compared with the current ideal, utilitarian ethics would prescribe a much more stringent acceptation of parental responsibility, in respect to the time and trouble given to the training of children. And it would more clearly enjoin the obtainment for them, by their parents, so far as possible, of a happy childhood, not only on account of the immediate gain of happiness at the period when there is least counteracting care, but also because the cultivation of susceptibilities to enjoyment is necessary for future happiness. On the other hand, it would condemn, much more emphatically, the over-indulgence of children, so common at the present time, and the procuring for them of elaborate and expensive enjoyments in place of simpler pleasures. As Mr. Spencer rightly argues, "a thoughtful beneficence will avoid a profuse ministration to childish desires," and will endeavor to initiate, at least something like a relation between the merits of the child's conduct and the benefits which he or she receives. Again, utilitarian morality would pronounce decisively against the undue bringing forward of children, and hence the undue fostering of self-confidence and self-assertion. Mr. Spencer enlarges on the duty of not showing favoritism in families, and the evil results which spring from undue partiality. But this duty is, I consider, sufficiently recognized in the current ideal, and does not, therefore, come within the range of my paper. What requires mention, however, is, that when the favoritism, so-called, consists merely in exhibiting a different

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attitude to children whose conduct shows that they belong to higher and lower types of character, such behavior is not only defensible, but ethically desirable in the interest of the children. As to families of more mature years, a certain further divergence between the prevailing and a truer ethical opinion would consist in full appreciation of the duty of not allowing parental interference to go beyond advice or injunction—*i. e.*, not to extend to any manner of coercion in the important affairs of life, as, for instance, choice of a career and marriage selection. Again, as regards wealthy parents, whose means enable them to leave their children independent of a money-earning pursuit, utilitarianism requires that they should fit them for the performance of some useful social function, so that they may not be mere "consumers of things which others produce."

Of matrimonial obligations, in later periods, there has undoubtedly been a large increase in the number of concessions made to wives. Nevertheless, as Mr. Spencer points out, in the received ethical views, there is no distinct perception of the fact that it is the duty of husbands to make certain compensations to their wives for the "antagonism between reproduction and individuation,"—their being more closely tied to home on account of the attention they have to give to children, with the consequent limitation of individual development, and the perturbations of health during the child-bearing period. Apropos of the health standpoint, I may add that the current ethics also fail to regard the duty incumbent upon both husband and wife—and upon relatives or friends living together—to make allowance for the depression and a certain amount of irritation which are the inevitable results of special forms of ailment, or general physical weakness, and also of great or very continuous worry. The prevailing morality enjoins upon us the duty of trying to be cheerful, or, at least, of displaying a calm fortitude in illness; but with respect to certain ailments, in particular, such injunction means asking impossibilities; while no consideration is given to the fact that to persons of highly strung nervous organization, suffering is far more unbearable than to those of coarser fibre. Moreover, as Dr. Bain observes in his essay, "Common Errors of the Mind," "to

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bid a man be habitually cheerful, he not being so already, is like bidding him treble his fortune, or add a cubit to his stature. The quality of a cheerful, buoyant temperament partly belongs to the original cast of the constitution—like the bone, the muscle, the power of memory, the aptitude for science or for music, and is partly the outcome of the whole manner of life." As to the continuance of the marriage relation, the received ethics does not countenance any separation of husband and wife for reasons other than those that already suffice to bring about a legal dissolution of marriage. But the utilitarian ideal would include, for example, separation in cases of demoralization through intemperance; or where husband and wife discover after marriage that the moral endowment of the other is essentially defective—when either he or she may be described as thoroughly unreliable. For the person of average morality, and still more the man or woman of high moral character, to be constrained by public opinion to continue a union with one of low *morale* is a serious evil; and the evil is much increased when it involves responsibility for the existence of children inheriting a low moral endowment. I fully acknowledge the practical difficulties, say as regards the maintenance of a wife separating from her husband; but there ought to be, at least, a recognition of the fact that, so far as possible, attempts should be made to overcome these difficulties in the cases I refer to.

Of the duties of children to parents, the popular ideal, although not the popular practice, may be said to include great, if not the utmost attention and almost, if not quite, unfailing obedience to parents, with little or no recognition of the qualifications which utilitarianism, I consider, would steadily keep in view. These are, that the amount of attention and obedience—I mean, of course, as required from adult members of families—should, in great measure, be guided by the character of the parents, the reasonableness or unreasonableness of their demands, the strength and capabilities of the children, their duties otherwise, and their duties to themselves. Mr. Spencer would appear to have been solely impressed with the idea that the current conception of filial beneficence inadequately recog-

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nizes the imperativeness of the "constant attentions, small kindnesses and manifestations of affection" due to parents; and particularly to aged parents, who would otherwise "suffer the weariness of monotonous days." No doubt, such devotion may be due to some, and perhaps to a very considerable number of parents, but certainly not to all, or anything approaching to all. To suppose so, would be to imagine that human beings, in becoming parents, underwent a character transformation. But I shall exemplify false exaction of filial duty countenanced by the current ideal. When the father or mother of an unmarried daughter becomes a chronic invalid, it is supposed to be the daughter's duty to devote herself to sick-nursing, whether she has or has not a turn for the work, although it should even prove extremely trying to her, and irrespective of what may be her aims and capacity otherwise, and the fact of her parents being able to afford hired nursing. I have before me two cases in which daughters died prematurely after being exhausted with a long period of nursing. To be responsible for a human existence, and when that existence is at its best as regards strength and capability, for the father or mother to make it subordinate to his or her comfort or convenience, when the parent's own powers of usefulness are either largely curtailed or have ceased altogether, is a mode of conduct which a hedonic morality would decisively condemn. Many other examples could be given of undue parental exaction—some to the extent of spoiling the life of a son or daughter. Like other virtues, filial duty can readily be carried to excess; and this fact requires to be fully understood.

As to further family obligations, in the meantime, I have merely to add that there is a general approval of assistance given by members of a family to one another, regardless of whether the assistance may involve encouragement to indolence and selfishness. The "bearing of one another's burdens" of the Christian ethics is often referred to as if the greater or more numerous the burdens to be borne, the greater would be the merit of the bearer. But, as Mr. Spencer has argued, to do too much for others not only means that fostering of indolence and selfishness already alluded to, but will, in all likelihood,

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prove more or less injurious to the health of the mistaken benefactor, and hence will curtail his future usefulness to himself and to others.

Before turning to instances from the social relations, it is perhaps well, though scarcely necessary to explain that it is not my purpose, in the meantime, to try to specify what section of persons are specially fitted, what class or classes specially unfitted, (having regard to individual circumstances, and natural constitution, physical, mental and moral), to promote the social changes which utilitarianism may enjoin. As I previously remarked, and have shown in my treatment of the family relations, my object simply is to illustrate points of difference between a utilitarian and the current conception of the duties of life. And as I also said in effect, these points of difference are merely with regard to the present conditions of life. It is impossible to speak with any approach to certainty of future conditions, and hence of modes of conduct affected by such conditions.

The current ethics may be held to approve of continuance in the customary lines of social intercourse and social procedure generally. But, as the individual assimilation, against which Mill uttered such a strong note of warning, has largely increased during the past forty years, deviation from custom, the example of non-conformity has become a more pressing need than it was even when his "Liberty" was written. To refuse to bend the knee to custom, when individual circumstances render the refusal at all practicable, would be in the forefront of utilitarian duties; in order to secure greater liberty of social action; to give more scope for that individual development indispensable to liberty and synonymous with progress; to obtain the immediately pleasurable, as well as the ultimately progressive effects of greater social liberty and increased individuality; to afford more encouragement to "efforts after right living"; because of the utility, in themselves, of varied social experiments. Unless it could be maintained that man had arrived at a state of perfection, and hence had established perfect modes of living, that it is necessary to make experiments in modes of living cannot possibly be gainsaid.

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And the divergence from custom is not merely requisite for the reasons above stated, but also because so many of our social observances are in themselves, to be condemned from the ethical standpoint.

To go to specific cases. In the usual run of social entertainments among the upper and middle classes, so-called, there is far too much formalism, elaboration and display, and where the generality of middle-class hostesses are concerned, these entertainments involve an undue expenditure of money, time and labor, and far too much nerve strain, with results altogether disproportionate. In social intercourse, if we seek to work towards the utilitarian end, we should not merely avoid, as much as possible, formality and needless display, but, setting aside largely a variety of considerations at present paramount, should be guided mainly, in bringing people together, by what are the essential elements of pleasurable intercouse—*i. e.,* at least considerable similarity in interests and sympathies, and, at any rate, some approach to equality of culture and intellectual capacity. These words, and, indeed, the draft of nearly the whole of this part of my paper had been written before I read Mr. Leslie Stephen's "Social Rights and Duties," in which, *i. e.,* in his essay on "Luxury," occurs the following sentence:—"The man whose pleasure in society is the genuine delight in a real interchange of thought and sympathy, who does not desire magnificent entertainment but the stimulus of intimate association with congenial friends, would probably find the highest pleasure in comparatively simple social strata where the display of wealth was no object, and men met, as Johnson met his friends at the club, to put mind fairly to mind, and to stimulate intellectual activity, instead of consuming the maximum of luxury." But *where* is the stratum in which social intercourse combines "high thinking" with "plain living," or, in other words, with no undue display in preparation for guests? I fear nowhere. In ascending from the working classes, each different social set may be described as imitating, or trying to imitate, the one immediately above it (in the conventional sense) with regard to formalism, display, snobbery, more or less general pretentiousness. Social life is directed by women; and not-

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withstanding all that has been claimed for their progress in this country, in our generation, the present condition of our social intercourse—much more objectionable in point of pretentiousness than in the early part of the century—to me, at least, suggests doubts as to their advancement, on the whole. It may be said that increased purchasing power, widely diffused, naturally leads to a large increase of the means of display. To this it may be replied that real mental progress should certainly tend to check *irrational* display. The changes that actually result in greater comfort or convenience, and in what may be called legitimate regard for the æsthetic, are undoubtedly approvable; but, as I do not need to explain, it is the changes beyond these that we have to condemn.

In social intercourse, utilitarianism would also enjoin refusal to be influenced, to the usual extent, by notions of so-called politeness and courtesy. Greater general sincerity in social life is certainly to be aimed at; and in place of much polite insincerity in agreeing, or seeming to agree, in conversation, there should be more frequent expression of frank disagreement. not, of course, put forward aggressively, but with a due, and not undue, regard for the feelings of others. Insincere compliment should also be wholly eschewed. More social sincerity would, of course, mean less mutual distrust—less of the pain, watchfulness and disquietude born of distrust,—or, to put it otherwise, more mutual confidence, involving a gain of ease, freedom and general satisfaction. This holds good as regards, at any rate, the higher types of character. But even with the lower types, more frequent manifestations of candor, fewer manifestations of insincerity, could not fail to have some influence in the right direction.

We often hear praise bestowed upon those who are said to make themselves extremely agreeable to everyone. But being equally pleasant to persons who do not deserve to be esteemed and those worthy of respect, is to help to do away with the distinctions between right and wrong. Strict adherence to utilitarian ethics would, therefore, mean disregarding, at least so far, an erroneous social courtesy, and showing a distinct difference in manner to the estimable and to those whom we

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actually know to be of bad moral character—*i. e.*, not persons whose faults only concern themselves directly, but persons who have shown cruelty to others, who have encroached upon the rights of others, or made unfair use of their advantages over others, the tyrannical and domineering, the revengeful, the thoroughly dishonorable, the intriguing and eminently deceitful. Those exhibiting such dispositions are, as Mill says, "fit subjects of disapprobation;" and, indeed, by persons possessing the opposite qualities, cannot fail to be regarded with strong distaste. It is no doubt well not to "needlessly" offend people; but to seem to be friendly to those who, in the interests of social morality, ought to be strongly reprobated, is, of course, a wholly different matter.

Another revolt against the popular ideas of politeness, countenanced by Mill from the hedonic standpoint, is that of a person's "honestly pointing out to another that he thinks him in fault." Mill meant it to be inferred that what he calls this "good office" should be rendered, not universally, but much more frequently than at present. If the reprover is right, the person reproved is afforded an opportunity for amending his fault, and, if he makes use of it, may thus be saved from the unfavorable opinion of others, and further disagreeable consequences in the future. If the reprover is wrong, he who is censured is able to set himself right in his censurer's estimation, and, probably, in that of others also. I may add that such remonstrance is certainly desirable in the case of the broader-minded—who are least liable to take offence, and are capable of appreciating the advantages of the plain-speaking—but may not, perhaps, be expedient as applied to those on lower levels, intellectually.

In the name of good breeding, the expression of unpopular views is still largely suppressed in general society. But here we have an instance, not of legitimate regard for the feelings of others, but of illegitimate regard for the prejudices and intolerance of others. And what of the feelings of the holders of the unpopular views, who may have been rendered specially sensitive by more or less experience of social buffeting? Disregard of *their* feelings is rarely if ever denounced in the name

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of good-breeding. In an admirable article on "The Ethics of Intellectual Life and Work," which appeared in the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS for April, 1899, Dr. Fowler, of Oxford, writes:—"Orthodoxy, and that not in ecclesiastical matters only, still holds in her hands rewards and punishments which are sufficient to deter the wary, the timid and the ambitious from venturing too far, on their own account, in the independent search for truth." And the restrictions of orthodoxy are felt, in an especial manner, as regards the expression of opinion in social intercourse. President Fowler remarks that "we are not bound to obtrude our opinions upon others, nor, unless we thought it were for their benefit, should we be justified in doing so." Again, I may put my former question, but in a somewhat different form, and ask—"What as to the obtrusion of orthodoxy upon the heterodox?" I do not, however, mean to approve of an altogether indiscriminate expression of opinion. On the other hand, judging from my own experience of the promulgation of heterodox opinions, I do not entertain the fears mentioned by Dr. Fowler as to the production of "an unintelligent and indiscriminating scepticism," or the conduct of life being prejudicially affected by the upsetting of old convictions. A much freer expression of unpopular or unorthodox views would certainly, I consider, be "for the benefit" of others, inasmuch as it would tend largely to the enlightenment of the average person, the increase of toleration and hence the decrease of injustice to others; the spread of truth—through sources, for instance, exhaustively described by Mill in his "Liberty"—and the furtherance of social sincerity. And thus regarded, such freer expression is, I would urge, a part of the utilitarian ideal the importance of which can scarcely be overestimated. From "Liberty of Thought," "it is impossible," Mill observes, "to separate the cognate liberty of *speaking* and of writing." And how to try to combat, at least part of the difficulties which stand in the way of greater freedom of expression in social life, I hope to discuss in a future paper.

Undue display, in addition to being so largely prevalent in social entertainment, is also very conspicuous in house decoration and in the adornment of women. Here, too, hedonic

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morality requires a departure from custom unknown to the popular ideal. Mr. Spencer is almost, if not entirely, justified when he remarks that "time among the women of the upper and middle ranks is largely and often mainly spent in pursuit of the ornamental. To make things look pretty seems to have become with them the chief end of life, and they never ask whether there is any proper limit to æsthetic gratifications." He goes on to speak of perversion of mind and bodily injury resulting from the "insane subordination of reality to show." Mr. Spencer adds that this state of matters is not only "to be ethically disapproved as putting the less important ends of life before the more important ends," but "is even to be æsthetically disapproved" inasmuch as it "defeats itself": a more modified in place of excessive ornamentation being really more artistic and more beautiful.

The present undue pursuit of the æsthetic may, in some measure, be attributable to the writings of Mr. Ruskin. We have to recollect, however, that, with a great many women, it is not the outcome of any distinct views upon art, or of either natural or acquired love of the beautiful, but merely the desire, on the part of Mrs. Brown, not to be outdone by, or to excel Mrs. Jones and Mrs. Robinson. And to blame her for this is to blame average human nature for not being exceptional human nature. It is the highly reprehensible custom or fashion, or rather those who can be held responsible for the fashion becoming a fashion, that we must inveigh against. But having regard to this excessive devotion to the æsthetic, at the present time, it is disappointing to read certain remarks made by Professor Sidgwick in the "Practical Ethics." He goes so far as not only to condone, but even approve of what he describes as the "luxury of the few amid the hard lives of the many," because the costly expenditure of the rich affords adequate opportunity for "the cultivation and satisfaction of æsthetic sensibilities," and thus provides "new sources of high and refined delight." No doubt Mr. Sidgwick had in view the really beautiful, and actual—not sham—æsthetic sensibilities; and, in addition to the æsthetic in furniture and ornamental buildings (he makes no mention of the old china, curios, etc., of ladies'

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drawing-rooms) he refers to literature regarded as a fine art, music and the drama, paintings and sculptures, flowers, trees and landscape-gardening of all kinds. As a matter of fact however, we know that great riches lead to excess of ornamentation and undue display in all its phases. In his "Political Economy," Mill expresses the opinion that immense fortunes are not needed "for any personal purpose but *ostentation* or improper power." To me, it appears that moderate expenditure concentrated upon fewer objects of ornamentation, but those that are really artistic, combined with access to public gardens, art galleries, museums, etc., could sufficiently satisfy æsthetic sensibilities; although the increased "public and collective effort" in this direction, which Mr. Sidgwick contemplates as a possible future substitute for costly private expenditure, might perhaps be desirable. If Professor Sidgwick's remarks had been made at an earlier period than the present, they could, so far, at any rate, have been regarded in a different light. But when pursuit of the æsthetic, or what is supposed to be the æsthetic, has come to occupy an altogether undue amount of time, and to be very widespread, consequently involving a considerable, perhaps large, curtailment of general happiness, this pronouncement coming from Mr. Sidgwick seems very regrettable and surprising. Still more does it appear so when we look at the question from another point of view. The inordinate social value attached to the possession of wealth, purely as wealth—*i. e.,* irrespective of how it may have been obtained, or what are the characters of its possessors—is largely due to the riches affording opportunities for lavish display in its many forms. Hence, to try to cultivate a force of opinion against excessive elaboration and needless display, and in favor of general simplification, reaches a further and high point of importance as a utilitarian aim in helping to lessen the temptation to social mammon-worship, which, the more we consider its direct and indirect effects, the more, I hold, must we deem ethically condemnable.

Of less important, but still, from the hedonic standpoint, very objectionable, social customs, on which Mr. Spencer comments disapprovingly, are the giving of marriage presents to the ex-

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tent that these have come to be expected, and also over-elaborate funerals. Marriage presents are bestowed most lavishly upon the wealthy and those in no need of assistance, and, save by the few friends who really wish to bestow them, are given more or less grudgingly, and as Mr. Spencer remarks, to avoid unfavorable criticism—in the first place, on the part of those immediately concerned, and afterwards that of others, when the presents and the donor's names come to be ostentatiously exhibited, or, what is worse, published in the newspapers. As to extravagant outlay or needless display at funerals, these serve to feed the vanity of the living, or are either a false adherence to custom, or the outcome of a mistaken idea of paying due respect to the dead. It is recognized, Mr. Spencer observes, that funeral expenses "weigh heavily on necessitous families"—and, we may add, weigh unnecessarily upon all those of small means. As he further argues, taking into consideration that "costly burial rites are equally accorded to the bad and to the good, they fail to be signs of respect; and were they generally abandoned, no slight would be implied by the absence of them."*

Again, the custom of making calls, as practised by so many women of the upper and middle classes, is in a great measure a species of insincerity, in addition to involving a needless waste of time and trouble. To go to see those whom we know to be our real friends and those whom we find specially congenial to us is, of course, very right and even commendable. But to spend much time upon mere acquaintances, exemplifies insincerities in different directions; for instance, when a call is made in the hope that the person to be called on will not be at home; that of seeming to be specially interested in those in whom we have little or no real interest; and the greater insincerity of appearing to be friendly, not merely with those towards whom no actual liking is felt, but those who

* Apropos of burial rites, I may mention that I have long been in favor of cremation—for which, also, there are required simpler preparations which dispense with unnecessary outlay.

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are regarded with positive dislike and in absence spoken of in very disparaging terms.

Proceeding to weightier social questions, I have to enlarge upon a far-reaching duty, not included in the current ethics, but certainly, I consider, prescribed by utilitarianism, and which might be expected from the more highly endowed, mentally and morally. That duty is to reject, not to take part in bestowing, and to show disapproval of undue or undeserved social distinctions and forms of homage; the willing acceptance of which displays insufficient altruistic feeling.

In his "Ceremonial Institutions," Mr. Spencer rightly says: —"With an increasing respect for others' claims, there goes a decreasing eagerness for distinctions which, by implication, subordinate them. Sounding titles, adulatory forms of address, humble obeisances, gorgeous costumes, badges, privileges of precedence and the like, severally minister to the desire to be regarded with actual or simulated admiration. But as fast as the wish to be exalted at the cost of humiliation to others is checked by sympathy, the appetite for marks of honor, becoming less keen, is satisfied with, and even prefers, more subdued indications of respect."

To these remarks I would add that, as selfishness may be called the arch-enemy of moral progress, what specially tends to the fostering of egoistic, at the expense of altruistic feeling, must be specially reprobated on ethical grounds.

I quoted, in an early part of my paper, Professor Sidgwick's admission that what social classes owe to each other depended on traditions, was "going through a process of change," and was "assailed by deep and far-reaching doubts and controversies." Amongst false distinctions, we may include a very considerable part of class subordination. To repudiate or ignore such real distinctions as the difference between the cultivated and the uncultivated, the refined and the unrefined, the highly cultivated and the partially cultivated, and so on, would be to remove the chief inducements to improvement from those who stand in need of it. But with the purely artificial distinctions, it is, of course, very different. Before turning to these, however, I wish to touch, in a word or two, upon the disproportion-

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ate regard shown for a certain part of what is embraced by the term refinement. That in the higher social strata, good manners may be said to be almost indispensable, while much is excused in the way of recognized and pronounced moral and mental defects, is an instance of false social distinction; and the verdict of hedonism is in favor of attaching a greatly lessened value to mere manners, in particular, relatively, but also absolutely. Along with external refinement, there may, as we are all aware, be little or no real regard for the feelings of others—which may be described as the root or natural origin of what we call good breeding. On the other hand, for example, a certain *gaucherie* or want of ease and suavity of manner may be due solely to voluntary avoidance of general society; always more or less uncongenial to those whose tastes and aspirations differ widely from its own.

To go to purely artificial social distinctions—the not infrequent use of the words "snob" and "snobbery," in connection with the court paid, say to titled or aristocratic personages, if merely on account of their titles or inherited social position, may seem to testify to the existence of a considerable amount of popular feeling opposed to unearned honoring. Yet this may be called a mere temporary or spasmodic ebullition of feeling on the part of a comparatively small section; and there is certainly no widely-held opinion that the doing honor or showing deference to those who have not earned for themselves any title to distinction is opposed to the furtherance of the social well-being. Nor could it be otherwise while, for instance, loyalty to a sovereign, *quâ* sovereign—*i. e.*, apart altogether from his or her actions and character—is still lauded as a virtue, and we still have with us the whole régime of status (which, as may be remembered, Mr. Spencer regards as a survival of the militant period, to be gradually superseded in the period of industrialism). Let us consider, first, evils resulting to those unduly honored. So long as the majority of their fellow-citizens treat them with the deference, and often much more than the deference, that they accord to distinguished men of science, they are provided with no adequate incentive to exertion. No doubt it may be said with truth, that there has been,

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for some time, a growing feeling among the upper classes that idleness is blameworthy, and a growing tendency to engage in public duties, industrial pursuits, or whatever may be regarded as useful occupation; nevertheless, the life of a large proportion of the aristocracy, and of the non-aristocratic inheritors of large means, may still be called a "life of pleasure-hunting." And of it Mr. Spencer says, and I believe deservedly, in his "Study of Sociology," that "it fails because the appetite for egoistic enjoyments is satiated in times much shorter than our waking lives give us: leaving times that are either empty or spent in efforts to get enjoyment after desire has ceased." Large parts of the nature are left unexercised: there are wanting "the satisfactions gained by successful activity" and "the serene consciousness of services rendered to others." And all this results in "weariness and discontent." Moreover, along with the frequent acceptance of homage that has no claim to be the outcome of social service, there cannot exist, in those deferred to, any vigorous sense of justice—a virtue which societies ought not to starve, but assiduously nourish. Then let us look to the bestowers of the homage, to the multitude who pay court to those who are held to be of special social consequence, no matter how the consequence is derived. Just as independence and truthfulness of character go hand in hand with repugnance to undue adulation, so the taking part in acts of undeserved homage is antagonistic to the development of these high qualities, and conducive to the growth of opposed traits. Or, we may say, the frequent practice of this far-reaching species of social insincerity is, in an especial manner, calculated to render other social insincerities easier, more natural, more habitual; and from those thus habituated, we can scarcely expect any robust moral action.

Another form of undeserved distinction, even more objectionable from the utilitarian standpoint, and which should therefore, I hold, be even more sedulously repudiated, is the bestowal of marks of honor upon those who have not merely failed to earn them, but have merited, on the contrary, emphatic social condemnation. I have before me two instances of men known to be thoroughly dishonorable in money matters,

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who received a majority of votes from certain electoral bodies. And there was no widespread or popular denunciation of the results of the poll on account of the character of the victors: no recognition of the fact that, by honoring those who deserve to be dishonored, we are materially helping to lessen the inducements to virtuous conduct, or to put it otherwise, materially helping to *discourage* "efforts after right living."

I have considered social relations in a purely restricted sense of the phrase—which is convenient for a single paper. If space permitted, it would not be difficult to multiply instances from the social relations, and what may be called personal-social relations—*i. e.,* conduct more peculiarly personal, but having inevitable social effects. There is room, however, for reference to a special duty mentioned by Professor Sidgwick in the end of his essay on the "Aims" of an "Ethical Society" in his "Practical Ethics." The duty alluded to is that of acquiring knowledge which, as "an element of human good," is not, Mr. Sidgwick observes, "sufficiently recognized in our current moral ideal." Apropos of this allusion, I may instance, but merely mention without any enlargement, certain other intellectual duties—all of which are, at any rate, possible to the better endowed mentally—that have been ignored, or almost ignored in the current ideal. There is the duty of truth-seeking, akin to, but not, of course, identical with the duty of acquiring knowledge. There are duties with regard to certain types of literature, in the way of respectively encouraging and discouraging those types. And there are political duties, having reference to mental equipment, of a kind unknown to the average citizen, and scarcely recognized by statesmen.

But apart from these and all further and possible illustrations—the examples previously given sufficiently establish my main contention: that there is a large amount of discrepancy between the current estimate of the duties of life and that which would be sanctioned by utilitarianism.

B. BAIN.

ABERDEEN.

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THE METAPHYSICAL PROBLEM, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO ITS BEARING UPON ETHICS.*

It is, I conceive, becoming for a society like ours, on the occasion of its first constitution, to take a somewhat wider and more discursive survey of the general field of thought within which it proposes to labor than we should naturally expect in its subsequent discussions. Such a survey, even though it should add little or nothing to our positive knowledge of any one department of our subject, will yet have its serious use if it affords any sort of common basis of agreement as to the first principles from which we may, in the future, proceed to the more special and detailed study of particular questions. I would, therefore, invite your attention, this evening, to the following question: What is the general character of the problem which Metaphysical Philosophy has to solve, and how is that problem related to the special subject-matter of Moral Philosophy? We shall perhaps be most directly provided with an answer to this question by a consideration of the difference between the teaching of Ancient and of Modern Metaphysics as to the scope and method of philosophical inquiry. It is, of course, little better than a truism to say that the characteristic which, in the eyes of a modern student, is most prominent in all Greek Metaphysics is its "realism" or "objectivity." Aristotle's definition of "First Philosophy" as the "Science of Being *quâ* Being" is hardly less applicable to all other systems of Greek constructive thought than to his own. In the ancient as in the modern world there were both sceptics and dogmatists, but dogmatist and sceptic were in substantial accord as to the nature of the task imposed upon philosophical thinking. The philosopher was expected, if a dogmatist, to present a positive account of the contents of the Universe of Real Existence, or, if a sceptic, to be ready with his proofs that such an account cannot

* An address read at the Inaugural Meeting of the Owens College Philosophical Society.

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be rendered. In a word, the tacit assumption of Greek thought from first to last was that the immediate object of philosophical investigation is "that which is," and that Philosophy rests—to use an ugly but convenient word—on Ontology. The sceptics of the ancient world, of course, denied that such a thing as Ontology is possible, but for that very reason they went on to deny the possibility of any genuine knowledge, and to obliterate every distinction between a true and a false assertion. That knowledge, if there is such a thing as knowledge, must be knowledge of "what is" the sceptics no more than the dogmatists dreamed of disputing. Hence, the constant aim of Greek metaphysicians was to find in the world of objectively real existences some distinguishing mark by which "the things which are" may be known from those that only "become." To have begun the work of philosophy from the other end by starting with the fact that something is experienced, and then working back from what is *felt* to what is, would have been opposed to the methodological traditions which governed Greek philosophy from its rise in Miletus to its ultimate evanescence in the mystical schools of Alexandria and Athens. Now, it is characteristic of modern Philosophy that it is precisely at this "other end" of the stick that it begins its examination of the metaphysical problem. Instead of starting with the assumption that we all have a recognizable and well-defined concept of "Being," and then going on to ask what object or objects in our experience answer to this notion of true "Being," modern Philosophy starts with the simpler and more concrete notion of something as felt or consciously experienced, and if it discusses the meaning of "Being" at all, it is with a view to defining Being in terms of felt or experienced fact.* Thus, if ancient Philosophy may be called radically objective, modern Philosophy must be spoken of as fundamentally subjective. The one starts with a theory about Reality and works down to a theory of knowledge; the other

* I do not forget Hegel's logic, with its opening discussion of *Seyn* and *Nichtseyn;* but I shall presently give my reasons for thinking Hegelianism no true representative of the specifically modern method in Philosophy.

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starts with an examination of experience and seeks to find, within experience itself, a criterion for distinguishing Reality from mere Appearance. And, hence, if the most "ideal" of ancient philosophers is at heart a realist, the most realistic of modern systems may fairly be called "idealistic" by comparison with the ancients.* This subjective trend of modern Philosophy already reveals itself in the clearest colors in the work of its great originator, Descartes. It is characteristic of Descartes' position as the first thoroughly modern thinker that he seeks the point of departure for his whole metaphysical theory within and not outside consciousness. Instead of beginning with a question as to the marks by which "Being" may be distinguished from "Becoming," Descartes starts his inquiry with a question as to the marks by which certainty may be known from guess-work. The central reality of his system of philosophy is not the ὄντως ὄν of Plato and Aristotle, but the "clear and distinct idea," which cannot be distrusted without distrusting the evidence of our own existence. Modern Philosophy thus from its outset has treated experience itself, and not some more or less external and independent reality, as the ultimate fact from which all philosophic reasoning must set out. The experiential character thus stamped upon modern Philosophy in its cradle was, I need hardly say, equally prominent in the treatment of philosophical questions by our great English writers from Locke to Hume. Whatever we may think of the results of Locke and Hume, there can be no mistaking the nature of the problem they set before themselves, which was to base a constructive philosophy upon an impartial analysis of the contents of experience. How much they accomplished in this direction, and how surely British philosophy in the pre-Kantian era was, even in its errors, marching toward the goal of an experiential Metaphysics, will be best understood by a reader who, having first studied in the school of a scien-

* Cf. Bäumker, "Das Problem der Materie in der Griechischen Philosophie," p. 3. "Das Alterthum Rennt jenen Gegensatz (between 'realism' and 'idealism') noch nicht. Sein Standpunkt ist immer der des Realismus geblieben. Nur missbrauchlich und ungenau redet man von einen erkenntnistheoretischen Idealismus in der antiken Philosophie."

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tific Psychology, will give a sympathetic hearing to Hume's analysis of causation and personal identity, without regard to those strange misconceptions of Hume's argument and meaning which the almost universal acceptance of a modified Kantianism rendered current among our metaphysical writers of ten or twenty years ago. The philosophical departure initiated by Kant and ended by Hegel must, I conceive, with all its attractions, be regarded by the impartial critic as a splendid attempt to divert philosophical speculation from its true problem and proper method. Kant may, in fact, be not inaptly regarded as a philosophical Moses who has led out three generations of metaphysicians into a desert whence his successors have headed, not for a land of promise, but rather for a gorgeous city of mirage and illusion, as dazzling and as unsubstantial as the "cloud-cuckoo-town" of the Attic comedian. In Kant's own hands, perhaps partly because of his Scottish heredity, Philosophy was by no means altogether wrested from her proper subject-matter and appropriate method. In insisting, against the inadequate Associationist assumptions of Hume, that the contents of human experience exhibit an organic structure for which mere Association is powerless to account, Kant was indeed carrying on the work of analyzing experience beyond the point at which Hume had left it, by exposing the baseless character of certain assumptions which had been allowed to vitiate Hume's own analytical inquiries. But, unfortunately for Philosophy, Kant was not content with the recognition of organic structure as a fundamental characteristic of knowledge. By assigning the formal structure of experience to a source independent of its material data, and by attempting to discover the complete system of its structural forms otherwise than by the analysis of experience itself, Kant inevitably prepared the way for the theory of younger and hotter heads than his own, that human reflection is capable of assigning, in anticipation and in independence of the analysis of concrete types of experience, a complete system of the forms or categories in which experience is compelled by some logical necessity to appear. From Kant's "Critiques" the transition was an easy one to the "Logic" of Hegel, with its audacious

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claim to construe *a priori* the "nature of God," or in other words, to prescribe to experience a series of successive forms into which it *must* fall, no matter what its contents.* It should scarcely be necessary at the present time to repudiate for philosophy any such pretensions to the possession of knowledge acquired by some directer and diviner way than that of painstaking analysis of the concrete contents of our experience. The categories of the Hegelian Logic, moreover, have long ago been discredited to a degree which makes it at least remarkable that they should be supposed in any quarter still to have a character to lose. It has been shown that, except by means of a constant covert reference to those concrete experiences which the logic professedly disregards as trifles unworthy of the attention of a philosopher, the logical evolution of category from category cannot be carried out and, in every department of specialized knowledge to which the method has been applied, the supposed necessary procession of stages and concepts has already become patently inadequate to the present state of our information. It will be time to reconsider the claims of the Hegelian Logic when some competent historian confesses himself content with the account of Greek philosophical development, some competent sociologist with the account of the evolution of religion, or some competent physicist with the account of physical processes yielded by the infallible method. The Hegelian philosophy seems for these reasons, in many respects, more akin to ancient than to modern philosophical procedure. With all its imposing regularity of form and wealth of pointed aphorism and apt illustration, it is the creation of a mind of what one may call the scholastic type; a mind furnished, indeed, with vast stores of information and endowed with singular penetration, but at the same time far too profoundly dominated by the passion for system-

*I know that some of the ablest modern exponents have maintained that Hegel's categories are really derived from and not imposed on experience; as Mr. McTaggart puts it, the dialectic is a "reconstruction," not a "construction." As to the fact, I should agree with him, but I am not sure that it does not invalidate entirely the claims made by Hegel and his disciples for "dialectic" as the necessary method of philosophy.

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atization to be trusted as an unprejudiced analyzer of experience. The Hegelian Logic may, perhaps, be said to be the fullest expression in modern, as Aristotle's "Metaphysics" was in ancient literature, of the conviction that the world as it really is is a system with an organic structure of its own. What we, from the special stand-point of modern thought, find wanting in both Aristotle and Hegel is the further conviction that every element in the structure of that system is itself ultimately matter of experience. It is not the quality of being a coherent system merely, but the quality of being a system which in all its parts contains experience and nothing but experience that a philosophy which starts from consciousness and experience needs to take as its ultimate standard of truth and of reality. We are thus led, in pursuance of the trend of thought first initiated by Descartes' substitution of consciousness for "being" as the central point of philosophic discussion, to conceive of Metaphysics or First Philosophy as consisting in the attempt to discover the nature of Reality, as distinguished from Illusion, by the analysis of experience in its full concrete character. The chief thought which will serve as our guide in the treatment of metaphysical questions from this point of view is that the structural forms revealed by the analysis of human knowledge, at any level of development, must themselves be regarded as having grown out of previous experience, and as being conditioned by the material character of the experiences on which they are founded. We may, perhaps, illustrate this conception of the relation of form to content in our knowledge by the very similar relation between the structural peculiarities of a physiological organism and its material environment. The reactions of any organic type against stimulus may be said to be ultimately conditioned by two sets of circumstances, the congenital peculiarities of the organism itself and the special character of the relevant elements in its surroundings. The modification of either set of conditions at once leads to a corresponding modification of the resultant reactions. A cat will not behave in the presence of stimuli in exactly the same manner as a dog, nor a neglected and half-wild dog in the same manner as a domesticated and well-nourished one. Here

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we have an exact physiological analogue of the relation between form and matter in a piece of human knowledge. The physiological organization corresponds precisely to the organized structure or frame-work of apperceptive categories into which a novel piece of information has to be fitted, the various stimuli from the external environment to the fresh pieces of perceptual experience which this frame-work assimilates. And, as in all cases of "apperception," the act of assimilation affects both the interrelated elements. Just as the new piece of perceptual experience acquires added significance by being brought under some familiar category, so the category itself (*e. g.*, that of "cause") derives a modification of meaning from being made to embrace the fresh case or set of cases. The mistake committed by Associationist disciples of Locke in supposing that the actual shape which our knowledge takes can be accounted for by the perceptual factor only would be precisely matched or caricatured if one could come across a physiological theory ascribing all differences in reaction upon stimulus exclusively to the difference between the surroundings of one animal and those of another. Similarly, the Kantian assumption of a typical human mind fitted out, in anticipation of experience, so as to think by the aid of twelve given categories and no more affords a precise parallel to the pre-Darwinian notion of an original creation of a definite number of fully characterized animal species. But now mark a further point. Though, in accounting for the varying behavior of an organism when confronted with various stimuli, we have to reckon with two distinct interacting factors, those two factors are not ultimately independent of one another as to origin. For, on the one hand, the congenital peculiarities of the organism in question are held to be immediately due to variations of germplasm, which are themselves, in part at least, known to be conditioned by features of the environment, *c. g.*, the nutritive conditionof the parent organism at the time of fertilization, and, on the other hand, the character of the environment itself is frequently conditioned by the fact that it has in the past served as environment to this special class of organism. Thus, insects fertilize by preference flowers of certain colors; this leads

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to intensification of those particular colors, and this presumably in turn to still more energetic preference of these flowers for fertilization. Sheep turned out to graze upon the waterless plains of Australia are said to modify the character of the soil in the direction of more permanent retention of moisture, and this in turn is likely to affect the behavior and the fortunes of future flocks of sheep inhabiting the same pastures. And when you come to deal with any department of human life, it is still more manifest that the environment into which each of us is born is immeasurably different, even as regards its purely physical aspects, from what it would have been had not England or America served for countless generations as the environment of human lives. The patent break-down of the attempts to determine *a priori,* from the mere notion of organic structure, what the specific structural forms of correct thinking and true knowledge ought to be, as well as the character of all our positive experience of the differences between various grades of intelligence, irresistibly suggests that this relation between germinal variation and environment has its analogue in the relation between form and matter in the organized whole of human knowledge and experience.* We are clearly bidden to assume, at least as a working hypothesis that the structural forms or *categories* (to keep to the traditional name), according to which the human mind, at various levels of intelligence, groups its experiences, are themselves conditioned by the character of previous experience.

From this point of view any such structural form, on its

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*I may, perhaps, make the precise force of the argument more apparent by one or two concrete examples. Let the reader who inclines to admit the possibility of drawing up a series of categories valid for all intelligences, independently of the *matter* of their experiences, ask himself the following questions: (1) Can we assert that the categories which are sufficient for the organization of human knowledge would be adequate, or even significant, for beings whose experiences consisted, to use Spinoza's phraseology, of modes of some Divine attribute other than extension? If you say "Yes," how do you know it? If you say "No," are you justified in denying the possibility that such beings may exist? (2) To illustrate with reference to the most famous *a priori* system of modern philosophy,—which of Kant's categories is competent to express (*a*) the relation between the physical and the psychical as conceived by Spinoza and by modern psychology? (*b*) the modern scientific conception of an organism?

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first emergence, would be something qualitatively new, and therefore incapable of being analyzed into a mere combination, in accordance with the laws of Association, of pre-existing materials. At the same time, though unanalyzable into such a combination, it would owe both its existence and its quality to pre-existing elements of form and of material data. Whether the appearance of such a qualitatively new structural form or category be supposed to take place within the experience of a single individual, or to be brought about in the course of generations by the influence of natural selection in preserving advantageous and eliminating disadvantageous germinal variations is a further question which has no bearing upon our present argument.* The point of immediate moment is for us to see that if such a view, which I believe to have been held in an undeveloped form by no less a philosopher than Aristotle,† be correct, two very important inferences can be drawn as to the true nature of the problem and method of Metaphysics. The first is that sober Metaphysics can have nothing to do in future with any such attempt, as that made by Kant in his table of categories, to draw up once and for all a complete system of such structural forms possessing universal validity and applicability to all grades of thought and experience. Even within the limits of our own human experience, structural forms will themselves be relative to the special material of which experience, at any level of intelligence and in any department of inquiry, is composed, and hence the "categories" of one race and age may be widely different from those of another. To the Greek mind, for instance, it appeared self-evident that in every case of interaction between two objects

* The second alternative would give us something very much like the well-known theory of Mr. Spencer that categories are "*a priori* to the individual, *a posteriori* to the race." But I have carefully avoided making any assumption about the *direct* inheritance of the structural form themselves. "The transmission of acquired characteristics" is not a subject upon which the mere philosopher has a right to dogmatize.

† At least, it is thus that I understand the famous discussion of the part played by "induction" in the formation of axioms. ("Posterior Analytics," ii., 19.) For Aristotle is there considering not the evidence for the validity of axiomatic truth s but the psychical history of their growth from sense-experience.

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one must be "active" and the other "passive"; to minds like our own, brought up under the influence, to a greater or less degree, of modern mechanical conceptions of the conservation and transference of energy, the distinction appears useless or even meaningless.† It is by the analysis of the concrete experiences in question, and by such analysis only, not by any *a priori* activity of pure thought, nor by any appeal to the classifications of logical text-books, that the structural forms, or apperceptive systems, or "categories" requisite for the organization of any body of human experience must be detected. In the absence of the experience no amount of ingenious speculation will enable the category to be discovered beforehand. As already suggested in a foot-note to a previous page, modern physiological and anatomical science has already provided us with a category—that of "organism"—undetected so recently as a century ago, even by the genius of a Kant. It is true, no doubt, that the notion of "organic unity" already appears in Schelling and Hegel; but its appearance there confirms our view of the matter; for it is intimately connected with the interest in biological discoveries which is so characteristic of both those philosophers as contrasted with Kant. And it would be at least presumptuous to deny that future scientific research—physical, biological, and sociological—may lead to the formulation of new categories lying as far beyond the scope of our present philosophizing as those mechanical and biological concepts which have become familiar to ourselves lay beyond the purview of Aristotle. So far, then, as this, Mr. Shadworth Hodgson seems to be conceiving of the fundamental problem of Metaphysics with perfect accuracy when he lays it down that the task of metaphysical philosophy is the analysis of experience without assumptions. Indeed, we should be justified in going further, and maintaining that genuine Metaphysics is not only an experiential science, but the only science which in the fullest sense is entitled to that name. For it is the

* The remark is, I believe, borrowed from Mr. Schiller's "Riddles of the Sphinx." It is noticeable that even Kant keeps up a distinction which had become quite superfluous in the definition of "Reciprocity" as "Wechselwirkung zwischen dem Handelden und Leidenden." [Kr. der R. V., p. 106 of Ed. II.]

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only science which approaches the range of human experience in its entirety without any preconception as to what it is going to find; unless, indeed, the assumption made by every science as a provisional hypothesis, that our search after knowledge will probably meet with some result, be regarded as such a preconception. Every other science begins its investigations into experience with assumptions either as to its scope or its quality which seriously affect the value of subsequently obtained results. Physical science of all kinds, for instance, apparently begins with the assumption that the material of which experience is composed is something possessing at least the characteristics of spatial form, extension, and movement. Whatever does not possess, or cannot be seen by us to possess, these characteristics, is, ex hypothesi, excluded from such a survey of the field of experience as is taken by strictly physical science, either permanently or until it has been discovered to possess these properties. Hence it follows that physical science, aided by the most painstaking observations and the most delicate methods of exact measurement, can never succeed in describing more than a fragment even of those experiences upon which its conclusions are based. Thus, you may work through a book on chemistry or electricity almost without discovering that there are such things as human thoughts or desires or emotions. And yet, if the full and complete description of the experiences involved in the performance of a chemical experiment could ever be obtained, we should find side by side with the facts and relations symbolized by the conventional signs of the chemist other facts, such as the hopes and fears, the anticipations and apprehensions of the experimenter, which require for their description an entirely new terminology of a non-physical kind, and positively refuse to submit themselves to any process of direct physical measurement. In other words, chemistry and the other physical sciences deal only with one aspect of the experiences which they analyze and describe, to the total exclusion of another equally real and no less important aspect. For the purposes of a physical science which knows its own business, this limitation is, of course, no defect, but a very real gain; it is only by ignoring the psychical aspects of

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our experiences that it becomes possible to concentrate the attention upon the full and complete description of their physical qualities. But when, as sometimes happens, the assumptions necessary to physical science are put forward as finally and certainly true statements about the contents of the universe as a whole, it becomes at once important to remember that there has been all along another side to every concrete experience, a side of which the physicist has purposely taken no account in the formation of his theories, and that the physical theories are therefore necessarily applicable only to a part of experienced reality, a part, moreover, whose relation to the whole happens to be unintelligible to us.* The consequence of this limitation of purview is that when physical science is confronted, sooner or later, with the existence of psychic states possessing none of the characteristics regarded by it as proper to its subject-matter, it has either to confess the inadequacy of its results as an account of the ultimate character of experienced reality or to lose itself in fantastic attempts to identify the qualities of psychic states with those of extended and moving objects, thus giving rise to the jumble of confusions which make up our popular materialistic philosophy. We may thus see that no science but one which approaches experience without any preconceived limitation of its scope or theory as to its quality can succeed in presenting us with an account of its main characteristics which we can accept as fully and finally true. Every other science must at best offer us statements which might be finally true if there were nothing in the world but its own special subject-matter, but are actually vitiated to an unknown extent by the fact that they hold good only of a limited portion of the whole field of experience, related in an

* Of course, I am not here attempting in any way to deny what is *meant* by the "scientific materialists." When you have granted in the most unreserved way that every mental state, say the pain of a tooth-ache, has some precise physical equivalent, say certain motions or tendencies to motion in the molecules of a particular cerebral area, it still remains true that the experience of the pain is, as an experience, specifically different from any experience of motion. And so in all other cases. Whether the fundamental assumption of the "scientific materialist" is as well founded as is currently believed would be an interesting question, but it would be irrelevant to discuss it here.

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as yet undiscovered way to other parts of which the science in question takes no account. In fact, we might say, even if "materialism" should be true, it is for the metaphysician and not for the physicist as such to prove its truth. It is thus to Metaphysics, conceived as the analysis of human experiences without assumptions, and to Metaphysics only, that we can look for any information as to the structure and general character of the world of experienced reality as a whole. The second point of which I spoke just now is one which will, as I think, take us a step farther in the direction of a true conception of philosophic method than Dr. Hodgson has seen fit to advance. Hitherto we have regarded it as the business of Philosophy to analyze the contents of different types of human experience, and so to discover their structural forms. Such a task, however, if undertaken without any further ideal to guide it, would at best yield no more than a "Phenomenology" of the Human Mind, *i. e.*, a comprehensive picture of the formal characteristics of different types of experience arranged in whatever order we might regard as corresponding to the actual history of the growth of experience-forms. To convert such a Phenomenology into a genuine Metaphysic we require some standard, based not upon *a priori* assumptions, but upon the concrete character of human experience itself, by which to determine what type of experience corresponds most nearly to our concept of an experience unvitiated by arbitrary assumptions and limitations. We need, in fact, some modern "criterion" answering in a general way to Descartes' "clear and distinct idea" as an internal test of finally satisfactory truth. Now, a study of the way in which our apprehension of facts varies with the growth of our intelligence will readily indicate what this standard ought to be. If you take any judgment in which we attempt to register some fact or limited series of facts of experience, you will see at once that while part of it is a description of what is directly given in the present experience, another part of it is made up of various assumptions which are not directly warranted by the experience under description, but inferred with or without warrant from other experiences not actually present. Thus, even in so rudimentary a judg-

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ment as "I feel cold" or "something is moving," it is easy to see that we have, over and above the expression of a present experience, elements of theory based upon what lies outside the experience professedly described. In the first of these judgments, for instance, the "I" is clearly meant to stand for something not given, or at all events not given in its entirety, in the experience called "feeling cold." Its very significance lies in the fact that it denotes an attempted synthesis of that experience with others which are not, in their original form, now present. Again, if we compare the expression given to what would commonly be called "identical" experiences (*i. e.*, experiences in which the extra-organic conditions and those organic conditions which are independent of the state of the highest cerebral organs are identical) by experiencers of different degrees of intelligence or training, we shall readily be led to see that the additional elements imported into our accounts of an experience may themselves either be accurate expressions of a wider whole of experience, within which the special fact to be described forms a constituent element, or they may involve assumptions which are not known to be veritable or are even known to be incapable of verification by any experience of human beings. Thus we get two distinct classes of judgment, in each of which what is asserted takes us beyond the narrow limits of a momentary experience and attempts to establish a connection between the present and other actual or possible experiences. In the one class, the superadded elements in the judgment stand at the best for experiences which we feel confident we should have under certain definitely ascertained conditions physical and psychical, and at the worst for experiences which, if we cannot confidently assert that they would be actual under precisely formulated conditions, are yet analogous with other experiences so known, and contain nothing in conflict with the general character of experiences received under the conditions contemplated in our judgment, so far as those conditions are realizable by human beings. In the other case, the additional elements are of such a kind that when you come to formulate them you perceive that your statement involves elements inconsistent either with the formal conditions of

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human experience in general, or with the special conditions under which the experiences in question are supposed to be given. As simple examples of each of these types of assertion, I suggest the following: I. (*a*) "If I cross Farmer B.'s field and he sees me, he will take out a summons against me for trespass;" (*b*) "If we could reach the moon, we should find it devoid of atmospheric air;" II. (*a*) "I intuitively perceive that the dictates of my conscience are the laws of my Creator;" (*b*) "I saw a spirit last night." For the sake of brevity, I will venture upon a piece of somewhat unsightly terminology, and will call the two classes of judgments the cases of the presence of "experiential" and of "symbolic" co-elements respectively in the expression of an experience, where by "symbolic co-elements," I mean such as are manifestly at variance either with the general conditions of human experience or with the special conditions of the kind of experience under consideration, and are therefore clearly a departure from accuracy in our account of our experience. Now it at once becomes manifest that the whole object of scientific investigation is, as far as possible, to banish from our accounts of the way in which one moment of experience is connected with another all merely "symbolic" co-elements. The very reason why much of my thinking strikes me as unsatisfactory and in need of correction by fresh investigation and fresh knowledge, is that I find it full of "symbolic co-elements," that is, of theories about the interconnection of experiences which involve contradictions of the kind just mentioned. Truth, for each one of us, means just such a set of theories about the interconnection of experiences with one another as involves no contradiction of other facts of his experience. It is, no doubt, a fact that we commonly regard a theory as wrong if it is in contradiction with experiences of other competent and trustworthy witnessses, even though it seems in harmony with all our own observations; but that is because the competency and trustworthiness of our authorities is a fact of our own experience and to deny it would thus introduce contradiction into our own inner life. Of what lies, assuming that anything lies, absolutely outside my own experiences and affects my accounts of them neither for har-

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mony nor for contradiction, I may fairly say, "If it be not true for me, what care I how true it be?" And in the same way, the human race, as a race, has no interest in the academic question whether there may not be whole series of experiences (like the unknown attributes of God in Spinoza's system) from which the human organism is forever debarred. A full, self-consistent description of specifically human experience would be the whole truth for human beings, and it would be idle to ask after the possibility of a Beyond absolutely unrepresented in the perceptions of the human organism. That the world of human action and knowledge is in its entirety a function of a special psycho-physical organism is a truth we cannot for a moment afford to ignore, whatever may be our ultimate views on the problems of "Realism" and "Idealism." It is, moreover, as I shall point out in a later passage, a truth of considerable import for Ethics. The guiding principle of scientific thinking, then, as expressed in the familiar Law of Parcimony (entia non sunt multiplicanda præter necessitatem), is that, so far as possible, every link established by scientific hypothesis between perceived facts should be itself in its turn of such a kind as to be matter of direct human experience under definitely assignable conditions. The full realization by any scientific doctrine of this demand is what is required to make the doctrine itself in its entirety actual matter of fact or experience. Where the full realization of the demand is, for any reason, out of the question, but the hypothesis at any rate contains nothing which can be proved inconsistent with the conditions under which the supposed experience would have to be received, so far as they are known to us, we call it a possible or a probable hypothesis; where, on the other hand, we feel sure that our accounts of natural processes contain "symbolic co-elements," terms which could under no conditions be known to us, or not under the conditions assumed in our theory, the contents of direct experience, our theory is itself purely "symbolic;" that is, it is a representation in terms known to be inadequate and to some extent positively misleading of processes which the present state of our knowledge will not permit us to construe in their true character. Thus, to take an example, most

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persons would, I presume, regard the corpuscular theory of matter as so probable as to approximate to the character of a proved truth, on the ground that it fairly represents a state of things analogous to what we actually perceive and conceivably itself capable of being directly perceived had we sufficiently powerful aids to the senses. The hypothesis of the existence of the light-transmitting ether, on the other hand, seems at best, a "possible" hypothesis, for it must surely be very doubtful whether any conditions can be conceived under which the existence of such a medium could be revealed to direct perception.* Now, it is ultimately only in Metaphysics that we can expect to meet with an account of experience free from all such symbolic or unreal co-elements. For so long as any proposition only enables us to connect the content of the present moment of experience with a limited number of other experiences of some special quality, without regard to the relations of that experience to other kinds of experience of which the special science with which we are dealing takes no account, there is always the probability that many features of our theory would be found to contradict the conditions imposed upon experience of the special kind in question by its connection in one system with other kinds of experience. In other words, except in a science which explicitly takes the whole frame-work of experience without selection or limitation as its object, we can never be sure that we have excluded symbolic features from any theory. We thus see what the standard and what the problem of metaphysical science for the future ought to be, if the science is to be based upon purely experiential foundations. The problem before us is to frame a general concept of the universe considered as a system of experienced contents, of which every term is in turn itself similarly composed of contents of experience and of nothing else, or, to borrow the apposite phrase of Avenarius, to describe the contents of the universe in terms of "pure" experience. And

* It is of course true that *every* science must in practice make abstraction from the greater part of the concrete complexities of perceptual experience. But the ideal of a completed scientific apprehension of reality is only approached in so far as we are able, at will, to say with accuracy what and how much our abstraction has removed.

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the method of Metaphysics is dictated by the nature of the problem. From the foregoing description of "pure" experience, it is clear that the one and only test of purity,—that is, of the absence of symbolic co-elements,—in an expression of experience is that it should be capable of being connected with other experiences by links, every one of which is known as containing nothing but what is or would be matter of experience under definite conditions. In other words, the test of the truth or "agreement with reality" of a philosophic system can only be sought in a thorough-going systematic unity between elements, every one of which is under known conditions a content of experience. The full completion of the task thus imposed upon Metaphysics would clearly involve complete insight into the quality of every kind of experienced content and the nature of its relations to all others, or would, in fact, only be possible to omniscience,—that is, to a consciousness to which all the experiences which make up the mental lives of all sentient being should be present at once in their entirety. But even for creatures like ourselves, who are compelled to view the universe from our own limited standpoint, and to remain without even the means of conjecturing what types of sentient life may exist over and above the few with which we are familiar, it is, at least, possible to attempt by analysis of experience—so far as it is known to us—to construct a general outline sketch of the features of a system corresponding to the ideal of "pure" experience. If such an outline be capable of construction, there must no doubt remain the further uncertainty whether there might exist contents of experience, inaccessible to ourselves, the knowledge of which would modify our conception of the general structure of the world of experience. But the doubt would, as I have already said, from the nature of the case, be merely academic; an account of the most general characteristics of specifically human experience in which no aspect of that experience was disregarded and every aspect represented by terms themselves resoluble into experiences would, at any rate from the human standpoint, be an ultimate appreciation of the universe. And hence we may, I think, finally allot to Metaphysics the task of discovering

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by analysis the formal characteristics of a world-wide pure experience.

I am, perhaps, approaching that side of my subject which will most keenly interest some members of our society when I go on to ask how such a notion of the metaphysical problem as I have roughly tried to indicate will affect our attitude towards the special questions of ethical philosophy. That our views as to the scope and method of Ethics cannot be left altogether untouched by our attitude on these ultimate problems will scarcely be disputed, and the main points of contact will, I think, be found to be two. In the first place, it should at once be clear, that if our theory of the nature of Metaphysics is correct, the so-called "Metaphysic of Ethics" must be placed at the end of ethical inquiry as its completion, and not at the beginning as its basis. For the "Metaphysic" of Ethics, upon our theory, can mean nothing but the analysis of ethical experiences and the testing of the special structural forms of ethical theory by the standard of "pure" experience. In other words, we must have an unprejudiced account of the ethical facts and theories which play so large a part in human life before we proceed to determine the ultimate validity of ethical conceptions from the standpoint of metaphysical criticisms. Every system of Ethics which begins with metaphysical theorizing about the ultimate nature of duty or of the self must be "suspect" as probably containing assumptions of a "symbolic" kind which may vitiate all its subsequent conclusions. In Ethics, as in other departments of knowledge, the function of Metaphysics will be to criticize and evaluate the results with which unbiased examination of concrete experience presents us, not to determine for us beforehand what we are to find in experience. There remains, in fact, upon our view of the case, no difference in principle between the relation of Ethics to Metaphysics and that of the physical sciences. In both cases the problem that lies first of all to hand is the examination of a certain mass of experiences possessed of common qualities and the detection of principle, uniformity, or structure within the mass. It is only when such an experience-mass has been considered in itself and reduced to something like systematic

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form that we can trust ourselves to raise the question whether the various systems thus obtained can be brought together into a single system of pure experiential type. To invert this order of proceeding is to violate the first principle of modern philosophizing, that experience is to be analyzed without preconceptions. We must no more let ulterior metaphysical theories dictate to us as to what we may expect to find in the field of ethical inquiry than we should allow them to prejudge the result of a physical experiment. It is after the ethical experience has disclosed its own characteristic structure to unbiassed examination of the concrete facts of moral psychology that Metaphysics should step in to *test,* by the standard of a world-wide "pure" experience, the construction so obtained. We may, however, carry the inference from one general concept of philosophical method a step further. For the same standard of "pure experience" which, when applied universally, supplies us with our test of metaphysical truth, may be, within the restrictions imposed by the nature of the special subject-matter, applied directly to the facts of the ethical experience themselves. It will, if our concept of the scope of philosophy be adopted, become our duty as students of Ethics to aim at creating a science which shall give a comprehensive account of all the facts connected with the ethical life of individuals and of societies in terms purged of all elements that can be detected to be "symbolic." Such an account would, of course, from the metaphysical point of view, be no more than provisional, for it may well be the case that assumptions which, so long as you remain within the limits imposed by the selection of moral life as the object for study, appear to contain nothing but what is translatable into terms of experience, will be found by the metaphysician, when he comes to ask after the relations between the ethical facts and other parts of experience, more or less vitiated by "symbolic" accretions. But for Ethics itself, such a picture of the various levels of the moral life would have supreme value as the last word which the ethical conscience, uninformed by metaphysical criticism, has to utter about life and the world. Work of this kind could be carried out on either of two converging but independent lines. On

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the one hand, it would be the duty of the student of morals rigidly to test by the standard of "pure" experience all the metaphysical or semi-metaphysical assumptions which are often dignified with the name of "ethical postulates." Such concepts, for instance, as Free-Will, Obligation, and Desert would have to be taken out of the obscurity in which they have commonly been left by those who have made the freest use of them and restated, as far as they will bear restatement, in terms such as to reduce them to recognizable psychological facts.* Until this criticism has been performed for the leading notions of Ethics, it is impossible to say how much or how little their value as contributory to a true account of the phenomena of the moral life may be, and it is difficult to make either assertion or denial of their validity. In the second place, an Ethic of experience would have before it a constructive task of proportions too vast to permit of execution by a single mind, yet capable of being in some degree discharged by the humblest of sincere students of the various ethical experiences. I mean the task of obtaining a description in terms which stand for definite psychological fact. We want to know, for instance, precisely how moral obligations are regarded by different classes or professions in the community and by communities of very varying antecedents and degrees of civilization. For instance, how does the moral life of a doctor compare with that of a lawyer or a clergyman? does "duty" present itself to each of the three under the same general aspect? or are there discoverable differences of point of view? What view does each class take of particular duties, such as those of truth-speaking, financial honesty, and so forth? How do the ethical judgments of dwellers in the town differ from those of dwellers in the country? *E. g.*, on what grounds would a jury composed of either class find a recommendation to mercy? Or, to take instances of questions which can be answered without the far-reaching statistical inquiries that those already mentioned would require, do I find that my own ethical experiences

* I may refer, in passing, to Nietzsche's brilliant little work, "Zur Genealogie der Moral," as an example of the kind of critisism which we have here in view.

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are accurately described by the language ordinarily employed in the text-books? For instance, how does the verdict of my "conscience" upon a wrong act resemble, and how does it differ from, my discomfort on realizing that I have made a social blunder? Do I find the pains of an awakened and guilty conscience as mere emotions so unpleasurable as to outweigh all the enjoyment derived from transgression? What do I personally detect in myself on the occasion when, as the phrase is, I "feel bound" to perform an unpleasant act? Such sample questions as these will suffice to show how vast a field of inquiry is open to the student who seriously desires that ethical theory should be expressed in language which accurately expresses psychological fact, and they will surely show, also, that the field is one in which a society like ours may do admirable work if each of us will only honestly cultivate his own little corner. The goal of such an undertaking, if it could be completed, would, of course, be the construction of an all-inclusive Phenomenology of Ethics in which every typical stage and variety of the moral life of men should be assigned to its proper place in the development of ethical experiences from their first rudimentary beginnings in the inarticulate feeling of "This is not so, but I wish it were," to their final transfiguration into a world-wide practical religion of mutual good-will and forgiveness. Nor would the concept of the ideal of pure experience be without its value as regulative of actual moral practice. The practical analogue of a scientific theory in which the whole of experience, and nothing but experience, should be mirrored would be a healthy social life in which each and every member of the community, while performing just those functions which he is best fitted to contribute to the life of the whole community, should, in virtue of the inherited organization and traditions of society, by the same course reach the fullest individual satisfaction of which his nature is capable. What "symbolic" co-elements are to our knowledge the existence of large classes whose energies are exhausted in drudging for the almost exclusive benefit of others is to our social and political institutions—an ultimate contradiction between their pretensions and their accomplishments, between systematic form and material

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content. And if the process of the purification of science is furthered by the expulsion from scientific thought and expression of the unmeaning products of perverted metaphysical reflection, the purification of morals calls first and foremost for the expulsion from our theory and practice of all that is based upon similarly false metaphysical concepts of the relation of soul to body and of the individual to the social organization. What we have to get rid of here is, on the one hand, the theory and practice of asceticism which rests upon exploded assumptions as to the separability of "soul" from body, and unproved and unprovable assumptions as to the relation of man and the world to "another world;" and, on the other hand the various theories and moral codes which arise from misconceiving the relation between the individual and his social environment, whether the mistake take the form of treating society as a mere external means to the individual's gratification, or that of regarding it as a sort of fetich to which he is "bound" to immolate himself, irrespective of anything it may have done or attempted to do for him.

To construct a theory of Moral Values based from first to last upon the conception of the ideal society as a *healthy* organism with the individual for a *healthy* functioning cell in that organism,—this is, I take it, the final goal of an "Ethics within the limits of Pure Experience." The concrete character of such an ethical ideal may, perhaps, be made somewhat clearer as follows: The ultimate ideal of a purely experential Ethics we have asserted to be the construction of a society in which the combined coöperation of all the individuals for the public welfare would constitute the whole state a healthy organism. In doing so, the coöperation of individuals would aim at ultimately making society independent for its continued existence of anything external to itself. Such independence clearly involves three distinct factors: (1) A healthy and independent society must be presumed to have grappled with the problems of hygiene and economics with sufficient success to have reduced want and disease to a minimum. In other words, it must be presumed independent of all ordinary changes in climate, variations in the quantity of particular food-stuffs, and similar

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features of its material environment. Within certain wide limits, there seems no reason why such independence should be regarded as anything chimerical. At least, I can see no inherent impossibility in the suggestion that, if proper attention were directed to the subject, most types of malignant disease might be eradicated and nearly all changes in our material environment anticipated and provided against by human ingenuity. Only—be it remarked in passing—if we are ever to grapple successfully with the problem of disease and beggary, we may probably have to adopt measures for the elimination of the physically unsound and the morally shiftless from the ranks of perpetuators of their kind which would considerably disturb the unprincipled sentimentalists who, in our own day, talk the most loudly about their ethical ideals and intuitions. (2) The second factor in vigorous social health would be independence of all competing social organizations. Social health is impossible so long as the members of the community have to live under the constant fear of a violent dissolution of national existence at the hand of foreign rivals. The present state of Europe, for instance, may fairly be called one of unremitting nervous tension. No one can be certain that the most insignificant of incidents in some remote corner of China or the Transvaal may not set the European nations flying at each other's throats, and, in such a state of permanent unrest, it is clear that civilization must be cursed with a feverish overactivity in certain directions and a consequent loss of energy in others which is quite inconsistent with steady, unremitting coöperation towards a reasoned ideal of social well-being. The very slang of our newspapers, which speak of every political incident as a "crisis," is enough to remind us that the world of to-day is a world of sick and invalid societies. As to the way in which this constant alarm for the permanence of the social fabric might conceivably disappear, it is manifest that it is twofold; social stability might be ensured by the ultimate victory of some one race-type (for instance, the Anglo-Saxon), over all its competitors, in fact, by the creation of a new world-empire like that of Rome, or, again, by the reduction of the competing race-types to one or two of fairly-balanced strength

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and markedly divergent intellectual and emotional character (for instance, the Anglo-Saxon and the Slavonic). The very antagonism of two such well-defined types would of itself tend to intensify the rivalry between them, and to postpone the final conflict till each felt itself thoroughly full-grown. When a man has one enemy only, and that a formidable one, he is not so apt to be hurried into premature action as when he has a hundred, each of whom singly he knows to be no match for himself. It might, indeed, be argued that a strong and thoroughly antipathetic rival of this kind is a necessity to any society that is not to decay for sheer want of public spirit and over-contentment with its existing achievements. Without enemies no progress, may conceivably be the law of human development. But as the further discussion of this suggestion would tend to involve us in the polemics of current politics, we shall do well to pass on. (3) The third requisite of full social health I take to be internal harmony between class and class within the social order itself. And such harmony, once more, is likely to be attained in proportion to the richness and complexity of the life which the social order with its institutions aims at maintaining. The wider the bounds of the state, and the more complex the functions which are contemplated in its institutions, the higher the probability that there will be room within it for every variety of individual type to find its own fullest development in life according to the social order. On the practical side, then, a philosophy based in all its parts upon concrete experiences, and having for its aim the construction of a system consistent not only with the general laws of thinking, but with the concrete facts of experience, would establish as its ideal the ultimate constitution of a state in which the combined coöperation of individual intelligences for the public welfare should, so far as is possible, render society in its organic structure independent of everything external to itself. A society thus organized and thus protected against internal collapse would be the nearest approximation we can conceive to our ideal of a perfectly functioning and, therefore, immortal individual of high complexity, and if once called into being should be indissoluble except by the occurrence of some

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catastrophe too vast to be averted or too strange to be foreseen by any exercise of human intelligence. It is in the notion of such a perfect social organization, rather than in conformity to a body of abstract moral principles or in the empty form of self-realization, that experiential philosophy would find its criterion of conduct. The final command of experential Ethics, in cases where doubt as to duty arises, would be, Act, according to thy lights, for the creation of the Free State. I may, perhaps, just point out the enormous revolution which the adoption of such an ethical standard would work in the mechanism and methods of Development. We may, I suppose, fairly say that Nature's general rule, in the infra-human world, is to shape organisms into harmony with their environment. The environment, in a fairly stable form, is there all along, and those individuals who for any reason are ill adapted to it die out and leave no progeny. With the dawn of intelligence however, natural evolution has presented us with a force capable of reversing the process and altering environment to make it square with organic peculiarities and ideals.* The fashioning of *tools* is one of the simplest, as the transition from a nomad to an agricultural life, is perhaps the most important, of the signs of this new order of development in the early history of mankind. Yet up till now the full significance of this advance upon "Nature's" methods has been obscured by the fact that there has been only the most occasional and sporadic collective coöperation towards the realization of human ideals. Even our moral codes, as has been well argued by Professor Alexander, have grown up to a large extent under the pressure of our environment, and thus represent adjustment of organism to environment rather than adjustment of environment to organism. Not to speak of the fact that, imperfect as our moral codes are, our actual practice is even further from being

* Throughout this passage I desire to acknowledge very great indebtedness to the excellent "Outlines of Sociology" of Dr. Lester F. Ward. Of course the contrast here drawn between human and infra-human evolution is not meant to be understood in any hard and fast sense. But it seems, roughly speaking, true that the intelligence of animals serves rather to adapt the individual animal to an unusual environment than to transform the environment itself.

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based upon the principle of harmonizing environment with organism, and is mostly dictated by the changing accidents of our external surroundings. The ideal of experiential Ethics, as described in the foregoing pages, means the full recognition by humanity of the power which it possesses of determining its own environment, of marking out the line which Evolution shall follow, of becoming with clear consciousness master of its own destiny. Not without reason, then, we might call the hour when men make up their minds to have done with all "symbolic" conceptions of duty and responsibility and free-will and the self, and to base ethical practice on the ideal of the healthy self-maintaining society, the hour of the Intellectual Majority of Man. When men set themselves to realize the Free State, the earth will, at last, have acquired a meaning and the history of development on the surface of our planet that "moral purpose" which Natural Theology has so lamentably failed to discover in it. I might, indeed, even go further, and say that the creation of the Free State of the future would be an event not only in the history of man, but in the history of the world. For if, whatever be our views on the problem of Realism, we must, at least, admit that the "choir and furniture of heaven ism and a vision of our own brain, it is, I fear, also only too manifest that earth and heaven, as seen by the average civilized man of to-day, are but *ægri somnia,* dreams of the sick. Who can say what new glories and unknown splendors heaven and earth would acquire when looked on by the eyes of the physically and mentally healthy? Something of these possibilities may, no doubt, be understood by anyone who knows the sense of mental convalescence and the increased love of earth and all its realities that accompany recovery from the debilitating influences of a narrowly puritanical early education. And, on a larger scale, in the new note that came, for instance, into Goethe's poetry with his Italian journey, one may see for one's self what the recovery of mental health means for the interpreter of Earth. The charm of convalescence in every line of the "Roman Elegies" is strong enough to make even an Englishman and a student of Virgil forget the barbarous jolting of the German hexameter. And from the convalescent's deepened

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love of earth and life we may guess faintly at the glories they would wear for the sound and strong. Thus, we may say, the ultimate problem of philosophy is twofold. It is for speculative philosophy to formulate an adequate description of human experience; it is for practical philosophy to see to it that that experience is that of a healthy and not a diseased and neurotic organism. It remains, of course, when all is said, for Metaphysics to examine this concept of a Free State with a view to discover whether there may not lurk in it some subtle contradiction; for Ethics, however, even the actual feasibility of creating such a state is a matter of secondary importance. It is, indeed, of the first importance that the Free State should not be known to be an impossibility; but that is all. Even if we can say no more of the Free State than that we do not know it to be impossible, it can still take the place of Kant's more questionable and less fully human assumptions as a regulative ideal for conduct. And even if, as metaphysicians, we could prove the impossibility of creating any reasonable approximation to our ideal, we should, perhaps, be well advised to keep our knowledge to ourselves.

Finally, the conception of "pure experience" is not without worth, even as regards its influence on the formation of individual character. As Milton thought that the poet should make his life a poem, so it was a favorite conviction with Plato that the qualities of sincerity, candor, and disinterestedness fostered by the study of dialectic would manifest themselves in the whole practical behavior of the philosopher-king. It would be a rash proceeding on the part of any of us to announce that we were studying for the *role* of Platonic philosopher; but there is, at least this much applicability in Plato's principle to even the humblest cases, that a man can hardly set before himself as his intellectual ideal the rigid elimination of the merely "symbolic" from his thinking without learning to carry his distaste for pretentious inanities and ingenious self-sophistications into the rest of his life. Sentimentality and cynicism, those rival wells of moral poison, are likely to be tasted but sparingly by the philosopher whose ideal, for knowledge and for practice, is experience as rich and full as possible and

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nothing but experience. His own professional faults he will, of course, have; but I doubt if cant, the traditional vice of the moralist, will be foremost among them.*

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JAMES MARTINEAU AS AN ETHICAL TEACHER.

A DISTINGUISHED thinker, speaking of the position which may be rightly adopted by an adherent of the "Ethical Movement," has recently said: To share in the Ethical Movement, it is enough to recognize that the "good life" does not depend for its worth upon any metaphysical or theological doctrines; "it does not stand or fall with them, though they may stand or fall with it;" that "moral ideals and moral activity are justified by moral experience itself;" that "the essential evidence for the value of the 'good life' is found in actually living it and in no other way whatever."† If this is the principle for which the Ethical movement stands, then that movement never had a stronger adherent than Dr. Martineau; and it would be strange indeed if in this JOURNAL there were no recognition of the work of a man whom the civilized world with one voice has pronounced to be one of the most striking figures of the nineteenth

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* I have purposely avoided saying anything, in the course of the preceding pages, on the question in dispute between Idealists and Realists. For my present purpose, it is, I conceive, indifferent whether the contents of our experiences be supposed to have some kind of existence outside the processes in which they are perceived, or not. What is important is that they come to us in the first place as parts of an experience "process-content," and that it is upon their character as such parts that any "realist" argument for their independent existence must be based. The only form of realism excluded by the foregoing argument is the belief in a "Thing-in-Itself" inaccessible throughout to human knowledge, a belief which is happily obsolescent among us. The conception of science as the full description of experiences in terms of nothing but experience seems quite consistent with any more sober "Realism" than this. My indebtedness to Avenarius and to Nietzsche will be readily perceived; and if I have hesitated to make formal acknowledgment of it earlier in my paper, it is only for fear that the very acknowledgment might look like an impertinence.

† G. F. Stout, in *Ethical World*, January 20, 1900.

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century. It is with great pleasure, therefore, that I respond to the request to send some notes on Dr. Martineau's work as an Ethical teacher.

It is with Manchester New College (now Manchester College, Oxford,) that Dr. Martineau's name as writer and teacher is specially connected: a college which has always adhered to the principle of "freely imparting theological knowledge without insisting on the adoption of particular theological doctrines." He entered its class-rooms as a student in 1822, and in 1839, on becoming its Secretary, commenced a career of service to his Alma Mater as devoted as it was brilliant. In 1840 he entered on the duties of Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy, adding, in 1857, Religious Philosophy to the subjects of his chair. In 1869 he became Principal, and from this office did not retire until 1885. It may seem to have been a narrow sphere within which to exercise such splendid gifts; but the spiritual freedom which was afforded to him was a priceless treasure to such a mind, "for it was not his task to expound some stale and borrowed notions, but to enter the sanctuary of Truth and listen for himself to the Divine oracles, and then reproduce those which he was permitted to hear in a form not unworthy of their august authority."

In this connection the following reminiscence, from the pen of a former student, afterwards a colleague, of Dr. Martineau, will be of interest:—

"The freedom which Dr. Martineau welcomed for himself he accorded in full measure to his pupils. No man knew better that we may err in giving intellectual form to our imperfect vision of the infinite God, and that our descendants may climb to heights which our feet have never trodden; and accordingly he never repressed by the weight of his authority the immature thought of the learner, but rather stimulated him to greater exertion, and taught him to love truth above all earthly gains, and to toil, though it should be with weary and lonely steps, towards that resplendent summit where she reveals herself transfigured in the cloudless light of heaven. For this mental freedom, which he maintained as a sacred trust, was not founded on scepticism, or on the peevishness of a restless mind, always learning and never able to come to a knowledge of the truth, but on faith—faith that spiritual truth always transcends our intellectual apprehension of it, and discloses new and deeper meanings to him who casts off the sloth of habit, and lifts his own longing and prayerful eyes to behold her beauty. For the humble soul he profoundly believed

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that there was still an open vision of the Highest; and he felt that only that truth is vital to us which we have clasped to our hearts, and recognized as a kindling power in our own experience. It was not his aim, therefore, to awaken incessant doubt, but to aid his students in forming strong and manly convictions founded on their own personal thought, and on the witness of their own spirits, and to help them on their way by leading them to the sources of the necessary knowledge, and by enriching the partiality of their opinions by large and catholic judgments.

"We will for a moment survey him at his post of teacher, and we will stray into his lecture-room at a time when he had the widest reputation, and men of various denominations in philosophy and religion acknowledged their indebtedness to him in the spiritual conflicts of our day. We enter, and find seated at the head of a table, addressing some half-dozen youths, this venerable man, whose look and bearing, however, do not betoken his four-score years, and whose commanding face, once seen, cannot be forgotten; and, as we listen, we hear searching criticisms, profound and suggestive thoughts, and comprehensive philosophical reflections, conveyed in language at once of exquisite precision and finished beauty, and uttered with a play of expression and a musical sincerity of intonation, which rivet the attention, and delight the ear and warm the imagination, while putting the intellectual powers on the strain. Here is no slovenly work, no discontent with the smallness of the field which he has to fill, but the best that is in him is poured forth as if he had prepared

What particularly struck many of the students who attended Dr. Martineau's classes, was his great admiration and love for Plato; and the happy combination in his lectures of high thought with exceeding beauty of expression was in no small measure due to the circumstance that he, consciously or unconsciously, made the great Greek philosopher his model.

Nothing was more characteristic of him, as of his master, than his constant openness to new light. Many writers have quoted and applied to Dr. Martineau himself a saying of his own, which, originally used in an ethical reference, is fully as true in an intellectual: "There is no life but in perpetual growth." There is no severer criticism to be passed on any thinker's work, than that he makes for himself a beaten track from which he cannot diverge,—that he seems tied to the use of certain formulæ, and cannot appreciate or even understand any philosophical principles which have received an expression less rigid and more free than his own. But though Dr. Martineau held firmly to his fundamental convictions, the forms in which he cast them were never rigidly stereotyped; and the

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student who reads Dr. Martineau's works with mind open and free from prejudice, will find that this was a man whose thought well exemplified his own definition of life.

Dr. Martineau thus describes the way in which he arrived at the ethical point of view which characterizes his thought:—

"When I first woke up, before and during my college life, to the interest of moral and metaphysical speculations, I carried into them, from previous training for the profession of civil engineer, a store of exclusively scientific conceptions, rendered familiar in the elementary study of mathematics, mechanics and chemistry. Small as it was, it was my all, and necessarily dictated the only rules of judgment which I could apply. I had nothing to take with me into logical and ethical problems but the maxims and postulates of physical knowledge. . . Steeped in the empirical and necessarian mode of thought, I served out successive terms of willing captivity to Locke and Hartley, to Collins, Edwards, and Priestley, to Bentham and James Mill; and though at times I was driven to disaffection by the dogmatism and acrid humors of the last two of these philosophers, my allegiance was restored and lengthened by literary and personal relations with the younger Mill." But the irresistible pleading of the moral consciousness compelled him to recognize that the postulates of physical science are inadequate to moral experience; and to insist on finding a real meaning in such terms as "responsibility," "guilt," "merit," "duty." He was forced to concede to the self-conscious mind itself, both as knowing and as willing, an autonomous function distinct from each and all the phenomena known and changes willed—a self-identity, unlike any growing aggregate of miscellaneous and dissimilar experiences. Subsequently, during a period of study in Germany under the guidance of Trendelenburg, Martineau went through what he himself describes as "a new intellectual birth": "I came into the same plight, in respect of the cognitive and æsthetic side of life, that had already befallen me with regard to the moral." I will endeavor to state in few words the essential features of the philosophical standpoint at which Martineau thus arrived.

Everyone, who endeavors to systematize his thoughts about

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the meaning of the world, will find that consciously or unconsciously he has been using as tools of explanation certain intellectual principles, which it has become the custom to call "categories." The character of a *Weltanschauung* depends on the range and depth of the categories employed. For a positivism like that of Mill, the only admissible categories are the like and the unlike, the simultaneous and successive; to discern the connection (if such it can be called) of events in these ways, is to "explain" them; and these categories can be applied without taking us beyond the region of "phenomena." Dr. Martineau, on the other hand, takes as his one supreme metaphysical category the principle of Causation. It is an "axiom,"—a principle which our thought naturally uses as it develops, but which derives its meaning from our self-conscious experience of personal (not merely corporeal) Activity; in a word, from Will. Now Will, so understood, is not even a mental *phenomenon,* as the "scientific" psychologist understands this term; still less is it a material phenomenon. Hence the principle of Causation, as a tool of explanation, means that every phenomenon depends upon that which is other than phenomenon, and is conscious, rational Will. Some phenomena we know to be immediately dependent upon our own wills; hence phenomena in general are rightly referred to a Divine Will. A consequence of this view is, that causation as dealt with in the physical sciences, *i. e.,* causation as a relation between one phenomenon and another, is causation improperly so called, or imperfectly understood. Dr. Martineau has worked out this theory in different forms, his most elaborate and matured presentation of it being in the "Study of Religion;" and it scarcely needs to be said that these discussions abound in brilliant, convincing and suggestive reasoning. Yet the general view is open to objections which have never, I think, been adequately dealt with. From the point of view of ordinary psychological reflection, there does not seem to be much resemblance between the human and a creative will. There is no doubt, whatever my theory of causation may be, that if I will to move my arm, my arm moves. But I might will all day to move anything beyond the reach of my arm, and no movement would take place. From the point of

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view of Epistemology, there are reasons pointing to the conclusion that the category of Causation must necessarily break down under the strain which Dr. Martineau puts upon it. If the Absolute is causal, it is infinitely more; and if *merely* causal, it ceases to be the Absolute.

In Dr. Martineau's Ethical theory there is an important ambiguity arising out of the ways in which such terms as "impulses," "springs of action," "motive," are used. Dr. Martineau sometimes seems to speak of "springs of action" as if they could, when ethically considered, be abstracted from their objects, and could be compared with each other in this abstract form. But his discussions also suggest a theory of conscience which is not far removed from that of T. H. Green. I may perhaps be permitted to quote a passage in which this view of Dr. Martineau's ethical teaching is summed up:

"We retain what is deepest and truest in his system; we accept his doctrine that our 'springs of action,' understood as consciously purposive desires—cannot be divided into two classes, the absolutely right and the absolutely wrong, but arrange themselves in a scale of moral worth and have various degrees therein; we recognize gratefully his insistence on the truth that every one of our 'natural tendencies' is ethically justified *in its proper place,* and his brief but profound interpretation of moral progress as the gradual organization of such tendencies, high and low, and of our reflection upon them, into 'social consensus and religion.' We say with Dr. Martineau, that '*any* knowledge with ourselves, large or small, which we may have of the superior right of one spring of action over another comes under the head of *conscience,*' and that this is the true form of the moral judgment; but this judgment of the relative worth of our desires is not based merely on a special kind of feeling which arises when two of them meet, it is based on a comparison of their objects with what *for the time being* is taken as the supreme Ideal of life as a whole. In view of such an Ideal their organization takes place, as the historical evolution of morality proceeds."—["Studies in Philosophical Criticism and Construction," pp. 358-9.

There are in fact two lines of thought in Dr. Martineau's

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ethical teaching. One of these leads to individualism and ethical Deism: "God's part is done when having made us free he shows to us our best; ours now remains to pass from illumination of conscience to surrender of will."* This mode of thought exaggerates the power of the individual will, and ignores the physiological and sociological truths involved in the ancient dogmas of Original Sin and the incapacity of the isolated individual,—truths concerning the effects of inheritance and environment on character. But Dr. Martineau also works out a deeper view when he recognizes the vast importance of social life for the development of ethical and religious insight,—not "social life" merely as the organized institutions of Society, but Society as a common life of thought and feeling animating its members, and affording them insight into one another's real being. "The social union," says Dr. Martineau, "is a concrete though spiritual form of life, penetrating and partly constituting all persons belonging to it; so that only as fractions of it do they become human integers themselves."† Hence we must be well grounded in Humanity before we can study Divinity to any good purpose.

S. H. Mellone.

Belfast, Ireland.

* "Seat of Authority in Religion," p. 106.

† "Types of Ethical Theory, II., p. 403.

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DISCUSSIONS.

"THE RIGHTS OF ANIMALS."

IN his article under this title in the January number, Mr. Salt lays down his opinions without discussing what the word "right" means; he simply repeats the dogma, which he has asserted before, that "if man has rights, animals have the same—in kind." He admits that there is a difference between human and non-human animals in degree. What these categories of "degree" and "kind" may mean, and whether they are mutually exclusive, Mr. Salt omits to inquire. The difference between water at 20° F. and water at 40° F. is a difference in "degree;" but you can stand on the one and will sink in the other. So, though we may admit that the intelligence of a man differs only in degree from the intelligence of a guinea-pig, it does not follow that, if the former has rights, the latter has them also *in the same sense of the term.*

(1) "Rights," properly, is a legal term. Mr. Salt argues that, because the State protects some animals from cruelty or destruction, it has conferred legal rights upon them. This seems to me an inaccurate use of words. In my book on "Natural Rights" (p. 108) I wrote:— "Because a work of art or some ancient monument is protected by law from injury, do we speak of the 'rights' of pictures or stones?" Mr. Salt considers my logic at fault here; he says I have "overlooked the fact that pictures and stones are *not* protected by law—against the owners." Mr. Salt has not taken the trouble to understand my illustration. I spoke of the case where works of art *are* protected, *i. e.,* where they belong to the State or to some public body, and are therefore protected against injury from individuals. Unfortunately, works of art and ancient monuments are often in unintelligent or careless private ownership, responsible only to public opinion, and in such cases they are not legally protected against the neglect or stupidity of their owners. By punishing cruelty to animals which are private property, the State has so far interfered with absolute private ownership: the owner may kill his cat or his dog, but he may be punished for ill-treating it. He may not practice vivisection without a license, etc. Certain wild birds may not be killed at certain seasons, because the State has taken them under its charge. These are perhaps the closest parallel to State-owned pictures or monu-

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ments, though the latter are more completely protected because individually more valued. Mr. Salt admits that the ill-used cab-horse cannot sue in a law court; nevertheless, he considers the horse a "person." Mr. Edward Carpenter, whom Mr. Salt calls "a great teacher," tells us "it is the same *human* creature that flies in the air and swims in the sea, or walks biped on the land." If all living things are "human" and "persons" what do the words mean? Is a sponge a "person," or is it several persons? And if we find a poor dog suffering from parasites, are we to respect these "persons"? There are some difficult questions of casuistry here.

(2) In the sense of "moral rights," *i. e.,* the sense in which a right is guaranteed by public opinion, it may seem more reasonable to talk of animals having "the right to be kindly treated" or "of our duty to the animals." I hold it to be much more accurate to speak of our having duties of kindness towards animals—these duties being duties owed to human society and enforced, more or less, by it. And Mr. Salt implicitly acknowledges the propriety of this distinction (though he scoffs at it) by calling himself a "Humanitarian," not an "Animalarian."

(3) In a metaphorical sense we may be said to acknowledge special rights, *i. e.,* special claims upon us, in domestic animals, and most of all in pets, to whom we give names and so a quasi-human, quasi-personal character. They are quasi-persons, because we have admitted them to a sort of membership of the family circle. All rights—legal, moral, or metaphorical—rest upon membership of a society.

But, it should be observed, that in the sense in which we may allow ourselves to talk of "duties to animals" and "rights" of animals to be well treated and painlessly killed when it is necessary, *in the same sense* (I admit differences of degree) we may speak of our duties to an ancient building, a beautiful landscape, an historic oak, a family heirloom—duties which are really and strictly owed to humanity, but which we may think of as owed to inanimate things, so far as interesting or pleasing to humanity. We may also speak of duties to logic and to accuracy of language, though Mr. Salt does not seem to care much about such duties. I feel more sense of "duty" to a beautiful plant than to the wretched parasites that are injuring it, more sense of duty to an old book than to the mice who are enjoying it; though the parasites and the mice are "persons" to Mr. Salt. In both cases my duty is really a duty to humanity. Mr. Salt, however, professes to look at matters

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from the animal's point of view. He objects to animals being kept in captivity, however kindly treated. "To live one's own natural life, to realize one's self, is the true moral purpose of man and animal equally." If a tiger comes out of his cage, to live his own natural life and realize himself, Mr. Salt would be well-advised to keep out of his way. "Treat the animal as you would willingly be treated if you were such an animal," is a maxim quoted with approval by Mr. Salt. Is he ready to treat the tiger, as the tiger would wish to be treated—not to a vegetarian diet, but to a diet of vegetarians? But about the *jus animalium* I have said quite enough in my book on "Natural Rights"—more than was necessary in the opinion of some of my critics.

D. G. RITCHIE.

UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANDREWS, SCOTLAND.

A REPLY TO PROFESSOR RITCHIE.

THE readers of this JOURNAL are now in a position to judge clearly between the humanitarian and what I have ventured to call the "academic" opinion of the Rights of Animals. I decline to follow Professor Ritchie into a desultory discussion of the term "rights," and am content to take my stand on Herbert Spencer's definition.

I adhere to the position which I took up at the outset—that there is no difference *in kind* between man and the other animals, nor any warrant in science or ethics for drawing between them, as between "persons" and "things," an absolute line of demarcation. Compelled to admit that the difference is only one of degree, Professor Ritchie now seeks to evade the significance of this fact by arguing that it does not follow that, if men have rights, animals also have rights "in the same sense of the term." I maintain that it *does* so follow. If, by the recognition of rights, we mean that man, as a sentient and intelligent being, should be exempt from all avoidable suffering, it follows that other beings who are also sentient and intelligent, though in a lower degree, should have, in a lower degree, the same exemption. This principle, if pressed to its extreme logical conclusion, will of course lead (like all other principles) to what Professor Ritchie calls "difficult questions of casuistry," and will open a door for small jokes about the personality of parasites and sponges.

Professor Ritchie finds an analogy between the case of a State-owned and State-protected monument, or work of art, and that of

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an animal protected by law, and argues that, as the monument is not said to have "rights," there can be no rights of animals. But the analogy is an extremely faulty one. The monument is protected because of its value *as property*, the animal is protected, without any reference to its value, because it is *sentient*. For what conceivable reason, except that of a humane regard for the feelings of the animal, does the law protect, let us say, a poor stray cat, of no value whatever and perhaps the property of no one? Or why else, if the animal be somebody's property, does the law protect it even against the owner himself, which it does *not* do in the case of the most costly work of art in private ownership? If readers will compare Professor Ritchie's remarks on this subject with my previous article, they will see that he entirely fails to meet the point which I made.

Then, again, Professor Ritchie appears to have overlooked the fact that the rights claimed for animals, as for men, are not absolute, but conditional ("this *restricted* freedom" is Herbert Spencer's expression) and that a recognition of the rights of other beings is not incompatible with an equal assertion of one's own. Self-defence is the first and most obvious right of everyone. If, for instance, we hold that a tiger has a right to be spared any unnecessary torture, are we compelled on that account to allow him to eat us if he comes out of his cage? And how would our shooting the tiger, under those untoward circumstances, prove that the tiger is not a "person," inasmuch as convicts, and *human* tigers, are similarly treated under similar conditions? This tiger argument, to which Professor Ritchie is much addicted, is really very small game, and I could wish that he had sent us something more formidable from his logical jungle.

In one matter only do I find myself in full agreement with Professor Ritchie, and that is his concluding remark that he has said quite enough about the *jus animalium* in his book on "Natural Rights." If a writer has no sympathy with a new idea, if he not only does not intuitively grasp it, but is so strongly prejudiced that he has not even taken the pains to learn what those who advocate it mean, then it is certainly true that the less he says about the subject the better. To refute a proposition, one needs first to have understood it.

Henry S. Salt.

Humanitarian League, London.

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A PERSONAL EXPLANATION.

MAY I point out that Professor Ritchie [*cf.* January number, p. 252] has misunderstood and unconsciously misrepresented my views in treating me as an intuitionalist? In the preface I state my position; idealistic evolutionism, with certain qualifications. When I assume the trustworthiness of the moral consciousness it is in no "extreme intuitionalist sense." The words quoted by Professor Ritchie from p. 129 do *not* "reveal explicitly" my own point of view, but are a mere objective statement of intuitionalism as a view held by others, and draw attention to one of its weaknesses, viz., that it offers no contribution towards a definition of the moral ideal. With this correction a whole page of disparaging comment falls to the ground—if I might not say, the whole critique. Take, for instance, the alleged incapacity of intuitionalists for studying the origin of moral ideas. I am not concerned to defend the capacity of intuitionalists for such a task. But there is no intuitionalist here.

When I speak of intuitionalism coming back in after days, I mean precisely what I say, "intuitional*ism, i. e.,* a particular philosophy." Of course it is not "symmetrical in character" with religion, conscience, and philosophy. Hence it is marked off from the others: "*even* intuitionalism," I say, will come back. Its return will not be an unmixed blessing. Yet intuitionalism will assert, in its sturdy if inadequate fashion, those primary moral truths which are being jostled aside at present by all kinds of appeals to biology, often the most foolish and shallow. In the chapter on Darwin and Miss Cobbe I state clearly this whole view of intuitionalism as a right-hearted and wrong-headed creed. There also I deliberately repudiated the "old pulpit attitude" which Mr. Ritchie imputed to me. Did he read that chapter?

I should be sorry to misunderstand or misrepresent Professor Ritchie; but honestly I cannot think that I have done so. He appears to me to use such phrases as "natural selection" with intolerable breadth of signification. Where there is "no death of the unsuccessful, there is no real struggle *for existence;*" consequently, no elimination of the unfit—no *natural selection.* If language is used vaguely, it is hardly possible to keep one's thoughts self-consistent; and I believe Professor Ritchie has failed. My work makes at least the attempt to *define as exactly as possible* what natural selection is; where it can be supposed to work, where it cannot. Professor Ritchie seems not to sympathize with this—

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perhaps not even to understand what I am about. He calls me a "minimizer." That is ultramontane language. What is it doing here? It is no compliment to the memory of Darwin, a modest and honorable gentleman, that we should shout "Great is natural selection," without defining our terms.

I hope those who are interested in the subject will not rely upon Professor Ritchie's misleading account of my book.

ROBERT MACKINTOSH.

MANCHESTER, ENGLAND.

BOOK REVIEWS.

A SHORT HISTORY OF FREETHOUGHT, Ancient and Modern. By John M. Robertson. London: Swan, Sonnenschein & Co., Ltd. 1899. Pp. xv., 447.

Those who are acquainted with Mr. Robertson's literary career will not need to be told that his most recent volume has been a labor of love. If the history of Freethought had to be written by a militant Freethinker, nobody had so good a claim to undertake the task. Mr. Augustine Birrell once divided freethinkers into "first class" and "second class," the former cultured and tolerant, the latter ignorant and zealous. This classification must be modified to include Mr. Robertson, who combines the learning of the one with the proselytizing zeal of the other.

A work of this character must be judged under two aspects, namely, its value as a storehouse of facts, and its importance as a contribution of thought. In regard to the first, the book deserves little but praise. Alone of English works, it presents a concise history of Freethought, in the amplest sense of the term, based on wide and well-selected reading. No two historians would, of course, agree on a list of men who should be included in a work with such a title; but the name of Kierkegaard seems the only notable omission. The chief value of the book consists, perhaps, in its recalling the achievements of men of the calibre of Sanchez, Knutzen, Peyrére, who, though not of first-rate importance, deserve to be remembered as pioneers. That the author has not always availed himself of the information recently accumulated in regard to several of the topics with which he deals may well be pardoned in view of the immense field which he has had to trav-

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erse. He may also be congratulated on his freedom from errors of fact. Mistakes, of course, are not wholly absent. Raymond of Sebonde is placed in the fourteenth century instead of in the fifteenth; the rise of the Wahabi sect is attributed to the nineteenth century instead of to the eighteenth; James Mill's "Analysis of the Human Mind" is dated ten years too late. But the trifling number of errors only emphasizes the general accuracy of the work.

Under the second aspect, Mr. Robertson's book merits less praise. Without expecting a purely objective treatment, which perhaps is unattainable, we have at least a right to demand that an author who undertakes to review almost the whole field of human thought should bring to his task the capacity to enter into, if not to sympathize with, widely different forms of opinion and belief. This spirit of tolerance is unfortunately lacking. It would hardly be an exaggeration to say that the most insignificant freethinker bulks larger in the author's vision than the most illustrious supernaturalist. We cannot weigh the thoughts of all the ages in a single pair of scales. Mr. Robertson is convinced not only that supernaturalism in any form is not a spiritual necessity for men, but that it is morally and intellectually harmful. Freethought, in the only reasonable interpretation of the term, is an attack not so much on certain specified dogmas as on the dogmatic spirit; it is, in fact, less a creed than an attitude. In the problems that lie at the root of human life, the dogmatism of negation is no whit less contrary to the principles of Freethought than the dogmatism of assertion. When Omar Khayyam's attitude to mortality is pronounced "preferable for any refined intelligence to the affectation of zest for a 'hereafter' on which no one wants to enter," and contempt is poured on "a mere emotional and ethical necessity assumed to exist in human nature," the author reveals a narrowness of vision, we might almost say a color-blindness, that goes far to destroy confidence in the sufficiency of current Freethought ideals. Mr. Robertson seems to have learnt very imperfectly the greatest lesson taught by the religious history of the world, namely, that different epochs, different nations, different individuals, need and will continue to need different beliefs. No philosophy can be regarded as adequate that fails to recognize the extent and the persistence of the subjective element in religion.

The strength of Mr. Robertson's convictions leads him to occasionally indulge in outbursts of rather questionable taste. The

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grain of truth in such statements as the following does not make amends for the unfairness of view that underlies them. "Every priest preaches for the institution by which he lives. . . . . Educated self-interest conspires with injustice, and an enormous revenue is annually devoted to the maintenance of beliefs not held by multitudes of the clergy themselves. . . . . Any creed whatever can subsist under the modern system of endowments. . . . . *Ubi Panis, ibi Deus.*" Scientists who do not share Mr. Robertson's opinions are dismissed as "clinging to the religion of their nurseries." In a review of our younger poets, we are informed that "on the side of the regulation religion can be cited, at best, the regimental psalmody of Mr. Kipling, the stained-glass Mariolatries of Mr. Francis Thompson and the Godism of Mr. Henley."

The earliest part of the book, dealing with pre-Christian freethought, is distinctly the best, not only owing to its varied information but because the faults which have been pointed out are almost entirely absent. Idealism, however, is suspect, and Plato is accordingly declared to be "overpraised." It is a pity that a book so valuable as Lewis Campbell's "Religion in Greek Literature" does not seem to have been utilized. That the Jews should fare badly at Mr. Robertson's hands was inevitable; and the uninstructed reader would never learn from these pages that they made any notable contribution to the heritage of mankind. Still more unsatisfactory is the discussion of Christianity, which, in the author's opinion, had no part in the moral regeneration which is commonly supposed to have take place towards the close of the Western Empire. The later Roman moralists are contrasted with the Fathers, much to the disadvantage of the latter; but if it was necessary to single out individuals, it seems scarcely fair to omit such men as Clement, Origen and Athanasius. The personal influence of Mohamed, again, is not adequately recognized. "Had there been no Islam, enterprising Arabs would probably have overrun Syria and Persia and Africa and Spain all the same."

The survey of mediæval and renaissance scepticism is on the whole very creditably done; but in preparing a second edition, the author would do well to consult Hauréau's "Philosophic Scholastique," Döllinger's "Sektengeschichte," Hausrath's "Weltverbesserer," and Reuter's "Aufklärung des Mittelalters." In the chapter on the Rise of Modern Freethought, he seems, in like manner, to have overlooked such serviceable works as Bonet-Maury's "Origins of English Unitarianism," Jundt's "Panthéisme Populaire,"

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Perrens' "Libertins," and Reusch's monumental history of the Index. The account of the English Deists presents a much more flattering portrait than that drawn by Mr. Leslie Stephen; and the attempt to vindicate the treatment of the clergy by the Convention is not altogether convincing. It is only fair to add, however, that the chapter on the *sæculum rationalisticum* contains a great deal of information. The closing section is devoted to a brief survey of the nineteenth century, to which the author hopes to return in a future work.

Mr. Robertson has taken great pains and has written a very serviceable book; had he made it less of a polemic, he would have given us a better history.

G. P. Gooch.

London.

The Gospel of the Atonement. Hulsean Lectures for 1898-99. By the Ven. James M. Wilson, M.A., Archdeacon of Manchester, etc. London: Macmillan & Co. Pp. 165.

The purpose of this small volume is to press upon the notice of the dissatisfied but expectant Churchman, as also of the enlightened yet unconvinced religious inquirer, a view of the atonement which will deepen the appreciation of that doctrine for the former, and make possible to the latter a practical realization of its essential significance. This aim, which is thus in the main practical, circumscribes the plan of the work as well as its contents. Those who wish an elaborate discussion of the atonement will find this volume of no value. It is not a systematic treatment of the doctrine in any sense. The relations of the atonement to other doctrines are no more than barely indicated, while the difficulties involved in the view put forward are not so much removed as ignored. What it does present, and that with great clearness and force, is a general point of view from which this doctrine may be regarded, and in the light of which it comes to have reasonable definite significance and practical importance. While, therefore there is little doubt that the first class to whom the author seeks to appeal will find the lectures fruitful and suggestive to no slight degree, it is to be feared that the second will find their perplexity playing havoc with a half-attained conviction.

The atonement, as previously understood, was the sacrificial means by which the two alienated spirits—God and Man—were externally brought together and reconciled. This ex-

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ternal view of the doctrine as a "transaction," with its implicated ideas of debt, ransom, sacrifice, and all that these involve, is entirely rejected by our author, who roundly designates such a representation of it as "Christian mythology" (p. 67). In the place of this he puts forward a view which he claims to be more in accordance with the attitude and the needs of our present religious experience. The fundamental factors which determine his view are (1) the insistence on the necessarily ethical content and function of all religious doctrine, and of the atonement in particular; (2) the claim that all doctrine must be verified by experience if it is to be accepted. The satisfaction of these alone will, he considers, meet the claims of the modern spirit. Since these two demands, however, are obviously directly connected, if not identical, we are not surprised to find that the importance of his own view lies in the stress laid upon the ethical significance and content imparted to the doctrine. He considers that the essential meaning of the atonement is found in the union of the Divine and Human, a union which all men share and can consciously experience (pp. 52, 53, 58, etc.), but which had its greatest historical expression in Christ. Hence Christ is the atonement in the sense and only in the sense, that by sharing his spirit, identifying ourselves with him, we consciously possess that union with God which he realized. If we take Christ as a "substitute," as a "propitiation," as a "sacrifice," as a "ransom," we turn the atonement into mere mythology (p. 60 ff.). By this simplification, the whole construction of mediæval and traditional Latin theology, with its formal precision and court-room distinctions, falls to pieces, and we are left with the naked facts,—a general but imperfect union of all men with God, a particular and complete union of Christ with God, and the gradual conscious identification of men with Christ, and through or by means of him with God. The atonement, in short, is simply the incarnation, the life and death of Christ on earth. This is the thesis of the volume, and is defended primarily by showing how it is supported by the statements of Christ and the apostles (from whom, however, no theory of the atonement can be derived, p. 39), and how it meets all the essential requirements of the traditional view.

We have only space here to mention a few of the many difficulties which this conception of the atonement raises. First of all, the "method," which the author, at least, professes to adopt in theology, shows a needlessly profound respect for and confidence

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in the "inductive" method of procedure. The author seems to confuse agreement with experience, which is certainly the characteristic of truth in the widest sense, with the inductive process, which is merely one means of establishing that agreement. Surely, the results of deduction hold of experience as much as those of induction. Such a confusion leads him into somewhat extravagant forms of statement. He speaks of religions as "theories" (p. 25) resulting from observation of facts; religion is said to rest on a "hypothesis," which the holder proceeds to verify (pp. 22, 133-135), and the scientist is now to be rewarded for his years of patient and persistent image-breaking, by being received into the company of the image-makers as a "brother theologian" (p. 140). This is surely the mere baptismal consecration of science. Against the whole view here implied, it is safe to say that the natural and ordinary religious mind, *qua religious*, no more works with a "hypothesis," has a "theory" regarding the reality with which it is brought face to face, and with which it asserts and seeks to realize its oneness and harmony, than Adam had a theory of marriage when he first saw Eve. The author's case would have gained and not lost had he, instead of seeking to gain assent by claiming conformity with the methods pursued by the experimental sciences, emphasized the principle, long ago enunciated by Aristotle, that the kind of certainty to be attained in a given inquiry and the method of attaining it depend upon the matter in hand, and are not the same for all the sciences.

But, again, when we ask how the author's doctrine is to be really established, we are met by another perplexing confusion. His view is expressed in such a way as to leave the nature of the relation subsisting between the general fact of actual union between man and God, between divine and human, and that union as found in the life and death of Christ, quite undecided and obscure. At one time, the difference between the two is described as one of "degree" only (pp. 94, 120), the divine life in man appearing as the "voice of duty," the call to "self-sacrifice" (pp. 106-108, 122). At another time it seems to be maintained that there is only one union of divine and human, that of Christ, from and by means of whom man discovered and realized his union with God (pp. 94, etc.), and apart from whom man would never have known it (p. 112). In this latter case, Christ wakens this union into living consciousness (pp. 112, 122), and is therefore the atonement (p. 94). It is quite obvious that these two views are by no means the same. In

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the former case Christ is merely the type of the union, of which all men are actually and always more or less incomplete instances; in the latter case Christ is the mediator, who makes possible any vital union with God at all. The confusion between these two views runs through the volume from first to last. When the author deals with the former, he speaks of the fundamental importance of self-sacrifice as the base and pinnacle of a truly religious life (pp. 107, 108); when he has in view the latter, he lays emphasis in the usual way on the death of Christ (pp. 105, 106, 109). Partly, no doubt, these views may seem to imply each other. But our point is that they are essentially exclusive of one another. The suffering and death of Christ were doubtless self-sacrifice; but self-sacrifice as such, as it is and can be experienced and undergone by human beings in general, does not involve the death of Christ. And, further, if self-sacrifice and obedience to conscience are the foundation of an ethico-religious life, it surely follows that, since Christ's life is no more than at best the type of such a life, the progress in that life will gradually tend to the elimination of the influence of Christ, to the personal possession of the principle instead of looking to him as the example. But if Christ is the mediator of man's union with God, then clearly he will be indispensable to the genuinely religious life from beginning to end. In the one case, he is valuable and important to the religious life, but not really essential; in the other, he is both important and absolutely necessary. No amount of verbal legerdemain therefore will ever make the two entirely synonymous. Of course, it is easy to point out a difficulty of this sort, which, indeed, is as old as Christianity itself. None the less, it is disappointing to find in a volume which ostensibly professes to face this difficulty, and unquestionably leans towards one side (the former view) without entirely abandoning the other, that we cannot obtain an unambiguous and unhesitating practical or theoretical solution of the problem.

Finally, we must ask how the author's general doctrine is to stand related to other aspects of Christian experience. It might at first sight seem true that general recognition of the divine life in all men, the union of man as man with God, would heal differences among Christians of all shades (p. 142); it might hasten the attainment of peace and charity; it might obliterate such distinctions as those between secular and religious, material and spiritual. But even were this the result, it is extremely doubtful if it would be desirable. The author must surely be aware that the belief that

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differences matter little becomes transformed very easily into the conviction that differences matter nothing at all,—a position which renders futile all judgments of value whatever.

A similar objection holds good against the author's identification of the atonement with the incarnation, and his apparent attempt to make it the leading principle of all other doctrines of theology. No doubt he is quite justified in insisting upon that inner unity of connection which makes it possible to find all the essential doctrines of Christianity implicated in any one of them. Each is the limited and approximate expression of the single but many-sided concrete fact of a religious life after the manner of Christ. But the unity and individuality of the fact described does not imply the identification of the ways and aspects from which it may be regarded. Hence it seems quite illegitimate to identify the atonement with the incarnation; nothing is gained by such a process, and a somewhat useful and important distinction is lost,—the distinction, namely, between the union of man's spirit with God's on the one side, and the union of matter and spirit on the other.

However, most of these objections the author might have obviated had he in this most opportune volume been less eager to win an immediate assent to his doctrine and more careful to secure its truth. He would thereby have performed a much needed service for the church. For if, as the author says, "the weakness of the church is the poverty of its popular theology," there is little doubt that the weakness of its theology is the poverty of its popular metaphysics.

J. B. Baillie.

St. Andrews University, Scotland.

The Philosophical Theory of the State. By Bernard Bosanquet. London: Macmillan & Co., 1899. Pp. xi., 334.

"The present work," says Mr. Bosanquet, "is an attempt to express what I take to be the fundamental ideas of a true social philosophy. I have criticized and interpreted the doctrines of certain well-known thinkers only with the view of setting these ideas in the clearest light. This is the whole purpose of the book; and I have intentionally abstained from practical applications, except by way of illustration." These "fundamental ideas," as our author himself is careful to warn us, are by no means unfamiliar to the student of Hegel and Green, but their presentation by Mr. Bosanquet is always fresh and stimulating, and he has often suc-

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ceeded in throwing valuable side-lights upon the common doctrine. Nothing better than Mr. Bosanquet's account of the "real will" could be prescribed for those to whom the Idealist's "true self" is apt to appear a somewhat shadowy abstraction with but little relation to man's actual life and character. Equally forcible is our author's account of social institutions as facts of mind, while his comparison of the functions of the State in respect of Society with those of a secondary automatism in respect of the individual mind is full of suggestiveness. Now and then I have found myself re-reading a sentence more than once before any very definite sense arose of whither it was moving. But after all this is not a very serious cause for complaint when, as here, the meaning is nearly always worth a little trouble in getting at it.

After a couple of preliminary chapters in which Social Philosophy is defined and distinguished from Sociological Science, our author gets started on his subject, taking as his text the "paradox of self-government." The idea of self-government contains "the true ground and nature of political obligation." Both in ancient and modern times the "thought and feeling of mature communities" has clung to this conception, and the same principles can be shown to lie "at the root of the common life of every state or community which has held together effectively enough to be treated as in any sense a political whole." Nevertheless the idea of self-government is one which cannot be reconciled with current views of the nature of the individual and of society which recognize only "the natural separateness of the human unit." The impossibility of founding a genuine theory of political obligation without a deeper insight into the nature of the individual and society is enforced by a criticism of the views of Bentham, J. S. Mill, and Herbert Spencer. As resting upon the view of man's nature which first impresses itself upon the modern man in the street, their theories are described as "theories of the first look." An examination of Rousseau's theory of the "general will" brings us within sight of the solution of our paradox. Self-government, whether ethical or political, must be understood as government by the "real will" which emerges as the result of criticism which reveals the incomplete and contradictory nature of the will as present to the individual's consciousness. The whole of Mr. Bosanquet's exposition of this conception and its application to political philosophy is full of interest. A special chapter of "psychological illustration" is devoted to the working out of the analogy between "the organized structure of

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minds and the organized structure of society," and to the elucidation of the thesis that minds and society with its various institutions are "really the same fabric regarded from different points of view." Indeed, so high are the hopes that have been raised, that it is with a feeling of considerable disappointment the reader comes upon a couple of chapters devoted to the exposition of the views of Kant, Fichte and more especially Hegel, with but little in the way of criticism or even interpretation. It is as if we had thought we were fairly out to sea for a voyage of our own, and found ourselves instead following the familiar banks of a river. We could well have spared these two chapters for a few pages of Mr. Bosanquet's own freer handling of the questions at issue, with closer reference to our own social life.

We reach more open water again in Mr. Bosanquet's defence of the actual State as a realization of freedom against the criticisms of Green. The question at issue is, of course, only one of emphasis, of less importance for theory than for the determination of one's practical attitude towards the State. Mr. Bosanquet fully admits the necessary imperfections of every actual State; while Green, even in his most adverse passage recognizes the reality of the work of liberation which the State performs for the individual. It is doubtless true that owing to "defective social experience" it has too often been assumed by members of the literary class that there can be little in common with their own life, and little worth living for, in the lives of those who differ widely from themselves in social circumstances. Mr. Bosanquet's respect for the *de facto* organization of Society is made plainer in the rule which he suggests for the practical application of the principle that State action must be limited to the hindrance of hindrances to the best life. In performing this negative function the State must indeed commit positive acts, but "we ought, as a rule, when we propose action involving compulsion, to be able to show a definite tendency to growth, or a definite reserve of capacity, which is frustrated by a known impediment, the removal of which is a small matter compared to the capacities to be set free," (p. 192). If, as appears to be the case, we are required to have direct evidence of the tendencies and capacities in question, this rule appears to me too stringent and to overlook the large extent to which tendencies and capacities may be unable to make even their existence manifest if left to shift for themselves.

JAMES GIBSON.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF NORTH WALES.

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Publications of the University of Pennsylvania. Series in Philosophy. No. 3. ON SPINOZISTIC IMMORTALITY. By George Stuart Fullerton, Professor of Intellectual and Moral Philosophy in the University of Pennsylvania. Published for the University, Philadelphia, 1899. Ginn & Co., Boston. Pp. viii., 154.

This brochure is much more than its title would lead one to expect. The Spinozistic doctrine of immortality occupies only a small part of the volume, as the headings of the four parts show: Part I. The World of Existences; Part II. The World of Essences; Part III. From Bondage to Freedom; and Part IV. The Religious Element in Spinoza. Still, Professor Fullerton is justified in the name he gives to the work, inasmuch as Parts I and II expound what he considers to be true Spinozism, only to show that Spinoza's personal belief in immortality was not consistent with Spinoza's philosophic creed.

Not that this philosophic creed was consistent with itself. "Spinoza was at heart a thorough realist; he thought like a realist, he felt like a realist, he wrote like a realist." Now, "the difficulty with which the realist has to contend, is that he is dealing in his reasonings with abstractions, and yet fails to see all that is implied in their being abstractions. His essences or universals tend not to remain essences, but to become, in some sense, existences. And they are necessarily inconsistent and unreal existences, whose incoherent and irresponsible behavior as they make their entrances and exits into the real world and out of it, produce a feeling of bewilderment in lovers of clear and consistent thinking" (p. 33). Spinoza, "of course, did not clearly recognize that his essences are abstractions. Had he done this, he would not have turned them into things. But then we should not have had the Spinozistic philosophy" (p. 34). Readers of Professor Fullerton's previous works will recognize in this condemnation a consistent carrying out of what he calls "moderate realism." Into the philosophical merits of this doctrine it is perhaps not proper to go in the pages of this JOURNAL, although a reviewer may be pardoned the dogmatic assertion that the luminousness of the exposition Professor Fullerton gives to his view is apt to blind one's eyes to the radical logical defect of it. Against such a view it may be said that a universal that is neither an abstraction nor an independent existence seems to be the very presupposition of any valid reasoning, and has the most striking resemblance to one form of Spinoza's

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essence. That Spinoza, however, was not consistent in his view of essence, Professor Fullerton has probably proved, although he has not convincingly shown that Spinozism is inconsistent with any consistent view of the universal.

Professor Fullerton takes a truer philosophical attitude in his treatment of the doctrine of immortality. To make transition without more ado from eternity to everlastingness is inadmissible; and this is true, whether we take eternity to be "the independence of time-relations enjoyed by universals" as abstractions (p. 75), or to be a transcendence of mere sequence on the part of concrete universals. Whether Spinoza committed this fallacy or not, it is a real service to clear thinking to have pointed out the paralogism involved in this procedure, and this service is the more useful and timely as many a thinker of the present day argues confidently from some form of timelessness to permanence through time.

The religious element in Spinoza is traced by Professor Fullerton to logically unwarranted associations that were brought from a religious past to an absolutely irreligious view. In true Spinozism "God or Nature becomes nothing more than nature; and it is only a traditional use of language and the associations that have been inherited with it that cast over nature the veil through which it is seen as a fitting object to arouse religious emotion" (p. 138). "The religious emotion which pervades the 'Ethics' evidently does not flow from the concepts and reasonings which characterize Spinozism as a system of doctrine. It is found where it is because Spinoza was a man of religious nature and theological training, who did not wholly break with the past, but liberally modified inherited concepts, while habitually using language rich in associations and well calculated to conceal both from himself and from his readers the actual degree of divergence between his thoughts and generally accepted notions to which they seem to bear a certain superficial resemblance. The wine which he serves is new wine, but it is contained in old bottles, and even he is not aware how new it is. Had he clearly recognized just what, in his doctrine, is meant by the word God, had he been able to free his conception of certain irrelevant associations derived from the past, I do not believe that he would have felt toward God as it is clear he did feel" (pp. 142 and 143). All this rests on the assumption that when the word God had been divested of "every shred of anthropomorphic reference," it is no longer a word belonging to the vocabulary of religion (p. 129). This assumption,

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in one "who would use the word religious in a broad sense," is rather surprising at this time of day; but it teaches us that in some persons at any rate, and in persons of high philosophic culture, too, it is impossible for the time being to dissociate emotions from the objects that have in their past history habitually been associated with these emotions. In view of the results, however, of historical investigations into the development of religious consciousness, it is rather bold to assume that every religious attitude toward nature is merely a survival of anthropomorphism.

Evander Bradley McGilvary.

Cornell University.

The Philosophy of Greece, Considered in Relation to the Character and History of its People. By Alfred William Benn, author of "The Greek Philosopher." London: Grant Richards. 1898. Pages x., 308.

The writer of this book, starting from the assumption that all philosophy is "a product not only of certain preëminent intellects, but also, and above all, of the nation," has attempted an historical study of Greek philosophy, not as a contribution to scientific truth, but as "an expression of national life." In his former book upon the Greek philosophers the main object was to study Greek philosophy in its relations to modern thought, to disentangle and to estimate elements of permanent value; but in the present work such estimates, and as far as possible all controversy, are avoided. Its thesis is that Greek philosophy exhibits, under an abstract form, certain ways of acting and looking at things which characterized the Greek genius before philosophy itself began; that, having come into existence, its evolution was determined by the history and geography of Greece; and that at every stage of that evolution it was influenced by the political, religious, and scientific culture of the Greek people.

One characteristic, above all, of the Greek genius, the writer takes as the key-note to all their thinking, viz.: that combination of self-knowledge with self-control which they expressed by the word, *sophrosyne*. This conception (Mr. Benn maintains) was developed into a law of thought, of reality, of conduct, by all members of the Hellenic family, but especially by the profound thinkers of the Ionian race. It is to be found equally in the grouping of personages in Homer, in the composition of the figures in a

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marble frieze, in the "shifting perspectives" of Herodotus, in the concentric masses and clustered molecules of Anaximander and Leucippus, in the groups of ordered activities of Plato's Ideal State.

The exposition of all Greek thought as simply illustrative of one idea, *sophrosyne*, is worked out in a thoughtful and suggestive manner; but the author has not escaped the danger, necessarily involved in such a method of exposition, of one-sidedness and exaggeration. Occasionally, indeed, he is betrayed into something near akin to an equivocation. For example, to identify the "middle term" in a chain of syllogistic reasoning (in geometry) with the "moderation in all things" of popular thinking is surely to strain a chance similarity of expression beyond reasonable limits. The fact, too, that the products of Ionian thought are more important than any other contribution to the totality of Greek philosophy is interpreted sometimes so as to give the impression that nothing but Ionia need be considered at all. On the other hand, the influence of this idea of limit, of self-control based upon knowledge, is demonstrated in an interesting way, and the analysis of the various pre-Socratic philosophies (in which the writer agrees mainly with Burnet) is admirable. The place of Socrates, and his relations to the Athenian democracy, are explained clearly and with sympathetic insight. The account given of Plato and Aristotle, especially of the latter, is, however, unsatisfactory, owing chiefly to its incompleteness. To assert that Aristotle was a "theoretical not a practical" thinker, and to justify this statement by a detailed analysis of his physical treatises alone,—dismissing his other writings in a few sentences,—is certainly to fall short of a fair or adequate exposition of one to whom, directly and indirectly, we, in common with the ancient world, owe so much.

W. H. Fairbrother.

Lincoln College, Oxford.

Through Nature to God. By John Fiske. London: Macmillan & Co., 1899. Pp. xv., 195.

This little work is rather addressed to the devout believer in Evolution than to one who takes a wider view of speculation. Its writer claims to propound "a wholly new line of reasoning" by which Theism is harmonized with, and proved by, the Doctrine of Evolution. Accepting Herbert Spencer's definition of life as the

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adjustment of inner states to outer relations, he goes on to remark that increasing complexity and perfection of such adjustment mark the advance of the Evolutionary process: but Man is the highest product and sphere of Evolution, and in Man again the highest element is the religious consciousness, which implies the quasi-human God, Morality, immortality. The adjustment of the human soul to God is the highest form of life: it implies a real relation of realities, a real adjustment of inner to outer, unless the principle of Evolution, found valid in the sphere of the seen world, must not be extended to the sphere where one side of the relation lies beyond human knowledge. Professor Fiske contends that this extension is inevitable. This is the passage through Nature to God.

Such is the argument of the third section of the book: the two preceding sections respectively discuss, also from the standpoint of Evolution, the "Mystery of Evil," and the relation of Ethics to the Cosmic process. The key to the former problem is found in the universal law that without change and contrast there can be no consciousness; thus feeling, as an element of conscious life, depends on antagonism: without evil there can be no good; otherwise, as is significantly substituted a few lines lower down (p. 25), good could not be recognized as such, or distinguished from evil. Evolution is the gradual elimination of evil, by a process which seems to us indeed wasteful, but is essential to the strengthening of character. In the end all evil will be destroyed, save such a memory of evil as may form a background rendering possible the reality of the predominant good. The sections on the relation of Ethics to the Cosmic process are directed against Huxley's idea that the ethical world is a merely transitory phase in a greater process which is non-ethical. Professor Fiske maintains that the Ethical world is the highest stage of the Cosmical process: the evolution of the Cosmos tended to the genesis of man: man could not have persisted without the unselfish devotion implied in the family and the care of the young in their prolonged infancy: this altruism is the root of morals and religion, and these again are the highest results of the evolution of Man.

These arguments must appeal to those thinkers who believe that Evolution is the principle which solves the riddle of the universe, and seek to harmonize it with transcendental assumptions. But it is obvious that their justification depends on much that is not made explicit. Evolution certainly involves an end: but it is not

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certain that a minute factor in the process should foresee the perhaps infinitely remote end of the universal Evolution. It is not shown why Man and the perfection of Man should be the supreme goal of the Cosmic process: it appears more compatible with such a line of thought to conceive, as Huxley did, that Man is a fleeting product in the millennial Cosmic process. If so, why should not Religion and Morality be rather human delusions by means of which Evolution serves purposes of its own which lie beyond the ken of the human spirit? Professor Fiske depends on what is for him a foregone conclusion. Again, he assumes a quasi-human, absolute God, a God immanent in the Universe: but what is the relation of this God to Evolution? How is God, further, at once immanent in and externally related to, the human spirits which are evolved by more perfect adjustments to God? And it may be asked whether the good in God is absolute or relative to Evil: if the former, the impossibility of a positive Good is given up: if the latter, God is not perfect. And as regards human good, it appears paradoxical that Evolution should proceed by eliminating an essential factor and thus tend to non-entity; or it is paradoxical that if good and evil are essential to each other, an infinitely small portion of the one should serve to make possible an infinitely great portion of the other.

These and similar difficulties seem latent in Professor Fiske's pleasant and confident reasonings.

R. A. WRIGHT.

LONDON.

HISTORY OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY. By Dr. W. Windelband, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Strassburg. Authorized translation by Herbert Ernest Cushman, Ph. D., Instructor in Philosophy in Tufts' College. From the second German edition. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1899. Pp. xv., 393.

An eminent psychologist who had received his training at the very source of modern experimental laboratory psychology, and who was himself in charge of one of the most important psychological laboratories in the world, once expressed his bitter disappointment that so often the labor in the laboratories was expended in employing psychology as an aid in the study of physiological problems. Or, if these pioneers in the new pyschology did perchance remember that they were in their laboratories first of all for

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the purpose of studying psychology, their time was spent in trivial things. For his own part, this investigator would always remember that he was a psychologist, and that he was in search of light on the large and comprehensive psychological questions. He has lived up to his claim; but he has paid the penalty. He is reproached by the "up-to-date" workers in his field with being an old-school metaphysical psychologist in disguise, one who gives merely "subjective" theories the veneer of scientific fact in his laboratory. There are obviously dangers on both sides. But I think my psychologist friend is on the safer and saner side, and that, in his work, he is vindicating his claim.

The situation as regards the history of philosophy is quite similar to the one outlined above with regard to the "new psychology." Long ago haphazard histories of philosophy which gathered their facts indiscriminately, and enlivened the tale, where it had life at all, with scraps of learned gossip, have been cast aside, or have been sent to keep company with Diogenes' curious scrapbook. For Hegel appeared and taught the real and present value of historical studies. History is interesting because it is the story of man "writ large," because in it we discover the self-revelation of the free spirit. The history of philosophy is valuable because it is philosophy itself "writ large." Truth is many-sided, and if all philosophies are false because "our little systems have their day," in another and a deeper sense all philosophies are true, because our little systems do not "cease to be." And that philosophy is the truest which most truly appreciates all other philosophies, and most completely systematizes all other systems. Since Hegel's day the desire of the intellectual revolutionist to ignore the past, to turn his back on philosophical "learning's many palaces," and strike out afresh, seeking perhaps new light in strange and out of the way places (consulting mediums and the like), or simply seeking it in the patient and minute study of experiences that lie near at hand, has sent its unfortunate possessor on a vain quest. If successful at all, he ends by bringing back as a new discovery merely some old and well-worn formula. Mastery of the past is necessary before one can with any well-grounded hope face the future. The Hegelian view was captivating. It found at once many devotees. But it has its dangerous side. Hegel, as indeed every philosopher must, undertook to be the *arbiter philosophorum*. Only, Hegel was so exasperatingly sure of his wisdom and of his right to play the Lord's anointed; and the narrative which was to

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illustrate and reveal the truth in its triumphant forward march of self-evolution was, in some cases at least, so obviously twisted to fit some preärranged formula according to which it should develop. In our own day, this method shared the general disfavor into which Hegelianism, and indeed metaphysics generally, fell, and we have been treated in recent years to works and monographs without end, written from the so-called "objective," "scientific" standpoint. If in the former case it was sought to explain the genesis of philosophy from its inner significance, in the latter it will rather be from its external conditions. In both cases are there dangers; in both cases have good results been accomplished. There are few historians of philosophy, however, who are at once able and willing to hold together these two points of view. This is precisely that which constitutes the great value of Professor Windelband's researches in the history of philosophy. "Hegel created the science of the history of philosophy according to its ideal purposes, but not until after his day was safe ground presented for achieving such a science by the philological method of getting the data without presuppositions" (p. 7). And so Professor Windelband would, on the one hand, portray the philosophical doctrines with "philological exactness," observing all "the precautionary measures of the historical method;" and, on the other hand, fix definitely "the value of each individual philosophic doctrine in the development of the scientific consciousness." He would be the chronicler of philosophers' opinions, and, at the same time, the constructive philosophical thinker.

The peculiar difficulties the historian encounters in treating of Pythagorean philosophy, Professor Windelband, following a modern fashion, avoids by rigidly separating the "practice" of Pythagoras from the "science" of the Pythagoreans. Pythagoras was a reactionary in the practical world, desiring a return to the old institutions and convictions, and, at the same time, endeavoring to purify the religious ideas of his countrymen. The Pythagoreans became philosophers and developed the "number theory." This is a convenient way of disposing of the difficulty, and the development of philosophical concepts becomes perhaps a little simplified if we can regard the number theory as an attempt to mediate in the conflict between the Eleatics and Heraclitus, as Professor Windelband does. But we fear this is one of those "subjective" pitfalls the Hegelian method of concepts exposes one to (*Pace* Burnet!). The plain fact is that it is just the treacherous Alexandrine

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sources that make Pythagoras preëminently, and almost exclusively, a religious teacher and miracle monger. And, as Professor Windelband has himself shown (pp. 350 ff. and 343) in Alexandria at that time the philosophies were being made over into religions. And it is a clear misrepresentation of the case to say: "Neither Plato nor Aristotle knew anything about a philosophy of Pythagoras, but simply made mention of a philosophy of the 'so-called Pythagoreans.' Nowhere is the 'number theory' referred to the 'Master' himself" (p. 29). That Aristotle did believe Pythagoras had a philosophy, and the reason why he does not distinguish that philosophy from the philosophy of the Pythagoreans, is evident enough from a careful analysis of the passage in Book I, ch. v. of the "Metaphysics," where Aristotle, after referring to the number theory and to the special theories of one branch of the school adds, that Alcmæon of Croton apparently had a similar view; and that this similarity could be explained either from his having borrowed the theory from the Pythagoreans or they from him, "for Alcmæon had reached the age of manhood in the latter years of Pythagoras." The truth is, much yet remains to be done before we can be certain precisely what Pythagoras stood for, and the investigations of modern scholarship are far from final.

Among the specially attractive features of the book we might mention the exceedingly interesting and suggestive sketch of the intellectual life in Greece in the seventh and sixth centuries B. C., which serves as an introduction to the study of the philosophy; the unusually complete treatment of the philosophy of Democritus; and the relatively full account of Alexandrine philosophy,—of the meeting of Greek and Jewish and Christian elements and the consequent philosophizing of religion and religionizing of philosophy.

Professor Windelband's book is at once the most complete, the most scholarly, the most philosophical and the most readable handbook of ancient philosophy in existence, and those familiar with it in the original have long wished that it might be made available for use in their classes. They owe a debt of gratitude to Dr. Cushman for having at last done it into English. The difficult task of the translator has been faithfully performed. Occasionally, we think, Dr. Cushman has been too literally faithful to the text, so that one is reminded that it *is* a translation.

Charles M. Bakewell.

Bryn Mawr.

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THE NEW HUMANISM: Studies in Personal and Social Development. By Edward Howard Griggs. New York: 1900.

Whilst we are very glad to welcome the scores of social reform societies which are springing up all over the civilized world, as an evidence that conscience is still to be a factor in sociology, we doubt, very often, whether any considerable portion of these societies have a conception of the nature of the problem with which they profess to deal, can trace its roots down through the mould of history, or understand the spiritual impulses from which so much of the demand for reform springs. We are all very busy reformers; and yet as effort after effort appears to have been little more than a pious ploughing of barren sands, those most deeply buried up in work must have felt occasionally that there was some truth in the hymn which told us that "doing ends in death." Tolstoï's reply to Zola that the gospel of work is the faith of the man who is afraid to stop and think is not nourishing food, perhaps, but it is good medicine. Whoever would "make the world better" must know the world, must be under no delusion regarding the complicated nature of the problem, must ever remember that in such work there is no beginning and no ending, that the ideal by which he is guided (if it is a rational ideal) is as much the product of history as the Constitution of the United States. The reformer cannot take a narrow and superficial view or live on his own potato patch and yet contribute to that structure of righteousness which he hopes, is to be the final habitation of humanity.

Hence we welcome "The New Humanism." Mr. Griggs is happy in having a firm grasp upon those two pillars of social reform—the historical sense and the spiritual sense. In his first essay he shows that as mathematical formula did not apply to biological facts, so biological formula do not apply to human facts. In the higher sphere, the laws of the lower are but inadequate guides. Each of the great divisions in the evolution process has a law and order of its own. "The assumption that when we have shown moral sensibilities and ideas, religious faith and all forms of spiritual life to have antecedent causes in determining conditions of physical and social environment, we have explained away the meaning of the higher activities, and may entirely neglect them in our study of humanity, is quite as absurd as to argue that a specialized structure has no significance beyond that of the simpler basis from which it developed" (p. 31). In "The Evolution of

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Personality," Mr. Griggs discusses the growth of a spiritual individualism. Every improved physiological adaptation, every progressive change in social structure, is accompanied by an extension of human liberty and "a deepening of the content of personal life." Moral progress is marked not so much by onward change in personality as by the comprehensiveness of the kinship of the human soul. "The progress of history is measured, not by the spread of material conquests or the accumulation of the equipment of civilization, but by the transformation of the universe into the life of the spirit, by the progressive emancipation of the individual and the deepening and widening of the content of his personal life" (p. 62).

In personal ideas, Mr. Griggs discovers the mainspring of progress. "An ideal is the most practical thing in the world, for it is a force behind action that must be reckoned with by the frankest materialist" (p. 74); but the ideal which is thus elevated is not a mere cold intellectual creed, but that warm palpitating life within which character forms. That this pressure to progress may be steady and rational, we have to undergo the discipline of organizing the elements of conduct which in most men are a chaotic mass, and this is the end of all rational education. Christian morals must not be regarded as an all round development from Greek morals. Both over-emphasize their special characteristics and need to be unified in a transcending conception of humanity. The progress towards an all comprehending breadth of spirituality may be seen in a review of the status of women in society and of the place she holds in literature.

Regarding the methods of social reconstruction, Mr. Griggs says, "because the social structure is an outgrowth of personal ideals, progress must be slow, and all schemes for bringing in the golden epoch must be ineffectual" (pp. 183 and 184). He expresses a still more suggestive thought when he regards a haste for social reconstruction of a formal kind, as an indication of a static view of society. "To seek to be true to our best insight to express in personal life the highest ideal that we know, is the highest possible service in the problem of social reconstruction" (p. 198). But this purely personal view has to be qualified by considerations of social circumstance. "Unless the tones he produces are in unison with the rest, they are not music, but discordant sounds" (p. 223). At the present time, the social circumstance to which personal life must be toned is the movement

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towards solidarity, hampered and hindered by competing nations, by class distinctions, by industrial divisions into rich and poor, but yet so strong and so persistent that it is becoming the conscious social idea of the best minds of the world. In its more spiritual heights this ideal assumes the aspect of a religion. "As the progressive evolution of the individual is accompanied by increasing social integration, so the development of religion renders it at once more intimately personal and more broadly human. These two principles are present everywhere in the human world, and are increasingly resolved into a higher unity. That which is most intimately personal is most universally human; and the religion which consists in the inner faith and attitude of the individual is always that which unites one with all in pursuit of the high aims of life."

Such, in brief, should we connect the ideas running through the various essays of the book. Although Mr. Griggs is well aware of the social nature of personal ethics, we could not help feeling that he had not allowed it its due place in working out his social criticisms. He treats it rather as an addendum or as a qualifying consideration, whilst it ought to have entered into his thoughts as an organic part of the individual life. As he has pointed out, those who lean heavily upon formal changes in law really regard society as a statical structure, but on the other hand, Mr. Griggs gives us the impression that he regards society too much as an amorphous spiritual entity. We could not help gathering such an impression as we read his essays. The fault may really lie in the fact that the book is composed of what appear to be lectures only imperfectly connected. Such a scheme leaves many interstices and exaggerates certain aspects of a general idea. But, "The New Humanism" is well worthy of study by everyone who has an intellectual interest in the meaning and genesis of the social and ethical life of the time.

J. R. McDonald.

London.

Higher Life for Working People. By W. Walker Stephens. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1899. Pp. vii., 132.

"We have got, as far as we can, to make this country more pleasant to live in for the vast majority of those who live in it." This is one of the quotations prefixed to the above work. The author proceeds to discuss how it might be done. In following his

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argument, we thought occasionally, especially when reading the essay on "Old Age Annuities," that he might almost have added to his prefatory mottoes, "It is all so easy." Mr. Stephens seems sometimes to underestimate the force of the other side. We have chiefly in mind the chapter on strikes. "How to prevent strikes" is the question with which the essay starts, and Mr. Stephens's response is immediate, "By profit sharing." "The only real and durable preventive of strikes is an arrangement between masters and men, such as shall guarantee the men that if they have to accept lower wages when trade is dull and profits are reduced, they shall enjoy proportionately better wages when trade is brisk and profits are increasing" (p. 58), the author says; and again, "A wise company would recognize its best interest to consist in making the workmen's share one of a *substantial* amount" (p. 61). Now we assert nothing here either for or against profit sharing, but we must emphasize that it cannot be asserted offhand, apart from the question of industrial control, that the employé ought to receive a share in individual profits. And again it must be observed that the quantity of the share preserves an antagonism of interest between employer and employé. There are industries and industries, and what may be desirable in the one may be not only undesirable but even impracticable in the other. In general, we find that the more developed the industry, the more graded the commodities in which it deals, and the more organized its markets, the greater is the opposition on the side of the operatives to profit sharing. Take, for instance, the policy of the cotton spinners for the last twenty years, a policy which the weavers are coming to follow. Let me emphasize again that all we contend for here is a little more rigid analysis before judgment. The author also mentions gain sharing, but that, as he sees, is quite a different question, and one involving fewer difficulties.

Mr. Stephens has touched on many other questions, among which may be specially mentioned those of the unemployed, the eight hours day, home colonies, the poor law, and workmen's dwellings. There is a simple directness about his treatment which is not unpleasing. Our only complaint is that it is at times too simple. But to have felt and stated the problems is something; and the work is suggestive.

S. J. Chapman.

University College, Cardiff.

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INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL OF ETHICS.

JULY, 1900.

THE TREATMENT OF SUBJECT RACES.

THERE is no nation in the world so much concerned in this question as the British, for no nation in the world governs so many subject races. But, alas, we forget that we do govern them, or only remember it to reckon up the millions of square miles over which the flag of England floats supreme. We delegate our enormous power to a handful of men over whom we exercise practically no control whatever. There is a startling sentence in one of Hume's essays to the effect that free people make the most oppressive governors of dependencies. I fear that Hume's saying has a great deal of truth in it in our case. The very fact of our being a free people makes it almost impossible for us to believe that we can ever do wrong in matters of government. We imagine that we have a divine right to govern and that there is something unpatriotic—if not impious—in the barest suggestion that Englishmen can govern wrong. Oddly enough, this national self-confidence often deserts us, just when it might be most useful; for no sooner are we invited to condemn any action of our countrymen in foreign parts, than we profess an edifying humility, very far removed from our usual somewhat aggressive cocksureness, and claim that "we do not know enough about it to express an opinion; but it is very unlikely that an Englishman would govern wrong. No doubt it is the fault of the

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people." With a few sentences like these, we wash our hands of the destinies of one-fifth part of the human race. Our sense of responsibility—that "white man's burden," about which we talk so much—becomes, in practice, rather a recognition of the duty of keeping up the British Empire, than of making that empire what it ought to be, might be, and would be, if we only tried to be what we think we are. In fact our present somewhat obtrusive sense of national responsibility is becoming almost more mischievous than our previous indifference.

It is true that many of us have a sense of responsibility towards non-British races in one particular. We feel it to be our duty to try to impart our religion to them. With this object, we yearly expend considerable sums and a great deal of effort; but the expenditure and the effort do not produce adequate results. I do not in the least depreciate missionary efforts, to which the world has owed so much, but I do say that those efforts are heavily handicapped by the glaring contradiction between our religion and our political administration. Our converts may justly ask us whether we govern them as we would wish to be governed, whether we treat them as "neighbors," not to say as "brethren." If there had been as great and persistent an effort on the part of Englishmen to ensure just government in our conquered territories, as there has been to teach the natives of those territories the religion of love and self-sacrifice, our empire would now stand upon an unassailable foundation, and our religion—thus honored by our practice—would have made an impression which it can never hope to do as things are. At present, I fear, we allow our missionary efforts to lull our consciences to sleep in regard to these matters.*

I cannot help thinking that before we try to convert a subject people we ought to do them justice. I allude especially to the case of India. We often hear the enemies of missions, (who are by no means always the friends of India), point

*I have great respect for those missions which have for their object the alleviation of the condition of women, especially the medical missions.

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disparagingly to the small results obtained. The only wonder is that these missions produce any results at all. They are too glaringly inconsistent with the political situation. What is a Christian missionary in India to reply, when, after he has read the Sermon on the Mount, his catechumen asks him: "If these things be so, why did you conquer us? Why do your Sahibs, who say they are Christians, treat us, not like brothers, but like a conquered people? Why do even some of you missionaries, when you have been here some time, begin to copy them, and put a distance between yourselves and us?" I think an honest missionary must sometimes feel uncomfortable, as he reads the New Testament with his converts. But he does not make many, and he must be often sorely in doubt as to the motives of those he does make. For, in India, Christianity is the way to worldly advancement. The people of India also suspect our motives, and think that while we profess to be anxious to establish the religion of Christ, we are really trying to strengthen the foundations of the British Empire. And I must say that I have heard missionary sermons at home which almost made me think the same thing. I confess that I cannot but feel somewhat suspicious of our complete *bona fides* in this matter, when I see that for one person who is concerned about the temporal welfare of the people of India, for one who thinks they are overtaxed and kept in an unwholesome state of subordination, often approaching to moral degradation, there are thousands who are willing to give their shillings to convert the Indians to the religion of their conquerors. I cannot read the New Testament without seeing that Jesus Christ devoted a very large part of His ministry to the alleviation of mere bodily pains and the providing for mere bodily wants, and that He expressly discouraged all ideas of domination. One might almost say that, except for this somewhat suspicious missionary zeal, we take no interest in India at all. Three lines in a daily paper tell us that there is a threatening of famine. Now and then a paragraph gives us an account of the deposition of a native prince. We pass with far more real interest to the

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announcement, that the Duke of ——— whom we never saw, is going to marry some great heiress, of whom we never heard.

Now it is not unnatural that we should take so little interest in India. India is a very long way off. We shall most likely never go there. We have seen a few Indians at a distance, and have perhaps pitied them for being black. We have a general idea that it is a good thing for them that we are taking the trouble to govern them. But why? Why must it be a good thing for any people to be governed by the delegates of those who know nothing and care nothing about them? For that is what the government of India by Great Britain really means.

Many years ago, in his book on "Representative Government," John Stuart Mill uttered some of the weightiest words he ever spoke, words which must commend themselves to all thoughtful persons, as at least worthy of long and careful consideration. They are to be found in the chapter entitled, "Government of Dependencies by a Free State."

"The government of a people by itself, has a meaning and a reality; but such a thing as government of one people by another does not and cannot exist. One people may keep another as a warren or preserve for its own use, a place to make money in, a human cattle-farm to be worked for the profit of its own inhabitants. But if the good of the governed is the proper business of a government, it is utterly impossible that a people should directly attend to it. The utmost they can do is to give some of their best men a commission to look after it. . . . Let any one consider how the English themselves would be governed, if they knew and cared no more about their own affairs, than they know and care about the affairs of the Hindoos. Even this comparison gives no adequate idea of the state of the case; for a people thus indifferent to politics altogether, would probably be simply acquiescent, and let the government alone; whereas in the case of India, a politically active people like the English, amidst habitual acquiescence, are every now and then interfering, and almost always in the wrong place. . . . Now if there be a fact to which all experience testifies, it is that when a country holds another in subjection, the individuals of the ruling people who resort to the foreign country to make their fortunes, are of all others those who most need to be held under powerful restraint. . . . . Wherever the demoralizing effect of the situation is not in a most remarkable degree corrected by the personal character of the individual, they think the people of the country mere dirt under their feet; it seems to them

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monstrous that any rights of the natives should stand in the way of their smallest pretensions. . . . The government itself, free from this spirit, is never able sufficiently to keep it down. . . . The settlers, not the natives, have the ear of the public at home."

These are the words of a man who knew what he was talking about. Mill's father, as well as Mill himself, had a close official knowledge of the government of India. Mill was not theorizing, he was speaking of that which he had seen and heard. And it is all as true to-day as when the words were written. I have heard intelligent young Indians, who had never seen this book, making the very same statements out of their own experience. I particularly wish to insist upon that expression, "the demoralizing effect of the situation," because it is the key to the whole problem, and yet is a consideration we entirely ignore. If we did not ignore it, we could never be so easily persuaded that all is sure to be well in a dependency governed by Englishmen. We should know that it is in the nature of things most unlikely that all should be well—that it is pretty certain the whole situation is demoralizing alike for governors and governed.

The relation of conqueror to conquered is an odious one. It closely resembles that of master and slave. It inevitably makes the one overbearing, arrogant and unscrupulous, and the other deceitful and time-serving. It is, like all injustice, doubly cursed. It implies a radically false position, the assumption of a superiority which is not moral—for, if it were moral, there would be no need to hedge it about with insulting distinctions and unfair privileges. No man can bear to be constantly reminded of his inferiority, but neither can any man bear to be constantly reminded of his superiority. A habit of insolent contempt is formed which in the good-natured is often no worse than a passive ignoring of the existence of the despised. Whether it is active or only passive depends on the temperament and character of the individual Englishman. But there is always the invidious distinction: the conquered are always made to feel the presence of the intruder, of the conqueror. One cannot take up a book

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of which the scene is laid in India without seeing this; and it is astonishing to see the little effect which these usually unconscious and unintentional revelations make upon us. For instance, I remember a story in the *Strand Magazine,* where the hero—a bridegroom of twenty-four hours—leaves his bride to go and hunt "black game." He is a long time gone, and in his absence, a dreadful adventure befalls the young bride. She is beginning to reproach him, when at last he returns, but he explains that his huntsman (described as a remarkably splendid specimen of a "native," and devoted to his master, whose life he had once saved) accidentally wounded himself, and was in danger of bleeding to death. The delay was caused by his master's efforts to save him. When the bride is told this, she looks admiringly at her husband, and observes that "there are not many Sahibs who would take so much trouble for a nigger." This is only a "story," but the writer is obviously trying to enforce no moral; he is simply telling a thrilling incident. We cannot take up any work of fiction treating of life in India, without finding traces of this presentment of the Anglo-Indian. It is taken as a matter of course, and I have never yet heard of a single Anglo-Indian protesting that the picture drawn of him is untrue. Yet the remark I have quoted is terrible. A young English lady is represented as telling her husband that very few Englishmen would have taken so much trouble to save the life of a native servant, even if he had saved theirs; and her husband is made to accept the compliment—he does not say that every Englishman would have done the same in his place. For my part, I cannot believe that even an Anglo-Indian,—arrogant and unsympathetic as many of them are, could be found, who would have done otherwise under the circumstances; but none of them think it worth while to say so, and I cannot but draw my own conclusion.

But, for all this, it is almost impossible to make an Englishman believe that it can be hard to live under our rule. The presentment of the Anglo-Indian as overbearing and unsympathetic never seems to inspire us with any uneasiness, until somebody begins to point a moral, then we turn indignantly,

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not upon the Anglo-Indian, but upon the pointer of the moral. What can we conclude, but that this picture is so true to life that it never occurs to anybody to challenge it? But the fact is that this obtuseness is but an illustration of Mill's assertion that the average Englishman in India thinks the natives are mere dirt under his feet; and that it is he and not the native who has the ear of our people at home.

This contempt of the natives is not a mere matter of "sentiment"; it translates itself at every moment into hard fact. It affects our whole method of government, in which we persistently ignore national character and tradition. The present situation in India is a glaring instance of this. In former times a kind of sliding scale taxed the farmer according to the goodness or badness of the crops. In a good year he paid a larger percentage than in a bad. The tax was not taken until the crop was reaped, and in years when the crop was entirely lost no tax at all was taken. This was the Law of Manu, and its justice and wisdom are obvious. But we thought we knew a better way—or, at any rate, a way more convenient for our officials. So we struck an average of the crop which each field may be expected to yield, and were mightily proud of our calculations as being far superior to the rough and ready native way. It was nothing to us that our system meant demanding every few years a tax upon crops which had never come above ground. Far from this, we have been so in love with our plan that we make a new settlement every few years, each time getting down lower and lower in the scale, not of payment but of payer, making the meshes of the great fiscal net smaller and smaller, to take in the gudgeons and the minnows, until now we are taxing the rag which the wretched peasant wraps about his loins, and enforcing a salt tax at a rate of 4000 per cent.* We excuse ourselves by say-

*Sir William Wedderburn, in an article on "The Starving Rayat," in *India,* for March, 1896, says: "The Rayat cannot be brought to see the justice of making a demand upon him when he has not even food for himself and his family. He says, 'In former days there were Rajas that were good, and others that were bad; the good ones took a small share of our crop, and the bad a large share; but heaven never before sent us a government which takes from us when we have no crop at all.'"

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ing that he has nothing else which we can tax, and the British taxpayer hears this without a qualm—the same taxpayer who clamors for his own "free breakfast table"—and whose average taxable margin is £4 3s. 2d. yearly, while the average yearly taxable margin of the Indian is two-pence, half-penny! This is the sort of thing that Mill meant when he said that the despotism exercised by a free country over a conquered state can easily become the worst of all, because it is exercised from a distance and is ignorant of the facts of the case.

There is perhaps no Indian matter which the British public understands so imperfectly as Indian famine, and those that think that the Englishman can do no wrong ask triumphantly if we are to blame for the failure of the rains of heaven. It is not our fault that the rains do not fall; but it is our fault that their failure produces such terrible consequences. In temperate climates famine is something abnormal, it comes as a surprise, we are astonished at it; but in India, famine is periodical; once in every five years at least the rain-fall is more or less insufficient, the result being a famine of more or less severity. Famine in India is a contingency to be provided against, as in England we provide against frost, although it does not come every year. Famine in India is a fact to be reckoned with, and we have reckoned with it—but how? By taking care that land "settlements" shall be so arranged, that though the rain may fall, the taxes shall not. I refer to the system of "averages," which, at first sight, may appear fair, but which does not and which never will appear so to the Indian cultivator. There is another point about Indian famines which the British public never takes into account. In England a bad "harvest" means that grain is a failure; the root crops may be good, the grass may be good, everything is not necessarily lost. But in tropical India, little rain means a bad crop all round; no rain means no crop at all. The Indian cultivator, with his long memory of famine years, thinks that the only fair arrangement is that he shall pay a percentage on the crops actually growing in his fields, which of course would mean that if there was no crop he would pay nothing, and this would embarrass the Indian exchequer.

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We have, therefore, adopted the system of averages: the effect of which is that even in the worst of years the tax must be found. The above statement as to the margin of two-pence, half-penny will show how impossible it is for the ryot to have saved enough from the good year to pay for the bad; even in the good years he is taxed above that which he is able to bear. In the bad year he must borrow, and the usurer is always ready. As security he must pledge whatever he has; his plow, oxen, and the surplus of next year's crops. That next year may, perhaps, be so good that it may pay a part of its lean predecessor, but then little is left for himself. At the best, he is a fortunate man if he can work himself out of debt during the good years which separate one scarcity from another. Can that be a good government, can that be a just taxation, which makes this state of things perennial? No wonder that the ryot lives upon one meal a day, not of rice, as his British fellow subjects fondly imagine—rice is much too dear—but of some even less wholesome mess of cheap grain. He has his one meal and if he is still hungry, he tightens his dhooly (waist cloth), upon which he has paid a tax.

In a fit of remorse and shame at the consequences of our own neglect of warnings, before the terrible famine which must always be a painful page in the history of Lord Lawrence's administration, we promised to set aside a "famine fund," but we allowed this fund to be drawn upon to pay for the useless and mischievous expedition to Chitral. The serious famine of 1896, regarded by Indians as the worst of the century, overtook us with this deficit still to be made up. No greater proof could be given of our entire ignorance of the true situation than the admiration we expressed at our own generosity in subscribing so large a sum to the Indian famine fund of 1896. We appeared quite oblivious of the truth that we were first draining India of her money, and then returning her, by way of charity, a little of her own. But though we thus impose on ourselves we do not impose on our neighbors. Foreign nations believe that these famines are the result of our taxation, and even allege that famine is a symptom of British rule. There was a caricature in the *Figaro*, in 1896,

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which would have surprised some of the donors to the fund. It represents John Bull, full-fed and self-complacent, smoking his after-dinner pipe in his snug kitchen. The dresser behind him groans under goodly hams and pastries and whiskey-jars. His over-fed bull-terrier dozes with one eye fixed upon a plate of broken meat. A plump serving maid is removing the crumbs from the table-cloth: "Don't throw those crumbs away, Kitty," says Mr. Bull, "they'll do for the Indians." And, sure enough, underneath the picture is seen a row of emaciated figures in turbans, who stretch forth skeleton hands to catch the crumbs that fall from John's table.

This is how others see us. This is how we shall one day see ourselves, when we come to look into Indian affairs as we look into our own. We shall then realize that there is nothing in the relation of conqueror and conquered, *per se,* to promote good government. There is indeed everything to promote unjust, unsympathetic, unconciliatory government, government not based on sound knowledge of the particular needs of the governed. An initial wrong—for such conquest is, by every rule of every school of ethics—is not likely to bring justice in its train. It is far more likely to blunt the sense of justice altogether, to intensify arrogance, greed, ambition, and all the passions which are the hot-bed of injustice. It makes the one side less averse to oppress, and the other less willing to obey. It affords rulers a greater opportunity for doing wrong, and it makes it inexpedient to bring that wrong home to them. In fact the position is so morally bad, that if we were in reality the hyper-moral people we imagine ourselves to be, we should not endure it for all the wealth of the Indies.

And yet what an opportunity we are throwing away! Never had a nation such a chance to justify conquest as we have in India; never was a country in which a just and strong overlordship might be made so much of an unmixed good. A vast extent of territory, occupied by men of many races, profoundly divided by religion and by the memory of ancient wrongs, but all more or less hide-bound in a civilization which had ceased to grow, and which chiefly showed that life yet

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remained in it by the rigidity of its prohibitions, and the never changing lines of demarcation which it set between class and class; a country in which all influences worked together for stagnation, only broken in upon where conqueror and conquered had become alike debased, and where the corrupting influences of despotic rule had eaten into the hearts of the people; finally, a country where from generation to generation Mohammedan despised and oppressed Hindoo, and Hindoo abhorred and distrusted Mohammedan; where if by chance there came a just ruler, like Ferozshah, the moment the reins dropped from his failing hands chaos came again. Compared with most of the old governments, we might, had we been less greedy and less arrogant, have appeared as very angels. Even as it is, I think I may venture to say that the leaders of Indian opinion seek the reform of our rule and not its discontinuance. They fully realize that India cannot become a single nation on any other condition, and that if she become many nations the old chaos will return. They are beginning to be proud to belong to this great empire, or would if we would treat them as our fellow subjects, our fellow citizens. We do so while they are in England, till they almost forget they are not Englishmen; then they return home, and are reminded every day that they belong to a subject race. They have fought for us on many a field, as common soldiers, for they cannot rise above the rank of corporal. I know a young Indian of good position, who besought his father with tears to allow him to enter the army, even under these conditions. "My son," replied his father, "you are a gentleman; you can never by any possibility rise above the rank of corporal; I cannot consent."

I do not ask, is it right forever to remind a people that they are subject, but is it wise? Is it really the way to build up an empire? Can the greatest empire in the world afford to make its rule hateful? Can a hundred armies be as secure a defence as the good will of the governed? The power of the sword has no roots in itself such as good civil government has. Twenty years is long enough to see the end of the best army the world ever saw. The battle of Jena was fought and

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lost, only twenty years after the death of the great Frederick. All empires that have been upheld by the sword have come to naught, even Rome. And Rome seemed to have no enemy to fear. It is not so with us, nor will any other empire ever be so long in falling as was Rome. The triumphs of the sword are at all times the most ephemeral. But if we would make it our main concern to strengthen our empire by justice, and a righteous consideration of the needs of those we govern, it would long endure.

We have considered the treatment of races, which, though subject, are civilized—whose civilization, indeed, is far older than our own. If even here the dominant race cannot resist the temptation to arrogance, to unfair use of its advantages, to unjust subordination of the interests of the subject race to its own, what is likely to take place in regions inhabited by races behind us in civilization—races to whom we appear as gods, until we show ourselves to them as destroyers? Those who have read Stevenson's terrible book, "The Ebb Tide," may see to what level man can sink, when exposed to the most awful of all temptations, unlimited power over his fellow. He falls immeasurably below the savages he immolates. He is the true Moloch, battening on human sacrifices, pleased with the sense of his greatness, finding a base delight in lording it over creatures feebler and less cunning than himself. Who can be trusted in such a situation? Not the trader, who goes to make money, where no one will ask him how he made it. Not the soldier, who goes to win a little cheap glory by mowing down a horde of savages. Not the speculator, most unscrupulous and pitiless of all, who stays at home, and from a safe distance fires the train which is to destroy a whole nation.

And public opinion upholds all this, that public opinion which is always ready to excuse the white man, on the score that the black man is "so troublesome." As we cannot deny the facts, we justify them. If the white man does these things, then they must be necessary. For, the moment the black man comes upon the scene all our views change. Even those of us who habitually distrust the average white man, and are

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constantly pronouncing whole classes "unfit to rule," are very hard to be persuaded that any white man is not "fit" to rule over savages. Instead of feeling certain that the white man will be oppressive from the very nature of the position, we are only certain that the black man is tiresome.*

The appalling possibilities of the situation seem never to occur to us. That situation may be summed up in three words —power without responsibility. To the African and the Polynesian trader, the "native" is no more sacred than a turtle or a rabbit. The white man has the same right over them all—the right of the strongest. He is restrained by no public opinion in his dealings with any of them; and his own conscience, depraved by the spectacle of human beings so much less cunning and strong than himself, scarcely utters even a protest.

Perhaps no one has ever painted the demoralization of the superior race as Stevenson has done. It is worth while to consider for a moment the picture he has drawn. Few indeed have had such opportunities of dispassionate observation. He was no trader, and was, therefore, able to take a disinterested position. It is worth while to try to understand with what eyes he saw the Islanders. He had been long enough among them for the novelty to wear off—on both sides.

I think the first thing that strikes us is the intense humanity of his picture. The "Beach of Falesa" is a wonderful study in human nature. In the relations between John Wiltshire and Uma we get down to elemental man and woman. For—and here is the strangest part of it, and herein we see the depth of Stevenson's insight—in the course of these relations, Wiltshire himself undergoes a transformation. When he first appears, he is one more Englishman come to trade in Falesa. All that civilization has done for him is to uncivilize him, that is, to make him less of a social being (which is the root-meaning of the word "civilization"), to make him cun-

*The following sentence is the first in a leading article in *Black and White*, for February 6, 1897: "Africa, *as a comparatively new Continent*, is giving the old country as much trouble as possible." The italics are mine. The words did not refer to the Transvaal.

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ning, to encase him in a hard, coarse husk, incapable of feeling. In short, he has learned to over-reach his fellow-creatures, without wincing. He is rather proud of his attainment, just as Red Indians were proud of bearing pain without wincing. But in proportion as Uma's innocence reveals itself to him, the dead, insensitive husk begins to split, and the sensitive, living flesh is seen within. Wiltshire becomes more and more human; his flesh comes again as the flesh of a little child, until he rises high enough to feel abashed before the innocent creature who loves him. With consummate skill Stevenson shows us this refining process, and paints the awakening of a conscience in Wiltshire, who began with nothing higher than a dull dread of ending like Billy Randall. "To see him and think he was seventy, and remember he had once commanded a ship, and come ashore in his smart togs, and talked big in bars and consulates, and sat in club verandahs, turned me sick and sober"—to realize the depth of this fall had been Wiltshire's moral high-water mark, before he knew Uma.

Terrible are Stevenson's pictures of the degenerate white man, from this same old Captain Randall ("Any clean-minded man would have had the creature out at once and buried him") down to Bostock, who "had a hand in the amiable pleasantry which cost the life of Patteson," and who liked to tell the tale himself, *"when he was sure he was among good fellows."* There is every variety of trader and of kidnapper to be found in "The Island Nights," in "The Wrecker," and in "The Ebb Tide." We see them at work, diffusing the blessings of civilization among the benighted islanders. We hear them talking the slang of the Pacific Ocean, as they sit in the station verandah enjoying a smoke in the soft darkness of the South Sea night, while the Southern Cross leans above them. All the tragedy of the Island race is there; but it is not only the islanders who are naked, and not ashamed.

In all these pictures of the islanders, Stevenson shows us no half-beast, but simply undeveloped man and woman—undeveloped, but intensely human, more human a thousand times than the "civilized" monsters who traffic in their blood. This is how he makes Wiltshire describe Kanakas. "It's easy to

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find out what Kanakas think. Just go back to yourself, any way round from ten to fifteen, and there's an average Kanaka. There are some pious, just as there are pious boys; and most of them, like the boys again, are middling honest, and yet think it rather larks to steal, and are easily scared, and rather like to be so. I remember a boy I was at school with. . . . . He didn't know anything, that boy; he couldn't do anything; . . . . he just boldly said he was a sorcerer and frightened us out of our boots, and we loved it." So he shows us the islanders contending with grown man, strong and cunning, who sets himself to trick and cheat a parcel of schoolboys. It is an ugly situation, and in the working of it out, it is not the savage who is a dark and treacherous mystery, a new revelation of evil. It is *civilized* man who is the terrible, unsolvable enigma! It is Bostock, boasting to an admiring audience of his hideous trick of the sham bishop; it is the American, who at the supreme moment saves his worthless skin and his more worthless soul; it is Herrick, the "moral bankrupt," the "skulker from life's battle;" it is Wiseman and Wishart, drinking themselves to death in the smallpox-stricken Faralone; it is the loathsome Cockney, Huish, the vitriol thrower. And last, and most terrible, it is Attwater, with his piety and his greed, his evangelism and his relentlessness, his fatalism and his energy, his frightful mixture of cunning and force. Attwater may stand for the type of the individualist, the type of the fittest to survive; the type whose survival means the survival of the fewest. In him we may see how little of "civilization" there may be in civilized man. For, deep down below his religion, below his education, Attwater is essentially a savage. In his savage environment, he has reverted to his original type. His methods are distinctively savage—distinctively the methods of uncivilized, and not of civilized man. They are the primeval qualities of cunning and strength carried, it is true, to an extraordinary perfection, but still primeval. The roots of his being are savage; civilization has given him a steadier confidence in himself, and a more unwavering contempt for his neighbor, but it has not raised him one whit morally above a bandit chief. Those things in him

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which look at first sight like virtues, only make him more terrible. He is essentially a destructive force. To him the very Grace of God is but "a dress in which we may go down into the world, and come up scatheless"—with a chestful of pearls. Being justified by faith, all things are lawful to him. By faith, he amasses a fortune, and explains that, in so doing, he has made the best of both worlds.

It is in "The Ebb Tide" that Stevenson's picture reaches its climax—that terrible book which we did not understand when we first read it. It seemed too awful, too much like a ghastly caricature. Yet we could not forget it; and, slowly, as we came across one incident and one character after another in actual "up-to-date" history we began to recognize that Attwater is no more fiction of a novelist's brain, but an all too true portrait of the Exploiter, as he is when free from all restraint. He is what a man can be, when he has no fear of the Factory Acts before his eyes, but only the fear of God, of a God Who will have His creatures help themselves, instead of helping their neighbors, and Who has given a commission to the Strong and the Cunning to lay up for themselves treasures upon earth of coral and pearl, and promised them in the next world life everlasting. And if anyone still thinks Attwater an exaggeration, let him turn to one of Mr. H. M. Stanley's Prefaces, and there he will hear Attwater talking. There is positively no relief in the picture which Stevenson draws in "The Ebb Tide." How could there be, in a situation which appeals to all the worst in man? And here we come to another moral of the tale. The men he drew are by no means conspicuously below the moral average, if we except Bostock and Huish, while Attwater would probably be considered to be above it. It is only their circumstances which make them appear so much worse than ordinary men.

Stevenson drew no moral in "The Ebb Tide." He left that for his readers to do for themselves. Yet many passages in his writings show that he fully realized the moral. We may give it its widest application, and say he meant to show that it is a very bad moral training for the strong man to be so very much stronger than the weak that he need not take the weak

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into account. The praises of the strong hand have often been sung, but it has been an ideal Strong Hand. In practice, the despot is very apt to degenerate into the tyrant and the bully; and the more absolute his power, that is, the greater the disparity between him and those he rules, the worse he always rules. When a man is able to do as he likes, he is far more likely to do his worst than his best. In fact, it is very seldom that any of us do better than public opinion demands, and this is why it is so incalculably important to educate public opinion —that moral force, stronger than armies and police, stronger even than our own selfish desires, which does in the main restrain human society, and which alone makes that society possible. It is the most terrible result of these enormous inequalities that there is no public opinion, and where there is no public opinion there can be no improvement. Much nonsense has no doubt been talked about abstract equality; but the other side ignore the whole history of human experience. That experience shows that there can never be absolute equality, yet the less the inequalities in any human society, the more healthy the condition of that society. And it shows us that those who are "The Superior" degenerate even more than those who are "The Inferior." The greater the inequality, the greater the degradation of the dominant class, till we come to the last expression of inequality, the dealings of a civilized with an uncivilized race. What happens then is notorious—we all know it, the most passionate Great Englander knows it as well as the poor-spirited Little Englander. We refuse to see the meaning of the facts, but there is not one of us that can deny the facts. Here the lesson is writ out large, so large that we may read it a whole continent away. Disproportioned preëminence is not good for man. Enormous gaps are more likely to be bridged over by deeds like those of Bostock or Attwater, than by the gentle paternal pressure we have been taught to see in fancy pictures of despotism. That cannot be a true Commonweal which is made up of Attwaters and Kanakas. The lowest "ebb tide" in man's affairs sets him where he is most undisputed master of those around him.

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The idea of innate superiority is an essentially immoral idea. Of course, there are enormous actual inequalities; it would be absurd to pretend that the Hottentot is not in many important respects "inferior" to any of the races of Europe. But it makes all the difference in the world to us whether we regard this "inferiority" as temporary or as permanent. An infant is certainly "inferior" to a full-grown man; but suppose it possible that in some imaginary state, the population consisted entirely of adults, who for some unknown cause had entirely forgotten that they themselves had once been children. If one of them found an infant by the roadside, he would certainly consider it a very "inferior" creature; he might even think it hardly worth preserving. If he thought it could never improve, never grow any stronger and more intelligent than it was when he happened to find it, an inarticulate infant, hardly able to find the way to its own mouth, he would assuredly not think it was worth much to the commonwealth.

Now the case of the less-developed nations is analogous to the state of infancy, or of childhood, in an ordinary "civilized" human being. Give the man and the nation time and favorable conditions, and they will grow to satisfactory manhood and nationhood. Refuse them these conditions, and time will do about as much for them as it does for a child left to grow up as it can, without education or training. In the case of our own children, we have long known that we must not leave them to "nature," as some of the philosophers of the last century proposed. Very few of them had any children of their own, or knew anything about children, or they would have known that children left to "nature" would grow up incapable of human speech and would eat like pigs, and that it would require many generations of such training as these "children of nature" could give *their* children, before they reached the level of Hottentots. The beginnings of civilization are very slow, when "nature" is left to herself and not aided by civilization from without.

But, alas, civilization from without usually approaches "barbarians" in the shape of robbery and murder. The first lesson it teaches the "savage" is how to kill his enemies with

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greater certainty, and greater safety to himself—not the noblest lesson in the world. And if the savage pupil survives this first lesson, the next thing he learns is how to forget his woes in bad brandy. Moreover, civilization invents for him sins he never knew before. For he has been used to the open veldt, or the primeval forest, where every man might take what he wanted for himself; but presently he finds himself shut out from his old haunts: all the common property has become the peculiar private property of the white man, and if the savage wants anything now, he has to steal it. He began by carefully carrying a broken pipe for six weeks, till he met a white man to whom to restore it; but when the white man has disinherited him, what wonder if the "savage" recoups himself with a little pilfering?

The deterioration which usually follows intercourse with the white man is to the reproach of the white man, not of the black.

MARY A. M. MARKS.

LONDON, November, 1899.

POSTSCRIPT.

Since the above was written another Famine—worse than any in our memories—is visiting India. Five and a half millions of people are receiving relief, more than sixty millions are feeling the cruel pinch of hunger. Our imagination cannot grasp these vast numbers—we should be more keenly distressed to hear that half a dozen Welsh miners were buried alive, and that their rescuers might reach them too late. We are not to blame for this inability to picture the anguish of millions as vividly as the anguish of units—but the fact that we are unable, ought surely to moderate our confidence in our own infallibility, when governing from a distance. This time, by a cruel chance, the inevitable difficulties of grappling with so enormous a calamity are increased a hundred-fold by the fact that our chief energies are engrossed by another crisis, on the other side of the world. Just at the moment when India needs all our thought, all our help, South Africa is demanding

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all the resources of our empire. We have even accepted subsidies from Indian princes, in this terrible famine year, to aid us in carrying on the war in South Africa! The bare fact is more eloquent than any comment. This time, our foreign critics draw John Bull hard at work turning the handle of a Maxim, glancing over his shoulder at an importunate Indian scarecrow, with the words, "why do you bother me now? Don't you see I'm busy?" Alas! yes—we are busy—too busy to give the starving sixty millions more than a distracted attention. Still, even now, our conscience has spoken, though but in a whisper; we are raising a Famine Fund even now, much smaller, it is true, than those we raised in other, less terrible, famine years; but we are giving something, and we are rewarded by a glow of self-approval, not to say of astonishment, at what appears to us our own generosity. But is it generosity? Is not our thinking it so only one more proof of the truth of Mill's words that "foreigners . . . cannot judge by the light in which a thing appears to their own minds, or the manner in which it affects their feelings, how it will affect the feelings or appear to the minds of the subject population."* In the present case, for instance, the great sums of public money spent on relief in India, and the thousands sterling which private charity spares from the needs of our soldiers in South Africa, appear to us to be a triumphant refutation of our foreign critics. But to the "subject population" it can only appear that whether by our public or our private charity, we are only returning them a little of their own. I do not here refer to Indian taxation in general, and to the great army of officials, and the other great army of fighting men, whose pay is draining India of her life-blood. I mean the Fifteen Million Rupees which we take from them every year, in addition to all the rest, *to form a Famine Fund.* In English money, this ought to mean £1,500,000 sterling—to the Indian taxpayer it does mean that; but the rupee, which ought to be worth two shillings, is so depreciated in value that it is now only worth fifteen pence at most; so that, if all the relief food were bought outside India, the million and a half sterling

*"Representative Government."

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would only buy to the value of about £937,500 sterling. But be the fifteen million rupees worth more or less, until we have expended at least one whole year's famine-fund tax, we are only returning to India her own money, *levied for the express purpose of being returned to her.* This being the case, it is surely too early to boast of our "generosity" or "charity." We cannot understand why our continental neighbors think us hypocrites; we cannot believe they are sincere. Yet what else can they think us? For they know about the fifteen millions. How the famine fund is really expended is yet another question, into which I cannot now enter. When we first started it—after the terrible lesson of Lord Lawrence's administration—we pledged our word that it should never be diverted to any other purpose. We broke that pledge, when we dipped into the Famine Fund to pay for Chitral. What else is it sometimes made to pay for? We do not know. As Mill says again, speaking of India: "The most essential interests of the country may be mismanaged to almost any excess without attracting our notice."

The great tree of Imperialism has in our time shot up, until it bids fair to parcel out the world among a very few Great Powers. Those who call themselves "imperialists"—they belong almost without exception to one or other of these Great Powers—seem to think this tree, like the mustard seed of the parable, will be a shadow from the heat, a shelter from the tempest, a roosting place for the fowls of the air. But to others—and these are for the most part well acquainted with the history of great empires—it seems rather like the baleful upas tree, which spreads a wilderness wherever its shadow falls.

There is one last consideration which I feel cannot be too strongly insisted upon, at the present moment. We Britishers need the warning most of all, but we are not the only nation bitten by the tarantula of "imperialism." It is this: The qualities which enable a nation to obtain empire do not necessarily imply the qualities which keep it. The conqueror is not necessarily able to administer his conquered territory. A policy of constant "expansion" is of the very worst augury

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for the stability of an empire, because it is the very worst education for an empire-keeper. It means that we are more occupied with getting new lands than with developing those we already possess; when this is the case, "expansion" weakens rather than strengthens. Citizens of an empire with a number of half-digested dependencies in every quarter of the globe may feel pride in looking at the map. But those flattering patches of color may only mean that the empire is vulnerable in every quarter of the globe. Tacitus perceived this, in his day, and we modern nations are more vulnerable by far. Formidable rivals surround us all—brought nearer by the great modern discoveries of steam and electricity.

Expansion, unaccompanied by consolidation, is now, more than ever, an empire's short cut to ruin. Consolidation requires much time, much patience, much undistracted attention. If the would-be consolidator does his consolidation in the intervals of new expeditions, new expansions, he will infallibly neglect the less exciting, the apparently less pressing work of consolidation, in order to give his whole attention to his new enterprise. The showy, quickly-earned results of conquest or annexation, will even spoil him for the dull, plodding work of consolidation, development, and reconstruction, till he resembles a man who will not give himself time to digest one meal, before he begins to devour another. The qualities which make for conquest are so far from tending to develop those which we need in order to keep our conquests, that they directly tend to impair our true governing capacity. As Cavour said: "Any fool can govern with a state of siege." But he cannot govern long. For a stable government, able to resist the shocks to which all governments are liable, we must have other qualities than those which suffice to take a town by storm, or put an enemy to the rout. The Power of the Sword has no roots in itself, and the empires which it founded all soon crumbled away, unless they were maintained by qualities of which the sword knows nothing, whose growth the sword can only hinder—and perhaps kill. Patient wisdom, far-seeing firmness, finely tempered with the instinct which knows when to yield; above all, the benevolent sagacity which un-

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derstands how to weld old and new together in a community of interests—these are the qualities which found an empire on the rock. The sword only founds it on the sands.

MARY A. M. MARKS.

LONDON, April 24, 1900.

LIBERTY AND GOVERNMENT.

THE two trisyllables, liberty and government, are probably as uncomfortable a pair of bed-fellows as it is easy to find. It is clear that they are connected; for both refer to the powers of individuals to do as they choose. And it is clearer still that there is some incompatibility of temper between them, for liberty suggests the withdrawal of restrictions, and government exists to enforce them. And so we find that Dr. Johnson, who defines liberty as the opposite of slavery, defines the neuter verb "to govern" as "to keep superiority," "to behave with haughtiness," and the definition certainly rings with the crack of the slave-driver's whip. And yet there is an austere handsomeness about government hardly less attractive than the softer charms of liberty; and we can ill afford to lose either altogether,—to become anarchists in the one case, or in the other hopeless slaves and absolute tyrants. Mankind in general has praised each in turn, and the poets have not been so partial as might be supposed.

> "O Liberty, thou goddess heavenly bright!
> Profuse of bliss, and pregnant with delight!
> Eternal pleasures in thy presence reign."

So Addison serenades the one. But of the other Shakespeare says,—

> "'Tis government that makes them seem divine,
> The want thereof makes thee abominable."

And Homer with equal justice says, "Half the goodness of a man doth broad-browed Zeus take away when the day of slavery comes upon him;" and on the other hand, "Many lords are not good; let there be one lord." Words, too, join issue and rank themselves on this side and that; "chaste" and

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"disciplined" on the side of government, and opposite them it may be sufficient to set that noble word, as Lord Rosebery has called it, the word "liberal."

Clearly it is impossible to contrast the two principles absolutely as good and bad, to hold to the one and despise the other. If rightly understood, both are good, and both tend to the good of the individual. Liberty resists all interference with natural license, and government interferes with unnatural license. Such at least are their functions and their aims. But what license is natural, and what the reverse? It is the object of this paper to answer this question. It is not an easy one. Blackstone says that the English law recognizes the rights of children to life even before their birth. Fichte suggests that men have a right to opportunities of work. Yet it is possible that in an overcrowded town the birth of a child with a right to work may be a menace to the same rights in others; and it is certain that he cannot be helped to migrate without a very considerable trenching upon the liberties of the rate-payer. And yet both propositions seem reasonable enough.

What is the natural extent, and what are the natural boundaries of individual liberty? This is our question, and it is a question of the most supreme practical importance; indeed, on the answer which we give to it in our inmost hearts, whether consciously or unconsciously, depends the answer that we give to all other political questions; for they all lead back to this at last, and are decided on the grounds upon which we decide this. Moreover there are many questions which make us openly discuss this one. Shall we insist on the children being vaccinated? Shall we force the publicans to close their houses on Sunday? Shall we speak of the blessed word "compulsion," and call ourselves liberals—"freedom-men"—in the same breath? Certainly the main question is one which we are all bound to face, for until we have done so we can hardly be fit to decide those which depend upon it; and in these days reasons of state demand that we should all be statesmen, and, as Pericles said of the Athenians, we deem that man who does not concern himself with the affairs of the commonwealth not a harmless, but a useless person. When we consider that

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every tax distinctly interferes with the liberty of someone, it becomes clear that the extent to which the state restricts the citizen is far greater than is usually supposed; and a very moderate amount of reflection will show us that the state can do nothing whatever without adding another restriction to those already in force. This may be right, or it may be wrong; the liberty of action which a new law curtails may be natural or not natural; but every bill which gets on to the statute-book, from a swine-fever bill to a disestablishment bill, if it adds to the liberty of some, diminishes that of others, and is, in fact, felt to do so. We have, therefore, two extreme and impossible alternatives,—to admit every law, because it is a governing of liberty, and government is good; or to reject every law because it is a governing of liberty, and liberty is good,—and between them we have the question which we have proposed above: What liberty is natural and right? What is its extent? And what its limitations?

Politics assume a theory of right and wrong, and it will make no immediate difference to our decision on political questions whether we ask what is just or what is expedient, provided that we look at each political question from the impartial standpoint of the nation as a whole rather than from that of the class or the individual. We need not, therefore, go further into the abstract questions of rights and duties, but may proceed at once to the business in hand. Our question, however, demands a certain elucidation, a word or two of what we might call political psychology.

It is obvious that while liberty and government are contrasted, they both spring from universal elements of human nature. We are all individual beings, and therefore liberty-men; and we are all social beings, and therefore association-men; and as association implies regulation,— for, as Plato said, the wholly unregulated cannot associate at all, and even gets on badly with himself,— it follows that we are government-men,—Ministerialists,—as it were, and members of the opposition at once, and yet not necessarily trimmers. And while the individualistic and the socialistic elements in us appear to be on opposite sides, they sometimes betray their nat-

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ural affinity in the most palpable way. It was, I think, first remarked by Sir James Stephen—and here we may claim exemption from further acknowledgments; this paper has little claim to originality, but claims of space are more pressing than claims of creditors—that of the three terms in the republican battle-cry, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, the first two are individualistic and the third socialistic. And while society is nothing but individuals in association, individuals apart from association and society—fatherlandless fellows uninfluenced by the language and institutions of race or country are despicable if they are not inconceivable—are, in short, not even individuals.

No doubt the contrast is due to history. In the states of ancient Greece, which in this respect almost attained to the ideal though within a very narrow horizon, the contrast was unknown. To separate the man from the state, or the state from the church would have seemed to the Athenian like separating the male from the human, and the sentient from the conscious in the individual. But the Roman empire was too vast for the citizen of Britain or of Syria to feel its unity. It is indeed possible that had Julius Cæsar lived he might have carried out his noble ideal of imbuing every provincial with a pride in Roman citizenship; and it is probable that he might have developed the germs of representation which it appears that we owe largely to him. But the traditional policy of the Roman Liberals, sublimated and partly carried into effect by Julius, needed a greater spirit than even that of his successors to enable it to win its way to realization; and the Roman empire, while on the one hand it was a vast organization in which few provincials felt much patriotic pride, on the other allowed too great a laxity to the subordinate states and granted them too much of what Suetonius calls the license of self-destruction. The church did rather less than nothing to remedy this state of things. It allied itself with the state, thereby making it impossible for itself to supersede it; and it remained distinct, thereby refusing to transform it. It became as unwieldy as the Roman empire, and the provincial Christian was left inevitably out of touch with the head organization of

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his church. Far better, surely, the smaller unities of the old Greek states, which, if they were narrow, at least succeeded in making every member an organic and conscious member of the whole. At any rate the empire and the church became immense semi-mythical figures, with which many a citizen and churchman in outlying countries, such as our own, felt himself in antagonism; and it was an inevitable development of this situation that in the course of time dumb antagonism should grow into outspoken revolt. The doctrine of the Reformation was that of the private judgment. "Rome," a Reformer theologian writes, "would substitute the authority of the church for the private judgment." And in politics the struggle between the king and the supreme Pontiff or Roman emperor was of the same kind; and it was felt to be the struggle of the individual country against the œcumenical society; while within the realm of England the commons were for a long period hardly recognized as persons at all by the eyes of the law; the dreary wars of the Roses had taught them that thev were pawns and had no more than the pawn's interest in the game; the church habituated the people to looking away from the state, and when it began to teach private judgment the doctrine was found to be no less applicable to politics than to theology. In this way, then, it came about that the individual could feel that his only connection with the state was one of mute opposition.

We have hitherto used the word society almost indiscriminately; and it is high time to justify this procedure, or at least to acknowledge that it is deliberate. If the individual is the private person, then as far as restrictions go it makes little difference to him how he is restricted, whether by public opinion or by the police, so long as the restriction is operative. Politics regards the individual alone and society not at all, in so far as it is possible to treat society apart from the individual. Looking at the matter, then, from the point of view of the individual, and finding that to the individual compulsion by agency of the state or of society in general is indifferent, Mill was clearly right in extending the question of government as contrasted with individual liberty to all cases of government of the individual by the society in whatever form; and in this

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respect Mr. Herbert Spencer is his inferior. The connection of the state and public opinion is indubitable. That the state should go beyond the maximum accepted by public opinion is an impossibility, or at least the state is thereby committing suicide by driving the society of which it is the organization to disorganize and destroy it, and found another upon its bones. Public opinion varies in extent like the powers of political authorities; it may correspond to the parish council, or it may correspond to the Holy Roman Empire, but as far as it is able to exercise compulsion upon the individual,—to make him observe the rules of decency, to prescribe, within certain limits, his fashion of dress,—so far it comes into our question. The general question, then, in its final form is, How far and in what cases is the public justified in interfering, by whatever means, with the will of the individual?

How has this interference been exercised in history? It would be tempting to make a survey of the laws of Moses and of Greece, in this connection, and, indeed, of all the codes accessible to us, ancient or modern. But this is a work for many volumes, and as it is we have a long enough stretch of high-road in front of us to forbid our trespassing up the lanes which lead out of it. It may, however, be well to take a cursory glance at some points in the history of state action in England. The story is a well-known one, and it could hardly be better told than it has been by Mr. Herbert Spencer until we come to our own times. I trust that he will not account it robbery if I venture to appropriate many of his illustrations. In feudal times it is true that there were limitations on the king's power; in Jocelin of Brakelond, for instance, we read that it could be questioned by a convent, and no one supposes that the king had absolute power over his barons. But this merely shows that the king was not sole governor, and the question remains how the government, whatever its composition, used its power. There is no doubt that the methods of early government were paternal and interfering to a degree, which, whether justifiable or not at the time, would now be intolerable. As late as James I. we have a law enacting how much ale should be sold for a penny; a law of Edward III. forbids Englishmen to send

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any staple goods abroad for sale on pain of death and confiscation, in the hope that thereby foreigners would be compelled to come to England: when they came they were compelled to reside with inspectors, whose duty it was to see their cargoes sold and the proceeds invested in English goods within a stated time, and to send to the Exchequer accounts of each merchant's proceedings. At the same time laborers were forced to work at a stated wage, and accordingly traders were forced to sell them the necessities of life at a stated rate. Sumptuary laws were common enough under the Tudors, and that renowned defender of the faith, Charles II., reflecting no doubt that in the midst of life we are in death, prescribed the stuff of which grave-clothes were to be made. It is interesting to us at this period to read that the game of football was censured and opposed by Edward II. (1314) and Edward III. (1349); that Henry IV. (1401), Henry VIII., and Elizabeth attempted to suppress it, and that it was finally stamped out about the middle of the seventeenth century. But it is not necessary to multiply instances. The first period of the history of state interference with the individual in England is one of active operation on the part of the state.

The next begins when this interference was felt to be tyrannical, and the teaching of the reformers, of the Puritans and of English philosophy, and especially of Locke, expressed and enforced this feeling, and there arose a settled spirit of antagonism to the government, factitiously fostered by the change of dynasty from the Stuarts to the Hanoverians which drove the conservatism of the country into opposition. And up to the middle of this century Bentham and Mill, and all the philosophic radicals of politics, directed their efforts to removing the galling restrictions upon individual liberty which government had imposed. The personal liberty of the individual was not finally secured till the end of the seventeenth century; the equitable treatment of the poor in magistrates' courts and of certain special classes, such as lunatics, has scarcely been secured in this; but the great work of the early Liberals was the abolition of restrictions on trade, and on political and religious belief; and now that the principle of free trade has

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been established in England, and we have abolished tests, disestablished the Irish Church, and secured the ballot, we seem to have entered upon a third epoch.

Mr. Gladstone once said that, while he rejoiced in the work that had been done, he did not envy those who had to take up the work of the coming century: the work accomplished was the necessary work of destruction, the work of the future was the work of building up. Mr. Gladstone was a greater man than he himself admitted, and he had not left the constructive work wholly to the future. But certainly his remark is notable as marking a change. The change is this, that whereas the old Liberals strove to reduce the restrictive powers of the government, the new Liberalism, when in office, has gone far beyond this, and has conceived the idea of legislating for the positive benefit of its subjects in a manner almost comparable to that of the ancient Athenians. It clears open spaces, it removes uninhabitable houses, it educates children, it constructs public works, it carries our letters, and it sometimes even attempts to build houses for artisans. Now in all this it is taxing some of its citizens at its own pleasure, regardless whether they like it or not, for the benefit of themselves or others; and it is therefore building up new restrictions, for taxation is a restriction of the individual's liberty to spend his income as he chooses. Nor is this all; it establishes a church, and thereby, according to Mr. Herbert Spencer, compels citizens to support a theological system of which they may disapprove. It interferes with natural competition by patronizing the colleges of physicians and of surgeons; it directly violates personal liberty by compelling house-builders and others to observe the laws of sanitation, and it threatens to surrender to the ever-increasing demands of medical men for the state enforcement of the particular nostrum of each, often only purchasable at the cost of a flagrant infringement of individual freedom. And all this in the name of liberty.

When the Protestants came into power in England, having delivered the country from the samewhat dominant tyranny of Rome, they signalized their triumph by establishing a vigilant tyranny of public opinion. No sooner have our Liberals

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succeeded in casting off their chains than they forge far heavier ones for their neighbors. It seems that there is no deliverance from domination; mankind is a weary Titan groaning beneath the mountain weight placed on its limbs; what matter who is standing on the summit, magnificent king or eloquent demagogue?

Such are the facts, and such the state of mind to which their contemplation reduces certain old-fashioned Liberals. Mr. Herbert Spencer accuses the Liberal party of having deserted its old task of removing restrictions and set itself to the hopeless and disastrous task of legislating for the positive good of the people; and as this is admitted without the appearance of any symptoms of penitence, he proceeds to read Liberalism a lecture on mistaking its own principles, and after a lengthy dissertation, illustrative of confusions in general, and particularly confusions of fish and shell-fish, of crustaceans and mollusks, he says that the root error of Liberalism lies in mistaking the removal of restriction, which was the traditional policy, for an attempt to benefit the people, which is the new policy ("Man *vs.* State," p. 282). But the fact is that Mr. Spencer has himself palpably fallen into the error of which he accuses Liberalism. He says (*op. cit.* p. 279), "They (Liberals) have lost sight of the truth that in times past Liberalism habitually stood for individual freedom versus state coercion." Now a very small amount of reflection is sufficient to show that this never can have been the policy of Liberalism, if freedom is understood in a sense which would be crossed by the modern legislation to which Mr. Spencer objects. For Liberalism has never interfered with checks because they are checks, but because they are checks to healthy development: otherwise it would have started with a prejudice in favor of repealing the criminal code. The old Liberalism never attempted to interfere with the natural powers of fathers over their children, or of masters over their servants. It left unquestioned those checks which it felt to be the checks of unnatural license, and it thereby showed that its interference with checks was not its central principle, as Mr. Spencer supposes, but the particular application, demanded by the particular time, of its true principle,

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which is to foster by all means, negative or positive, the full natural development of its citizens. And it is interesting to see how our view is confirmed by the above-quoted remark of Mr. Gladstone, the statesman in whom the Liberalism of the past is transformed into the Liberalism of the future by the eternal principle which is at the root of all Liberalism whatever.

The two most distinguished individualistic writers, Mill and Mr. Spencer, are alike in this that they both seek for some hard and fast rule which will enable them to settle all political disputes by bringing them to book. And without stopping to ask for the end of political action, they enunciate the means, and having enunciated it, there being, *ex hypothesi*, nothing prior to it, they naturally mistake it for the end. This is clearly the way in which Mr. Spencer has fallen into his mistake with regard to Liberalism. But Mill also begins with no proper statement of the end of politics; and in his book on Liberty commences by singing its praises without waiting to explain how the liberty of his ode differs from the workingman's liberty to beat his wife. The advantages of individuality are conspicuous. They are not peculiarly the property of the individualist. All of us aim in politics at the good of the individual. Strong character is what we should all like to see in our citizens. But the individualist is impressed with the distinction between the individual and society, and views with a jealous eye all action of the state affecting the individual. He considers it an evil that the state should have to act at all, and Mr. Spencer actually maintains that the interference of criminal law with it is immoral ("Social Statics," pp. 115, 116). Let us trace the development of this theory.

Under the present system the evils of government are mainly,—

(1) That it is unbusiness-like. This has to a large extent been remedied of recent years. It is quite possible that Mr. Spencer's writings may have contributed not a little to this result.

(2) That it is too rigid, as opposed to the flexibility of individual action, and that it is therefore irritating.

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(3) That it is enervating to individuality as the individual tends to lean on the community, as is seen on the continent.

(4) That it sometimes errs gravely; as when it enacted the Old Poor Law with its principle of supplementing laborer's wages from the rates.

(5) That it is comparatively callous, and tends to admit of the rise of taxes until they become an insupportable piece of tyranny.

(6) That it tends to increase its activity more and more as it more and more blights the counteracting forces of individuality, thus at once inflaming the disease and destroying the remedy.

Mill enlarges on the menace to individuality of an overstrong public opinion, and Mr. Spencer writes in a panic of the coming slavery. Government, he shows, is already interfering in a wholesale way with trade, by factory laws, by regulating the hours of labor, by enforcing sanitary conditions, by establishing hosts of inspectors. Already it is making the virtuous pay for the idle, and theatens to do so more in the future. The people now have the power; education breeds discontent and aptitude for being gulled by optimists like Ruskin and William Morris; parties truckle to the electorate, and the press makes matters worse. Socialism advances; and socialism is slavery. The state threatens to become sole householder, sole railway-manager, sole ship-owner, sole tobacconist. Officials threaten to become supreme; and as for the end, let the reader take this passage commenting on a wild utterance of Democratic Federation, "We may suspect that the heads of the ideal society desired, would be but little deterred by considerations of equity from pursuing whatever policy they thought needful: a policy which would always be one identified with their own supremacy. It would need but a war with an adjacent society, or some internal discontent demanding forcible suppression, to at once transform a socialistic administration into a grinding tyranny like that of ancient Peru; under which the mass of the people, controlled by grades of officials, and leading lives that were inspected out-of-doors and in-doors, labored for the support of the organization which regulated them, and were left

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with but a bare subsistence for themselves. And then would be completely revived, under a different form, that régime of status, that system of compulsory coöperation, the decaying tradition of which is represented by the old Toryism, and towards which the new Toryism is carrying us back?"*

After reading the accounts written by Mr. Spencer and others of the principles of modern legislation, the actual statute-book is the tamest reading imaginable. Page after page of careful and detailed legislation, and only here and there an enactment which common sense could question for a moment on the score of socialistic bias. But whether the existing state of things makes us glad or sorry, we must ask what the individualist would have in its stead. Mill proposes for society two mutually complementary principles of action and inaction:

(1) "The individual is not accountable to society for his actions in so far as these concern the interest of no person but himself."

(2) "For such actions are as prejudicial to the interests of others, the individual is accountable, and may be subjected to either social or legal punishment, if society is of opinion that either the one or the other is requisite for its protection."

Mr. Spencer starts with the principle that nature is the true builder and the only healer in politics. And he goes on to say that we must leave nature to take her course, and content ourselves with insuring liberty for the individual, provided only that other individuals can have the same liberty as we give to the one individual under our protection. It will be sufficient to recite the list of departments in which Mr. Spencer thinks that the individualistic principle forbids the state to operate. Probably, in the sense in which he understands individuality, he is right. The state then has no business to regulate commerce, to establish a church, to enact poor laws of any kind, to educate the children, to assist in colonization, to intervene between ignorance and its fatal consequences in sanitary matters, to establish a mint, to manage postal and telegraphic arrangements, and to erect light-houses.

*"Man *vs.* State," ed. 1892, pp. 325, 326.

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It is remarkable that Mr. Spencer, with his principle of leaving nature to take its course, should exclude from his conception of nature the moral and political operations of man; as if he thought that the normal man stood aloof from all intercourse with his kind. Again, it is startling to find that a writer who lays claim so forcibly to a reputation for treating politics as a branch of science should be conspicuous among political thinkers for neglecting the factor of environment in politics, attempting to treat the individual as if he had none.

But apart from this the theory that the claims of individuality make it necessary for society to legislate against acts in which the agent interferes with the liberty of others, and inadmissible for it to legislate except with this object, seems to break down before the following considerations:

(1) It is impossible to distinguish between public acts which are self-protective and public acts which are self-assertive. Mr. Spencer in one passage includes acts which constitute a nuisance among acts which merit public prohibition ("Man *vs.* State," p. 399), but this would cover almost every imaginable point of resistance to the absolute will of a tyrannical society. Yet Mr. Spencer is clearly right in holding that acts which constitute a nuisance do trench upon the liberty of society. The definition is, therefore, either far too broad or else too inexact for its practical employment to be possible.

(2) If we reject Mr. Spencer's interpretation as too broad and include among public acts of self-protection, or acts which the state may legitimately perform, only such as prohibit acts of positive interference with personal liberty, apart from the immense practical and theoretical difficulties of distinguishing between positive and passive interference, we find our new definition too narrow to satisfy the experienced common sense of political thinkers. Unlimited competition is a gigantic evil; nobody maintains that we ought to sit still and watch the wealth of nations being poured into the sea by strikes and lockouts, if only a satisfactory method of interference were discoverable; nor would any one really regard the intervention of the state as an evil to set against the good of putting a stop to the disturbance in trade, supposing the discovery made,

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irrespective of the question whether such interference had been demanded by an infringement of personal liberty on the part of either employers or employed. The theory is thus seen to be in conflict with political experience.

(3) The reasons which impel us to this theory would drive us to refuse to the state all right of interference whatever; surely, for instance, it would distinctly tend to foster the manly virtues of individuals if we left them to defend themselves against pick-pockets, instead of enervating them by teaching them to rely on the state in the matter. On the other hand it is difficult to see why on the reasons assigned the state should take sides with the pick-pocket any less than with his victim, seeing that the latter, either by resistance or by precaution almost always actively interferes with the former in the free discharge of his function of stealing. The state should certainly punish the pick-pocket for robbing his victim, but it would also find itself compelled to punish the victim should he in any way resist his assailant, and if Mr. Spencer's theory of nuisances were accepted, the fact of having inaccessible or empty pockets would of itself furnish grounds for a constructive charge of passive resistance and constitute an offence against the first principle of the individualistic state. In any case the theory proves to be anarchical.

(4) In the ordinary sense of the word, temptation is voluntary, and if the state is to do all it can to insure to the individual the liberty of voluntary action, it must scrupulously assist men and women in sin so far as to prevent any interference with them in the moment of temptation. Nor may it diminish the number of opportunities of sin; it is therefore bound to protect and patronize the betting-ring and the brothel, and this without that compunction which it feels, or ought to feel, in threatening the assassin.

(5) All individualist arguments tell against association of any kind; for the individual is opposed not particularly to the kingdom or the empire, but to organized society in any form whatever. Otherwise, how is it that we are not compelled, if we admit opposition in the case of a kingdom, to deny it in the case of an empire, or *vice versa?* As has been already shown,

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the principle on which individualists limit state interference would compel them, if consistent, to limit all associations, however voluntary, in the same way, beginning with the family. Either, then, we must forbid all societies to act except within the limits assigned to the state, or reject the theory in politics as well as in the regulation of smaller and more elementary associations.

(6) As Mr. Spencer understands nature—that is, taking good and bad as equally natural—his principle that the evil of state action consists in interference with nature is fatal to all doctors and ministers of religion, if, indeed, it is not fatal to all action whatever, with the alternative that we are to bring into operation our moral natures, and all the intolerance of evil which they display.

(7) Strong individual natures are produced by opposition: to forbid opposition then, as Mill does, is to diminish rather than to increase the individuality of our citizens. On the other hand, law is good not only for the person protected, but for many individuals who are helped by it to refrain from a temptation to which they might otherwise succumb. It is a mistake, therefore, to regard law as essentially an evil for individuality; and this self-styled individualism is but an awkward nurse who overlays her charge.

We must clearly begin again to lay our foundations. The individualist theory has broken down. Practically, it condemns itself by condemning such institutions as the post-office; and it only succeeds in presenting a state in operation at all by being false to itself and admitting socialistic elements to which it has less than no right on its own presuppositions. We must either allow unlimited competition, curtail or altogether abolish the action of the state, do the same to the family and the club, interfere, if we interfere at all, to protect vice, and otherwise prohibit the action of individuals except where it goes with the stream of nature; or, if we are not prepared for all this, which it is impossible that we should be, the purely individualistic theory must be abandoned.

In reconstructing let us avoid the mistake which we pointed out in the individualistic writers, and begin by enunciating our

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purpose in politics. That purpose is the welfare of the citizens. Citizens are individuals; the welfare, then, of which we are in quest, is the welfare of individuals, whatever that may be. But at least this much is clear: that there is nothing good for the individual which remains outside of his life and does not imply his enjoyment of it. It follows, then, that we aim at promoting the spontaneous individual life, and that, as life cannot be created, our task is to secure for it opportunities of development and expansion.

The principle of state action is that the state should do nothing that individuals can do equally well (using the word "well" as referring to the end of state action as already presented)—otherwise, there is danger of enervation; and on the other hand that it should do everything conducive to the welfare of the citizens which individuals do ill, and it well—otherwise energy is wasted by impotent attempts.

We have already enumerated some of the disadvantages of state action. Let us now admit that it has compensating advantages. Let us admit that the state has more power, more opportunity to obtain knowledge, more certainty of continuity in policy, more common sense and freedom from monomania. It thus can often "facilitate readjustment," as Hegel said, where individual action would spend itself in vain, and where nature would operate only after æons, and not without convulsion and upheaval.

Considering these advantages and disadvantages, circumstances may guide us to a right decision in each particular case, whether we shall employ the machinery of society or wait for individual enterprise.

With regard to public intervention, we may, still keeping our object in view, draw up rules such as the following, which are founded merely on common sense.

A. The moral interference of public opinion must be truthful and impartial, and censure crime, of whatever kind, with the spirit appropriate to it—being careful, for instance, to punish Philistinism, but not to mete out to it the castigation due to immorality.

B. The armed interference of the law must,—

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(1) Not interfere where interference is uncalled for, *i. e.*, where there is no obstacle to the growth of individuals.

(2) Nor where interference with crime would mean hampering natural development, as, *e. g.*, in the family, where it is impossible to interfere without doing more harm than good. Interference with small misdeeds here would, as has been said, be like extracting an eyelash with fire-tongs. You would put out the eye, and you would leave the lash.

(3) Nor where public opinion does not accept state action. Otherwise the public will overthrow the state. At the same time the public will accept more than it would propose, and what it has once accepted it is very soon ready to regard as the normal. Progress is therefore possible; as the state may educate the public by steadily acting on principles higher than the public would propose, but not higher than it is prepared to accept.

(4) There must be no general legislation for particular hard cases.

(5) The state must procure the fullest information both of the general laws of sociology, political economy, history, and ethics, and of the particular technicalities of the subject with which it is dealing.

With these rules observed, we may set out to do all we can to develop our individuals. What, then, is an individual, and what is his development? It is impossible to answer this question without speaking of truths deeper than are often or easily mentioned in political discussion. But here we are on the threshold of the shrine within which our secret is hid. It is the secret of all life and of all politics. Throughout we have been haunted by the opposition of liberty and government, of individualistic and socialistic within the same being. Let us pass within the veil into the very crypt of our being, and we shall see the two distinct and yet united so as to satisfy all our practical needs if it still confronts us with an insoluble problem and an answer which is an impossible fact, for our spirits are such as to contain within themselves all these contradictions. Strip them of all false accretions and they stand out, the spirits of individuals, strengthening their individuality as

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they grow in strength, enforcing union with others as they grow in individuality. The spirit of life is entirely good, and there is no goodness apart from it. And the spirit of life is in our individuality. It follows, then, that by purging it of all which, whether within or without the soul of man, hampers its proper development, we are enabling individuality to assert itself. Goodness is one, and yet multiform as life, whose correlative it is. Therefore foster this divine spirit in men, and you get a tendency to uniform goodness coupled with a tendency to ever-increasing variety. On no account, then, can we refrain from interfering with the evil in man, because it is evil; for as evil it directly militates against the principle of individuality itself, namely, the spirit of spontaneous life.

Now the nature of this spirit commands our attention, and the practical end of this discussion will shortly appear. For as life develops it goes through various stages. Between the animate and the inanimate connection can as yet neither be demonstrated nor denied. And it is possible that the magnificent intuition of St. Paul and of Hegel, according to which the whole creation is a hierarchy rising up towards the full expression of its divinity in the Divine Person, may eventually be proved empirically. But at least it is certain that above the inanimate, the principle of life is one, taking in its development the three forms of the sentient, the æsthetic, and the intellectual. Now, starting with the experience of educationalists, we find that the proper development of the first leads on to the second, and that of the second on to the third. Each forms an intrinsic part of the life of the individual, and each is therefore part of the end of politics. In a word, what politics aims at is to produce in its citizens the sentient, the æsthetic, and the intellectual life of the spirit, each in completion.

In all this the state must move in accordance with the rules laid down by the nature of things; whether we have tabulated them aright or not is another question; but it is certain that we cannot break those rules, "the eternal verities," as Carlyle calls them. "The sun," said Heraclitus, "cannot transgress his bounds; if he should, the dreadful goddesses of necessity, daughters of justice, would hale him back again."

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And now, in developing this national spirit, we must not attempt to move one portion apart from the others, to drag along the stomach and leave the head behind, or *vice versa.* We must attempt to elevate, but this should be a tendency rather than an event. We must, according to the principles already laid down, become more educative; but we must see to it that we do not lose our national spirit when wars have ceased, and all men can admire a fine building. Probably we shall be more likely to encourage football than to repress it after the fashion of the Tudors.

What deductions can we make from these principles? It is unnecessary to say that these deductions are far from being a complete program.

Firstly, with regard to physical life, society must superintend the action of nature, rectifying it and directing it where circumstances call for action. It should not check population, as long as there are spheres calling for workmen; it should tend to put individuals to the work to which they are called by their nature rather than by the accidents of their parents' station in life. It should follow the dictates of nature with regard to the question of women's position in the world, not coercing, but letting nature express itself. It may undertake difficult tasks like the clearing of unhealthy neighborhoods, the direction of railway building. It must protect its citizens at once against violence at home and abroad, and against monstrous taxation to meet this violence.

Secondly, it must exercise a superintendence over the moral welfare of its citizens; and this because morality is at the root of all life higher than animal life. It therefore establishes a church with this purpose, or, rather, in this aspect of its operation it is a church. The church should beware of confining its interests to morality and neglecting æsthetic and intellectual life, and the state should beware of neglecting to lay the foundations of character strongly by the proper performance of its ecclesiastical duties. The state also enforces certain moral laws, such as the laws of marriage, and for the same reason, namely, because morality is found to lie at the root of the whole matter.

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Thirdly, the state must give its children the highest education. It should not be content with influencing its children in infancy, but it should insure for them libraries, picture galleries, beautiful architecture, music, art of all kinds—perhaps especially dramatic art—that, as Plato says, from all quarters the sense of beauty may flow into the soul, and harmonize it like a breeze from a pure country carrying health along with it. And we notice in passing that this work is peculiarly satisfactory because it is never felt by individuality to be a degradation to allow the state to see to it. Yet we remain far behind ancient Athens in this respect.

When society undertakes to produce good character in its children, it ends with the intellectual; at which stage the citizen understands his relations to others and to society in general. His character is trained; and he is the perfection of what we call a gentleman, the perfect presentation of modesty and self-reliance together, coupled by the highest culture. Society should not be content as long as one of her children falls short of this ideal.

Now, as it advances, the spirit becomes its own guardian, and external is replaced by internal restraint, just as in a family the children when grown to maturity are no longer governed by the parents, but perform that service for themselves. In society, law must still remain as long as there is a criminal minority; but the majority will hardly be aware of its existence. Thus progress of national education in this highest sense, undertaken by society in all its forms, is naturally accompanied by an extension of local self-government. Moreover, this is met by a remarkable development in the life of the spirit, which as it grows extends its interests from the *ego* to the family, and thence to the club, parish, guild, college, county, constituency, country, kind. Its interest in each must be maintained, and this is the test of the natural growth of the political spirit; its cosmopolitanism is not empty, but goes with an intense but unexclusive clannishness.

Thus as the proper life of society develops, the state becomes more educative as progress in its citizens enables it to supersede force by education, external by internal restraint; it extends

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and intensifies our interests; and its functions become more positive and less negative, the duty of propagating the true and healthy and beautiful and good more and more tending to supersede that of self-defence against the false and sickly and ugly and base.

It is obvious that we are speaking of an endless process; but as the geologist postulates infinity of time in the past, so may the politician in the future. Every statesman must be proud to contribute to this end, which is indeed the consummation of the entire creation's tendency; only, if work seems long and progress slow, let him reflect, when tempted to act at the prompting of impatience, that truth is the daughter of time and not of authority.

Can the principles laid down in the foregoing pages be applied to international politics? At first sight it might appear that there was no connection between the principles of the relation between a state and its members on the one hand, and the questions of international relationship on the other. But in criticizing individualism we observed (fifth argument, page 452) that it was impossible to contrast the individual with the state, without at the same time contrasting him with all other associations; and just as the individualist is forced to apply his principle af state-action to the action of the family, so his opponent is bound to extend his, so as to govern the wider social intercourse of international relations; for the broader principles of government by father or by king, are not peculiar to the particular form of association in which they first appear, but have to be explained by the principles which regulate association in general, and this can not be confined within the frontiers which form the delimitation of states. Friction and hostility alone prove the fact of association beyond the borders of the state; and the fact once realized immediately calls for the application of that branch of ethics which deals with external relationships as a whole.

In the previous inquiry we examined the conditions under which a state may be permitted, or compelled, to interfere with the individual. We have already seen the necessity of extend-

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ing these principles to international relationships, which, as a species of association, must necessarily be governed by the laws of all association. But while this necessity drives us forward, we are at once confronted by the difficulty that there is in world-relationships no association answering to the state in the ordinary political relationship. We need not inquire whether, between the unity of the nation and the unity of humanity, there are intermediate unities, such as unities of East and West; for, in any case, these unities resemble the larger unity of humanity in not being organized. The present generation has witnessed a temperary concert of some of the great powers, but this has had but a spasmodic existence and a very closely confined sphere of operations. Still, just as in reviewing a cyclopian society, where every man does what is right in his own eyes, we, looking backwards, consider the individuals as necessarily discharging in their intercourse with each other many of the functions more naturally performed by the state; so, looking forwards, we can regard the interaction of states as a work naturally belonging to a union of states not yet existing; and, moreover, if we can regard logical and disregard chronological priority, we can consider this union as prior to the particular state, just as the state is logically prior to the individual, and hold that the individual, in the absence of the state, exercises political authority, and the state in the absence of a union of states exercises an authority attaching to, and derived from, that not yet realized entity. Moreover, organization comes after public opinion, and there is already something like a public opinion of the world, though in classifying this, owing to its actual existence, we should be compelled to make explicit the distinction, which it was previously only necessary to suggest, between a union of humanity and a union intermediate between that and the union of the state. We may, for the present purpose, be content to use the very unphilosophic expression, the opinion of the civilized world. We can, accordingly, speak of a society of states and of a state of states; the former being already articulate, while the latter is not yet realized. It is clear then that just as all interference between individuals comes within the cognizance of

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the state and society, which can encourage it, permit it, or check it, in whatever way seems most suitable, whether by the expression of public opinion, or by the active exertion of law; so all interference between states comes within the cognizance of the state, or society of states, which can, and should, act in a similar way, if it is sufficiently strong to do so. Thus every state which declares war on another, whether it desires it or not, and whether it knows it or not, appeals to the opinion of the society of states, and usurps its dormant prerogatives.

There is, therefore, no difficulty in applying the rules of state-action to the interaction of states. When intercourse becomes more general, and public opinion—a quantity even now no longer negligible—has advanced and grown stronger, it may be possible to formulate and organize it. Meanwhile, states must act without law, because there is no authority above them, but according to the law which should inspire that higher authority, supposing it to exist, and which is already active within the limits of the state itself. We therefore transfer bodily to the science of international politics the rules prescribed for the state (pages 454, 455). Hence, one state may, and, therefore must, interfere with another: (1) if it does so with the object of protecting and fostering life in the fullest sense of the term, (provided that it does this with singleness of eye, not allowing the title, "defender of the faith," to be a pretext for baser motives; and provided that the extent and manner of the interference which it occasions is commensurate with that which it sets out to check); (2) if its interference is called for by preceding interference; (3) if its interference will further more life than it hinders; (4) if it does not allow a general interference for the sake of particular cases; (5) if it acts on the most perfect knowledge attainable, conscientiously refusing to neglect light from any quarter, and actively searching for light wherever it may be found; (6) if its interference tends to make further interference eventually unnecessary, by promoting, directly or indirectly, but not superseding, the ideal of self-government.

We would add two remarks, both concerning the peculiar double position of the state as at once litigant and judge. First,

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if we regard the power naturally belonging to the state of states as put into commission, that part which falls in the first instance to the lot of each state must be supposed to be that which concerns its own subjects, otherwise it will hardly be possible to meet the requirements of rule 4. Experience and the analogy of the delegations of power made by the state, on the whole tend to enforce this inference. On the other hand, if nations interfere with each other to protect their own interests, they have not the advantage of detachment which enables the state to judge impartially between its subjects. Extreme caution and carefulness of self-examination is therefore necessary in applying the first, which is the general rule, and excluding all motives besides the one assumed.

Secondly, the question of the relation of laws to justice, which hardly seemed worth mentioning in the previous discussion, now becomes a matter of the first importance. In the state, the infringement of written law, if committed by a subject, is called rebellion; if by the government, tyranny, the original meaning of the word "tyrant" signifying a governor, who, whether for good or for ill, exceeded the law. Aristotle ("Eth." v. 10), following Plato ("Politicus," pp. 294-5), gives some account of the conflict between equity and law. For various reasons, law may fail to express justice, and in such cases justice, which is the origin of all law, itself demands the evasion of law; in other words, the spirit of law is at feud with the letter; or, if the object of law is the protection of life, and the rigidity of written law has become an obstacle to life, healthy vitality will, and should, break through the dead writing, in the name of the living principle which originally dictated it. Now, while the sanction of law consists entirely in the implicit morality of its spirit, the iniquity of law-breaking consists entirely in opposition to that spirit, and to the letter as expressing it. It might appear, therefore, that, as Aristotle would seem to suggest, the smallest discrepancy between the two would justify what he calls equity, which is the obverse of what we call rebellion and tyranny. But we shall find it necessary to modify this teaching when we remember that the letter of the law represents the spirit for the majority

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of men, who even regard a piece of legislation as a new law rather than as a fresh attempt to reaffirm the old. We must, therefore, be careful not to shock the conscience of men, and thereby so far weaken the force of all agreements, by evading law in our own interests, except where extreme cases of legal oppression make such evasion necessary. Bearing in mind our third rule—that interference should do more to forward than to hinder life—we shall often find self-sacrifice necessary for the sake of our weaker brethren; and on all accounts, when we find it necessary to break the law, we must endeavor, not only to make sure that our motives are honorable, but also to make it clear to all concerned that they are so, and that it was really necessary to transcend the law; and, further, we must, as soon as may be, secure the rehabilitation of a readjusted written law, so as to shorten as much as possible the period of justified lawlessness.

When we apply this to international relationships it will at once be clear that the objection against superseding law is at any rate not decreased. Considering that there is no general system of law regulating the intercourse of nations, and that, even in states where there is an established system of law, the spirit of law is so imperfectly realized that the utmost caution is necessary in appealing to it, we cannot doubt that a great weight of oppression is necessary to justify the infringement of international treaties. We might add that as each state, as far as it is independent, possesses the delegated sovereignty of the state of states, and each state which interferes with another acts on behalf of that supreme power, aggression between states assumes the double character, and the double responsibility, of rebellion and tyranny.

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[Space limitations made it necessary to omit the author's application of the foregoing principles to the questions raised by the South African War. —*Man. Ed.*]

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THE SOURCE OF MORAL OBLIGATION.*

THE subject that I have selected for discussion this evening is the problem of moral obligation, that is, in general terms, the question, Why are we bound to do what is right? as distinguished from the question, What is the nature of right doing? Perhaps it may seem to some of you that such a question is somewhat too speculative, somewhat too remote from any practical bearing on the concrete problems of life, to be deserving of much consideration in such a society as yours. Indeed, even some speculative moralists have affected to treat the problem to which I refer with contempt. Referring to such questions as, Why should I do what is right? Why should I appreciate what is beautiful? Why should I want to know what is true? Mr. Bradley, who is certainly one of the subtlest of our philosophical thinkers, says that the only proper answer is, We do not know, and we do not care. I am doubtful, however, whether this can be quite the proper answer to any question about human aims and obligations. Still, I should like to try to disarm criticism at the outset by saying that it is not my object at present to discuss, in a purely speculative way, the correct answer to the question that I have suggested. I believe it would be more suitable for such a society as this, whose objects, as I understand them, are not purely theoretical, to consider the importance, from a practical point of view, of having some convictions with regard to the right way of answering this question. I intend, accordingly, to begin by indicating the way in which this question seems to arise in connection with some of the most urgent practical problems of our own time, then to proceed to refer to some of the answers that may be given to it and to explain, in a somewhat brief and summary fashion, the answer that seems to me the most correct one, and, finally, to point out the practical significance of the answer that is given.

Recurring for a moment to the answer that is suggested by Mr. Bradley—we do not know, and we do not care—I should

*A lecture to the Bristol Ethical Society.

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say that this is perhaps the kind of answer that would be appropriate in what Carlyle described as an Age of Faith. There are times when people see so clearly what are the claims made on them by the conditions in which they find themselves, that the question why they should meet these claims appears not only superfluous, but impious. Perhaps all of us find this to be the case with respect to the larger half of the work that we find before us. When the content of our moral obligations is perfectly obvious, it hardly occurs to us to inquire why we are bound to fulfil them. We hardly seem to have even the choice of doing otherwise than we do. Perhaps in times of faith this may appear to be the case with regard to the whole of life. *Ich kann nicht anders*—I cannot do otherwise—may be the feeling not only of a Luther, possessed with the passion for reform, but even of the majority of mankind. But in general it seems to be true, at any rate, in times that are not specially Ages of Faith, that there is a considerable margin in most men's lives, a region of doubt and indecision. It may be said that the doubt in such cases is generally with regard to the content of our obligation; but this does not appear to be entirely true. Perhaps when we are perfectly clear as to the content of our obligation we can hardly raise the question, Why? But I believe there is a double region of doubt in many men's minds, consisting on the one hand of things about which they are not quite clear what they ought to do, and on the other hand, of things about which they are on the whole convinced that they ought to do something, but are doubtful whether it is worth while.

Now, on the whole, I do not think we can flatter ourselves that we live in an Age of Faith. By this I do not mean merely to call attention to the obvious prevalence of scepticism and agnosticism with regard to certain speculative problems; for I believe that such scepticism is quite compatible with the existence of an Age of Faith in the sense chiefly emphasized by Carlyle—*i. e.*, in the practical sense. What I mean is rather that in our time scepticism has distinctly begun to creep—as it did in the time of the Greek Sophists—into the practical aspects of life, as well as into the more purely theoretical. I

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do not think that this would have been as true of the last generation as it is of this. In the last generation practical faith was not only represented among us by those two Hebrew prophets, Carlyle and Ruskin; but it would be easy to point to prominent men—in general the most prominent men—in all departments of public life, in poetry, in fiction, in politics, in science, in philosophy, in history, in art, even in military and commercial affairs, who were dominated by a somewhat similar spirit. Speculative doubt did not in many such instances materially affect practical moral conviction. Whatever may be true of other countries, our country has in the main been faithful, in profession, if not in practice (for some people call us hypocrites), to the great moral traditions which are broadly associated with the ideas of Christianity. Now, no doubt, there is something of the same still; and, indeed, perhaps, quite as much of it still among those who do not accept the specific doctrines of Christianity as among those who do. But I think there is some change. It has been pointed out by some, and I think it is on the whole true, that it would be difficult, in the various departments of life to which I have referred, to name men of equal eminence with those who could have been singled out in the last generation, as representing the same consistent elevation of tone and strength of conviction on the practical problems of life. I do not mention this as a sign of deterioration; for I am not at all sure that it is. I merely mention it as a point that has been noted, and that, I think, is on the whole true. And I may, perhaps, make my meaning more definite by saying that such teaching as that of Nietzsche would have seemed more surprising in the last generation than it does in this. Here again I do not mean to imply that I regard Nietzsche as a bad influence. I only mean that he illustrates, more definitely, perhaps, than any other writer, the tendency to carry into the region of practical morality that sceptical habit of mind which had previously been applied in the main to more purely speculative problems. For Nietzsche has boldly questioned the whole standpoint of Christian morality, which he describes as the morality of slaves, and has sought to substitute for it a morality of freemen or lords, which would involve a complete

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transmutation of moral values. Something of this was, perhaps, involved in Carlyle's doctrine of heroes; but on the whole, our British moralists, even when most revolutionary in speculative doctrine, have tended to write as if the general basis of morality was not to be called in question. It seems to me probable that this questioning attitude of Nietzsche will become more common as time goes on, and will render it more and more necessary for those who believe in moral principles to be able to give some reason for the faith that is in them.

Now, some of those who have noted this tendency of recent thought view it with a good deal of alarm. They fear that we are losing our old anchorage before we have found any new moorings, and that a general decay of moral purpose is to be anticipated, giving rise to a recrudescence of barbarism. Some even point to recent events as showing already the beginnings of such a decline both in this country and in others. They point to the revival of the spirit of nationality, with the violent passions which it breeds, and the appeal to brute force which is its inevitable resort. They point to the increase of armaments in Germany, the dominance of militarism in France, and the growth of the imperial spirit in both the great Anglo-Saxon peoples. They say that in all these nations the development of this kind of patriotism—which means, not so much love of one's own country as hatred of the countries of others—is accompanied by the spread of calumnies, the dread of open inquiry, the attempt to suppress freedom of opinion, and the appeal to the worst prejudices and passions of the mob. They say that we saw all this at a distance in France, and that we now see it close at hand among ourselves. Such are, I believe, the pessimistic conclusions of several prominent members of ethical societies, and of others who are interested in the maintenance of the moral standard.

Now, I am not by any means prepared to deny that there is a considerable amount of truth in all this; but I think it is possible to regard it all in a much more hopeful light. If men's passions have been roused by national crises in this country and others, and if some have for a time lost their heads in

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connection with them, that does not justify us, who are in the position of calm students of human nature, in being carried away by the current, and mistaking the turmoil of the moment for the spirit of the age. I believe that there are deeper influences at work, and that perhaps those that are making for good may be stronger than those that are making for evil. Hence, if I call your attention to such recent events, which must no doubt have a prominent place in all our minds, it is not with the view of suggesting a moral deterioration, in which, on the whole I do not believe, but rather of illustrating what I mean by the practical necessity for a clear consciousness of the true source of moral obligation. Great problems are being forced upon our attention—problems that are in many respects old enough, but that in some respects also are essentially new—and these problems, unless we are very callous indeed, must make us think a little, and ask ourselves where we stand. Let me try, then, to state, by way of making my point more definite, what appears to me to be the great practical problem of the present time.

A generation or two ago the world woke up, one may almost say suddenly—and this country, perhaps, woke up more suddenly than any other—to the presence of a new problem among us, *viz.*, the economic or social problem. It was talked about, written about, preached about, sung about, till everybody realized that it was there. It is, perhaps, an exaggeration to say, as has been said, that we are all socialists now; but it would hardly be an exaggeration to say that we are all social-problemists. And the recognition of this problem has, to a great extent, altered men's moral conceptions. The good man of two generations ago was an individualist—not in the sense in which an individualist is opposed to a socialist, but in the sense in which one who thinks mainly of personal obligations is opposed to one who thinks mainly of social obligations. We have changed all that. The good man of our time is one who thinks, not of personal virtues and duties, but of trades-unions and municipalities and model dwellings. This transformation has meant an enlargment of our interests, a shifting of our centre of gravity, a readjustment of our moral estimates. But

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we have accommodated ourselves to all that, and it no longer suggests any very searching inquiry into the basis of moral obligation. We see our way more or less; and, though the great social problem is still very prominently with us, yet I cannot but believe that we are well on the way to its solution, simply because we have so fully recognized it. To see a problem is almost the same as to see through it; to face it is almost to conquer it.

But now it seems to me that in quite recent days another great problem has emerged in this country, at least as suddenly as the last one—the imperial problem. Just as our grandfathers woke up to find that they were not, as they had fancied, merely individual human being, but parts of a great social organism, with the most complex interrelation of elements, and the most momentous interaction of results, so have we woke up, almost on a single day, to realize, as we had never realized before, that we are members, not of a country, but of an empire, that we have ties and obligations that carry us round the world. This, I cannot but think, is a great awakening, just as the other was. It is in truth but an extension of the same process. It is a further enlarging of our conception of the system to which we belong. Of course we have, in a way, had this enlarged conception all along, just as our grandfathers had a sort of social conception all along; but it had not come home to us before; most of us have, I believe, been far too little awake to the demands which it made upon us.

It must be admitted, I am afraid, that this enlarged consciousness of our relations to the world has come to us in a somewhat disagreeable way, and has been accompanied by much that is in the highest degree objectionable—by much, even, that might not unreasonably lead us to fear that we are losing some of the best results of our past civilization, rather than advancing to anything better. But it should be remembered that the same might have been said of the early beginnings of our social consciousness. Our wider social relationships and the economic and political problems involved did not at first present themselves to men's minds in any considerable degree as an enlargment of the moral consciousness.

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They did not bring a sense of new obligations. They rather tended to make men more individualistic than they had been before, more inclined to insist that "business is business," and is quite outside the province within which conscience has sway. It was only by slow degrees, by the labors of such men as Robert Owen, Carlyle and Ruskin, that the moral claims implied in the economic revolutions became at all apparent. Hence we need not be surprised that the consciousness of the obligations of empire does not at once come upon us as a matured and sobered sense of new duties, but is rather accompanied in some cases by the abrogation of duty and an apparent relapse to lower standards—by the contention, for instance, that empire is empire, and that such an end sanctifies almost any means. But I am hopeful enough to believe that this is only a passing phase of popular feeling—which generally attaches itself in the first instance to the most superficial aspect of things —and that in this case, as in the other, we shall find a gradual development of an enlarged sense of our duties and responsibilities. Hence I think the occasion calls, not for despair, but only for a renewed effort to understand what our obligations are.

Perhaps I may bring out what I mean a little more definitely by referring once more to some views of a writer to whom I have just alluded. I am by no means a great admirer of Nietzsche; and I do not at all admit the truth of his view that Christian morality is a morality of slaves, and that we have to advance to a new morality which shall be that of masters. But I think this statement may be applied with some truth to express the general nature of the advance that is at the present moment demanded. The moral consciousness of this country a couple of generations ago was not that of slaves; but I think it was too much that of men who did not sufficiently realize how far it was possible for them to control the conditions of their lives. The economic changes of the past century have to a large extent impressed on men's minds the great possibilities that lie before them in the way of improved organization, and have thus enabled them to feel more and more that they are masters of their fate, and that it is both their duty and their

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privilege to act as such. In this sense it may fairly be maintained that there has been a partial advance from an attitude of servitude to one of freedom. And I think it will be simply a carrying onward of the same advance if we learn more and more how great a part we may have, by wise exertion, in ordering the affair of other parts of the earth with which we are closely connected, and so of forwarding what has been, perhaps somewhat too magniloquently, described as "the parliament of man, the federation of the world." I think we are bound to recognize that this is a thing to strive for, just as most of us have already to some extent recognized that economic reorganization is a thing to be promoted. It would be low indeed, it seems to me, if we were to renounce these great obligations, and hark back to those merely individual ideals which were indeed by comparison little better than a morality of slaves. In this sense we may well re-echo the language of Nietzsche—"The sea is in storm. Everything is in the sea. Up! Up! Ye old seamen's hearts. *Fatherland,* say ye? *Our* helm is set thitherwards where is our *children's* land. Thither, stormier than the sea, storms our great longing."*

Now it is, I think, when we find ourselves to be in such an attitude of fresh adventure that we feel the force of the demand for a right understanding of the source of moral obligation. The morality which does not know and does not care about its authority is seldom a progressive morality. It is rather one that holds fast by established traditions. It is of such that Nietzsche says again, "The good, verily, they cannot make anything new; they are always the beginning of the end. They crucify him who writes new values on new tables; they sacrifice the future; they crucify all men's future." And it is because we stand face to face with great problems that concern what is distant and future, that we are called upon, more than ever before, to understand the source of our obligations.

With respect to individual morality, inquiries of this kind are apt to seem uncalled for. Our ideas of individual morality, of the kind of conduct in the ordinary affairs of life that is

*"*Also Sprach Zarathustra.*" The rendering is that of the late Professor Wallace.

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suitable for a gentleman and a Christian, is the result of a long course of development, and is, in the most cultured natures, a finely polished product, about which any further inquiry seems almost sacrilege. The relations of men in their more complex modes of social intercourse are in a much more crude condition; and we may often discover there traces of an earlier barbarism which in the more purely personal relations of life has been long outgrown. And I believe it will be found that this is still more decidedly true with respect to imperial and international affairs. The way in which a gentleman believes with reference to his servants would probably be found in general to show traces of a finer development than we could commonly discover in the way in which a dominant race behaves towards a subject one. And similarly the way in which a gentleman behaves towards his neighbor shows, I think, in general a refinement and consideration for others for which we should look in vain in the behavior of one nation towards another. I do not merely mean that the attitude is different. This is perhaps involved in the nature of things; since a nation is not an individual. But I mean that in the one case we seem to see a crudity which reveals relative want of development, whereas in the other case we have something that looks more like a finished product. A small illustration may suffice. When we speak of the "honor" of a nation, most people seem to understand by it very nearly the same as they would have understood by the honor of a gentleman in the old duelling days. We have, I fancy, quite ceased to understand this now by the honor of a gentleman. We should all take it to have reference to the uprightness of his actions. Now, the actions of a nation must no doubt be of a somewhat different character from the actions of a gentleman. But it seems doubtful whether there is any sufficient ground for giving a different meaning to the word honor in the two cases. I believe the difference is due almost entirely to the relative lack of development in our conception of a nation's obligations.

In all this I have been trying to bring out, by reference to questions of the day, how the pressure of practical problems may lead us to reflect on the source of moral obligations. But

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there is another point in the illustration that I have been using. For, when we ask ourselves what the source of moral obligation actually is, we shall find, I believe, that the view that has the longest history, and that still exercises a good deal of influence over most men's minds, is that which connects our obligations with the authority of the state—a view which is at once found to be inadequate when we begin to think of the obligations of the state itself, whether towards its subject races or towards other sovereign powers. But it can hardly be doubted that for all primitive peoples the will of the tribe, usually as expressed by its chief, is the supreme law. "Tell the Spartans that we lie here in obedience to their law," is the supreme expression of the primitive conception of duty. And probably there is nothing that comes more directly home even to the modern mind than such appeals as—"England expects every man to do his duty"; "Here and here did England help me—How can I help England? Say." Yet we readily see that there are many aspects of the life of the modern man which such appeals do not at all touch; and this becomes especially apparent when such a nation as ours is being swept out of its insular seclusion by the call of more distant obligations. Accordingly, I refer to this primitive view of the source of moral obligation, only to set it aside at once, and to go on to notice some other views that have from time to time dominated men's minds.

I suppose the view that has, on the whole, had the greatest influence, next to the conception of the state—if, indeed, its influence has not been even deeper and more far-reaching—is that which finds the source in the will of a divine power. This view seems to connect itself very closely with the first: for most nations have believed themselves to be under the protection of some God, from the time of the Jews, whose conception of the "Lord of Hosts" probably seems to many of us to have something in it that is sublime, to the present Emperor of Germany, whose confidence in his "Old Ally" probably appears to most of us to have more than a touch of the ridiculous. But the idea of a divine law-giver has seldom been used merely as an added sanction to the authority of the state. It has generally implied the recognition of obligations that are deeper

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and more far-reaching than any national laws. And this is a way of thinking of the source of moral obligation that even in quite recent times has been employed with much effect by moral teachers among ourselves—most notably, I suppose, by Carlyle. But the instance is significant; for it is always a little doubtful how far Carlyle's references to a divine law are to be taken as literal and how far they are rather symbolic. At any rate, most people at present would recognize that this way of expressing the nature of the source of moral obligation is unsatisfactory; not merely because so many doubt its reality, but because modern thought tends to invert the relation—not to proceed from the idea of God to the idea of morality, but rather from the idea of morality to the idea of God. I expect it would be so fully recognized by the members of such a society as this that the latter would be the proper order, if there is to be any such process at all, that it is probably quite unnecessary to dwell upon the point.

Conscience is, I think, the next of the great sources that have been recognized for moral obligation; and this again connects itself very closely with the last. For most of those who have upheld conscience as an ultimate authority have regarded it as the voice of God within us. And, indeed, unless it is regarded either as the voice of God, or as the voice of reason, it is very difficult to treat it as an ultimate authority at all. Apart from such ulterior support, a man's conscience does not appear to be much more respectable than any other disagreeable feeling that he may have. It would be very nearly on a par with indigestion. Most people would recognize that the conscience of the fanatic requires some chastening. Even Butler did not deny this.* The conscience of such a one may be the best guide he has; but it stands in need of education to make it reasonable. This means that we take reason, rather than conscience, as our final authority. And here again this transition is made so inevitably by almost every one in modern times that I need not emphasize it further.

And so we are led at last to reason as the ultimate source of

*See his third sermon "On Human Nature."

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moral obligation. And I do not believe that it is really possible to go further than this. As reasonable beings, or beings who hope that they are reasonable, we cannot but be convinced that whatever it is reasonable to do it is right to do. The only doubt is, whether this source of moral obligation is not a somewhat dry one, whether it can of itself furnish us with any real content for the moral life. Kant did his best to show that it could; but most people are convinced that he was not really successful. Most people who have reflected much on the subject are agreed that all that reason can do is to point us to some end at which it is reasonable to aim; and that then the thought of that end becomes the ultimate source of moral obligation. And thus we are led away from the idea of a law that stands as an authority above us to the idea of some good at which it is reasonable for us to aim.

And here, perhaps, we come upon the best meaning that can be given to that antithesis of Nietzsche's between the morality of slaves and the morality of freemen. For there is something slavish in the thought of an authority which we are simply to obey. I do not mean that the freeman is always "agin' the government"; but he has some other reason for being for it than simply that it is the government. And it is true that modern thought, as contrasted with the thought of the ancient Greeks, has tended too much to express moral ideas as if they depended on some law above us, instead of on some end that we seek to realize. We are only gradually learning to go back to the Greeks again in this, as in many other respects. But I think it is hardly fair to say that Christianity was responsible for the falling off in this respect. I believe that the morality of Christianity was in essence a morality for freemen, as well as that of Plato and Aristotle. But its significance had partly been forgotten; and, I think, it is true that we have to learn to emancipate ourselves again.

Well, then, what finally is the end to which reason points us as the source of moral obligation? To this some would answer—Happiness. But if this means pleasure, it does not seem a sound answer to give. I need not trouble you here with the theoretical objections to regarding pleasure as the end. It

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is enough for practical purposes to say that any such answer must be comparatively empty unless we can point to those modes of human realization in which an abiding happiness is to be found. I think the best modern thought is concentrating itself on the view—which in essence is the view of Plato and Aristotle as well—that we can only get to understand the end which it is reasonable for man to pursue by studying human nature in the concrete in relation to the conditions under which it has to develop. I believe there is no royal road to such an understanding. It is not an end that can be summed up in some simple formula. Rather it involves, as Carlyle was fond of saying, a swallowing of all our formulas, and a resolute attempt to grasp the concrete reality of things through the experience of life. It is only thus that we can feel our way and learn by degrees how much there is of value in the life of the family, of the city, of the state, and of still wider human relationships. And I believe it is only in the gradual understanding of all these that we can find the ultimate source of moral obligation. The great lesson of modern thought is that our whole life is a development, that it is only through its growth that we can learn by degrees what its meaning is; and that its claim upon our devotion lies simply in its being the only way in which we can realize what we truly are. To attempt to unfold the nature of this development would, of course, carry us far beyond the limits of such a lecture as this.

An answer of this kind—which practically amounts to saying that the end of life is the whole of life, rather than any particular thing that we can point to in it—is apt at first to seem discouraging. But I do not think it is so in the end. The moral life seems to be like walking or eating or playing a game. We get to know both how to do it and what is the good of it, if we try, and hardly in any other way; and it is in this sense that Mr. Bradley's answer, to which I referred at the outset, is right. But, perhaps, it would be better expressed—We know, but we would rather not tell. I do not think that such an answer is discouraging. It is rather stimulating to know that we cannot discover our duties in any mechanical way, but that life is its own interpreter, and that we can only

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grow into the understanding of the duties of life by living. At any rate, if we accept this as the best result of modern, as it was of ancient, wisdom, the great lesson that it seems to bring to us is the need of incessant thought and vigilance. If the source of our moral obligations were some external law, whether of the state or of a divine power, we might learn it by rote and follow it blindly—"ours not to reason why." Or if we had simply to listen to the voice of conscience, we might afford to let our reason and all our other powers fall asleep. Or if the end were merely happiness, we might hope to reckon it out and be done with it. The idea that the source of our moral obligations is the demand for the complete realization of human powers, is the only idea that makes incalculable demands upon us, and calls for constant wakefulness. But for beings like us, I believe that a demand of that kind is the most truly encouraging.

At any rate, it is not in a spirit of hopelessness that I have sought to put it before you. And by way of emphasizing the encouraging aspect of it, I should wish to recur to the point from which I set out. In the light of what I have said, you may perceive that it was not so much of a digression as some of you may have thought to refer to the great practical problems that are in front of us as a nation at the present moment. If the view that I have indicated of the source of moral obligation is true, it is precisely in such problems that we should find the inspiration of our lives—that which fills them with their most real content. There is every reason, I think, why we should regard such problems, not only with courage, but with hope. The great need, here as always, is to be in touch with reality. We must see clearly where we stand. We, for instance, as members of this nation, must, I think, recognize once for all that, for good or ill (I believe for good), we have relations and obligations all over the surface of the earth. We cannot altogether refuse the imperial crown, even if it should seem, to some of us, to be a crown of thorns. But we must be careful in what spirit we accept it. True imperialism would mean, I think, the recognition that we have our part to play with others in the great task of advancing humanity, that we

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have to join heartily with others in the promotion of peace, liberty, justice, and enlightenment, to which we hope all nations will be more and more devoted. Such a spirit would, I believe, be equally far removed from what are known in cant phraseology as Little Englandism and Jingoism—the one meaning, as I suppose, the failure to recognize the greatness of our obligations, the other the failure to recognize that the only true greatness is greatness of obligation. If we can learn to take our Imperialism in that sense, we need not despair of our country. We have, no doubt, like others, had great faults, made great mistakes, even, I am afraid, committed what can hardly be called less than great crimes. But there is always room for repentance. If we truly grasp the situation before us, if we see clearly where our obligations lie, we shall, I am convinced, find nothing but good in the breaking down of our insularity, in the widening of our horizon, whether it be in Africa, in India, in Australia, or, it may be, nearer at home, in Ireland. If we seize the situation in the right spirit, there is every hope for us still, that when "the tumult and the shouting dies" there will be some fruit of our labors that is not wholly vain, an honor that is not rooted in dishonor, a flag that is something better than a "commercial asset." But if we do not seize the occasion in some such spirit as this, if we do not see the new duties which the new situation brings, then, I dare say, like so many other nations before us, we shall have our decline and fall; and, indeed, it will be high time that we should.

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THE RELATION OF ETHICS TO RELIGION.*

THE purpose of the present paper is not to investigate in detail the connection which has subsisted historically between codes of positive morality and the various religious systems with which they have been contemporary, but rather to inquire how the relation of ethics to religion must be conceived by one who seeks to subject the phenomena of man's moral life to scientific treatment. While in the history of the race morality and religion have grown up together in close union, and while they are indissolubly united in the experience of a large portion of mankind at the present day, it is necessary, in the interests of scientific thought, to distinguish and separate them. However closely the threads of the one are interwoven with those of the other, clear thinking requires that they should be disentangled. Otherwise one will never be sure to which department any given fact of the complex whole is to be referred for explanation. In approaching the subject one must therefore distinguish between the historical and the logical, the practical and the theoretical point of view. All that can be attempted in the present paper is to ascertain, if possible, certain fundamental principles which must govern our view of the relationship.

I. And first of all it is necessary to determine the generic character of the two classes of phenomena. Without offering an exact definition of religion upon which it would perhaps be difficult for all to agree, it may be confidently asserted that religion involves belief in a higher power or powers, in a superhuman being or beings, and also some form of cult, or worship. Morality, on the other hand, has to do with man in personal and social relations. Religion with its belief in the transcendent, views the individual in his relations to an infinite power more or less completely manifested in the cosmic order. Morality, with no such transcendent reference, views him in relation to his fellows.

*A paper read before the American Psychological Association, at New Haven, December 29, 1899.

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It will be seen that this statement of the essential nature of religion excludes the so-called religion of humanity of the positivists, as well as such a conception as that of Mr. Thomas Davidson in his recent article, "American Democracy as a Religion,"* in which he has quite outdone Auguste Comte himself. All such views seem to me to fall within the sphere of ethics and to mean nothing less than the rejection of religion in favor of ethics. They certainly involve the casting off of an element which has been present in religion from the earliest times, the presence of which alone enables one clearly to differentiate its phenomena from those of ethics. What gives color to the claim that such views are religious is the undeniable fact that they often evoke in those who accept them a spirit of renunciation and devotion akin to that of religion. They also are attended by emotional experiences similar to those which in the religious believer find a superhuman object. The currents of the emotional life have simply been turned into another channel; they express themselves within the circle of human relations and no longer seek satisfaction in a transcendent sphere. A shifting of the ideational centres of emotion is a constant phenomenon in the case of every individual whose intellectual life is expanding. Changes in the intellectual bases of the emotions, greater than popular thought imagines possible, actually take place through the process of education. Thus it can be seen that to one who has rejected belief in a deity, an enthusiasm for humanity may appear to fill the place of religion.

As religion can not be merged in ethics, so ethics must not be lost in religion. As an historical fact they have sometimes existed independently of each other, and do so still, though their normal and legitimate relation to one another is that of interaction. Religion may be non-ethical and ethics non-religious. The first member of the proposition—that religion may be non-ethical—finds numerous illustrations in the history of the world's religions. Indeed, at a certain stage many primitive religions appear to have been non-ethical. That of Rome

*International Journal of Ethics, October, 1899.

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continued so for centuries, remaining to the last almost exclusively formal and ritualistic. The statement that ethics may be non-religious finds abundant support in modern life, as in the case of the positivists already noted. It can not be admitted that the acceptance of some form of religious belief, still less of any particular form of belief, is an essential element in morality, *as morality*. Nor can a science of human conduct accept any such limitation. If it were thus conditioned it would be confined to particular times, places, and individuals. Many would be excluded from its scope, for there are not a few who strive to satisfy all moral requirements and yet wholly reject religion. Ethics as a science must be able to make its appeal to the non-religious man. It must deal with man as man and be universal in its application. Whether religion may not be an important ally of morality, lending to it a warmth of feeling as well as a force of sanction otherwise wanting, is a further question. For the moment the problem is to distinguish generically the two classes of phenomena.

The sense of obligation, which has often been regarded as the generic moral experience, is common both to religion and morality, for this feeling often transcends the sphere of the human relations and allies itself with religious beliefs and practices, which then are as binding upon the conscience of the individual who accepts them as is any strictly ethical code. Those ideas, judgments, and emotions connected with the feeling of obligation within the sphere of human relationships, constitute the specific phenomena with which a science of conduct attempts to deal.

Not only may religion and morality be thus distinguished by the superhuman reference of the one and the human limitation of the other, but they may also be differentiated as regards their root and source in man's experience. Religion has its source primarily in the relations which man sustains to nature, to the totality of those cosmic forces by which he is surrounded and which produce in him the idea of an infinite power. Man finds himself dependent upon these cosmic forces; he has physical needs which they alone can satisfy; his awe is awakened in the presence of their vastness and power; his admiration is

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kindled by their beauty and order; his intellect demands a causal explanation of their operation; and he is compelled at last to yield life itself to their conquering might. These are the psychological experiences which make man a religious animal, and they are quite clearly distinguishable from those which lie at the root of morality. For morality springs from those human relationships in which the individual finds himself compelled to live and act. It has its roots in the needs, physical and mental, which other human beings can satisfy, and in the sympathies which answer to those needs. "By the impressions made on him by nature, his reason was incited, we conceive, towards religion,—by social life towards morality."*

II. Bearing in mind the generic distinction between morality and religion we may pass to a consideration of the ways in which they act and react upon each other. Religion in its development takes on ethical elements. The conception of the deity which any religion offers represents the ethical standards of its adherents. The history of religion makes it clear that the moral attributes of deity are in every case drawn from the ethical ideals prevailing among the chief worshipers, and that they have been first constructed in human relations before being ascribed to the gods. Morality has thus grown up from the earth towards heaven; historically it has not proceeded the other way. Man has projected upon the infinite spirit the highest excellence he has known, bringing his best gifts as an offering to religion. There is, therefore, a half-truth in the startling paradox of Feuerbach that "instead of God creating man, man has created God." Man has certainly created his idea of God, including its moral elements. As Goethe has expressed it:—

> "Im Innern ist ein Universum auch,
> Daher der Völker löblicher Gebrauch,
> Dass jeglicher das Beste, was er kennt,
> Er Gott, ja seinen Gott benennt,
> Ihm Himmel und Erden übergibt
> Ihm fürchtet, und womöglich liebt."†

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* Pfleiderer, "Philosophy of Religion," Vol. IV., p. 227.

† Proemium to "Gott und Welt."

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As man advances to higher stages of morality his earlier conceptions of the moral character of the deity no longer satisfy him and are accordingly criticized and reconstructed to meet the demands of his new ideals. Among the many illustrations of this principle may be mentioned the history of the religious thought of the Greeks and the Hebrews. Greek literature from Homer to Plato displays in the clearest manner the gradual transformation of the ethical elements in Greek religion. From the crude thought of the gods as possessing human appetites and passions which give rise to constant intrigues, jealousies, and strife, there slowly emerges a more worthy view, until in Plato and Aristotle the conception of the deity is made to express the highest spiritual perfection which philosophic thought had attained, and is at the same time the ideal of what humanity should be in its ethical life. The evolution of the religious thought of the Hebrews followed a similar course. Yahweh is at first a tribal deity and is viewed as the partial defender of his own worshipers, caring nothing for the fortunes or the fate of other peoples. But gradually with the attainment of a higher ideal on the part of their leaders, and especially with the appearance of the prophets who make a ringing appeal for moral reform, a change is effected. Morality is seen to require a regard for those outside of Israel; justice and mercy between man and man universally are emphasized; and in keeping with this change Yahweh is made the God of all mankind, dealing with all in justice and requiring rightness of heart and life as the condition of his favor. The prophets declare that he will even cast off his chosen people if they fail to meet these ethical requirements. Illustrations lying closer to our own thought are found in the modification of religious conceptions in our own century through the influence of ethical ideals. Among many examples of such transformation may be mentioned the change from that view of God which emphasized his imperial sovereignty to that which emphasizes his fatherhood. So, too, even in popular thought the atonement is ceasing to be regarded as a mere *quid pro quo,* or the balancing of a ledger account.

The significant fact here is that people have come to see that

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no man could be called ethically good who in human relations should display the spirit which religious thought had freely ascribed to the deity. Accordingly a demand, springing from man's moral nature, was made for the reconstruction of the religious view. It was this ethical motive that prompted the remark of one of the Wesleys when he said to a Calvinist: "Your God is my devil." The essential truth upon which I am insisting is that the entire history of religion bears clear and emphatic testimony to the fact that all the ethical elements which it contains have been transferred from the human sphere to the divine; they are of earthly warp and woof; they contain man's imperfect but ever growing ideal of what he ought himself to do and to be. In other words, the ethical elements in religion are due to an immanent, not a transcendent, process of development. Nor could it have been otherwise in the case of beings like ourselves. "If a man love not his brother whom he hath seen, how can he love God whom he hath not seen?" Were not man so constituted as to discern and love truth, beauty, and benevolence of character, it would be idle to bid him strive for their attainment. Only as his own inner nature impels him towards them does it become possible for him to respond to the call of duty to realize them in his own life. A motive which finds no response within us is no motive at all, for it is powerless to move us. In the words of Martineau: "If a Creator in projecting a moral world should omit to render appreciation of goodness immanent in the nature of its people no repairing message could overtake the defect."* It is to be observed, however, that an insistence upon the immanency of all moral progress is no denial of the possibility, or even the necessity, of an appeal to a Supreme Mind for its ultimate explanation. Every event of the world-order, whether moral or physical, may be as truly a divine event as if it were not mediated by natural agencies.

Two remarks may here be added by way of explanation. In the first place it is possible to see why ethical thought has slowly transformed religious conceptions,—why it has criti-

*"The Relation between Ethics and Religion," an address, p. 7.

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cized with freer hand than has religion itself. For religion not only strikes root deeply into the past, and being bound up with the life of one's forefathers is hallowed in the memory of the individual, but it is also linked to sacred usages on the part of the family and the community, and is closely connected with those doctrines of a future life which have always aroused the strongest hopes and fears of the race. About all its rites and beliefs, therefore, an atmosphere of awe, of mystery, and sacredness, inevitably gathers. Whereas problems of conduct, which have to do primarily with temporal and human relations, are not so hedged about with sacred and awe-inspiring sentiments; here criticism moves more freely and advances more boldly to new positions. It was but natural, then, that religious and theological beliefs should be purified and reconstructed largely through the influence of purely ethical insights.

Again, the fact that the ethical elements in religion appear to most minds to be transcendent, to have been let down from heaven to earth as a special revelation, is readily explicable. When once an ethical insight has been reached by the leaders of thought, and, in accordance with the principle already examined, has been taken up into religion as a part of its content, it is then taught as a religious truth. In this new association it carries with it the sacredness and mystery of religion itself. Impressed upon children with all the weight of religious authority and always retaining this connection in the minds of the people, it necessarily appears to them to be a transcendently given truth, a revelation. But its real origin and history are traceable to man's growing comprehension of his own nature, its meaning and worth, its dignity and ideal perfection.

III. Almost every religion has developed, as has been seen, some more or less detailed code of morals which it has imposed upon its adherents as an element in religious obligation. Morality is therefore often regarded almost exclusively from a religious point of view, and it is important to distinguish between a theological, or religious, and a scientific treatment of the problem of ethics. A theological system of ethics involves certain pre-suppositions concerning a superhuman order

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and man's relation to it. In such a system the accepted ethical principles appear as commands, or laws, of the deity or deities. Thus the rites of hospitality which the ancient Greek observed were viewed as the requirements of Zeus, the protector of the stranger and guest. The ethical laws embodied in the ten commandments appear as the direct expression of the will of Yahweh. And in the Brahmanic religion the entire life of the higher castes from birth to death was subjected to the control of religious rules. The sanctions of conduct in such a theological system are viewed as residing in the will of the deity, who, it is believed, either directly or indirectly rewards right conduct and punishes evil doing. But a scientific, in distinction from a theological, treatment of ethics seeks to discover and explain the facts of human conduct as facts of the existing order without regard to their ultimate philosophical interpretation. It seeks to find the sanctions of morality in the natural and inevitable results of the conduct itself, and to establish morality on a rational basis by exhibiting the inescapable consequences of right and wrong action, of good and evil character, as in themselves sufficient grounds for the choice of the one and the avoidance of the other. As a science it does not even inquire whether there is a Supreme Being who is the author and sure support of the moral order, or whether there is a future existence for the finite spirit in which the sanctions of good and evil will more perfectly appear. These are problems which belong to metaphysics.

A science of ethics, as such, does not enter upon these questions, but rather asks: What are the facts of the moral life, and how are they explicable in a system of concepts? How far is a moral order discoverable in human history? Are the ways of righteousness "ways of pleasantness" and its paths "paths of peace," when judged by the findings of human experience? As the student of physical science does not, as a scientist, press beyond the empirical order to ask what its metaphysical meaning is, as he does not inquire concerning the ultimate ground or source of the physical laws which he seeks to discover and formulate, but accepts them as given facts, so the student of conduct who seeks to subject its phenomena to a

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merely scientific treatment does not deal with their metaphysical interpretation. And yet the empirical facts of morality are deeply significant for a metaphysical and religious view of the world. The ultimate explanation of the moral order, which appears historically as an immanent principle of progress, brings one close to the heart of the religious problem. Indeed any theological system of ethics which possesses theoretical value and is not a mere utterance of religious authority, is always found to be simply a metaphysical treatment of the subject,—a treatment from the point of view of an attempt to interpret the ultimate nature of the universe in which man finds himself.

IV. In the historical evolution of religion may be distinguished three general stages, which, if not phases in the career of every religion, have at least been moments in the development of religious thought as a whole and may well serve as criteria of progress. The first may be described as a stage of magic and of sacrificial rites. The deity is thought to be propitiated by certain formal acts when duly performed. The second stage is that at which emphasis is placed upon creed and dogma, upon a right intellectual attitude towards the deity. Less external and formal than the preceding stage it still represents the divine favor as depending upon something else than the heart and will. The third stage is that in which the emphasis is shifted to morality,—to conduct and character. The earlier stages may of course still be represented in the final stage; the real character of a religion, however, is tested by the emphasis which is given to the different elements. In a deeply ethical religion like Christianity, the whole of conduct is viewed as matter of religious service, and there results a unification and harmony of the moral and religious life of man. In such a view morality is warmed and brightened by faith in a Supreme Spirit, who is reverenced as the author and guarantor of the moral order. Possessed of such a faith one feels that he does not enter upon the moral conflict at his own charges, but that behind the phenomenal order, where often the good is overborne and the evil is triumphant, there is an infinite champion and defender of right.

It can be seen, therefore, that religion may render to moral-

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ity an important service in enforcing its requirements by an appeal to supernatural sanctions. Although it may well be insisted that with clearer vision and more adequate knowledge the natural sanctions will be a sufficient support of morality, and although it must be confessed that for centuries men have emphasized the religious to the almost total neglect of the natural sanctions, it may still be freely admitted that in the case of many individuals and even of whole peoples, the fear of future punishment and the hope of future reward have been strong supports of social order and of private virtue. It is easy to overestimate the moral worth of conduct induced by such hopes and fears. But it is not to be forgotten that there are higher phases of religious experience than those in which the lower motives operate. The human spirit, smitten with pure love and reverence for that beauty and goodness which its faith sees enthroned in the heart of the Infinite, may be drawn upward, even as Plato taught, by the force of this divine affection.

The powerful and varied influences which religious beliefs have exercised upon conduct in the course of human history can not receive a detailed discussion here. It is clear, however, that these influences have been of a dual nature,—partly beneficent and partly baneful. For while heroic and saintly souls have again and again quickened their moral life at the altar of religion, the fanatic and the inhuman persecutor have no less surely drawn inspiration from the same source. Some of the saddest pages of history are those which recount the dominance of religious motives. The zeal which is begotten by the belief that the heavenly powers are lending their sanction and support to man has not always been a zeal according to morality. In proof of this statement one does not need to describe the nameless degradations of phallic worship, but may point to other well-known phases of religious history. An "age of faith" is not *ipso facto* an age of morality, nor an "age of doubt" necessarily one of immorality. It all depends upon the kind of faith and of doubt in question. But one should surely be cautious about identifying moral conviction with religious faith, and moral enthusiasm with religious emotion. Examples are never wanting of those who "believe and trem-

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ble," and yet boldly play the devil's part in the business of life.

V. In attempting to establish theoretically a religious interpretation of the world, it is necessary to proceed from the known to the unknown. One must start well within the field of experience to secure a satisfactory point of departure for a metaphysical theory. For an intellectual justification of basal religious beliefs few facts are so significant as those of the moral life. Indeed, it may be said that in just the measure in which ethics can justify its claims within the sphere of man's actual experience and can vindicate its laws as laws of the existing order, it furnishes support for a religious interpretation of the world. And as far as ethics is discredited as a science of actual human experience, the religious argument is thereby weakened. If moral laws are universal, holding throughout the whole of nature, nature gains thereby an added significance. If moral laws are at least laws of man's own nature having adequate sanctions there, what conclusion may be drawn concerning that world-order in which man has been reared and trained? To the question, How shall I interpret the universe in which I find myself? I can only answer, By what it does, by the results which it has wrought out, by the meaning which can be spelt out of its processes. What, then, must one think of a world which has unceasingly developed morality? What of a universe in which it has been more and more completely enthroned?

For its theoretical support, for the establishment of those metaphysical beliefs which form the intellectual bases of its faith, religion requires ethics. This order of dependence can not, from a theoretical point of view, be safely reversed. It is often asserted that what a man ought to do depends ultimately upon the kind of world in which he finds himself. For purposes of human knowledge more truly may it be said that to determine ultimately the kind of world in which he finds himself man must consider what he ought to do, what are the requirements of his moral nature in social and personal relations. For he has no other alphabet by which to read the world than that which he finds within. To assert, as did recently a certain teacher of ethics, that in the last analysis morality is

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dependent upon a belief in a God who "exists as numerically separable from the universe," and in finite souls "eternally and immortally separable from God," is completely to invert the evidence, to place the pyramid of thought on its apex instead of its base. To insist upon such metaphysical beliefs as the basis of ethical teaching seems to me not only false in theory, but pernicious in practical tendency. It is to involve ethical principles in the hazards of speculation, to abandon the relatively known for the relatively unknown, the relatively certain for the relatively uncertain, that upon which there is comparatively general agreement for that upon which there is comparatively little agreement. Against such a view it may be urged that we have in the facts of man's moral experience more immediate and convincing grounds for the support of morality. Man's own nature yields no uncertain sanctions for moral conduct. And these sanctions extend beyond the field of the negative virtues; they are, I believe, adequate for a life of positive and strenuous goodness. The sanctions for altruistic endeavor, for example, are not far to seek. If I act selfishly I thereby condemn myself by the operation of psychological laws, as certain in their action as those of physics, to the wretchedness of a petty, self-centred life, full of vexations, jealousies, and anxieties, which never reach that serener atmosphere in which the generous spirit dwells. Similarly if a man pursues any evil course, be it that of lust, or greed, or cruelty, he sows the sure seeds of pain, unrest and dissatisfaction, for he becomes the slave of his evil passion and may not know the joy of freedom and self-mastery. Not only does the evil-doer reap in many a subtle and unnoted way the penalty of vice, but he also shuts himself out from all the rich possibilities of the good life, in which each may prove for himself the joy of unselfish service, the satisfactions which spring from devotion to truth, beauty, and love, and the peace of a conscience devoid of offence. To make morality depend upon the metaphysical proofs for the existence of a God "numerically separable from the universe," while disregarding these ever present sanctions in human nature, is surely to stumble into speculative wells and to subject oneself afresh to the merited laughter of Thracian hand-maids.

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The neglect of the inescapable natural sanctions of conduct is largely responsible for the false glamour which surrounds vice. Science in its various departments is rendering no slight service to morality in demonstrating far more convincingly than any theological system that vice contains within itself its own sure punishment. But one may go far beyond the results which either physical or mental science has thus far been able to formulate. For the vindication of morality one may appeal confidently to the results of the most adequate human experience as it records itself in private life, in biography, history, and literature. Evil doers are not found at the end of their careers offering their mode of life as a sure prescription for permanent satisfaction. Gœthe's final message, won from a life of the richest experience, was that he could only say to the passing moment—"Verweile doch! du bist so schön," when the moment was filled with an ethical content of self-forgetful and altruistic endeavor. Considerations of temperament apart, who to-day are the pessimists, who the whining mourners over the ills of life? Not those, surely, who, whatever their creed, or whether of no creed at all, set themselves with resolute purpose to the task of giving to life a present ethical value. The actual experience of the good life is its own best vindication as that of the evil life is its completest refutation. No view is more shallow than that which sees in morality only a means for securing the blessings of a future life. Even a writer like Martensen allows himself occasionally to fall into this mood. He says: "Truly, if the light of religion be extinguished no reason is perceptible for leading a moral life in all these finite and temporal relations."* Rather must one say, whatever may be true or not true of a transcendent order, ethics as a science rests upon the facts of the present order. Nay more, morality would still remain and its requirements be no less exacting were mankind to reject belief in the transcendent. As Martineau has said: "Did we even imagine that we came out of nothing and went back into nothing and had ties only with one another, still so long as we are what we are, our life

*"Christian Ethics," p. 16.

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must take form from its own germ, and grow and ramify into moral communities."*

VI. Finally, if in the evolution of religion its value has been placed more and more in its ethical content, may it not be true, as many have conceived, that religion will at last be merged in morality and that the specifically religious will cease to exist? In answering this question in the negative one may point with no little confidence to the fact that religion has a source in man's nature and in his experience of the world quite distinct from that of morality. Not only is there a sense of incompleteness even in our ethical ideals, which are never fully realized in this life, but there are æsthetic and intellectual impulses which compel man to be metaphysical and religious. He is forever haunted by a feeling of the insufficiency of the empirical order, and can not permanently escape the recognition of "the infinitude which surrounds our lives." In her gentler moods nature whispers to man of "something far more deeply interfused," but when with irresistible might she crushes all his hopes and brings him face to face with death, the final mystery of life, she rudely shakes him out of a temper of easy-going acceptance of the seen and the temporal and compels him with all the vehemence of his spirit to ask concerning the unseen and the eternal. Despite all scientific prescience of nature, and despite all the mastery which it gives us, "We still acknowledge our complete and absolute dependence on the power that brought us hither and will conduct us hence."†

While the transcendent is a region which lies forever beyond the ken of science, it still remains for philosophy the legitimate sphere of speculation and for religion the legitimate sphere of faith and hope. In the future, however, thinkers will, I believe, more clearly recognize and more frankly admit that speculation is not certainty and that faith and hope are not knowledge. Dogmatism both in philosophy and religion can only prevail by the decadence of intellectual life. With the passing of dogmatism religion will inevitably undergo still further modi-

*"Study of Religion." Introduction, p. 22.

†J. A. Symonds, "Essays Speculative and Suggestive," Vol. I., p. 32.

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fications. Certain elements which have belonged to its childhood will perish. But man will still give a religious interpretation to the world. He will by the necessities of his own nature be compelled to give to his ethical ideals a larger setting than that which is offered by human life, and will interpret them as a part of the cosmic order. When, however, he seeks to give an intellectual warrant for a religious interpretation of the world, that warrant must consist of inferences drawn not only from other fields of science, but also especially from the ethical life of the race as it appears in its slow but steady unfolding.

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THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY AND THE MORAL TRAINING OF CHILDREN.

I.

IN a century of wonderful discoveries, perhaps the most wonderful, all things considered, is the discovery of the child. This discovery we owe to the rigorous application of the evolutionary method of thought to the investigation of the meaning of life, by which means we are brought face to face with its mysterious borderlands. The profound consciousness of the unity and continuity of biological phenomena, which characterizes all scientific enterprise in the present day, has come about largely under the same inspiration. Thus as soon as attention was seriously directed to the matter, men saw a special significance in origins, especially in the origin of human intelligence, and this, of course, involved the study of infant life from the comparative point of view. Interest was added by the unique contribution to the subject made by Professor Fiske, of Harvard, the discovery namely, that the human organism occupies an exceptional place in the scale of life by reason of the lengthening of the period of infancy. This is a fact of enormous importance both to the body and more especially to the mind of the child.

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The child, therefore, has occupied us because of the intrinsic interest of its discovery; but (as I wish to show) also because of the bearing this discovery has had, and is having, on the subject of training. For, after all, the new feeling for childhood which has come through the evolutionary philosophy, was without a genuine teleology if it did not lead to profound modification in both psychology and pedagogy. For the great problem, after the clear understanding of the place of the child in the scale of biological processes, is the better equipping of the child for the duties that lie before him.

None of the sciences has taken the child more seriously than psychology, and specially as related to the business of child-training. The great educators from the time of Comenius have tried to adjust the difficulties involved in educating the human infant; but it is safe to say that more has been done during the nineteenth century than in all the time previous. Both in method, and in actual results, is this statement beyond question. With all the vigor of a new inspiration has psychology, in its recent form, "modified" this newest and greatest acquisition of the scientific spirit. The child-mind, after the labors of Preyer, Perez, and Sully, is no longer a *terra incognita,* where pedagogues grope in the dark. We now understand the force of such words as heredity and environment as applied to children. We even speak of self-activity in relation to the conscious evolution of the mind of the child. We have a rooted distrust of the haphazard in relation to child-training; we instinctively feel that it dishonors the subject of the educational process; we feel that so important a matter demands the most accurate, patient, and thorough investigation working in connection with facts carefully determined. The new psychology, of all the sciences, has given this kind of attention to the subject.

The results of study so far show that a thorough change has come over the whole problem of child-training in the home, in the kindergarten, and in the primary school. We may epitomize these results thus:

(*a*) Study child nature. Only thus, *i. e.,* by the direct observation and careful computation of functions, can educa-

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tion be carried on successfully. This means that child-training must be based on the recognition of individuality in childhood. The object of all education is to strengthen self-activity and make it superior to the forces of heredity and environment. The teacher, in order to do this, must direct his attention sympathetically towards the relative differences revealed in children in the crude state. The new pyschology has done a grand service in certain directions of this problem.

(*b*) Arouse the self-activity of the pupil. As already stated, the goal of education is the emancipation of the mind from the force of natural impulse. Self-activity is the principle which organizes mental evolution, specially, (in the case of children) through *imitation*. To direct this capacity, so that in play, in symbolic language, and in all ways possible, the child may become adequately conscious of the meaning of life—this is the real purpose of child-training, and our practice is largely determined by the results of modern psychologic pedagogy in these matters.

(*c*) Teach by interest, rather than by rule of authority. The scientific point here is the discovery of stable points of interest. Preyer found such in the tenth week of the normal child, but not till considerably later are such centres associated with self-activity. Then they are united with attention; and it is attention *and* interest that define for us the significant facts in early training. Psychology, especially in the study of fatigue, has placed pedagogy under lasting obligation, and has uttered one clear note of warning against the crowding of the child-mind. It is one of the most fruitful results of child-study.

(*d*) Rely on the routine of school work for the *moral* training. School work is, and must be, largely mechanical and undoubtedly exerts a great influence over the child's moral habits. The "school virtues" are certainly trained in this way: punctuality, obedience, love of order. The new psychology has placed this beyond question in a statistical way, and thus a scientific foundation may be gained for the subject of moral training. Results, so far, are largely in favor of a system of "conditions," which, by eliminating uncertainty, may place the moral training of children in school beyond hazard.

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(*c*) Indirection, or influence, is the chief power in the religious training of the young. The new psychology has done little beyond empirical observation in this matter, but all are agreed that the old method of teaching religion is based on insufficient insight. The "New England Rhymes," beginning:

"In Adam's fall
We sinned all."

are now, and rightly in the opinion of the writer, regarded as out of date. Religion is, therefore, being studied; but with very small result beyond a statistical survey of the chief emotions—fear, sense of sin, the feeling after God, and allied states of consciousness. But the time is not far distant when, with the aid of exact method, religion may be taught as readily and easily as reading or spelling.

These results of the application of scientific psychology to child-training would be enough to justify the method employed. It has three advantages, at least, over the old. In the first place we have a much clearer apprehension of the *subject* of the educational process. It creates the demand that teachers take a course in child psychology before attempting to teach children. Normal schools are now happily coming to see the importance of this, by providing for it in their curricula, as well as by so adapting the instruction of childhood as to suit the condition of the child-mind. On the other hand, we have gained in consequence of this method a deeper feeling of responsibility for ignorance, and a mystical reverence for the possibilities of teaching children.

Another important merit is the better knowledge gained of the influences exerted by certain leading functions of the child-mind in acquiring knowledge. Thereby definiteness has been introduced into the good intentions of the teacher. It is a trite saying that the teacher needs sympathy with children if he is to teach them; for it is sympathy that gives insight, *when combined with intelligence and education.* And here the paramount importance of psychology to the teacher is apparent. The teacher who understands what the new psychology has been saying about attention, interest, fatigue and habit is immeasurably more useful, other things being equal, than the teacher

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who knows nothing of these subjects. Such knowledge is useful if it only overthrows the complacent dogmatism, the methodical affectation of the impersonal, of the ordinary teacher. Children like to be understood, and generally know if their teacher has done justice to their rights or not. The new pyschology has shown us that feeling comes first, and next volition, and lastly intellect in the line of emphasis in child-training.

A third merit of the scientific study of childhood is the improved conditions in pedagogical theory it has led to. This is too vast a subject to take up here; but we may pause to remark that the child that modern pedagogues deal with is an altogether different child from that of the old-dame schools. The modern child is full of independent spontaneity; his mind is no unmapped region of sin-ridden instincts, but a well-known, but unconscious, kingdom where law reigns. No one can say that he is not an improvement over the past in many respects. And this result is due, in large measure, to the devotion and labor of those who have pursued their studies along the line, and under the inspiration, of the modern exponents of the science of psychology.

In our estimate and criticism of the attitude of the new psychology towards child-training, these things should not be forgotten.

II.

THAT much of the study of child nature has been vitiated by excessive zeal for the new, as such, is only saying that science is a purely human pursuit, exposed to the disturbance of human passion, desire and ambition. Generally speaking, there is more faith among scientists than in the churches. Therefore, in criticising the atttitude of the new psychology towards the child, the defects which appear to me are only those which appear in all scientific research when under the powerful impetus of a new method. My own standpoint is one of firm belief in the new methods; but justice to the child compels me to sound a note of warning lest in our zeal for method we lose the sense of *value* in the subject of our study. Allow me to call attention

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to these defects. They all group themselves around the failure adequately to value the moral and religious nature in children. Space forbids the mention of several important points connected with the more primary matters about which there still exists much dispute; hence I shall confine myself to three criticisms connected with the ethical life of children.

In the first place, the new psychology underestimates the complexity of the child-mind. The genetic method logically involves this error. It is presupposed that the child-mind is a comparatively simple phenomenon, or that in it we have to deal with a relatively homogenous state, and *therefore* observations and experiments made in this region have a high degree of scientific accuracy. Now, in any case, it is exceedingly difficult to control the conditions in any systematic experimentation on children—a fact which empties our averages of a good deal of their scientific import. But what shall we say when to these difficulties are added such metaphysical factors as heredity, natural impulse, and the so-called ultimate feelings, particularly that of justice The positive influence of these factors is acknowledged, and they tinge every mental operation with its own character. In the life-history of the child they play a more potent part than the more superficial actions which are the result of acquired habits. It is impossible to set a quantitative limit to the influence of these organic and ultimate feelings.

The failure to recognize the complexity of the child mind involved in this statement has resulted in serious confusion in pedagogy. On the one hand, the practice of teaching has been affected; and, on the other, no standard or norm of mental activity has guided students of pedagogy and psychology in unravelling the mystery of the dawn of intelligence. In child-life we witness a vast and complicated accumulation of tactful adaptation, most of it sub-conscious, as well as the fleeting forth-putting of will, and, above all, self-directed teleological activity. Empirical observation and experiment in these phenomena is good so far as it goes; but the need still remains for some recognition of ends or ideals according to which all this activity proceeds. To vivisect the mind of the child, so to

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speak, for the sake of proving that it can be done, smacks of the dilettante; it makes of child psychology a fad. On the other hand, it is quite possible to over-estimate this complexity and to exaggerate it. This, it seems to me, Dr. Harris has done in his "Psychological Foundations of Education." Pursuit of ends is without doubt *the* sign of mental life in children; but from this we cannot infer such unwavering exactions in the details of self-activity as that book presupposes. Dr. Harris is obviously aware of the complexity spoken of, for he has penetrated beyond the tyrannical actuality of the child-consciousness and gained a higher point of view. This has not happened as yet to the new psychology, and the consequence is that, in practical affairs, we have received little help from the laboratories; there is no agreement as to the essential diversity in unity of every state of consciousness in childhood.

A second criticism emerges here, namely this: the new psychology does not do justice to the ethical natures of children. It might be replied that to do so would carry us into the sphere of metaphysics, and the new psychology is uncompromising in its exclusion of metaphysics from all its work. It has yet to be proved whether this position does not prejudice the analytic work, especially that expended on the "higher" aspects of conscious activity. The extreme empirics, like Kirchmann and Scripture, followers of Wundt, however, have a real grievance against metaphysics, in so far as *a priori* interpretations have often been imposed on the facts of consciousness by dogmatical teachers. But these disputes do not affect the fact for which we contend, viz., that the new psychology is in danger of omitting data revealed only to ethical insight; that not before they are so revealed can they be measured and rendered serviceable through science.

Thought seeks to bring the ethical into relation with sensible experience; this, in fact, is what child-life consists in for the most part. The extreme advocates of the empirical method claim that *all* mental phenomena naturally belong to it; yet in works recently published by these students little or nothing is said of the moral and religous nature of children. Others, less enamored of the universal application of the tape, but still

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holding advanced standpoints, the advocates of the "nature" method, have done something, but it is little more than statistical analysis. In fact, we are safe in saying that all the newer methods of studying the child have failed in these respects; we are still the merest empirics as yet; the effort to bring the ethical and religious facts in childhood to the test of sense, involves a hopeless dualism. It must be noted that this dualism is academic; it does not exist in the experience of children.

This defective analysis of the higher nature of children becomes seriously obvious in the practice of teaching. Indeed, it is generally true that defective analysis of the subject of the educational process will vitiate the best laid schemes of education. Two things, in this connection, reflective of the situation, merit mention. The first is the practice of regarding children as merely intelligent. The child-mind is, on the contrary, a moral organism; its life consists in seeking ends. It may be said, perhaps with some truth, that the study of childhood is of recent origin and that the new psychology has not yet perfected its methods of studying the moral and religious nature. But this cannot really be urged as an argument for ignoring the facts in question. All family training proceeds, and always has proceeded, on their recognition. Parents determine their attitude towards their children on the assumption that they are not only intelligent, but also moral beings. It would have been better if the new psychology and pedagogy had kept at arm's length, until methods common to each had been perfected and so employed as to make room for the ethical traits of mentality in children. Lack of method, however, is not, in my judgment, the total cause of this state of things; a deeper reason is found in the historical conditions amid which our recent theories of teaching have been formed. But deepest of all is the fact that psychology itself has failed, for the most part, to carry its analysis of childhood deep enough. Our science is not overstocked with the spirit of reverence, such reverence for example as characterizes all the great teachers of children. Nevertheless, to regard a child as merely intelligent, as is our practice, limits our insight and cripples the higher effect of our teaching.

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The development of the child's mind is a good instance of what Wundt has called "the inwardizing of the ethical ideal."* That is to say, the life of constant change and movement in which childhood consists, all of which has more or less moral quality, is rapidly mechanized, and the results, if rightly taught, are seen in right feeling, in the obedient will, and the synthetic activity of intellect, in the harmony of the psychoses. This process of inwardly mechanizing its states is unintelligible unless the child-mind is essentially teleological and ethical. The external acts of a child cannot be mechanized by a blind power in an unconscious process comparable, in the last analysis, to chance. The moral sense of children cannot be a *result* of such a process, for that which makes a moral judgment possible and valid cannot be evolved from non-moral elements. If character is formed in a child in its early years it can be only because the elements have been in the making, ideally, from the start.

The final criticism which we shall make of the new psychology is this, that it is in danger of perverting the ethical aspect of child-training. This follows from the failure to recognize the predominant ethical bent of childhood. This lack is most evident in the method of teaching. This resolves itself into the question of the relation of the mechanical routine of school work to the personality of teacher and pupil. At present the emphasis is almost wholly on mechanism, on "conditions." The theory is that moral habits are to be formed by conforming the mind of a child to a definitely chosen and wisely administered system of studies. The results so far do not bear out the expectation. Witness both the manners and morals of the children in public schools in America or England. It seems sometimes, indeed, that our educators are not as fully aware as they might be of the actual state of things in this respect. Perhaps no improvement will come until politics are entirely eliminated from school management; but, meanwhile, it is our duty to point out the dangers, and I believe the chief of these to be the almost complete failure to recognize the ethical and relig-

cf. "Facts of the Moral Life," p. 37.

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ious nature in pupils at school. There can be no substitute for the definite recognition of the total nature in teaching. Fortunately for future generations, there is a growing demand for this among independent students of the public school system. At present, however, morals are not taught and religion is as though it were unworthy of notice.

The fact plainly is that teaching is an ethical process to the core, involving the personality of the teacher, the chief teaching force in early years. In fact, no calling, not excepting that of the Christian ministry, makes such demands on the ethical nature as true teaching. The absolute subordination of routine to this fact is the first of the greater axioms of pedagogy, as its history clearly shows. For the greatest teachers have been those of the profoundest moral and religious feeling. We are to-day too much under the influence of such empiricism as that of Rousseau, and too little impressed with the moral earnestness of Kant. In short, from whatever standpoint we regard the situation, we are impressed with the deficient analysis of the moral factors of education. Whether this is a permanent, or only a transient mood of our time cannot be exactly determined. It is the conviction of the writer that it is only a question of time when what is so deeply rooted in human nature will be provided for in the scheme of education. A revolution generally precedes an advance in science. This has taken place in both ethics and religion. The result will, nay already is, deliverance from a hard and unyielding dogmatic spirit in these matters, and the evolution of certain generally clear and demonstrable religious and ethical truths, the failure to teach which is equivalent to unfaithfulness to science. We may, I feel sure, safely trust to the earnestness and good faith of the new psychology and the new pedagogy to avail themselves of these results in the future; though, as I have contended, the attitude in the past has not been sufficiently critical of the facts in question.

Humboldt said: "Whatever we wish to see introduced into the life of a nation, must first be introduced into its schools." If we wish a nation to be moral, as well as intelligent, we must see to it that school education provides for the instruction

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which will result in this. At present, with our political conception of school work, it is to be feared that we are hardly conscious of the fact that the problem of education centres, as Plato taught, in the problem of ethics. Everything points to the probability that *the* problem of the twentieth century will be the moral training of the young.

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THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS FOR THE HISTORY OF RELIGIONS.

THE Parliament of Religion which was held in Chicago in 1893 was in many respects one of the most remarkable assemblages in the history of mankind. For the first time representatives of almost all the great religions in the world and of the various subdivisions within the great religions, met together; and the opportunity was afforded to each and all to present their doctrines, views and aspirations to an audience, disposed, by its natural surroundings and by the conditions under which it met, to be sympathetic. While the practical results of this Congress were naturally small, if at all perceptible, the moral influence of the example set by this unique gathering was wholesome. It was not to be expected that, through a single assembly of this kind, prejudices would be swept aside or misunderstandings cleared up. But as a symptom of a general disposition existing among civilized nations to consider calmly the religious views with which they were not in sympathy, the Parliament was an augury that the hopes and dreams of the visionaries in ancient and modern times might at some remote period be at least partially fulfilled. Not that a union of religious beliefs could ever be realized as long as the social, political and intellectual conditions in different parts of the world varied to so large an extent; but the recognition of the common aim served by all religions would become clearer and the philosophical insight into the reason for the profound differences in religious beliefs among nations and individuals would lead to greater clearness

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in discerning between the permanent and transient elements of religion itself. The Chicago Congress was brought about through the efforts primarily of men interested in the practical side of religious faith, men who while strongly clinging to the tenets of very specific forms of religion, yet were broad enough to recognize the existence of certain truths outside of a given circle and who were stirred by the purely religious ideal of a possible unification of all faiths. The historical aspects of religion were of less interest to the leaders who brought about the great Parliament, so that while students interested in the phenomena of religion mainly as a significant part of mankind's history were welcome, the general spirit of the gathering was one which emphasized the practical side of religion rather than its historical and theoretical aspects.

The success of the undertaking naturally gave rise to the hope that a repetition of the experiment might be made in connection with the proposed Exposition at Paris, marking the close of the present century, and attempts were made a number of years ago to inaugurate the movement for a second Parliament. Opposition to it, however, soon began to develop in Paris itself. The representatives of the Catholic Church who cordially welcomed the Chicago Congress felt that the conditions prevailing in France were not favorable to their meeting on a common platform the representatives of other faiths* Considering the manner in which religious interests and political considerations are entangled in the network of European diplomacy, one can well understand the attitude of the Archbishop of Paris, who, it is understood, led the opposition. There were others, too, who without sharing the fears entertained by the clerical party, questioned the advisability of holdin a second Parliament in Paris, and, above all, questioned its advisability at so short an interval after the first. The utterances to be expected could hardly be more than a repetition in another form from those which were made in 1893. No greater practical results could be looked for, and the moral effect, so far from being strengthened by repetition, might possibly be

*See an article by Jean Reville, *Revue de l'Histoire des Religions,* vol. 32, pp. 73-79.

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weakened through the workings of that curious instinct which is well expressed in the common adage that "familiarity breeds contempt." It was on the whole fortunate, therefore, that the plan of a second Congress failed of realization, but it is even more fortunate that in consequence of the discussion and agitation which the plan aroused, the project for a scientific gathering of scholars of all shades of belief, but all sympathetically interested in the investigation of religions, took shape. Paris, so ill-adapted apparently for a Congress of Religions was pre-eminently the place in which the first international gathering for the study of religion should take place.*

France shares with Holland the distinction of affording a full recognition in the University curriculum of the importance of the historical and comparative study of religions. As early as 1880 a special chair for the History of Religions was established at the Collége de France, occupied since its inception by the distinguished Albert Reville. In 1886 Paris set a notable example to the world by the formation of a *Section des Sciences Religieuses* in connection with the Ecole des Hautes Etudes. The Faculty of this school for the study of religions consists at present of seventeen members among whom are to be found such distinguished scholars as Professor Reville, the director of the Section; his no less distinguished son Jean Reville, whose particular field of investigation is the Early History of the Christian Church, in which he ranks as one of the leading authorities of the world; Professor Hartwig Derenbourg, who expounds the history and doctrines of Islam; Professor Maspero, the eminent Egyptologist; Professor Sylvan Levi, who enjoys a high distinction as an Indologist; M. Maurice Verns, whose field embraces the older phases of the religion of the Hebrews; M. Israel Levi, who covers Judaism in its later phases, and M. Leon Marillier, who has made important contributions to the elucidation of primitive religious thought and customs.

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*A Congress for the Study of Religions was held at Stockholm, August 31 to September 4, 1897, but it was not international in its character. See an article on it in the *Revue de l'Histoire des Religions*, Vol. 36, pp. 265-270.

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Besides this school, Paris has a special journal, the *Revue de l'Histoire de Religion*, established in 1881, and also a magnificent museum and library specially devoted to the History of Religions, which was opened in 1896. Both these enterprises are due to the munificence of M. Emile Guimet, a man of large means, enthusiastically interested in the study of religious phenomena and who has devoted his life and his fortune to the furtherance of interest in the historical aspects of religions. M. Guimet, not content with a journal and a museum, has provided a fund for the publication of treatises and texts bearing on the history of religions; and when it is stated that over thirty volumes have been issued in the series known as the Annals des Gazette Guimet, an idea of the scientific activity which prevails in France in this field may be obtained.

The proposed International Congress for the History of Religions, while emanating from the Faculty of the School for the History of Religions, may be set down as in reality M. Guimet's creation, representing as it does the outcome of the stimulus which he gave to this branch of study. It is but proper that every opportunity should be taken advantage of to emphasize this man's unselfish devotion, as well as his great services to science. At the XIIth International Congress of Orientalists, held in Rome in October of last year, M. Jean Reville delivered an interesting address setting forth the aims and purposes of the proposed Congress, and from this address as well as from the two circulars issued in May, 1899, and in January, 1900, the large scope of the Congress becomes apparent. It may be said at once that the plans for insuring a successful meeting, to be marked by communications of a high scientific order, are admirable. A central committee of organization has been formed, consisting of Professor Albert Reville as president, with such distinguished men as Guimet, Breal, Oppert, Maspero, Senart and Bertrand as vice-presidents; Jean Reville and Leon Marillier as secretaries, and M. Philippe Berger, the successor of Renan at the Collége de France, as treasurer, together with a list of twenty-eight other members representing the various scientific institutions of France, as well as distinguished scholars devoted to the study of religions. Recently

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at a meeting of the committee, held on the 10th of December, 1899, a number of foreign correspondents were elected, and it is gratifying to note the large representation that has been given to this country. Among those chosen are Professor Toy, of Harvard University; Dr. W. R. Harper, president of the University of Chicago; Hon. William T. Harris, the United States Commissioner of Education; Dr. J. H. Barrows, the organizer of the Chicago Parliament of Religions, and now president of Oberlin College; Professor Haupt, of Johns Hopkins University; Professor Lanman, of Harvard University; Professor Gottheil and Professor Jackson, of Columbia University; Dr. Paul Carus, the editor of the *Monist;* Mr. Carroll Bonney, of Chicago, one of the promoters of the Chicago Congress, and Professor Jastrow, of the University of Pennsylvania. The dates set aside for the Congress are the 3d to 9th of September, 1900. In view of the large field to be covered, eight sections have been formed, as follows:

Religion of Non-Civilized Nations, including also the Religion of American and pre-Columbian Civilization.

Religion of the Extreme Orient.

Religion of Egypt.

Semitic Religions.

India and Iran.

Greece and Rome.

Germans, Celts and Slavs.

Christianity.

The meetings will be held at the Sorbonne, with the exception of the opening and closing sessions, which will take place at the Exposition. Those intending to join are requested to send their names to the treasurer, M. Philippe Berger, Quai Voltaire 3. There will be a number of general meetings in which papers of general interest will be presented, but the bulk of the work of the Congress will be done in the various sections. In order to insure a certain amount of system in the papers to be presented, the Committee on Organization has mapped out a program embodying suggestions of the most important topics which should be discussed at the meetings. It is hardly likely that time will be found for treating all the

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subjects enumerated at one Congress, but the plan of thus suggesting the lines along which communications should be presented is an admirable one, and ought to be generally adopted for international meetings of a scientific character. There are plenty of opportunities in national and local societies for scholars engaged on any particular piece of research to present the same to their colleagues prior to publication, for the purpose of obtaining comments and criticism. International meetings, however, which bring together scholars from all parts of the world ought to be utilized primarily for summaries of work done in certain lines in various parts of the world, and secondly for bringing together the various views held on the larger aspects of questions still in dispute or in regard to which conflicting opinions are held. It is gratifying to note in the subjects proposed by the Paris Committee the stress laid upon the points just mentioned. Selecting from the large number of topics proposed a few of more general interest, it will be recognized that the opportunity offered at the Paris meeting will probably be unique for hearing from specialists current views held regarding such topics as Totemism; the meaning of sacrifice; the historical evolution of Buddhism in China, Korea and Japan; the cults and popular religion of Egypt; the Chaldean views regarding the end of the universe; the gods of the ancient Kingdom of Southern Arabia; the reaction of Christianity on Judaism; the influence of Persia on Islam; the origin of various phases of Babism; the history and present state of Islam in Africa; ancestor worship in Hinduism; the institution of pilgrimages in India; the Homeric poems as sources of myths; legends and cults; Celtic Eschatology; the remains of Slavic paganism in Northern Germany.

The program passes through the religions of antiquity and of later times and comes right down to the border of our own generation. In the eighth section, devoted to the history of Christianity, we find among subjects to be discussed, the question, how far Essenism may be regarded as one of the factors of primitive Christianity; the Greek and Jewish element in the elaboration of ancient Christian Eschatology; the relations existing between Byzantium and Russia in the ninth century;

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the influence of the philosophy of Kant and Hegel on critical history as applied to the origins of Christianity.

Apart from the scientific value of the communications that may be expected and which it is to be hoped will be published in a volume, the Congress will undoubtedly prove beneficial in stimulating interest in the historical study of religions at colleges and universities. It is only by recognition of this subject of investigation through the scholastic institutions of this country and Europe that misunderstandings which still prevail as to the purpose and scope of religious investigation can be removed. Next to Political Economy, there is no subject which touches so closely upon living interests as the investigation of religious phenomena, and it seems strange that at American colleges so little has as yet been done toward providing proper instruction in this field and toward furthering researches among those especially qualified for the work. If the Paris Congress realizes the expectations of those who have been instrumental in bringing it about, we may look forward to a more intelligent general interest in the subject and to a larger recognition of it in the college and university curriculum.

MORRIS JASTROW, JR.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA.

DISCUSSIONS.

THE HISTORY OF FREETHOUGHT.

In Mr. G. P. Gooch's review of "A Short History of Freethought," in the last number of the JOURNAL, there are some misrepresentations which, I trust, Mr. Gooch would prefer to have corrected. I refer to them with the more regret, because Mr. Gooch has paid the book some very liberal compliments. When a critic does this, his strictures are specially apt to be taken by readers as valid, without inquiry.

1. Mr. Gooch writes: "It would hardly be an exaggeration to say that the most insignificant freethinker bulks larger in the author's vision than the most illustrious supernaturalist." Yet he also writes that "the account of the English Deists presents a much more flattering portrait than that drawn by Mr. Leslie

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Stephen." If the latter assertion is true, the former cannot be. The Deists, properly so-called, were all supernaturalists. The whole plan of the book involves the recognition of supernaturalists as "freethinkers" when they apply reason freshly to their problems. And it is the literal fact that most of the men praised in the book were supernaturalists. Thus Mr. Gooch's phrase about "weighing the thoughts of all the ages in a single pair of scales," constitutes a further misrepresentation.

2. By way of discrediting my "discussion of Christianity," Mr. Gooch writes: "The later Roman moralists are contrasted with the Fathers, much to the disadvantage of the latter; but if it was necessary to single out individuals, it seems *scarcely fair to omit such men as Clement, Origen, and Athanasius.*" The contrast to which Mr. Gooch refers is drawn in the chapter entitled "Freethought in Ancient *Rome*," and it is avowedly made between pagan writers down to Marcus Aurelius and Latin Christian writers after him, as showing that in the Western Empire the intellectual atmosphere and temper notably worsened. In the next chapter, which is entitled, "Ancient Christianity and its Opponents," and deals specially with the Greek-speaking world, Clement and Origen are repeatedly referred to, and Origen in particular is discussed through several pages with praise of his relative reasonableness. Finally, it is shown that after Origen there is the same kind of deterioration in the Eastern as in the Western Empire. Athanasius is certainly no proof to the contrary. Origen, who represents many pagan philosophic influences, is taken as a Christian high-water mark. No reader of Mr. Gooch's notice could have supposed the possibility of this being the line of statement.

3. More than once Mr. Gooch distorts the purport of a passage by ignoring the context. Any one who will turn to the passage on Omar Khayyam, aspersed by him, will see that what he represents as a gratuitous attack on supernaturalism is a defence of Omar against supernaturalist defamation; and that one of the clauses he cites is a historical statement to the effect that the modern vogue of Omar shows Omar's point of view to be now common. Another clause quoted by Mr. Gooch in this connection is wrested from a totally different context, and the "pouring of contempt" alleged by him is his own fiction.

4. But the most surprising of these manipulations is one in which Mr. Gooch presents in sequence, with marks of elision, as

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parts of a continuous argument, a number of sentences of which the *last* occurs on page 408 of the book, and the *first* on page 418. I cannot think that his readers will approve of such a method. In every instance, as it happens, the effect of it is to give a false notion of the position taken up. For instance, the phrase *Ubi Panis, ibi Deus,* which he virtually represents as an attack on priests, is part of a sentence of which the obvious purport is that physicians (and other laymen) are economically coerced. The next sentence runs: "While the priest's bread depends on his creed, the physician's must be similarly implicated." The theory put forward is one of *general* economic causation; and such a theory has as much right to a hearing as Mr. Gooch's doctrine that people who do not feel as he does must be "color-blind."

5. The last misrepresentation on which I shall touch is Mr. Gooch's assertion that: "Scientists who do not share Mr. Robertson's opinions are dismissed as 'clinging to the religion of their nurseries.'" I regret to be forced to protest against this as a bad perversion. The passage quoted from is an argument directed specifically against the common assumption that the mere positing of true beliefs will avail to expel false, without any process of criticism. It proceeds:—

"All modern culture-history proves this to be a fallacy. Even gifted brains can harbor childish errors on the side on which they are undeveloped. We *need not go back to Faraday to find* scientific men clinging to the religion of their nurseries. An eminent mathematician, entirely unqualified in other fields, pays tribute to Paley; and the average church-goer straightway claims that 'science' is with him."

Now, thus to deny Lord Kelvin's competence in *historical* science is not to do what Mr. Gooch says. From many scientific men whose views differ from mine I can dissent without even calling them "color-blind." Mr. Gooch, not content with such characterizations, thinks fit to alter, by garbled quotation, the color of propositions he does not like.

Having taken some trouble, in my time, to protest against the normal unfairness of English reviewing, I am fain to hope that I do not waste time in standing for greater scrupulosity of criticism in a JOURNAL OF ETHICS. In making my protest, I feel bound to avow that the book has shortcomings to which Mr. Gooch has been lenient, and more errors than he specifies. It suffered much from the attempt to make it "short." For some of his suggestions I am thankful.

JOHN M. ROBERTSON.

LONDON.

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DR. MACKINTOSH AND INTUITIONALISM.*

DR. ROBERT MACKINTOSH, the author of "From Comte to Benjamin Kidd," objects to my calling him an "Intuitionalist," and raises a doubt whether I had read all his book. I can assure him that I read every word of it and re-read much of it more than once, in the endeavor, which apparently has proved unsuccessful after all, to discover his hidden philosophical basis. The passage to which he specially refers me on p. 112, I find I had marked as of particular significance: in it he admits that *"old-fashioned* intuitionalism, with all its honest *loyalty to truth* and its *essential* right-heartedness, is weak, as philosophers say, *formally,* and is no longer fit to sustain the struggle for existence against subtler theories." (The italics are mine). I certainly did not understand this passage as a repudiation of *all* intuitionalism. I took it as implying that Dr. Mackintosh held some new and improved Intuitionalism, which he supposed to possess all the "essential" merits of the old and yet to be free from its "formal" defects. I quoted a passage from p. 7 in which Dr. Mackintosh seems to regard "the trustworthiness of the moral consciousness" as an equivalent phrase for "the reality of the distinction between right and wrong." I might have referred to other passages, *e. g.,* that on p. 88 where he asks "whether conscience has not its own tests?" If this is not "intuitionalism" of a somewhat extreme sort, I do not know what "intuitionalism" means. The late Professor Calderwood was a militant intuitionalist and he defined "conscience" as "immediate knowledge of moral law, as clear and indubitable as a simple fact of consciousness." Now, Dr. Mackintosh seems to me always to judge evolutionary theories of ethics from the standpoint of such an immediate and absolute knowledge of the distinction between right and wrong. And an attempt to give a scientific historical explanation of the development of moral ideas is said to be "incompatible with loyalty to morals," (p. 112), or to "set morality at defiance" (p. 128). I, therefore, (naturally and excusably, I think), supposed that Dr. Mackintosh's words on p. 129 (about Professor Alexander ignoring intuitionalism), were the sarcasm of an intuitionalist, whose theory had been passed over in silence. I see now, in the light of Dr. Mackintosh's explanation, that the words admit of another construction. But I am still driven to think that, unconsciously perhaps, Dr. Mackin-

(*Cf.* January number, pp. 252-258, and April number, pp. 391, 392.)

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tosh's attitude to evolutionary ethics is esssentially that of the intuitionalist: otherwise many of his criticisms, and such pulpit phrases as "incompatible with loyalty to morals," are quite unintelligible.

Dr. Mackintosh warns those interested in the subject not to rely on my account of his book. The warning is superfluous. I myself warned the reader that I was not attempting to discuss the book as a whole, but to do little more than show how Dr. Mackintosh had misunderstood certain opinions of my own, which he had briefly criticised.

D. G. RITCHIE.

UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANDREWS, SCOTLAND.

BOOK REVIEWS.

THE CONSCIENCE OF THE KING. By J. C. Spence. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., Ltd., 1899. Pp. xii., 280.

Mr. Spence's book is an appeal to the "Conscience of the King" —a solemn warning to Parliaments and other makers of laws to keep within their proper sphere. The gospel which he preaches is the well-known and, as some think, obsolete gospel of *Laissez-faire*. In this volume he confines himself to one aspect of the broader problem, namely the folly of legislators; and he sets himself to analyze the causes of the aberrations of the political conscience from the paths of justice. The theme is a well-worn one, but Mr. Spence imparts freshness by a style always bright and pleasant, by his somewhat original angle of observation, and by the mere force of his convictions. He is never flippant and he is never shrill: he generally—though not always—avoids overstatement, and is never consciously unfair. On these grounds he deserves a careful and sympathetic hearing. The object of the volume is, we are told (p. 14), to point out to "all who by vote or influence partake of the sovereign power of law-making, the folly and iniquity of their interference in the private affairs of their neighbors." Our author thus sets out, not as a searcher after truth, but rather as a propagandist of assured convictions. The conclusions arrived at may be outlined thus: All laws are not necessarily bad. Some distinctions must be drawn. Thus "there are two distinct sources of law. One set of laws is manufactured by

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legislators; another is evolved by judges in the process of administering justice" (p. 263). This is the familiar distinction between statutes and judge-made laws. All parliamentary enactments are arbitrary; most of them are unnecessary and evil. Judicial decisions which profess to be deduced from "the principles of justice" are infinitely to be preferred to Acts of Parliament which merely embody the commands of legislators. That common law which Oliver Cromwell characterized as an "ungodly jumble" appears to Mr. Spence (who usually looks on all laws with suspicion) to be "rational, equitable and almost invariably favorable to individual liberty." On the other hand, the statute book is bristling with enactments which are foolish, iniquitous and unnecessary. Little consolation flows from the knowledge that the worst laws are often those made with the best intentions. Heinous crimes are committed under the cloak of law, not by criminals, but by well-intentioned members of Parliament. Individuals, blameless in their private lives, become, it seems, blind to the distinction between good and evil the moment they are entrusted with the making of laws. This disease is called political dementia. Here our author is in danger of exaggeration. Why, he laments (p. 262), "should any sane or honest man ask his representative in Parliament to act as a criminal lunatic? How comes it that any honorable gentleman will accept the mandate of the people to act like an angry ape or a maudlin imbecile?" The question is answered by the interesting chapter on "Political Dementia," freely illustrated by reference to the parliamentary careers of Mr. John Morley, Mr. Chamberlain, and Sir John Gorst!

Remedies for these evils are suggested with some confidence. Above all, the legislature must confine itself rigorously to its own business. Having provided and perfected the mechanism of justice, it must step aside; further interference is only mischievous. Parliament must set up a tribunal with incorruptible judges and independent juries, and leave them to deal with every case that comes before them "unfettered by statute law and merely charged to enforce justice" (p. 12), which means, of course, justice as defined by the author. It is confidently assumed that the consciences of judge and jury are immaculate exactly where the conscience of the legislator fails to act. Reasons, ingenious if unconvincing, are advanced for this optimistic belief. Each judge is thus to be endowed with absolute discretionary

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powers, and he is confidently advised how to use them. His intuitive sense of justice must never be distorted by an incubus of statutes and precedents. "The rudimentary sense of justice is perhaps not a perfect or infallible guide to judicial proceedings; but it is the only one available" (p. 61). In difficult cases, however, the magistrate has a simple rule to guide him. When in doubt he must refuse, point-blank, to interfere at all. The plaintiff who brought his claim before a doubting judge would necessarily lose his case; and possession would become something more than nine-tenths of the law.

This suggestive volume, it will be seen, treats of wide and unsolved problems. Criticism at once adequate and brief is difficult, but a few suggestions may be offered. Mr. Spence would seem to prove too much and to triumph too easily. We have here, indeed, an ingenious piece of special pleading, where no effort is made to state strongly the evidence on the opposite side. A more evenly balanced argument would be more convincing. Again, the benefits to be derived from fixed, even from arbitrary, rules of law are undervalued, as is also the danger of freeing judges from the guidance of precedents. Laws and former decisions are useful things in themselves, and their accurate study is the only school to fit men for the duties of the bench—duties always onerous and now to be increased tenfold. Where, in the absence of fixed rules of law, would Mr. Spence's judges find their judicial training? A course of philosophic reading on the metaphysical basis of justice would seem to the lawyer and the layman a poor preparation for judicial impartiality. Further, the rudimentary sense of justice might direct differently in different men. Would magistrates agree better than philosophers in their deductions from the empty unreality known as abstract justice? The convictions of some judges might compel them to give effect to socialistic schemes of justice. Less extreme men might still refuse to accept Mr. Spence's somewhat narrow conception of equity. "The word justice," he tells us, "must be reduced to its lowest terms, and used in the judicial sense of equity. . . . . The function of justice is thus reduced to the prevention or redress of wrongs or injuries done to others" (p. 266).

The real value of the book lies, perhaps, in its incidental features. The ethical supplement suggested to the lawyers' doctrine of "Sovereignty" is peculiarly instructive: a perusal of the lucid chapter entitled "Rights and Mights" would end many

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pointless discussions between disputants who disagree, chiefly because they misunderstand each other. The whole duty of the subject to his sovereign is a legal one—to obey the law: the whole duty of the sovereign to the subject is a moral one—to make the laws conform to justice. Each of these duties is absolute, admitting of no exception. Thus, sensibly interpreted, the rival doctrines of absolute sovereignty and natural rights become the best of friends.

Other incidental topics worthy of notice are the nature of the political conscience, and the essentially moral basis of politics—doctrines which may be profitably contrasted with the Machiavellian creed.

This well-written book might prove a wholesome restraint on any rash legislator who would stop to read it. Unfortunately it is more likely to be welcomed by faddists, who are already too firmly committed to the somewhat one-sided program which it advocates. When all is said, the scheme of political reform here advanced is merely academic, quite unsuited and probably never intended, to stand the rude test of practice.

Wm. S. McKechnie.

Glasgow University.

The Distribution of Income. By William Smart, LL. D. London: Macmillan & Co. Pp. xv., 341.

At length we have a book on that branch of economics which intensely interests everybody, the sharing of wealth, written primarily for the ordinary man; and as he, according to Bagehot, rules the empire, although he sits at the back of the omnibus, it is well that somebody should address him; and it is appropriate that it should be the successor of the great Glasgow professor, one of whose most conspicuous successes was that he was understood of all and did most profoundly influence public opinion. Professor Smart, moreover, is of all English economists the best qualified to write such a book. He has lived the business life, and therefore knows what the general public wants. "I decided," he remarks in his preface, "to take my own difficulties as probably representing those of the ordinary man. If my brother economists find this procedure tedious, and are disposed to think that I arrive at familiar conclusions by tortuous paths, I can only say that, from my business experience, I am perhaps more likely than they

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to know what are the lines of thought along which the ordinary man moves, and what are the difficulties which prevent his freer acceptance of these familiar conclusions."

The book is not too rigidly scientific for the end which it has in view. The author conceives it to be quite within his scope to justify the ways of economic law to men,—and rightly, because the difficulty of the business world is mainly a practical one. His conclusion is: "One may, perhaps, imagine a better distribution, although, it seems to me, it is not easy to do so except by assuming that society is much simpler than it is, or that it is willing to renounce many of its motives as well as its gains. . . . . When the question is whether a regulated state control according to any social or socialist ideal would bring us conditions of life wherein all would have the possibility of realizing their moral being, or of being what is called 'happy,' I am disposed to think that the 'invisible hand'—however one interprets Adam Smith's reference—is bringing about these conditions more quickly than any deliberate reärrangement of industry would."

A readable book in support of such views has been for a long time wanted; since the works of those who oppose them have proved remarkably readable, and free from technicalities; and there has consequently been a danger that their opinions should carry the day merely in default of the kind of opposition needed; for complicated diagrams, strings of equations, and the learned treatises of specialists, written in the language of their science, are replies utterly futile in the arena in which the battle has to be fought.

So much for the general aim of the book, an aim of which all, socialists as well as their opponents, will heartily approve. Turning from object to method, we find that Professor Smart has proceeded analytically, rather than synthetically, and, without assuming any abstractions, from actual fact direct to principles; in the language of Bastiat from the seen to the unseen. This, of course, while it exactly suits the ordinary man, makes the work a little tedious to the specialist, but not very much so, since the author has a keen sense of humor and his pages are relieved by many amusing passages.

Aim and method, then, are admirable, but the reviewer finds himself less completely satisfied with the structure of the book, and with some of the doctrines there expressed. As regards the first, while recognizing that arrangement is largely a matter of

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individual taste, he would like to suggest that upon two or three points the treatment is out of proportion. In a book which, for instance, devotes ninety-four pages to a definition and description of income, more than nine pages each should be given to rent and professional incomes. Professor Smart might reply that he is specially concerned with business incomes. Quite so, but then does not the title, "The Distribution of Income" promise too much, and also, we might add, the tone of Book I? Then again, waiving this point and considering only distribution between employer and employé, I have looked in vain for any adequate discussion of quasi-rent. The only reference given in the index is to a short passage, in the chapter on rent, of less than a page; and so, if that chapter were cut out, with the object of confining the work to business income, quasi-rents would be wholly ignored. Now the author would be the first to admit that almost the first thing you find on analyzing profits is quasi-rent; and that makes its omission the more incomprehensible. Further, I do not think that sufficient emphasis has been laid on the Standard of Life, which is less appropriately termed by our author "Standard of Comfort." The latter expression suggests the distinctions between necessaries, comforts and luxuries, which, of course, a term employed like "Standard of Comfort" should not suggest.

Our author states with beautiful clearness what he calls "the problem" at the beginning of Book II; but the clearness is sometimes secured at the expense of accuracy. For example, we read, "among suggestions for a better distribution some have thought of a distribution according to Needs. As the only needs which could reasonably be assessed are physical ones, this would be a distribution according to size of families." This is quite ambiguous without a definition of needs, which is not given. Then Professor Smart judges that a distribution according to needs might be better than the existing one "if we could define the word in any satisfactory way." By "define the word," I conclude from the context that "measure the need" is meant. Now we ought to be told at least whether by "need" something ethical or actual is intended. If it is something ethical then I should judge any proposal on such a basis as quite beyond the pale of practical politics, because it implies laying out the income for the recipient, as well as finding it, and seeing that he consumes at the right time. And if we suppose a moral change so that the above difficulties do not apply, then any talk of system is fatuous since all

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arrangements in such case would work equally well, as it has been wisely said elsewhere. On the other hand, supposing that "need" means something actual, I cannot see how you are to deny that distribution by needs is largely taking place to-day, since needs determine the supply price of labor, and this is one of the determinants of remuneration. An examination of the Standard of Life leads necessarily to this view. Then I am inclined to think that our author's "income credited," to this or that person, comes to nothing more nor less than the view advanced above. Perhaps that is what is intended. Of course the warring of needs against needs reacts on the combination of factors in production, and success or failure reacts on needs. And here I should like to ask an explanation of the following: "The fact that many rich men get more than they deserve is obvious; it seems to have been overlooked that even a very poor man may be getting more than he is worth." If one of these propositions is ethical and the other economic they are incomparable; if both are economic they simply tell us of oscillations about a position of equilibrium, which we knew, and which besides prove nothing against the man who objects to the whole system; and if both are ethical I cannot conceive why you are to be satisfied with people getting much more than they deserve because you get a little more than you deserve; the notion being, I suppose, that we are all miserable sinners and that any reward is more than we deserve; yet, nevertheless, I being no more of a miserable sinner than another, why should he receive a bigger gift than I? This point may seem trivial, but I am inclined to think that the reader will go with me on the next. Professor Smart writes: "Given these premises: that competition between employers is active, that the pressure of self-interest is strong enough, and that employers are given a free hand to employ what factors they please, we may assume that at any moment the goods which constitute the National Income, are, on the whole, made by that combination of factors which is most efficient for the purpose" (p. 141). Now, that I must deny, because all the supply prices have been entirely left out of account. Only the combination which gave the greatest net return to the employer would tend to survive, and it is not proved that this is the most efficient combination. Again, a few lines further on, we read: "There is an *a priori* probability that each factor is actually paid according to the share it has in producing this total result."

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My difficulty is that in almost all cases this share is indeterminable, as Prof. Smart himself admits elsewhere (p. 110).

I should have much more to say if space allowed; as it is limited, conventionalities and terms of appreciation have been curtailed. This review proceeds on the assumption that Professor Smart's book is understood to be a work of high standing—in fact, one of the most important economic publications of the year.

S. J. Chapman.

University College, Cardiff.

English Political Philosophy from Hobbes to Maine. By William Graham, M. A. London: Edward Arnold, 1899. 8 vo. Pp. xxx., 415.

Professor Graham has set himself two objects in composing this volume. The first object has been to "give a connected account within a moderate compass of the political theories of the great English political thinkers who have most influenced practice from the days of Hobbes." This part of his design Professor Graham has realized with a great degree of success. The political thinkers in question are Hobbes, Locke, Burke, Bentham, J. S. Mill, and Maine. They are selected, partly by reason of their influence on practice, partly because they "sufficiently illustrate the different schools of political thought," and still more because "they represent and exhaust the methods of discovering truth on the subject." These reasons may, with some qualification, be accepted as sufficient for the purpose in hand. The summaries given of the different "systems" of political theory are sufficiently full to concentrate attention upon the main and central ideas, as well as to constitute a useful guide and introduction to what is perhaps the most enduring and characteristic product of English thought. Professor Graham's appreciations are perhaps wanting in background and perspective: but he has a feeling for "temperament," and treats his subjects for the most part with sympathy as well as with respect. His criticisms, on the other hand, are somewhat rough, so rough as sometimes to throw out the sense of proportion which, as a rule, he succeeds in preserving. The eulogy of the "man" seems in some cases designed to give the author a freer hand in condemning the "thinker." This is conspicuously the case with "poor Mr. Mill," as Professor Graham, in effect, sums up the "thinker" as opposed to the "man" in Mill. Professor Graham is too much given to "sawing things asunder"; what,

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after all, would Mill's political philosophy have been without his "idealism"? What Professor Graham regarded as a defect, is really the element of determinate value in Mill. The idealism which Mill imported into utilitarianism is often regarded as an inconsequence of theory; but it may also be said that there is a much deeper logic in Mill's utilitarianism than the logic by which he is generally measured. Professor Graham accounts for Mill's "comparative failure," partly on moral, partly on intellectual grounds: Mill had too much moral ardor, and intellectually he was "not original"; but it was just the combination of the moral and scientific elements in Mill which constituted his originality. Professor Graham describes the "System of Logic" as Mill's "greatest book;" but for the real strength and greatness of Mill, the student might be more fitly referred to the two essays on Bentham and Coleridge. The "humanity" and the peculiar philosophical temper of Mill may not compensate for his want of "original intuitions," or his failure to "discover" what Professor Graham is much too ready to acclaim as "new" truths, but they may account for his having been "formerly much read at the universities," and for the no little influence he has had on political thought. It is certainly curious that Professor Graham should praise Mill for his "logical acuteness," but it is not surprising that he should have missed the point of what acuteness it had, inasmuch as he at the same time regards Mill as a speculative dreamer of dreams. In the same way, Professor Graham hardly brings out the element of positive idealism in Bentham, the ideal of equality, expressed in the principle that every man should count for one and for no more than one. This ideal, interpreted as equality of consideration, was the really significant aspect of Bentham's political utilitarianism. Maine, again, is reproached for not combining the historical method with the theory of natural law: but where would have been the point of Maine, if he had?

But, apart from these defects, and the more serious, because more comprehensive, misreading of Rousseau (pp. 66-7), Professor Graham's reproductions, based as they are upon analyses of the original treatises, are sufficiently full and objective to be undeniably useful. On the other hand, the value of the book is, to my mind at least, greatly discounted by the political reflections of the author, and for that reason I cannot think that Professor Graham has succeeded in his second object—"by a measured criticism, to distinguish what is permanently true from what is

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doubtful or erroneous, to disengage the former, and, as far as may be, develop it further, with the hope that finally from the exposition and criticism together something like an Introduction to Political Science might result, resting on authority and reason combined."

The "result" to which Professor Graham seems to point is (as already hinted) a combination of the truth of natural law (and natural justice) with the truth of the historical method. But the author, as far as I can see, has a somewhat crude conception of both truths, and the fusion only makes confusion worse confounded. I must content myself by quoting typical passages. The sense of justice which Professor Graham assures us is a sounder "ethical base" for jurisprudence than considerations of utility—it being "easier to find the first than what is conductive to the happiness of the greatest number (or even the weal of the social organism)"—is original and innate in human nature. We are not, therefore, surprised to find that some of its manifestations are exceedingly primitive and "natural" (to animals as well as man).

"It is instinctive; we are born with a predisposition to it, the result of heredity. It appears early in children, who in play with each other show their sense of it; and of the innate feeling of 'mine' and 'thine,' which appears much earlier. Certain phrases mark the early appearance of the notion of natural rights, and of the law of equality of rights in certain cases, 'I have as good a right to it as you have,' 'as good a right to be here as you have,' etc. Again immediate anger at wrong or injury done to them shows the instinctive sense of justice and injustice. They feel that certain acts are just and 'fair,' the contrary ones wrong and unfair. The instinctive notion of property which appears in the child is seen in developed form in the school-boy. The bird's nest that he first discovers is 'his' and so are the young, and both by the right of the first 'occupant,'" etc., pages 380 and 381.

The "attempt to follow natural law," it is not altogether surprising to hear, "might produce temporary widespread misery and anarchy": "to avoid anarchy, the doctrine of natural law must then give way to utility"; in any case, it must be held subject to the lessons of history. In what way, then, can the historical method come to the aid of a jurisprudence based on "the law of nature"?

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"History shows what has always and everywhere been held as just, and which, as giving the long experience of our species, must now be considered as necessary."

Now for the person. "It is the historical method chiefly that teaches what *must be* and what has always and everywhere been, from universal and eternal (sic) experience. But it is the doctrine of natural law which shows what *ought* to be in general, in conformity with justice chiefly, but also with utility and necessity."

There is, therefore, "no necessary antagonism between the historical method and the theory of natural rights," and the result is that we are provided with a double-edged "weapon" in defence of "property" (which appears throughout to be a matter of great and not very discriminate concern to the author), for, "the doctrine of natural law" (after having deflected into a slight course of "perversion" in which it became "a weapon of attack on the richer classes") "is now the great defence of the natural rights of property, old as the world." The doctrine of natural law justifies private property as founded on natural rights, while the historical method shows it as a "universal and necessary" fact. Professor Graham has not indicated at what point "the moral sense or sense of justice" ceases to be merely natural, and what is involved in the transition, and, on the other hand, he has not shown us at what point the experience of the race is sufficient to make "what has been" the standard of "what must and will be," at what point "the sense of justice" which each of us has "as part of his moral nature" ceases to have any validity. Still less does he give any clear account of the ultimate standard by which a possible conflict of "principles" can or should be adjusted.

"History has always shown the necessity and universality of our present system of contract and property. Bentham has shown that both conduce to the general happiness, save as respects the law of inheritance, and that anarchy and chaos would result from the abolition of property; but the theory of natural law alone can show that property and contract conform in their essence to the principles of justice, though abuses may creep in, so that things have been made property that ought not to have been so made, and unjust contracts have been permitted and enforced which it should be the business of equity and wise and just legislation to correct."

Does not this passage (apart from the wonderful see-saw of

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points of view it suggests) show the futility of arguments directed to establish the justification of rights of "property" in the abstract. But Professor Graham's argument moves most freely in the region of general and absolute statements. Collectivists and communists are lumped together as persons desirous "at a bound apparently" to "abolish private property and inequality"; "it would not be easy," we are told, again, "to hold the belief in socialism and sociology simultaneously"; "a return to the primitive communism is so far from unthinkable that it is the goal of collectivists." Wholesale and question-begging statements of this kind are much too abundant in what purports to be an introduction to Political Science, unless Political Science is to be regarded, like so many other truths, as a closed revelation. For Professor Graham is not afraid even to suggest that finality has been reached, not only as to a condemnation of socialism, but as to the work of statesmen, savants and soldiers.

"We are perhaps within reasonable distance of the time when science will be complete, philosophy finished, and when 'the war-drum will throb no longer,' when in consequence neither the creative savant, original philosopher, nor the soldier of genius will be longer or even possible for want of sphere."

We are also nearing the issue "when Biblical criticism has said its last word." "We know all the possible directions within which progress or effort is possible," and apparently still more surely the directions within which it is "impossible." The kind of confident generalization and sweeping statement in which Professor Graham indulges only serves to discredit the cause which his book is designed, and in many ways admirably designed, to advance—the cause, that is, of reason and knowledge as applied to political problems. Apart from evidences of rough and hasty thinking, the book shows signs of haste in composition: clerical errors are too frequent, and the writing sometimes careless; the analytical table of contents is very useful, but it hardly excuses the absence of an index.

Professor Graham's book is so good that it might very well be much better, and it would have been much better if the author had been less disposed to regard his own "philosophy" on these subjects as "finished." But Professor Graham has really provided the best antidote to political dogmatism in the exposition he has given of "the greater English political thinkers"; and, whatever defects any "higher criticism" may find in the *apparatus criticus,*

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no one can fail to recognize the merit and the value of a book which is certainly the completest, as it is also the most convenient introduction to English political philosophy that exists.

SIDNEY BALL.

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A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO MODERN PHILOSOPHY. By Arthur Kenyan Rogers, Ph. D. New York: The Macmillan Company. Pp. viii., 360.

There can be little doubt that at the present time an introduction to philosophy is a desideratum. Anyone, therefore, who seeks to supply this need in philosophical literature should meet with a welcome not merely from teachers of philosophy or students beginning work in the subject, but from that wider public which finds philosophy more or less of an intellectual necessity.

It is the ostensible intention of Dr. Rogers in the volume before us to meet in some measure this want. Writing apparently as a teacher of philosophy and with a broad and living interest in its problems, he has, perhaps, the best equipment for such an undertaking. But it is not easy frankly to congratulate him either on his appreciation of the difficulties of his task or on the specific manner in which he has sought to carry it out. An introduction, no matter how brief, should primarily introduce. Dr. Rogers has throughout concentrated his attention mainly on criticism. A few representative problems and points of view, which have appeared in modern metaphysics (though certainly not for the first time in the history of philosophy) have been selected, and passed under a short critical review. But it is obvious that criticism deals with results, not with beginnings, leads away from what is discussed, and not up to it, as an introduction should. The author is so eager to bring forward objections and difficulties that he scarcely takes time to give a sufficient, not to say sympathetic, statement of the subject he wishes to discuss. The consequence is that he really presupposes on the part of the reader a knowledge of the ideas and principles he deals with, and even considerable insight into the meaning of the problems involved; and thus writes not so much for the philosophically uninitiated as for those who have already made some acquaintance with the subject.

To come to details. Any author is of course at liberty to

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conceive and to restrict the object-matter of which he treats as he chooses. But it may be doubted whether an introduction to modern philosophy which omits all direct reference to ethical, psychological and logical questions and problems, and confines attention solely to metaphysics (p. 19, 20), is made as valuable to the student as it might be, or is entitled to be called an introduction to philosophy and to *modern* philosophy in particular. What is of importance for such a purpose is rather a comprehensive statement of all that is embraced by modern philosophy, and a precise delimitation of its various parts.

On the other hand the subjects brought forward for discussion by Dr. Rogers are sufficiently central to justify the prominence which the author assigns to them. After an introductory chapter, where he seeks to state the aim of philosophy, a chapter which is somewhat vague and confused, both in thought and statement, the author takes up as the first problem of metaphysics, the first approach to the inquiry into "the fundamental nature of reality, of the universe in which we live," the distinction and the relation between mind and matter. A very brief analysis on traditional lines of the empirical concept "thing" (which is apparently taken, with doubtful reason, as the type of what is meant by "matter"), and of the notion of self leads to the question of the nature of the relation subsisting between them. Here three views are dealt with, Dualism, Pantheism and Theism. The author criticises these modes of explanation quite generally, without distinguishing the various forms in which they have appeared. The various modes of explaining the unity of matter and mind are successively passed in review and rejected by a criticism which is far too brief to be convincing. One peculiarity of the author's method of criticism which is discoverable at intervals throughout the book, appears here in the course of his argument and may be mentioned in passing. So eager is the author to urge difficulties and objections to the views discussed, that he does not scruple in the case of one doctrine to point a criticism which assumes the truth of some principle whose worth he nevertheless deliberately questions whenever it suits the purposes of his criticism of another doctrine to do so. In the present chapter, for instance, he questions the necessity of the principle of causation at one point (p. 55), and soon thereafter (p. 57) argues with the scientist that to doubt the supremacy of causation is to imperil the whole fabric of scientific knowledge. Such a *modus disputandi* makes it diffi-

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cult to determine where our author stands; it is suggestive rather of a stage duel than of a genuine combat.

After deciding that none of the above three forms of explaining the unity of matter and mind are tenable, the author passes in the next chapter to consider two other modes of uniting their apparent heterogeneity, both of which proceed by explaining away, or explaining one in terms of the other. These are Materialism and Subjective Idealism. A very inadequate reference to the relations of mechanism and teleology forms the bridge between the two chapters. The argument in this chapter is a striking instance of the author's method of criticism above noted. After pointing out that the scientist is necessarily a materialist (p. 64), and that it is the natural consequence of his view to reduce all phenomena to matter and motion, the author finally refutes materialism by showing that after all the very basis of the materialistic view is the principle of consciousness, that the materialistic construction of the world is a thought-product (p. 73-5), and that thus materialism, when it understands itself properly, should become idealism, more particularly subjective idealism (p. 76). But in the short discussion of this latter view, the main objection to it rests just on the substantial truth of the scientific (*i. e.,* materialistic) position (p. 82-3).

Materialism and Subjective Idealism having in turn both been found wanting, the author thinks that in order to come to a clearer view of the nature of reality we are compelled to leave this attempt to solve the problem by means of the ultimate facts, matter or mind, and must rather examine first of all the nature of knowledge itself. The inquiry "shifts from ontology or cosmology to epistemology" (p. 88). The problem of knowledge thus forms the subject-matter of his fourth discussion and is dealt with in the succeeding four chapters on "Rationalism and Sensationalism," "Kant," "Hegel," and "Agnosticism." It is perhaps necessary to protest in passing against the somewhat loose way in which the author regards epistemology and ontology as both answering the same question (p. 18, 19). He seems to suppose that in passing from ontology in the preceding chapters to epistemology he is still dealing with the same subject-matter. This is surely erroneous.

The position of rationalism is not clearly stated; it is even (p. 100) identified with the doctrine of innate ideas. It is treated as antithetic to the position of sensationalism, both being found

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defective when taken separately. The argument follows the historical evolution of the theory of knowledge, through Kant and the idealistic and agnostic developments of his principle. It is unfortunately impossible in this JOURNAL to go into the details of the argument and criticisms contained in these chapters. But, to take isolated statements, we must point out that the existence of things in themselves, is not, as the author supposes (p. 155), identical for Kant with the external reference in knowledge. The author's statement, too, on p. 251-2 would lead one to believe that he is unacquainted with the Critique of Judgment, where precisely the same view is put forward by Kant himself which the author seeks to use to improve on Kant! Again, both in the case of Kant and of Hegel, the author is quite mistaken in limiting their positions to what is purely or primarily individualistic, subjective. It is impossible to read without some astonishment that "Hegel's philosophy is an acute and valuable psychology of the individual and of society, not a science of the universe."

All the views in these four chapters on epistemology are rejected, agnosticism included, the criticism of which is suggestive, though too short and wandering in statement to be effective. After this consistently negative attitude to all the positions hitherto brought forward, we look with some expectancy for the author's own positive views. These we are left to gather from the last two chapters, entitled "Theistic Idealism" and "Scepticism and the Criterion of Truth." There is no essential connection between the contents of these chapters; the former gives in the barest outline a general metaphysical point of view; the latter the conditions under which a philosophical theory can be accepted as valid.

The author holds that "in idealism of some sort is alone to be found a solution whose failure is not a foregone conclusion." The essential character of idealism is that ultimate reality is conceived "after the analogy of conscious life" (p. 269). For knowledge itself, it is necessary that the sensational (objective) element in experience should have the power to stand for something "similar to" active conscious life (p. 271); ultimate existence to be known must be "of a nature resembling in some degree our own conscious life." Hence objects are looked at as elements in absolute consciousness, in God's life, are foci of God's purposes, whose nature is to be determined by the part they play in the

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"intelligent purposive life which makes up the absolute." Conscious beings, because essentially active (p. 290-1), have their reality in the function they fulfill in the life of the Absolute, and in virtue of that function (which is seen clearest in social life) they can be at once dependent on the absolute and yet distinct from it. The author has not elaborated this view in detail, which makes it hardly fair or possible to criticise it. It is his own position in a book which is a guide to modern philosophy in general. By so doing he merely brings forward another theory (if theory it can be called), to which as many objections could be raised as to those he has attacked. This, indeed, the author practically admits when in the next chapter he declares that "no philosophical theory is . . . fitted to carry conviction to every mind;" and such vague terms as "life," "resemblance" or "analogy" between our conscious life and that of ultimate reality, make it sufficiently difficult for his own view to carry conviction.

The last chapter is a rather tangled piece of argument, from which it is hardly possible to obtain a definite result of much value. It is nominally an attempt to determine the criterion or criteria of truth by means of which we may avoid scepticism. The test is taken at one point to be "consonancy with experience as a concrete whole" (p. 320). "Experience as a whole" is at one time equivalent to all the facts we know (p. 322), at another to the "concrete whole of reality," which is "only taken as it stands" (p. 323). At one time he says that "if reality were a purely intellectual affair" consistency would be quite sufficient to test the truth of a theory (p. 323); at another (328 ff.) we find it is only for "practical purposes" that the test of consistency can hold, theoretically we cannot rest satisfied with it. Setting aside the difficulty of applying the test of "experience as a whole," which probably means the same to the author as the ideal of knowledge, we are furnished later on with another test of truth. This is practical "experiment." Which is to be the ultimate test is "only a matter of our point of view." Experiment theoretically "implies the test of consistency," "consistency is the ultimate criterion" (p. 331); but later on (p. 333 ff.) he proceeds to show that "experiment may be said to be more ultimate than intellectual consistency." We may note in passing that the author is obviously wrong in describing experiment as a test of truth at all; it is a means of attaining knowledge, not a formal characteristic of the ideal of knowledge.

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Again, to test the truth of a philosophical theory we must "apply it to life" (p. 338 ff.). The purpose of thought is practice; a philosophical theory is a hypothesis for life to act on. Hence action is the test of a theory of life and not consistency. But "action" is not "experiment" (p. 360); the test of a practical hypothesis by action and an intellectual hypothesis by experiment are altogether different (ibid.). Yet later on (p. 365-6), we cannot make any real separation between them, though the "distinction" remains. Again, the intellectual is said (p. 363) to presuppose the moral; but on p. 366 we find that intellectual knowledge is the absolute presupposition of moral action. Such contradictory statements make it quite impossible to derive from his argument a positive conclusion. All truth, we are finally told (p. 349), is at best "a more or less probable hypothesis," and it is suggested that we should "give up an ideal of certainty," for "might not a life of certainty be a rather stupid life?" The ultimate test of a philosophical theory is simply the "progressive experience of living;" "we find out the meaning of life by living, not by merely reasoning about it" (p. 352-3). Would the author find out the meaning of sleep by sleeping, or of digestion by taking food? Does it not strike him that to take up a position like this is to commit his library to the flames? It is doubtless true, as Fichte says, that philosophy is not life, but it is no less true that life is not philosophy.

The last chapter particularly, and parts of the book as a whole, seem to have been hurriedly written, and indefiniteness and vagueness of expression have taken the place of pointed statement. This has seriously affected the author's exposition of views which are in many ways freshly conceived and could easily have been made more effective and convincing.

J. B. Baillie.

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The Scientific Basis of Morality. By G. Gore, LL. D. F. R. S. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1899. Pp. vi., 576.

The object of this lengthy book is "to place the subject of human conduct upon a comprehensive scientific basis and supply a rational want—to show that the entire conduct of man, physical, mental and moral, is based upon a scientific foundation; to make clear the truth that the great powers and laws of science are the

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chief guides of life; to show that universal energy acting according to law is the true 'divine' power governing physical, moral, social, and religious conduct; and to illustrate the influence of science upon the material, mental and moral progress of mankind." It is written "largely for the future—in advance of its time—for those whose minds are in a fit condition to receive scientific truth." Who these superior persons are is in no wise made clear by the contents of the treatise, but their conception of what constitutes a "rational want" (if this book satisfies it) must be a curiously strange one. The absence of reasoning, in any ordinary acceptation of the term, is indeed the chief characteristic of the whole work. The one thesis is obvious enough, viz., that all mental, social, or moral phenomena are direct products of "natural" causes. By "natural" is meant "physical" or "material," as opposed to supernatural, spiritualist, idealist, or theological (all these words being synonymous to Dr. Gore). The support of this thesis, on the other hand, will be sought for in vain. Neither the book as a whole, nor any single chapter, nor isolated paragraph, scarcely even any two consecutive sentences, show that logical dependence which the ordinary man understands by the term "reasoning." The book is amorphous—an incoherent aggregate of disjointed remarks without any structure or connection, interspersed with poetical quotations which are equally irrelevant to the context in which they appear.

Criticism under such circumstances becomes hopeless, but some attempt to show how Dr. Gore deals with the great problems upon which he touches is perhaps necessary. The first chapter opens with the statement, "Facts are Truths; they are the foundation of all knowledge and even mathematical formulæ must be made to agree with them." Thus comfortably seated upon the throne of science, free "from the conceit of the metaphysician and the theological gnostic," Dr. Gore proceeds to demonstrate how moral or religious truths (so-called) are really cases of the working of energy acting according to law. "The fundamental rule of righteousness, that we should do unto others as we would have them do unto us under like circumstances, is evidently based upon the principle of causation, viz., that the same cause always produces the same effect under the same circumstances, for if it could not be depended upon in all cases, the rule based upon it could not be fully trusted" (p. 2). "According to the law of causation, whatever is, must be, and this is true of all things living or dead.

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We all do as we must, *i. e.*, as we are caused. Starvation compels a man to steal, and the necessity of protecting our property compels us to punish him" (p. 118). "Men are much better pacified when they have done wrong, by telling them they did as they must under the circumstances, than by unconditionally blaming them" (p. 44). "With regard to the biblical statement that 'man was created in the image of God,' the explanation afforded by science and its principle of evolution is, that the brain of man has been gradually developed by the impressions made by Nature upon it, until his mind has largely become an image of the universe, and, therefore, of the omnipotent powers and laws which govern it" (p. 183). "It is very flattering to man to be told that he is 'the lord of all creation'; that 'the value of a human soul is infinite'; that 'Thou hast made him a little lower than the angels,' etc., etc., etc.; but these statements have been shown to be without proper and sufficient evidence. Nevertheless, there was some justification for the statements being made, and that was because the great energies of Nature, acting through surrounding conditions upon men, compelled them to believe and assert them" (p. 184). "That the human brain and mind are subject to all the chief energies and principles of science does not admit of doubt. Every change of mind requires time and the brain occupies space. Rapid talkers are rarely profound thinkers; some deep thinkers are very slow of speech; according to Swift, Sir Isaac Newton was very slow in answering a question" (p. 267). "Freedom of will is only a particular instance of a general truth, viz., that all bodies whatever, under certain conditions, are free to act in certain ways and within certain limits, but not in others, and are not only free to act, but are compelled to do so" (p. 331). "Accuracy [as a criterion of truth] is not a sufficient proof of certainty unless the fact stated, or the thing or action measured, is itself certain; we must possess a thing, or know a fact or action, before we can measure it" (p. 442). "'Man doth not live by bread alone' (Deut. viii.; St. Matt. iv.); we all eat earth and grass second-hand through the medium of edible animals and plants. The chief essential conditions of human existence are air, food, water, clothing; in addition, heat and light, exercise, sleep, a dwelling, a variety of food and of physical and mental occupation. Dead food becomes living men" (p. 208). "The answer to the question 'why does man exist?' is very simple, and is included in the vastly greater one, 'why does

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anything exist?' it is manifestly because the operations of the energies of Nature, under the particular group of conditions, compel it, just in the same way that they cause everything else to happen; there is, therefore, no special peculiarity in the process in his case" (Ibid).

The above quotations—taken haphazard, not carefully selected—are typical of the whole treatise. They are not statements of conclusions, but are the actual arguments themselves. The concluding sentences (p. 576) of the final chapter will equally well illustrate the writer's curious conception of logical cogency or sequence. He has just stated in ten propositions the conclusions of his reasoning, and adds as follows: "As a matter of course, if the first of the above conclusions is untrue, all those dependent upon it are invalid.

'Great is the art of beginning, but greater the art is of ending;
Many a poem is marred by a superfluous verse.'
—*Longfellow.*"

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Lincoln College, Oxford.

Outline of Practical Sociology, With Special Reference to American Conditions. By Carroll D. Wright, LL. D. American Citizen Series. New York and London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1899. Pp. xxv., 431.

Whatever comes from the pen of the United States' Commissioner of Labor is of importance. The present work is a gold mine of practical information for students in the sphere of ethics or sociology. The title is somewhat misleading and therefore unfortunate. The author may not have been responsible for this. The work is not really an "outline" of any subject, but rather a series of most valuable miscellaneous essays on various practical themes in the general sphere of sociology, and contains a valuable "Reference Library." In the list of works dealing with the whole science of Sociology one cannot help regretting that there is no translation into English from the German of the great treatise by Schäffle, so that it might be included in this list along with "The Principles of Sociology," by Herbert Spencer.

Each of the chapters in this volume by Mr. Wright covers the material for a volume by itself. It were better to read only one of

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these essays at a time, as they are packed with figures which become bewildering if one's head is too crowded with them at any one time. The chief value of such a work, after all, is in the splendid discipline it must give as a training for those who have to deal with figures or statistics. The material here is presented by a master hand. Some of the facts brought out are especially interesting where the statistics contradict popular impressions. This is noticeable, for example, in relation to the subject of marriage. At this point Mr. Wright overthrows a popular delusion by showing that according to figures the number of marriages is not growing less. One is also very much impressed with the figures he presents concerning the occupations of women, to be found in Chapter XII., dealing with the general subject, "Employment of Women and Children." It is positively startling to see the change which took place between the years 1870 and 1890 in the United States. As an illustration we note the fact that the number of women teachers had increased almost three-fold in that interval, from 84,000 to 246,000. So, too, it is curious to see the new occupations women are entering. The author calls attention to the fact that in 1890, one hundred and twenty-four women were engaged as "engineers and surveyors," while none were so employed in 1870. Our chief interest centers, however, in what the writer has to say concerning cities and city life, as this is the burning problem which must confront the next century. Among the various tables or series of figures he gives dealing with this subject, one of the most striking is that giving "constituents of the population of the great cities in 1890." We are surprised to learn, if we have not investigated the facts before, that such cities as Omaha, Denver and Kansas City, in the great West, where the population is supposed to be so new, actually head the list in the proportion of population of native-born parentage; while a number of the older Eastern cities are falling into the background on this score and seemingly becoming less and less representative of the early America. The value of such essays is very great for the student in ethics. Without such facts as we have here presented in magnificent array in this volume, the theorist is liable to be "talking in the air" in regard to the problems he is working out. We are certainly very grateful to Mr. Wright for the stimulus he gives, by this means, to those who are working at the great practical problem of ethics.

Walter L. Sheldon.

St. Louis, Mo.

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CHRISTIAN MYSTICISM. By William Ralph Inge, M. A., Fellow and Tutor of Hertford College, Oxford. (Bampton Lectures, 1899.) London: Methuen & Co., 1899. Pp. xvi., 372. 12s. 6d. net.

"As a type of religion," says Mr. Inge, "mysticism seems to rest on the following propositions, or articles of faith: First, the soul (as well as the body) can see and perceive. . . . . The second proposition is that, since we can only know what is clear to ourselves, man in order to know God must be a partaker of the Divine nature." Thirdly, "Without holiness no man may see the Lord. . . . . Sensuality and selfishness are absolute disqualifications for knowing 'the things of the Spirit of God.'" Further, "there is one more fundamental doctrine . . . our guide on the upward path, the true hierophant of the mysteries of God, is love" (pp. 6-8).

We are not told whether a system which rejected the third principle would be improperly called mystic, or whether it would only not be mysticism "as a type of religion." Nor does Mr. Inge say anything of a principle which is sometimes held to be of the essence of mysticism—the *immediacy* of the consciousness of reality. (This characteristic of mysticism is admirably brought out by Dr. Royce in "The World and the Individual.")

To attempt to summarize a book which is crowded with interesting accounts of the most fascinating speculations, would be useless. It can be recommended as combining a wide range of information with real sympathy for the subject. Where so much is given it seems unreasonable to ask for more. And yet I cannot refrain from regretting that the author did not find room for a comparison and contrast of Christian Mysticism with non-Christian systems. To say nothing of the Orientals, there is Spinoza. And it would have been interesting to know what Mr. Inge thinks of the mystical elements in Hegel's system. The existence of some such elements can scarcely be denied when we consider that the Absolute Idea transcends the categories of cognition and volition.

Mr. Inge does not confine himself to exposition, but criticises freely. The basis of much of this criticism, as is only natural in lectures on the Bampton foundation, is frankly dogmatic. Thus we read, "Even if, with the school of Antioch and most of the later commentators, we transfer the words ὃ γέγονεν to the preceding sentence, the doctrine that Christ is the life as well as the light of the world can be proved from St. John" (p. 47).

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One or two remarks on philosophical points invite notice. The author seems to ignore an important distinction when he says: "True Pantheism must mean the identification of God with the totality of existence, the doctrine that the universe is the complete and only expression of the nature and life of God, who on this theory is only immanent and not transcendent. On this view, everything in the world belongs to the Being of God who is manifested equally in everything. Whatever is real is perfect: reality and perfection are the same thing" (p. 117). It is no doubt true that many pantheists would hold that God is manifested equally in everything. But many others would reject this view. It is quite possible to hold that the universe is the complete and only expression of the nature of God, and yet to believe that nature is unequally manifested in different things. God is the only reality, but then the reality of finite things may be a matter of degree, and therefore God may be more or less in them. I conceive that this is Mr. Bradley's position (except for the use of the word God), and I believe that Hegel's is the same, though the point is no doubt obscure.

Occasionally Mr. Inge disposes rather too parenthetically of difficulties which merit more elaborate treatment if they are to be touched at all. Thus he says that "an irrational universe" is "the one thing which a rational man cannot believe in" (p. 9). Did Hume believe the universe to be rational, or was he not a rational man? Perhaps he ought, in consistency, to have believed in the rationality of the universe. But he certainly did not. And if he was not a rational man, where should we find one—unless we should claim the privilege of defining rationality as equivalent to idealistic, in which case Mr. Inge's epigram might be blamed as tautological.

And again, "the basis of the belief in future judgment is that deep conviction of the rationality of the world-order, or, in religious language, of the wisdom and justice of God, which we cannot and will not surrender. It is authenticated by an instinctive assurance which is strongest in the strongest minds" (p. 54). And yet it was entirely wanting in Spinoza, in Hume, in Clifford. Were their minds so weak? Appeals to authority in philosophy are never justified, for the authorities are always divided.

But all these are very small points in a most valuable book.

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THE SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY OF RODBERTUS. By E. C. K. Gonner M.A., Brunner Professor of Economic Science at University College, Liverpool. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1899. Pp. xxi., 209.

Professor Gonner attempts to expound and at the same time to criticize the Social Philosophy of Rodbertus; if this task was worth doing, undoubtedly Professor Gonner has done it well. The book is well written, the exposition is clear, the criticisms well founded; but is there much value in expounding and trying to patch up a system which is wrong? In the cant phrase of the day we talk of an author as being "suggestive" or "stimulating" when we want to praise his theory and yet know that he is wrong. Rodbertus is suggestive and stimulating. To Rodbertus we owe much of the nonsense that is written about society being an organism, about its inward meaning, and what not. A biological metaphor cannot solve a difficulty, and affords but a poor excuse or substitute for careful thought and inquiry. The kernel of any system of economics is its theory of value. Rodbertus's theory of value is wrong. In his day Rodbertus was useful, at the present time he is merely interesting. The influence of Rodbertus in Germany has undoubtedly been great; in England his influence has been very small. Students to whom Rodbertus is but a name will learn from this book not only what Rodbertus' system is, but also the essential points in which it is wrong.

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